tain the Order which makes the Benefit, Department and its good and cheap insurance possible. It carries out the announced object of the Benefit Department, by making it for the benefit of members of the Order and their families. The law had the cordial endorsement of an overwhelming majority of the Grand Division, and was enacted to prevent adding to the list of about 1000 members of the Benefit Department, upon whom we are carrying about two million dollars of insurance, and who were doing nothing to help the Order, although many of them were and are in active railway service. EDITOR.]

Editor Railway Conductor:

In reading the letter in August CONDUCTOR, relative to the excursion of the Boston & Maine conductors to the coast, I notice among the lines that extended courtesies to us that the Boston and Maine, Central Vermont, Grand Trunk and the Chicago & Alton are left out. I wish to say that it was owing largely to the courtesies of these lines that made our trip a success; while the Grand Trunk attached a special parlor and observation car on the rear of our car for our use from Montreal to ToA. H. BROWN.

ronto.

Boston, Mass.

Liability to Person Injured in a Smoking

Car.

This was an action brought in the Circuit Court of Miller County on behalf of appellant, a minor, by his father, as next friend, against appellee for damages. It was alleged in the complaint and shown by proof that appellant resided at Texarkana, Ark., and was a student in school at Annapolis, Md., preparatory to entering the United States Naval Academy. After failing to pass the physical examination at the academy, he notified his father at Texarkana of his desire to return home immediately. This was on September 8, 1898. On the same day his father applied to the local ticket agent of appellee at Texarkana, and paid to him the price of a first-class ticket from Annapolis to Texarkana, and the latter agreed to telegraph instructions for delivery of the ticket to appellant at Annapolis. The ticket agent executed and delivered to appellant's father a written receipt for the sum so paid for the ticket, reciting that the sum paid was "for one first-class ticket to be furnished to Arnold Brezewitz from Annapolis, Md., to Texarkana, Ark." The ticket was not delivered to appellant until September 12th or 13th, about six o'clock in the evening, too late for him to get a train out that day, and he left Annapolis the next day. The ticket was over the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad from Annapolis to St. Louis, and thence over appellee's road to Texarkana. Appellant testified that on his arrival at St. Louis, where he

changed to appellee's train in the Union Station at that place, the porter of appellee's train directed him to enter the smoking car, in which he rode from St. Louis to Texarkana; that he did not use tobacco and was made sick from the continuous ride in the atmosphere laden with tobacco smoke and other foul odors. Damages were claimed on account of loss of time in waiting in Annapolis for the ticket and the physical and mental pain resulting from the enforced ride in the smoking car. It was proved by appellee's employes, and not disputed, that immediately upon making the agreement with appellant's father to deliver the ticket to his son the ticket agent, by telegraphic message sent to appellee's general passenger agent at St. Louis, and thence transmitted to the ticket agent of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company at Annapolis, caused a ticket to be delivered to appellant. The message was received by the general passenger agent of appellee at St. Louis on September 8th and on the same day he sent the following telegraphic message to the manager of passenger. traffic at Baltimore, Maryland, of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, viz.: “Please furnish Arnold S. Brezewitz, care of R. L. Wernz, one first-class limited ticket Annapolis to Texarkana, Tex., via your line B. & O. S. W. and our line. Rush delivery. Advise description of ticket. Will send prepaid order for $30.85 to cover." The message was received at 7:09 p. m. on September 8th and at 9 a. m. the next day a message was sent by

the last named official to the local agent of the latter company at Annapolis directing him to deliver the ticket to appellant.

The court said: Appellant claims that appellee fell short in his duty to him in two respects, and is liable in damages therefor, viz., in failing to cause the ticket to be delivered to him at Annapolis in due season and in directing him to the wrong car at St. Louis. The first ques

tion was submitted to the jury by the court upon instructions that if appellee's agents, with reasonable promptness, transmitted the order to the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company for delivery of the ticket to appellant, that was sufficient compliance with its contract, and that appellee was not responsible for the failure of the latter company to promptly deliver the ticket. We think that instruction was correct. Conceding that it was within the scope of the authority of appellee's local ticket agent at Texarkana to execute the contract in question, it was, in effect, only an agreement to transmit the order for the ticket to the initial carrier. It did not amount to an undertaking that the seller of the ticket would deliver it to appellant. It is not contended that appellee assumed to carry passengers from Annapolis to Texarkana. The ticket was to be furnished by another carrier, over whose line appellant was to travel to St. Louis, where appellee's line terminated, and under the agreement the first carrier cannot be treated as the agent of appellee for the purpose of delivering the ticket.

