fuperftition, the fky happening, on the night of the fire-works, to be alternately obfcured by clouds, and inflamed by lightnings, they cried out "That this was an expreffion "of the Almighty's indignation against the impofture put upon "the proteftant heirs to the "throne." Few reflected how unlikely it was, that James fhould ftifle the voice of nature, to injure his daughters, who had never injured him. It was faid, "That one who had broken faith with "his God in changing his reli"gion, and who had broken faith with his people in invading the "conftitution, was become in"fenfible to all the ties of na"ture."

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An Effay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, in Oppofition to Sophistry and Scepticism. By James Beatie, LL.D. Profeffor of Moral Philofophy and Logic in the Marifchal College and University of Aberdeen. The Second Edition, corrected and enlarged. 8vo.

THE

HE proper nutriment of the understanding is truth; and the difcovery of it the great object of all fuperior minds. There have been, however, fpeculatifts in all ages who have earneftly contended, that this object is utterly unattainable. Not contented with fhewing, what is but too evident, the narrownefs and imbecility of the human understanding, they have denied that it is at all calculated for the difcovery and comprehenfion of truth; or, what amounts to the fame, that no fixed order exified in the world, fo correfpondent to our ideas, as to afford the

leaft ground for certainty in any thing. This fyftem, if it deferves the name, has been efpoufed by very different forts of men, for very different ends, but with equal warmth. It has been made fubfervient at one time to fanaticifm, and at another to infidelity. It is evident, that if fuch an opinion fhould prevail, the purfuit of knowledge, both in the defign and the end, must be the greatest folly, inftead of being an indication of fome wifdom in the attempt, and in the progrefs a means of acquiring the higheft. It is evident too, that morality muft fhare the fate of knowledge, and every duty of life become precarious, if it be impoffible for us to know that we are bound to any duties, or that the relations which gave rife to them have any real existence.

Dangerous and groundlefs as this fyftem is, in the hands of ingenious men it is capable of confounding (it cannot confiftently aim at convincing) minds, that are not habituated to deep and close refearches. It is particularly fuited to the temper of this age, impatient of thought and labour, Many are very ready to believe, that every thing which is troublefome is vain, and are pleased to embrace a cheap and lazy fcepticifm, which at once frees them from all ftudy, and emancipates from all duty. The author of the work before us has great merit in attacking this pernicious fophiftry. He has gone to the bottom of his fubject, and vindicated the rights of the human understanding with fuch precifion and fagacity, with fuch powers of reafon and investigation, as will do him honour, when the fyftems he expofes will

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be remembered only in his refutation. His method is extremely natural and clear; his ftyle lively and ardent. He is no cold, uninterested, and uninterefting advocate for the cause he efpouses. If he may fometimes be thought too warm, it may easily be forgiven, when his warmth neither hinders him from doing juftice to the merits of his adverfaries, where they have real merit, nor leads him to any intemperance of language, unworthy of himself or of his fubject. The imputation, however, of this warmth, has given Dr. Beattie an occafion for adding a postscript in his vindication to the fecond edition of his work. This poftfcript is one of the finest pieces of writing we remember to have feen.

The author eftablishes the ftandard of Truth in Common Senfe, into which all reafoning is ultimately refolved. The tenor and idea of this primitive and fundamental standard of all Truth, he diftinguishes and defines in a manner the most clear and precife, marking clearly the fenfe in which he ufes it.

"The term Common Senfe hath, in modern times, been used by phi lofophers, both French and British, to fignify that power of the mind which perceives truth, or commands belief, not by progreffive augmentation, but by an inftantaneous, instinctive, and irresistible impulfe; derived neither from education nor from habit, but from nature; acting independently on our will, whenever its object is prefented, according to an eftablifhed law, and therefore proper

ly called Senfe*; and acting in a fimilar manner upon all, or at least upon a great majority of mankind, and therefore properly called Common Senfe. It is in this fignification that the term Common Senfe is ufed in the prefent inquiry.

That there is a real and effential difference between thefe two faculties; that common fenfe cannot be accounted for, by being called the perfection of reafon, nor reafon, by being refolved into common fenfe, will perhaps appear from the following remarks. 1. We are confcious, from internal feeling, that the energy of understanding, which perceives intuitive truth, is different from that other energy which unites a conclufion with a firft principle, by a gradual chain of intermediate relations. We be→ lieve the truth of an inveftigated conclufion, because we can affign a reafon for our belief; we believe an intuitive principle, without being able to affign any other reafon for our belief than this, that the law of our nature determines us to believe it, even as the law of our nature determines us, to fee a colour when prefented to our open eyes at noon-day. 2. We cannot difcern any neceffary connection between reafon and common fenfe; they are indeed generally connected; but we can conceive a being endued with the one who is deftitute of the other. Nay we often find, that this is in fact the cafe. In dreams, we fometimes reafon without common fenfe. Through a a defect of common fenfe, we adopt abfurd principles; but fuppofing our principles true, our reafoning.

