offering it to the public, will be better qualified to judge of it, and perhaps be better difpofed to give it his attention.'

The author then giving a fhort explanation of the nature of the two forts of argument, viz. à priori and à pofteriori, in the words of bifhop Law and Dr. S. Clarke, enters into detail on this subject, making, by the way, fome pertinent ftrictures on the fallacious methods of reafoning adopted by the atheifts, particularly Spinoza, and adds,

Common fenfe, and, I may fay, experience, will always be able to prevent men in general from falling into the abfurdities of downright atheifm, or from being perfuaded by any metaphyfical fubtilties, that all things are fo carried on by a blind and fatal neceffity that no one event could poffibly have hap pened otherwife than it has done. Atheistical writers, therefore, not being like to bring over many profelytes to their way of thinking, are not fo dangerous to the caule of religion and morality as thofe that are called fcepticks. These are fuch as admit that this world muft indeed have been the work of fome fuperior being, who is to be called God, and who had power and intelligence enough to do juft what we lee he has done; but at the fame time affert, that none of our arguments are fufficient to produce a rational and firm belief of the perfections of his natural and moral attributes, whereon we may found a fyftem of religious duties due to him as the moral governor of the world, who concerns himself in the happiness of his creatures, and from whofe goodness and power we might hope for protection in this life, or for happineis in a better life hereafter. Thefe writers would have us believe the existence of a God, or fuperior Being, merely as a speculative truth, not as one from which we might, with a reafonable certainty, draw any inferences that fhould influence our conduct, or give us either hopes or fears; and thus they propofe a fystem which, for any ufetul purpofe, is no better than atheifm."

Before going into a minute confideration of the method of reafoning on this fubje&t fynthetically, or à priori, Dr. Hamilton thinks proper to take notice of the objections made by fceptical writers to thofe arguments that are drawn à pofteriori, for proving the being and perfections of God. Mr. Hume, in his Eays, or Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding, and in his pofthumous work, entitled, Dialogues concerning natural Religion, having infifled much on the infufficiency of analogical reafoning, has induced our author to examine his three objections; all, he fays, that he has feriously urged in the latter of thefe works. For a refutation of the falfe and groundless cavils propofed in the Effays,' the reader is referred by the dean to Leland's View of the Deiftical Writers, and to Beattie's Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth. On the subject of Mr. Hume, he concludes as follows.

As it was proper on this occafion to fhew how little weight there is in the objections that have been made to the argument a pofteriori, which is applied to prove the exiftence, unity, and abfolute perfection of the fupreme Being, I thought I could not do better than to confider these objections as they have been fated by Mr. Hume, who certainly did not want either inclination or ability to fet them off to the best advantage. He is a celebrated writer, and has been thought one of our most formidable opponents; it may, therefore, be fashionable to read, and perhaps to admire, this work of his; efpecially as he is known to have fet a particular value upon it, by the provifion he made in his will for having it published after his decease. And though he has written moft part of this work in a manner between jeft and earnest, no doubt he expected it would have a ferious effect in promoting the caufe of infidelity and fcepticism in which he had laboured fo long. For he has here openly, inveighed against revealed religion, under the title of vulgar and popular fuperftition, and endeavoured to remove the very foundation of natural religion by denying the probability of God's moral attributes. I know not how his admirers will be able to reconcile that wisdom and gravity of character they afcribe to him, with his having employed his talents, even to the last stage of life, in trifling fo egregioufly and fo profeffedly on, what he acknowledges to be, the most important of all fubjects, natural theology and religion. In the character of Philo, he intended to exhibit to us a learned and acute sceptical philofopher; but his harangues are fo inconfiftent with each other, that he gives us only the idea of a careless young ftudent, with a lively imagination, and an elegant flow of language declaiming in a college-hall on the wrong fide of a question.' He immediately fubjoins,

