1 Thus, we find that it is no exaggeration, no metaphorical lan guage to denominate France a great military empire; to fay that the government now calls forth the whole refources of the ftate, and that every Frenchman is literally a foldier. Nothing like this has ever ap peared fince the early days of the Roman people. The feudal militia had not the fame regularity, the fame fcience and difcipline. The infurrection of Hungary, the rifing en m of Switzerland and America, were all confined to particular emergencies. The national guards and firft confcriptions of France herself, which approach nearer to the new order of things, were ftill far inferior to it in fyftematic arrangement and extent of operation; yet by their aid, imperfect as they were in the comparison, fhe gained all that she had conquered previous to the last · campaign. But her present system is in truth a terrible spectacle. The most numerous and ingenious people in the world have abandoned the arts of peace, not for their defence, but after having conquered all the nations around them. They have betaken themselves to the military life as their main pursuit, almoft their exclufive occupation, not from impatience of a long continued quiet, but at the end of various revolutions, and a series of the most deftructive wars. With a government purely military, a stock of fcience peculiarly adapted to the fame purfuits, and a fpecies of wealth not likely to be immediately ruined by fuch a change, they have eftablished a regular fyftem of difcipline, which draws every arm into the fervice of the country, and renders the, whole furface of the most compact, extenfive, and beft fituated country in Europe, one vaft camp, fwarming with the finest foldiers • Ubi fas versum atque nefas: tot bella per orbem,' &c. This branch of the Inquiry clofes with a full difcuffion of the neutral question, at present so much agitated in this country and America. It is unneceffary to dwell upon the reasonings contained in it, as they coincide for the most part with those which we have ourselves fubmitted upon the fame fubject in the present Number. We fhall only remark, that the author waves the queftion of right, applies himself chiefly to fhew that the value of the object in difpute has been greatly exaggerated, and proves, that every argument of policy is against the affertion of our claims. All the evils or difficulties,' (it is obferved) which press upon this branch of our affairs, are the neceffary confequences of the long war in which we have been engaged. They are part of that fucceffion which the new administration have fallen heirs to; a fucceffion made up of all the dangers and difficulties which a long course of mismanagement and misfortune has accumulated upon the country. The tract concludes with a ítatement of the inferences fuggeft-. ed by the foregoing investigation refpecting the policy which this. country ought now to adopt, if the wifhes to remain independent, and to preferve a chance of once more liberating the rest of Europe. • That That the high, unbending, unaccommodating tone, which we have been accustomed to hold all over the world, and which the personal behaviour of our foreign minifters has generally rendered ftill more unpalatable, is in the extreme foolish at all times, and particularly unfit for the present aspect of things, needs not be proved by a fingle argument, or illuftrated by one example. Nor is it lefs obvious, that the feelings and the language of conciliation, of moderate views, of calm and temperate dignity to our enemies, of friendly fincerity and frankness to our allies, are the feelings and the language moft fubfervient at all times to our highest interests; most confiftent with our true honour; and most agreeable to the fituation in which the affairs of Europe, as well as of England, are placed in the prefent crifis. p. 206, 207. A more particular delineation is then given of the system which ought to be pursued at home and abroad, as adapted to our perilous fituation. The chief points touched upon are, the employment of able men in our foreign diplomacy: the reform of our Weft Indian colonies, by the abolition of the flave trade; and the relaxation of the navigation law: the recurrence to a wife and pacific, and, if it be poffible in that country to talk of justice, a juft fyftem of policy in the Eaft; the reform of abuses in our domestic adminiftration; and the improvement of the Catholics in Ireland. But the grand change of all is, the recommendation of pacific views, with which the work concludes, and to which, indeed, every page of it leads by irrefiftable arguments. This paffage forms our laft extract, which we give with a fincerity of joy, proportioned to our withes that fuch counfels may at last prevail, and to our defire that the world may now be saved, while it is yet poffible, by the restoration of tranquillity. It is, indeed, abundantly clear, that the ftate of our