we understand God himself. I know, fome divines difcover great myfteries in thefe terms, and tell us that there are fome paffages in fcripture where the word presence means the fecond perfou in the moft holy Trinity, and where the term spirit is certainly to be underfood of the third. But as there are fome paffages where thefe terms have not this fignification, it is beyond all doubt that this, which we are explaining, is precifely of the latter kind. However, if any difpute our comment, we fhall leave them to difpute it; for it would be unjust to confume that time, which is dedicated to the edification of a whole congregation, in refuting a particular opinion. The other expreffions in our text, heaven, bell; the wings of the morning, a figurative expreffion, denoting the rapidity of the light in communicating itself from one end of the world to the other; thefe expreffions, I fay, need no comment. The presence of God, the spirit of God, fignify then the divine effence; and this affemblage of ideas, whither shall I go from thy spir it ? whither shall I flee from thy presence ? means, that God is immenfe, and that he is pref ent in every place.

But wherein confifts this immenfity and omniprefence? If ever a queftion required developing, this certainly does not only because it pres fents to the mind an abstract subject, which does not fall under the obfervation of the fenfes, but becaufe. fe many who have treated this matter, (pardon an opinion which does not proceed from a defire of oppofing any individual, but only from a love to the truth) many who have handled the fubject, have contributed more to perplex, than to explain it. We may obferve, in general, that, unlefs we be wholly unacquainted with the hiftory of the sciences, it is impoffible not to acknowledge, that all questions about the nature of fpirits, all that are any way related to metaphyf

ics, were very little understood before the time of that celebrated philofopher, whom God feems to have beflowed on the world to purify reafon, as he had fome time before raifed up others to purify religion.*

What heaps of crude and indigefted notions do we find, among the fchoolmen, of the immenfity of God? One faid, God was a point, indivisible indeed, but a point, however, that had the peculiar property of occupying every part of the univerfe. Another, that God was the place of all beings, the immenfe extent in which his power had placed them. Another, that his ef fence was really in heaven, but yet, repletively, as they exprefs it, in every part of the univerfe In fhort, this truth hath been obfcured by the groffeft ignorance. Whatever averfion we have to the decifive tone, we will venture to affirm, that people, who talked in this manner of God, had no ideas themselves of what they advanced.

Do not be afraid of our conducting you into thefe wild mazes; do not imagine that we will bufy ourfelves in expofing all these notions, for the fake of labouring to refute them. We will content ourselves with giving you fome light into the omniprefence of God:

I. By removing thofe falfe ideas, which, at fire, feem to prefent themielves to the imagination ge

"11: By affigning the true. Poul de

I. Let us remove the falle ideas, which, at firit, prefent themfelves to the imagination; as if, when we fay that God is prefent in any place, we mean that he is actually contained therein; as if, when we say that God is in every place, we mean to affign to him a real and proper extenfion.

P

The philofopher intended by Mr. S. I fuppofe, is his countryman Descartes, born in 1596. Vie de Defe par Baillet.

fion. Neither of these is defigned; and to remove thefe ideas, my brethren, two reflections. are fufficient.

God is a fpirit. A spirit cannot be in a place, at least in the manner in which we conceive of place.

1. God is a fpirit. What relation can you find between wifdom, power, mercy, and all the other attributes, which enter into your notion of the divinity, and the nature of bodies? Pulver. ize matter, give it all the different forms of which it is fufceptible, elevate it to its highest degree of attainment, make it vaft and immenfe, moderate or fmall, luminous or obfcure, opaque or transparent: there will never refult any thing but figures, and never will you be able, by all thefe combinations or divificns, to produce one> fingle fentiment, one fingle thought, like that of the meanest and most contracted of all: mankind. If matter then cannot be the subject of one fingle operation of the foul of a mechanic, how fhall it be the subject of those attributes which make the effence of God himself?

