An Inquiry Into the Human Mind, on the Principles of Common Sense

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R. Tullis, 1823 - 263 pages

An Inquiry into the Human Mind, On the Principles of Common Sense by Thomas Reid, first published in 1819, is a rare manuscript, the original residing in one of the great libraries of the world. This book is a reproduction of that original, which has been scanned and cleaned by state-of-the-art publishing tools for better readability and enhanced appreciation.

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Page 8 - The labyrinth may be too intricate, and the thread too fine, to be traced through all its windings; but if we stop where we can trace it no farther, and secure the ground we have gained, there is no harm done; a 30 quicker eye may in time trace it farther.
Page 13 - Philosophy, (if I may be permitted to change the metaphor) has no other root but the principles of Common Sense ; it grows out of them and draws its nourishment from them; severed from this root its honours wither, its sap is dried up, it dies and rots.
Page 285 - The wise and beneficent Author of nature, who intended that we should be social creatures, and that we should receive the greatest and most important part of our knowledge by the information of others, hath, for these purposes, implanted in our natures two principles that tally with each other. [The first of these principles is, a propensity to speak truth, and to use the signs of language, so as to convey our real sentiments...
Page 37 - ... hot, nor snow cold, nor honey sweet; and, in a word, that heat and cold, sound, colour, taste, and smell, are nothing but ideas or impressions. Bishop Berkeley advanced them a step higher, and found out, by just reasoning, from the same principles, that extension, solidity, space, figure, and body, are ideas, and that there is nothing in nature but ideas and spirits. But the triumph of ideas was completed by the Treatise of human nature, which discards spirits also, and leaves ideas and impressions...
Page 81 - ... I grasp a ball in my hand, I perceive it at once hard, figured, and extended. The feeling is very simple, and hath not the least resemblance to any quality of body. Yet it suggests to us three primary qualities perfectly distinct from one another, as well as from the sensation which indicates them. When 'I move my hand along the table, the feeling is so simple, that I find it difficult to distinguish it into things of different natures ; yet it immediately suggests hardness, smoothness, extension,...
Page 121 - ... colours, as apprehended by the imagination, are only ideas in the mind, and not qualities that have any existence in matter. As this is a truth which has been proved incontestably by many modern philosophers, and is indeed one of the finest speculations in that science, if the English reader would see the notion explained at large, he may find it in the eighth chapter of the second book of Mr. Locke's Essay on Human Understanding.
Page 67 - ... mind or sentient being ; but more frequently they signify a quality in bodies, which, by the laws of nature, occasions the sensations of heat and cold in us ; a quality which, though connected by custom so closely with the sensation that we cannot without difficulty separate them, yet hath not the least resemblance to it, and may continue to exist when there is no sensation at all. " The sensations of heat and cold are perfectly known, for they neither are, nor can be...
Page 121 - I have here supposed that my reader is acquainted with that great modern discovery, which is at present universally acknowledged by all the inquirers into natural philosophy: namely, that light and colours, as apprehended by the imagination, are only ideas in the mind, and not qualities that have any existence in matter.
Page 21 - A traveller of good judgment may mistake his way, and be unawares led into a wrong track; and while the road is fair before him, he may go on without suspicion and be followed by others; but, when it ends in a coal-pit, it requires no great judgment to know that he hath gone wrong, nor perhaps to find out what misled him.
Page 35 - If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life...

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