make answer to the following questions relating thereto, and in addition make such comment that may occur to you as to its effect upon railroad employés engaged in interstate commerce or to labor in general: "If this bill were enacted into law, would it grant Federal judges any new authority or power to issue restraining orders or injunctions in cases involving or growing out of labor disputes? "Would the passage of such an act imply the affirmative power of courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes? "In your opinion, would it be unconstitutional because it applies only to cases growing out of labor disputes? 'What general objection if any would there be to having its provisions apply in all cases, not confining them to cases growing out of labor disputes? "If it were amended so as to provide that a court should not issue an extraordinary writ without giving the adverse party an opportunity to be heard, would a labor injunction be considered 'an extraordinary writ'? "If it became a law could state courts issue injunctions and restraining orders against employés engaged in interstate commerce without giving them an opportunity to be heard? "If so, could it be amended so as to prevent this? "Would its passage mean that where employers have heretofore applied to Federal Courts for injunctions they would in the future apply to the state courts? "If this became a law could it be technically evaded by issuing a writ of mandamus or other process before a hearing was had which might operate against the employés to the same effect as if an injunction had been issued?" Under date of February 2nd, 1905, Mr. Worthington answered these inquiries as follows: DEAR SIR: Referring to your letter of January 28, 1905, enclosing a copy of H. R. 18327, being a bill entitled "To Regulate the Granting of Restraining Orders in Certain Cases," I make the fol lowing reply to the questions submitted by you: 1. If this bill should become a law it would, in my opinion, grant no new authority or power to Federal judges. But as a matter of abundant caution I would suggest that to avoid the possibility of such a construction being given to the act, there should be added a proviso negativing such an inference. 2. The foregoing answers your second question, which is, whether the passage of such an act would imply the affirmative power of courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes. 3. As to whether such an act as this would be constitutional, because it applies only to cases growing out of "labor disputes," it is impossible, I think, in the present state of the judicial decisions in the Supreme Court of the United States, to give a positive answer. All the cases in that court which determine what is and what is not objectionable as "class legislation," grow out of controversies as to the constitutionality of State statutes. The 14th amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." There is no express provision of the Constitution which, in terms or in substance, applies the same restrictions to legislation by Congress. The same question arises here which arose under the contract clause of the Constitution-the States are forbidden to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts; but there is no prohibition against the United States doing so. And yet, in various cases, there have been intimations by the Supreme Court of the United States, or by some members of it, that the dictates of natural justice might be held to forbid the United States from passing any law which would have the effect of abrogating existing contracts. There has never, however, been any express adjudication by the Court to that effect. In the case in the Supreme Court involving State statutes claimed to be invalid because they are class legislation, the Supreme Court has said that to sustain such statutes the differences between the cases which are covered by it and those which are excluded must be such, as in the nature of things would furnish a reasonable basis for separate laws and regulations. In other words, the question is whether the discrimination is purely arbitrary or has some basis in that which has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be accomplished. To defeat your proposed bill on the ground of unconstitutionality as class legislation would require, therefore, that it should be held that class legislation by Congress is invalid because of some implied prohibition on that subject and that "labor disputes" can not be reasonably distinguished from disputes in general which come before courts for adjudication. In my opinion the Supreme Court would not so hold. It occurs to me, however, that the object which the organizations you represent have in view might be accomplished by amending the bill so that it will refer only to "labor disputes" affecting interstate commerce, since the Constitution of the United States itself makes a clear distinction between interstate commerce and intrastate commerce by giving jurisdiction in the first case to the General Government and in the second to the separate States. 4. I think there would be grave objection to amending the bill so that its provisions would apply to every case in which a Federal Court is asked to grant an injunction or a temporary restraining order. There are many cases in which the requirements of notice would defeat the very object of the proceeding. Take one illustration out of a hundred that would occur to any practicing lawer: Money is about to be paid and the object of the bill is to prevent the payment and protect the rights of the complaining party. If a notice of even one day should be required the money could be paid before the matter would come before the court and the complainant would have no remedy. I should say that if the bill was amended, as suggested in this fourth, inquiry, it would be so objectionable that it would be impossible to have it passed or to obtain for it any substantial support in either house of Congress. 5. As to whether, if the bill were amended so as to make it apply to extraordinary writs in general, it would apply to labor injunctions, is simply to ask whether the writ of injunction is an extraordinary writ. I think the word "extraordinary" in that connection would be so ambiguous that it would be highly injudicious to use it. Technically, I believe that the writ of injunction is an extraordinary writ like that of mandamus, certiorari, etc.; but it is so much more commonly used than the other writs which are classed as extraordinary that a Judge who wished to issue an injunction might very well say that if Congress had intended to include so common a writ as the writ of injunction it would have designated it by name and not by the use of the adjective "extraordinary." 