All

that the parties could have had in contemplation at the time of the agreement was that appellee's agent should transmit to the initial carrier at Annapolis instructions to deliver the ticket to appellant. This they did with reasonable promptness, and appellee cannot be held responsible for delay of the other carrier in delivering the ticket after the receipt of the instructions.

Appellant testified as follows:

When I arrived at St. Louis preparatory to departing south for this place, I went through the gates and tried to get on the chair car next to the sleeper, and the porter said, 'Go to the forward car next to the baggage car.' The porter saw my ticket. I obeyed orders and went to the smoker, the one next to the baggage car, the one he directed me to, and rode in it to Texarkana. At that time I did not use tobacco. The effect of being in a place where it was used was sickening, made me sick at the stomach. It was in obedience to orders that I went there and rode to Texarkana in it. There was smoking in there all the way. *

*

I did not say anything to the conductor or brakeman about wanting to go into the other car and made no complaint. I did not get off the train at any point." According to his own statement he voluntarily submitted to the discomforts of the smoking car without objection or complaint, and cannot, therefore, claim damages therefor. He was not justified in accepting the direction given him by the train porter at the station to the car which he should enter as a command to remain therein throughout his journey. The train was in charge of the conductor, and when appellant found that the car to which he had been assigned by the porter was uncomfortable, and not such accommodation as he was entitled to on his ticket, he should have appealed to the conductor for more comfortable quarters. Failing to do so he is deemed to have voluntarily accepted the place assigned him with its discomforts. He had reached the age of discretion and cannot be allowed to claim damages on account of a situation caused by a mistake of the porter, which he accepted and gave the railroad company, through its proper official in charge of the train, no opportunity to correct. Brezewitz vs. St. Louis &c. R. Co., 87 S. W. Rep., 127.

TRAIN RULES

EDITOR FORUM-I desire to submit to you, for an opinion, the following questions:

A and Z are terminals; No. 1, firstclass train; No. 10, second-class train; on old time card No. 1 is due to leave, A at 11:30 p. m.; B at 11:50 p. m.; C at 12:10 a. m. On new time card, which goes into effect at 12:01 a. m., July 1st, No. 1 is due to leave: A at 12:10 a. m.; B at 12:30 a. m.; C at 12:50 a. m.

No.

On June 30th No. 10, east bound, makes B for No. 1 west bound at 11:50 p. m. No. 1 arrives at B on time. 10 cannot make A by 12:10 a. m. What rights, if any, would he have against No. 1, due to leave A at 12:10 a. m. July 1st? Could No. 1 of July 1st leave A at 12:10 a. m., following No. 1, which left A at 11:30 p. m. June 30th? If so, how would they proceed with respect to each other after new card went into effect, at 12:01 a. m. July 1st? If an order was put out under Form K Example 1, reading No. 1 of June 30th was annulled A to Z, how would this affect No. 1, due to leave A 12:10 a. m. July 1st? On the other hand, if the above order read that No. 1, due to leave A at 11:30 p. m. June 30th, was annulled, how would No. 1 be affected by this order after 12:01 a. m., July 1st? What orders should No. 10 have to proceed from B to A?