But perhaps God, who is fpiritual in one part! of his effence, may be corporéal in another part, like man, who, although he hath a spiritual foul, is yet united to a portion of matter. No for, however admirable in man that union of fpiritual and fenfible may be, and thofe laws which unite à his foul to his body, nothing more fully marks { his weakness and dependence, and confequently r nothing can lefs agree with the divine effence. Is it not a mark of the dependence of an immor- ? tal and intelligent foul, to be enveloped in a lit tle flesh and blood, which, according to their different motions, determine his joy or forrow, his happiness or mifery? Is it not a mark of the weakness of our fpirits, to have the power of acting only on that little matter to which we are united, and to have no power over more? Who

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can

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can imagine that God hath fuch limits? hath no body he is united to none; yet he is united to all. That celebrated philofopher, shall I call him? or atheist,* who aid that the affemblage of all existence constituted the divine effence, who would have us confider all corporeal beings as the body of the divinity, published a great extravagance, if he meant that the divine effence confifted of this affemblage. But there is a very juft fenfe, in which it may be faid that the whole univerfe is the body of the Deity. In effect, as I call this portion of matter my body, which I move, act, and direct as I pleafe, fo God actuates by his will every part of the univerfe he obfcures the fun, he calms the winds, he commands the fea. But this very notion excludes all corporiety from God, and proves that God is a fpirit. If God fometimes reprefents himfelt with feet, with hands, with eyes, he means in thefe portraits, rather to give us emblems of his attributes, than images (properly Speaking) of any parts which he paffeffeth. Therefore, when he attributes thefe to himself, ̈ he gives them fo vaft an extent, that we eafily perceive they are not to be grofsly understood. Hath he hands? they are hands which weigh the mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance, which measure the waters in the hollow of his band, and mete out the beavens with a span, Ifa. Ix. 12. Hath he eyes? they are eyes that penetrate the most unmeasurable distances. Hath he feet? they are feet which reach from heaven to earth, for the heaven is his throne, and the earth is his footstool, ch. lxvi. 1. Hath he a voice? it is as the sound of many qaters, break. ing the cecars of Lebanon, making mount Sirion

skip

Mr. S. means, I fhould fuppofe, Spinoza; whofe fyftem of atheifm, fays a fenfible writer, is more grofs, and therefore lefs dangerous, than others; his poifer carrying its antidote with it.

skip like an unicorn and the binds to calve, Pfal. xxix. 3, 5, 6, 9.′

This reminds me of a beautiful paffage in Plato. He fays that the gods, particularly the chief god, the ineffable beauty, as he calls him, cannot be conceived of but by the understanding only, and by quitting fenfible objects; that, in order to contemplate the divinity, terrestrial ideas must be furmounted; that the eyes cannot fee him; that the ears cannot hear him. A thought which Julian the apoftate, a great admirer of that philofopher, fo nobly expreffes in his fatise on the Cæfars. Thus everything ferves to establish our first principle, that God is a fpirit.

2. But to prove that God is a fpirit, and to prove that he occupies no place, at least as our imagination conceives, is, in our opinion, to eftablish the fame thefis.

I know how difficult it is to make this confequence intelligible and clear, not only to thofe who have never been accustomed to meditation, and who are therefore more excufable for having confused ideas; but even to fuch as, having cultivated the fciences, are moft intent on refining their ideas. I freely acknowledge, that after we have used our utmost efforts to rife above fenfe and matter, it will be extremely difficult to conceive the existence of a fpirit, without conceiving it in a certain place. Yet, I think, whatever difficulty there may be in the fyftem of thofe who maintain that an immaterial being cannot be in a place, properly fo called, there are greater difficulties till in the oppofite opinion: for, what is immaterial hath no parts; what hath no parts hath no form; what hath no form hath no extenfion; what hath no extenfion can have no fituation in place, properly fo called. For what is it to be in place? is it not to fill fpace? is it not to be adjufted with furrounding

bodies?