is

is often unexceptionable. The fame thing may be obferved in certain kinds of madness. A man who believes himself made of glass, may yet reafon very juftly concerning the means of preferving his fuppofed brittlenefs from flaws and fractures. Nay, what is ftill more to the purpose, we fometimes meet with perfons whom it would be injurious to charge with infanity, who, though defective in common fenfe, have yet, by converfing much with polemical writers, improved their reafoning faculty to fuch a degree, as to puzzle and put to filence those who are greatly their fuperiors in every other mental endowment. 3. This leads us to remark a third difference between these two faculties, namely, that the one is more in our power than the other. There are few faculties, either of our mind or body, more improveable by culture, than that of reafoning; whereas common fenfe, like other instincts, arrives at maturity with almoft no care of ours. To teach the art of reasoning, or rather of wrangling, is eafy; but it is impoffible to teach common fenfe to one who wants it. You may make a man remember a set of first principles, and fay that he believes them, even as you may teach one born blind to fpeak intelligibly of colours and light; but neither to the one, nor to the other, can you by any means communicate the peculiar feeling which accompanies the operation of that faculty which nature has denied him. A man defective in common fenfe may acquire learning; he may even poffefs genius to a certain degree: but the defect of nature he can never fupply; a peculiar modifi

cation of fcepticism, or credulity, or levity, will to the very end of his life diftinguish him from other men. It would evidence a deplorable degree of irrationality, if a man could not perceive the truth of a geometrical axiom; such inftances are uncommon, but the number of felf-evident principles cognizable by man is very great; and more vigour of mind may be neceffary to the perception of fome, than to the perception of others. In this refpect, therefore, there may be great diversities in the measure of common fenfe which different men enjoy. Further, of two men, one of whom, though he acknowledges the truth of a first principle, is but little affected with it, and is easily induced to become fceptical in regard to it; while the other has a vivid perception of its truth, is deeply affected with it, and firmly trufts to his own feelings without doubt or hesitation; I fhould not fcruple to fay, that the latter poffeffes the greater share of common sense; and in this respect too, I prefume the minds of different men will be found to be very different. Thefe diverfities are, I think, to be referred, for the most part, to the original conftitution of the mind, which it is not in the power of education to alter. I acknowledge, however, that common fenfe, like other instincts, may languish for want of exercise; as in the cafe of a perfon who, blinded by a falfe religion, has been all his days accuftomed to diftruft his own fentiments, and, to receive his creed from the mouth of a prieft. I acknowledge alfo, that freedom of inquiry doth generally produce a jufter, as well as more liberal turn of thinking, that

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can ever be expected, while men account it damnable even to think differently from the established mode. But from this we can only infer that common fenfe is improveable to a certain degree. Or perhaps this only proves, that the dictates of common fenfe are fometimes over-ruled, and rendered ineffectual, by the influence of fophiftry and fuperftition operating upon a pufillanimous and diffident temper. 4. It deferves alfo to be remarked, that a distinction extremely fimilar to the prefent, is acknowledged by the vulgar, who fpeak of mother wit as fomething different from the deductions of reason, and the refinements of science. When puzzled with argument, they have recourfe to their common fenfe, and acquiefce in it fo fteadily, as often to render all the arts of the logician ineffectual. "I am confuted, but not con"vinced," is an apology fome times offered, when one has nothing to oppofe to the arguments of the antagonist, but the original undifguifed feeling of his own mind. This apology is indeed very inconfiftent with the dignity of philofophic pride; which, taking it for granted that nothing exceeds the limits of human capacity, profeffeth to confute whatever it cannot believe; and, which is ftill more difficult, to believe whatever it can not confute: but this apology may be perfectly confiftent with fincerity and candour, and with that principle of which Pope fays, that "though no fcience, it is fairly worth the feven."

Our author applies this principle, 1. To mathematical reafoning. 2. The evidence of external fenfe. 3. Internal confcioufnefs.

4. Evidence of memory. 5. Reafoning from the effect to the cause. 6. Probable or experimental reafoning. 7. Analogical reafoning, And, 8. To faith in teftimony.

The grand effort of the author has been to expose the sceptical fyftems of Bishop Berkley and Mr. Hume; the one made with good intentions but with a bad effect; the other with intentions to produce that infidelity to which it leads fo evidently. It was always fomewhat injurious to a fyftematic work, where one part depends upon another, to give detached parts as a fpecimen of the author's manner of writing; to abftract the work, and reduce it to a dry skeleton, would be also injurious to a performance fo beautiful with all the graces of an elegant and fertile imagination. There is one part, however, in which the author has fo happily united all his powers, that we have no doubt that it will excite in our readers a defire of becoming acquainted with the whole of a work, in which good taste, learning, morality, and religion, are fo deeply interested.

"It is aftonishing to confider, how little mankind value the good within their reach, and how ardently they purfue what nature hath placed beyond it; how blindly they over-rate what they have no experience of, and how fondly they admire what they do not underitand. This verbal metaphyfic has been dignified with the name of Science, and verbal metaphyficians have been reputed philofophers, and men of genius. Doubtlefs a man of genius may, by the fashion of the times, be feduced into these studies; but that particular caft of mind which fits a man

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