6 and 7. As to whether, if this bill should become a law, the State Courts could issue injunctions against employes engaged in interstate commerce, without giving them an opportunity to be heard, it is clear I think that the bill as it stands would not affect proceedings in the State courts; nor do I think it could be amended, so long as it applies to labor disputes in general, so as to affect proceedings in the State courts. Congress has no power to direct how proceedings in the state courts shall be conducted except in matters over which jurisdiction is given Congress by the Constitution of the United States. There are many labor disputes as to which the States have absolute control. This leads me again to the suggestion that if the bill were amended so as to apply only to labor disputes affecting interstate commerce it could be made much stronger, because, in my opinion, Congress, as to labor disputes involving interstate commerce, would have the right to direct that not even in the State courts should an injunction or restraining order be granted without notice to the parties affected. 8. As to whether, if this bill should be passed as it stands, employers would resort for injunctions to the State courts instead of to the Federal courts, I should say that the bill would probably have that tendency. If it were amended, as I have suggested, in answer to the preceding questions, it would not, of course, have that effect, because the bill would apply then to proceedings in any court, State or Federal. 9. I see no reason to suppose that such a bill as this could be evaded by the courts issuing a writ of mandamus or other process before hearing was had. A mandamus is never issued until an opportunity has been given to the respondent to be heard; and I cannot conceive how any other writ could be used in the way suggested by this question. As to your further request that I shall make any suggestions which occur to me in this regard that would be of benefit to those whom you represent, whether they are called for by the specific questions asked or not, I would only say that I think the bill might be more effective if amended in accordance with the suggestions I have made above. I think this could have been done by inserting after the words "labor disputes," the words "affecting interstate commerce," and by adding to the bill the words: "Provided, that nothing herein contained shall be held to authorize the issuing of a restraining order or an injunction in any case in which the same is not authorized by existing law." There can be no argument as to the effect of the amendments suggested by Mr. Worthington of confining the operation of this measure to disputes affecting interstate commerce but it is not railway employes alone who have believed they had causes of complaint on account of the issuance of injunctions and it would seem desirable to have a law which would apply in all labor disputes rather than one which would apply only to railway employes and companies engaged in interstate com merce. ENFORCEMENT OF SAFETY APPLIANCE LAW: The determination of the adminisstration to strictly enforce existing statutes is shown by the action of Attorney General Moody in a recent letter of instructions to all United States Attorneys, requiring a strict enforcement of the safety-appliance laws enacted for the promotion of the safety of the traveling public as well as for the protection of railway employes. In the circular letter of the Attorney General mention is made of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Johnson against the Southern Pacific Company, involving the construction of the "Automatic Car Coupler Act," and attention is called to the rulings of the court that locomotives are comprised within the term "any car" as used in the Act; that the Act forbids the use of cars which can not be coupled together automatically by impact, the object being to obviate the necessity of men going between the ends of cars to couple or uncouple them; that the Act applies to cars used in interstate commerce, whether empty or loaded; that the primary object of the Act was to promote public welfare, and that it falls within the rule of liberal construction applicable to statutes to prevent fraud upon the revenue, and for the collection of customs. The letter of instructions is as follows: TO UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS: In the recent decision in the case of W. O. Johnson vs. Southern Pacific Co. involving the construction of the "Automatic Car Coupler Act," the Supreme Court of the United States held that: 1. Locomotives are comprised within the term "any car" used in the act, and are subject to the provisions thereof. 2. The act forbade the use of cars which could not be coupled together automatically by impact, the object being to obviate the necessity for men to go between the ends of the cars for the purpose of coupling or uncoup ling. 3. The amendment of March 2, 1903, is affirmative and declaratory and in effect only construed and applied the former act. 4. The act applies to cars used in interstate commerce, whether they are empty or loaded. 