affairs, domeftic as well as foreign, enjoins a ftrict regard to the conciliatory fyftem in general, and prepares us more especially to expect, in fuch a peace as may be confiftent with our real honour, the highest advantages, both to our own intereffs and thofe of Europe at large. With regard to the continent, it has already been demonftrated that nothing but mischief can poffibly accrue from a renewal of the late unhappy war. What then is Ekely to refult from things remaining in their prefent unfettled ftate? Will the enemy, fo long as we refufe to give him peace, fo long as we prevent our allies from treating, fo long as we do not use our influence to bring about a negotiation-will he abftain from reaping the thousand advantages of his prefent fituation? Will he fubmit to all the evils of warfare, and forego all its gains? Will he unite in his plan all the loffes of war and all the conftraints of peace? This would be too close an imitation of our own conduct with regard to Spain. Unhappily we cannot expect to be imitated in our European tactics. Our Eaft Indian policy will fuit him better. He will go on conquering fuch of our allies as continue hoftile; uniting with those whom he may intimidate, or or allure to share in the plunder of the reft; ftretching his creations of kings over the North of Germany; aggrandizing those whom he has made in the South; extending his dominion in Italy over the islands, and from Italy ftriding onwards to the Eaft. Fam tenet Italiam, tamen ultra pergere tendit To all this prospect of lofs, from a fenfelefs prolongation of a war which has unfortunately reached its natural conclufion, the enemies of peace can only oppofe certain vague indefinite fears of the dangers with which they conceive a peace to be pregnant. First, they imagine that good or even fair terms cannot be expected; then they think the enemy will not be fincere; next, they dread his taking the opportunity of recruiting his resources, and especially of reftoring his navy; laftly, they expect that he will take us by furprise, and attack us when he is fure to fucceed. In all these apprehenfions, however, there is a great deal of mifconception, and no fmall inconfiftency. As to the terms, we must firft fee what he offers. It is indeed very evident, that we cannot expect fuch favourable conditions for the Continent, as if we had not plunged it into the late war, and occafioned the ruin of Auftria, the conqueft of Naples, and the aggrandizement of France and her depend encies. We cannot hope fuch terms as the prefent Administration would have gained, had it been formed two years ago. But it is equally clear, that, if the enemy finds his advantage in peace, (and if he does not, we need neither expect it nor defire it), and if he estimates, as he muft, the high spirit, and unconquerable valour of this country, he will make no proposals which can dishonour us. He will even tempt us to overcome our repugnance towards him, and our contempt of his new authority, by fome favourable conceffions. Then, with regard to his fincerity, we may fafely conclude that the fame motive which leads him to think of making a peace, will induce him to keep it-the motive of intereft for what can he gain by a tranfient peace, except the paltry ceffion of a few iflands, which we fhall always be able to retake, with the troops and shipping he may fend thither, fo long as our marine is fuperior to his. Next, as to his recruiting his refources, and particularly his navy, this he moft undoubtedly will attempt to do. We must lay. our account with it. We mean to recruit our own army, and he muft lay his account with that. But does it follow, that he will be able to acquire a navy equal to ours during the peace? Where are his feamen? Where are his officers and pilots? Where are his Nelfons? Should the peace laft for ten years, which is unfortunately a high estimate, how much would England gain in her commerce, her finances, her colonial and domestic economy, her military fyftem, her foreign policy! And France, too, would gain fomewhat in feveral of these particulars. Her trade would increafe, and fhe would acquire colonial eftablishments. Would not this make her much lefs warlike? Would it not be utterly incompatible with the military confcription, the moft formidable feature in her prefent afpe&t ? Would it not render her lefs military in peace, and and more averse to war, the greatest of evils to a mercantile and colonial nation? But could her navy in ten, or even twenty years of peace, poffibly grow up fo as to match our own? Should we not, at the end of fuch a happy period, enter upon the war with our commerce augmented, our finances cleared from debt, our wealth more able to supply our neceffities, our navy more numerous? And would not this be the very fame thing with beginning a new series of brilliant victories over the navy of our enemies? Befides, with the restoration of our continental relations, and