schedule No. 1 of the new card. No. 10 would have no rights against No. 1 of the new card, as has been pointed out before, because it is possible to run a No. 1 on new card from A. You notice we say it is possible! we do not think that a train would or should be started from A at 12:10 if a train had left A on the old time table. It is the duty of the superintendent in such cases to make the necessary arrangements, and see that no traps are set for misunderstanding and accident. In view of these facts, where there is any material change in a schedule to a later time, and inferior train should require orders against this changed schedule on the new time table, even though they have met the train of the old schedule before the new time table took effect. An order put out annulling No. 1 June 30, A to Z, would not affect No. 1 of the new time table. If the order read: No. 1, due to leave A at 11:30 p. m. June 10 is annulled, then of course the train would not be running on schedule No. 1 of the old time table, and could not assume the new schedule if on the road at 12:01 a. m. But if waiting at A might proceed on new schedule at 12:10. No. 10, to proceed from B to A, should have an order giving them right over No. 1 of the new time table. The American Railway Association is at present making an effort to revise Rule 4 B (also some other rules), so that there will be less chance for misunderstanding. Rule

4 B is the best rule for change of card that has been in use so far, but if the committee is able to frame a rule that will cover every possible condition and leave no chance for a wrong interpretation, it will be vastly superior to the present rule.

EDITOR FORUM-Please answer the following through CONDUCTOR. Lagrange is a registering station for all trains. Train No. 31 is due to arrive at 11:47 p. m., and due to leave there 12:01 a. m. I think that train should be registered in on one date, and registered leaving on the next date. J. W. GULLION.

Louisville, Ky.

ANSWER-If this is a terminal station for the division we think you are right; otherwise not. Will Brothers kindly write me the prevailing practice of registering on their roads in such cases?

EDITOR FORUM-Will you please give ruling on the following order through the CONDUCTOR?

Order No. 10-C. & E. of Ex. 755 North-No. 109 will wait at Plainville until 1:45 a. m. for extra 7:55 north.

The question is, must the extra clear 109 at Plainville ten minutes, or does the order give them up to 1:45 a. m. to clear?

Fort Scott, Kansas. MEMBER 79. ANSWER-Under Standard Code Rule the extra must clear at 1:40 a. m. When this form of order is used, the train last named must clear the time stated in the order the same as before required to clear their schedule time of the firstnamed train.

EDITOR FORUM-Please give ruling on the following orders. Train order No. 5. To C. & E. Eng. No. 19 at Soo, but engine No. 19 will work extra between Soo, Mich., and Soo. Ont., from 4:35 p. m. until 7 p. m., and will protect against work extra engine 2049 working on same limits. Complete at 4:38 p. m.

Have this order and clearance, and am ready to go when I get order No. 6, which reads: Engine 19 will have

right over engine 2049 between Soo, Ont. and Soo, Mich., from 4:35 p. m. until 7 p. m. Complete at 4:52 p. m.

I claim that the part of order No. 5 which affected engine 2049 should have been annulled, as order No. 6 is not a superseding order, and if I go by order No. 6 I have no running orders. Please answer through THE CONDUCTOR. J. C. MACLEOD.

Sault Ste. Marie, Canada.

ANSWER-Order No. 5 is your working order, and advises you to protect against extra 2049. Order No. 6 gives you rights over extra 2049, but does not supersede or annul order No. 5, as it is not necessary to do so, as order No. 5 is not in conflict with order No. 6.

P.

EDITOR FORUM-Will you please answer the ruling on the following orders? Order No. 13 to C and E of engine 28 at A. Engine 28 will run extra from A to Will hold main track and meet No. 6 at D. Station D is between A and P. When we got to B we got order No. 14, which we read as follows: Order No. 14 to C and E of engine 28 at B. Engine 17 will display signals and run as first No. 6 from D to B extra north. gine 28 will meet first No. 6 at C instead of D. Questions: Has extra engine 28 got a right to go to D for second No. 6? I claim the word instead an order No. 14 supersedes my meet on order No. 13. M. H. L.

En

ANSWER-Order No. 13 fixes a meet for extra 28 and No. 6 at D, and rule 218 says that "where a train is named in an order all its sections are included", so that, as a matter of fact, order No. 13 is an order for extra 28 to meet all sections of No. 6 at D. Rule 220 says an order or part of an order may be superseded or annulled. Order No. 14 supersedes that part of order No. 13 regarding 1st No. 6, but does not supersede it as regards 2nd No. 6, which, under the rules, must have copies of order No. 13 addressed and delivered to them, and in absence of further orders must meet extra 28 at D.