and therefore not improperly called Senfe; and acting in a fimilar manner upon all mankind, and therefore properly called Common Senfe. It is in this fignification that the term Common Senfe is used in the prefent inquiry.

That there is a real and effential difference between thefe two faculties; that common fenfe cannot be accounted for, by being called the perfection of reason, nor reason, by being refolved into common sense, will perhaps appear from the following remarks. 1. We are conscious, from internal feeling, that the energy of understanding which perceives intuitive truth, is different from that other energy which unites a conclufion with a first principle, by a gradual chain of intermediate relations. We believe the truth of an investigated conclufion, because we can affign a reason for our belief; we believe an intuitive principle, without being able to affign any other reason but this, that we know it to be true; or that the law of our nature, or the conftitution of the human understanding, determines us to believe it. 2. We cannot difcern any necessary connection between reafon and common sense: they are indeed generally connected; but we can conceive a being endued with the one who is deftitute of the other. Nay, we often find, that this is in fact the cafe. In dreams, we fometimes reafon without common fenfe. Through a defect of common fenfe, we adopt abfurd principles; but fuppofing our principles true, our reasoning is often unexceptionable. The fame thing may be observed in certain kinds of madness. A man who believes himself made of glafs, fhall yet reafon very justly concerning the means of preserving his supposed brittleness from flaws and fractures. It deserves also to be remarked, that a distinction fimilar to the present is acknowledged by the vulgar, who speak of mother-wit as fomething different from the deductions of reason, and the refinements of fcience. When puzzled with argument, they have recourfe to their common fenfe, and acquiefce

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acquiefce in it fo fteadily, as to render all the arts of the logician ineffectual, I am confuted, but not convinced," is an apology fometimes offered, when one has nothing to oppofe to the arguments of the antagonist, but the original undisguised feelings of his own mind. This apology is indeed very inconfiftent with the dignity of philofophic pride; which, taking for granted that nothing exceeds the limits of human capacity, profeffes to confute whatever it cannot believe, and, which is ftill more difficult, to believe whatever it cannot confute: but this apology may be perfectly confiftent with fincerity and candour; and with that principle of which Pope fays, that "though no fcience it is "fairly worth the seven."

Thus far I have endeavoured to diftinguish those two powers of our rational nature, to which I give the names Reafon and Common Senfe. Their connection and mutual dependence, and the extent of their respective jurifdictions, I now proceed more particularly to investigate. -I ought perhaps to make an apology for these, and fome other metaphorical expreffions. And indeed it were to be wifhed, that in all matters of fcience, they could be laid afide; for the indifcreet ufe of metaphor has done great harm, by leading philofophers to mistake verbal analogies for real ones; and often, too, by giving plaufibility to nonfenfe, as well as by disguising very plain doctrines with an affected pomp of high-founding words and gaudy images. But in the philofophy of the human mind, it is impoffible to keep clear of metaphor; because we cannot speak intelligibly of immaterial things, without continual allufions to matter, and its qualities. All I need to fay further on this head is, that I mean not by these metaphors to impose upon the reader; and that I fhall do my utmost to prevent their imposing upon myself.

It is strange to obferve, with what reluctance fome people acknowledge the of instinct. That man is governed by reapower fon,

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fon, and the brutes by inftinct, is a favourite topic with certain philofophers; who, like other froward children, fpurn the hand that leads them; and defire, above all things, to be left at their own difpofal. Were this boast founded on truth, it might be supposed to mean little more, than that man is governed by himfelf, and the brutes by their Maker *. But, luckily for man, it is not founded in truth, but in ignorance and inattention. Our instincts, as well as our rational powers, are far fuperior, both in number and dignity, to those which the brutes enjoy; and it were well for us, on many occafions, if we laid our fyftems a

fide, and were more attentive to these impulfes of nature wherein reason has no part. Far be it from me to speak with disrespect of any of the gifts of God; every work of his is good; but the best things, when abused, may become pernicious. Reason is a a noble faculty, and, when kept within its proper fphere, and applied to useful purposes, proves a means of exalting human creatures almost to the rank of superior beings. But this faculty has been much perverted, often to vile, and often to infignificant purposes; fometimes chained like a flave or malefactor, and fometimes foaring in forbidden and unknown regions. No wonder, then, if it has been frequently made the instrument of seducing and bewildering mankind, and of rendering philofophy contemptible.

In the science of body, glorious discoveries have been made by a right use of reafon. When men are once fatisfied to take things as they find them; when they believe Nature upon her bare declaration, without fufpecting her of any defign to impose upon

And Reafon raife o'er Inftinct as you can,
In this 'tis God directs, in that 'tis man.

Pope's Efay on Man, Ep. 3. ver. 99.

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them; when their utmost ambition is to be her fervants and interpreters; then, and not till then, will philofophy profper. But of those who have applied themselves to the fcience of human nature, it may truly be faid, (of many of them at least), that too much reasoning hath made them mad. Nature speaks to us. by our external, as well as by our internal, fenfes; it is ftrange,. that we should believe her in the one cafe, and not in the other; it is most strange, that fuppofing her fallacious, we should think ourfelves capable of detecting the cheat. Common sense tells me, that the ground on which I stand is hard, material, and folid, and has a real, feparate, independent existence. BERKELEY and HUME tell me, that I am imposed upon in this matter: for that the ground under my feet is really an idea in my mind; that its very effence confists in being perceived; and that the fame instant it ceases to be perceived, it must also cease to exist : in a word, that to be, and to be perceived, when predicated of the ground, the fun, the starry heavens, or any corporeal object, fignify precifely the fame thing. Now, if my common fenfe be mistaken, who shall ascertain and correct the mistake? Our reafon, it is faid. Are then the inferences of reason in this instance clearer, and more decifive, than the dictates of common fense? By no means: I ftill truft to my common fenfe as before; and I feel that I must do so. But fuppofing the inferences of the one faculty as clear and decifive as the dictates of the other; yet who will affure me, that my reason is less liable to mistake than my common sense? And if reason be mistaken, what shall we say? Is this mistake to be rectified by a fecond reasoning, as liable to mistake as the first ?— In a word, we must deny the distinction between truth and falfehood, adopt univerfal fcepticism, and wander without end from one maze of uncertainty to another; a state of mind fo miferable, that Milton makes it one of the torments of the damned; - or else we must fuppofe, that one of

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these faculties is of higher authority than the other; and that either reafon ought to fubmit to common fenfe, or common fenfe to reason, whenever a variance happens between them : — in other words, that no doctrine ought to be admitted as true that exceeds belief, and contradicts a first principle.

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It has been said, that every inquiry in philosophy ought to begin with doubt; that nothing is to be taken for granted, and· nothing believed, without proof. If this be admitted, it must also be admitted, that reafon is the ultimate judge of truth, to which common fenfe must continually act in fubordination. But this I cannot admit; because I am able to prove the contrary by incontestable evidence. I am able to prove, that " except we be“lieve many things without proof, we never can believe any thing all; for that all found reasoning must ultimately rest on "the principles of common fenfe; that is, on principles intui❝tively certain, or intuitively probable; and, confequently, "that common fenfe is the ultimate judge of truth, to which "reafon must continually act in fubordination."-This I mean to prove by a fair induction of particulars.

All reafoning terminates in first principles. All evidence ultimately intuitive. Common Senfe the Standard of Truth to Man.

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N this induction, we cannot comprehend all forts of evidence, and modes of reasoning; but we shall endeavour to investigate the origin of those which are the most important, and of

the