the improvement of our army, might we not fairly expec even fuccefs on fhore, as well as at fea? Why is not France averse to peace from her fears of our commerce increafing, and our army being eftablished on a new fyftem? Why then should we, who are as courageous as herself, dread the progrefs of her trade, and the reeftablishment of her marine? But to all fuch fears one anfwer may be given-they prove too much they prove that peace can never be made, if they dif fuade us from making it now; they have no application to this particu lar time, they are apprehenfions of all times, and they go to involve the world in one eternal war.' p. 212-217. We now take leave of this most important tract, which we have done little more than faintly defcribe to our readers; and which, both for the magnitude of its object, and the merits of its execution, would, we are fully fenfible, have deferved a more able review. But we conceive that the extracts which we have given, and the abstract which we have resorted to, when the original could not be laid before our readers, may have the effect of fpreading more univerfally the knowledge of its contents; happy if, by our humble efforts, we fhall fucceed in our earnest with to aid thofe falutary effects, which we think it cannot fail to produce upon the minds of men in this eventful crifis. The only parts of the author's doctrines in which we do not heartily agree, are thofe, we are forry to fay, which are of a confolatory nature. We do not think he has at all exaggerated the dangers of war, but we cannot help fufpecting that he has underrated the dangers. of peace; and, defponding as we have no doubt he will appear to many of the fanguine fpirits of this country, we only blame him for giving too flattering a picture of the hopes and refources which remain to us. ART. XVI. Leonora. By Mifs Edgeworth. Two Volumes. pp. 580. London, 1856. MISS ISS EDGEWORTH always writes with good fenfe, and with good intentions: but this is not among her beft doings. The flory is neither very probable, nor very interefting;-moft of the the characters are rather sketches than finished portraits; and there is a want both of perfons and of incidents, which produces a degree of languor not to have been expected in fo fhort a work of fo animated a writer. There are not many perfons, we believe, in this country, who stand in need of the leffons it is intended to teach; and perhaps it is not altogether calculated to produce much effect upon fuch perfons. All the leffons which it does teach, however, are falutary; and all the effect it can produce, must be favourable. It is chiefly for this reason that we have thought it worth while to give a fhort account of it. The story is that of a wife, virtuous, well-bred English hufband, who is feduced from the most amiable wife in the world, by the arts of a Frenchified coquette; and after having run the whole career of unlawful intrigue and gallantry, has his eyes opened to the true character of his feducer, and returns penitent and humiliated to his generous and forgiving confort. This is a very nar row foundation, our readers will perceive, for a novel in two volumes: but it is eafy to difcover, that it was not fo much the ftory, as the moral, that Mifs Edgeworth was anxious about, and that the intended this fable merely as a vehicle for thofe difquifitions on affected fenfibility and conjugal duty with which it is very copiously adorned. The work being thrown into the form of letters, gives her an opportunity of introducing thefe with great felicity and fuccefs; and fhe has put together a number of remarks and reafonings, which we have perufed with great fatisfaction and delight. The evil, however, we think, is fcarcely of fo urgent a nature as to make us fet any extraordinary value upon the remedy. The affectation or the indulgence of exceffive fenfibility, is no longer the vice of our countrywomen ;-they have been pretty well laughed out of it; and, we believe, no tolerably well educated young woman of eighteen, would feel any thing but contempt and derilion for fuch effufions as fell from the pen of Lady Olivia. The fashion has gone down now to the lower orders of fociety; and we dare fay there is ftill a good deal of raving about tidelcfs blooded fouls, overwhelming emotions, and narrow prejudices, among the abigails and dealers in fmall millinery, who read novels, and fip ratafia upon the borders of proftitution :-But as it was not for fuch patients, we prefume, that Mifs Edgeworth compounded her cordials, we fcarcely think fhe will find much occafion for them in the world fhe takes charge of. The character of this fentimental lady and her French friend, we do not think very well drawn. Both are caricatured, and their views and follies fo clearly marked, as to render it quite improbable that they should impofe upon any person of common obfervation or knowledge of the world. The French picture is the best, |