5. The primary object of the act was to promote the public welfare, and it falls within the rule of liberal construction applicable to statutes to prevent fraud upon the revenue, and for the collection of customs. It does not appear that any question can now arise as to the proper interpretation of the law, since this decision apparently settled every disputed point.. The government is determined upon a strict enforcement of these statutes, which were enacted for the promotion of the safety of the traveling public in general, as well as for the protection of railway employes. Therefore, any case of violation which is brought to your attention by the Interstate Commerce Commission or its inspectors, or by other parties, must be promptly and carefully investigated, and suit for the statutory penalty be instituted and earnestly pressed, if in your judgment the facts justify that course. You are instructed accordingly; and you are expected to be vigilant and active in the matter, and make prompt and full report to me of any such cases (particularly of any cases now pending in your district,) and of your action, with your reasons therefor. Respectfully, W. H. MOODY, Attorney-General. OPEN OR CLOSED SHOP. It seems that in this curious old world of ours there are some things so coldly or severely logical as to interfere with the various points of justice involved. As for instance in our subject, the cold logic of the open shop is so absolute and incontrovertible that its uncompromising advocates simply call it an axiom— it is the straight line between two points, and as there can be but one straight line between two points there is nothing more to be said—right is right and that's the end of it. Mitigating circumstances are not admitted into the realm of this kind of logic by those who openly advocate it. The conscience of such logicians must have its "pound of flesh," and the fact that the "debt with full interest" might otherwise be paid makes no difference to these Shylocks. Almost every consideration outside of cold logic may impel toward the closed shop side of the proposition, and still there be employers and journalists who refuse to depart from their position. Even sin cerity and honesty of purpose by the closed-shop advocates is twisted and distorted so as to make its possessors appear dangerous. That is to say, the man or men who advocate the closed shop side of the controversy, from a belief in its greater good or justice, are accounted dangerous, even as are those who advocate it from selfish or bad motives. And that we may not be accused of drawing upon our imagination for taking the above position, note what "Public Policy," January 21, 1905, says: "We claim that more damage has been done to the cause of humanity by sincere and honest persons ill informed, or not informed at all, than by willful rascality. Many persons mislead themselves and others by assuming, because they know they are sincere and honest, they must as a logical sequence be right. Of this kind of stuff the witch-burners were made. It is necessary for highly sympathetic persons to guard themselves against the delusion that sincerity and honesty make right. They do not. Because they do not, a too high appreciation of them is dangerous.' This is a kind of argument that proves too much; or at least if the argument is considered conclusive as a primary proposition, then the converse of it is just as absolutely proven-that is, admitting that honesty and sincerity of purpose actuated the witch-burners, we must admit, conversely, that those who were burned certainly had some very firm convictions. In fact, this converse proposition takes us straight into the society of martyrs. and heroes-Washington, Lincoln, Alexander Stephens, and the pioneers of our country certainly were actuated by the most sublime sincerity and honesty of purpose, and had they not been, that history would have been written in a vastly different way—a way in keeping with a full "appreciation of the dangers" of sincerity and honesty of purpose. We recognize, of course, that labor leaders and followers may be honestly misguided and mislead, at least for a time, but certainly no man would be justified for a moment in the assertion that organized labor in this country has been led by men not thoroughly alive to the involved questions of rectitudeand rectitude of a very exalted standard. Nay a sincerity and honesty of purpose that has made organized labor the mighty force for good that it is today-not only that, but it has shown the unscrupulous employer and capitalist that in no small degree has the just condemnation of their own acts been meted out to them. The self-evident sincerity and honesty of purpose of organized labor speaks volumes in confirmation of the generally accepted idea that labor organizations are here to stay, and that they had their origin in necessity and their growth in the continued inhumanity of man to man-much as unjust treatment was at the root of the determination of the original thirteen colonies or states to rebel and throw off the yoke of English oppression. Certainly we recognize the rectitude of the position of the "open shop" advocates-that perfect freedom carries with it the right of every and any man to sell his labor to whomsoever he can and for whatsoever he can get, but we should remember also that our personal rights and liberties are so only as they do not interfere with the rights and liberties of others. "The trade unionist holds, and it is generally admitted, that the trade union, as an organization, is a necessary quantity in our industrial life today, and only a glance at the history of our industrial development is necessary to show us, unmistakably, that organization of workingmen in their labor unions has benefited and improved their condition throughout those crafts, in every manner, to an extent beyond estimate." Wages, environment, sanitation, and conditions of work have all been brought up to a higher plane of work by devotion to his fellows, and his family by the trade unionist. Does it seem just the right thing then for a few men, who have persistently refused to join in this work of general uplifting, to step in and get all the advantages of it? Are they not reaping where they have not sown? They know of all the advantages which have been brought about by the unions, and their attitude in not joining them tends to retard and impede their progress. Can any one really blame men for not seeing the cold, delicate logic of the "open shop" controversy when the living, palpable facts of its operation are shown. "In union there is strength" is an axiom entirely within the mental grasp of any man who has sense enough to get a job and keep it, and when men do not join the union of their craft, the reasons for so doing are certainly selfish or worse. Absolute honesty of intent and straightforwardness in execution by both employers and the unions would soon settle the "open" or "closed" shop controversy forever. We quote from an editorial in the Wall Street Journal that shows what may be called the essence of the controversy, or at least, how the extremes of the controversy are gravitating toward each other. "In his statement addressed to the annual convention of the federation, Samuel Gompers deals interestingly with many matters affecting the inter |