'Many pious and ingenious perfons, though perfectly fatiffied with the proofs for the existence and abfolute perfection of the fupreme Being, drawn from the works of the creation, have thought them lves well employed in devising arguments, drawn from other topics and confiderations, which might lead to the fame conclufion, and might prove it perhaps in a still more forcible manner. Hence arofe another way of reasoning on this fubject, usually called the argument a priori. The scholaftic terms a pofteriori and a priori are used to denote the two methods of arguing, one from the nature of effects to the nature of their caufe, the other from the nature of a cause to the nature of its effects. The argument a priori, taken in this sense, cannot be applied to the prefent fubject; for we cannot argue from any thing confidered as a caufe when we mean to prove the existence or the attributes of that Being who is the first caufe of all things. Therefore when we speak of proving the being and attributes of God a priori, we must understand that term in a more comprehenfive fenfe, as it denotes the common

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fynthetic method of arguing, which is applicable to this as well as to most other fubjects. In this method we lay down fome evident principles or axioms, and from thence deduce other truths that are more complex.'

The learned dean now proceeds to give an account of the arguments of the principal and lateft writers who have used the fynthetic mode of reafoning on the existence and attributes of the fupreme Being. The most celebrated of them are the productions of Mr. Locke, Dr. S. Clarke, Dr. Fiddes, and Mr. Wollafton. Thefe, fays Dr. Hamilton, were very learned men, and no doubt were well acquainted with what preceding authors had written on the fame subject, and would not fail to adopt from them fuch arguments as they thought moft for their purpose. The reader will therefore be fufficiently informed of the nature of this method of reasoning, and the progress that has been made in it, if I give him an account of the arguments that each of thefe eminent writers has advanced on this fubject.'

The exhibition of thefe arguments is managed with perfpicuity, and, we believe, with candour, and conveys fome valuable metaphyfical hiftory; but it would be unfatisfactory, if not abfurd, were we here to attempt an abridgement of what is already abridged. We muft, therefore, refer our readers to the performance itself, for more adequate information. We fhall only observe that, though the ingenious author is not altogether fatisfied with what these celebrated men have advanced on this fubject, and fhews, that they were not equally confident of their ftrength in every part of their reafonings, it is his opinion, that their failure is most visible in the proofs they have undertaken of the unity of God.

The dean concludes his Introduction with an account of his own argument; for fome idea of which, our readers will begin to grow impatient. The paffage not being ong, we fhall tranfcribe it.

As our argument is built chiefly on one principle, which I have laid down as an axiom, it is proper to fay fomewhat of it here, that the reader may more fully perceive its meaning. The axiom is this: "Whatever is contingent, or might poffibly have been otherwife than it is, had fome efficient caufe which determined it to be what it is." 55 Or in other words: "if two different or contrary things were equally poffible, whichever of them took place, or came to pafs, it must have done fo in confequence of fome efficient caufe which determined that it, and not the other, fhould take place." The truth of this is fo evident, that we cannot find any principle more evident by which we may prove it. It runs through our reafonings on many fubjects, in which we fhould make little or no progress if we did

not

not affume this as a felf-evident axiom. Whenever we perceive that a thing might have been otherwise than it is, we naturally enquire for the cause which made it to be what it is. But when we are sensible that a thing is neceffarily fuch as it is, we never enquire for the caufe that made it to be what it is, for we reckon it abfurd to ask why a thing is fo, when we fee there was no poffibility of its being otherwife. This fhews that contingency implies, and that neceffity excludes, caufality. If it be faid that fome things are determined to be what they are by chance, I answer, that in this cafe chance is as real and efficient a cause as any other for it means a caufe which, in its operation, is not directed by defign to produce the particular effect it does, rather than fome other effect. Thus moft effects or events, brought about by human operations, are attended with fome unforeseen and undesigned circumftances, and these we afcribe to chance; meaning that they were produced, not without a caufe, but without a defign. So that chance is always oppofed to defign: and this feems to be the only fenfe in which the word chance can be used with any meaning; except when it is used instead of the word probability; as when we fay, there is a great chance, or there is but little chance, that fuch an event will happen.

• Most of the following propofitions are demonstrated indirectly, that is, they are proved to be true, by fhewing that an abfurdity or contradiction would follow from fuppofing them to be falfe. From the nature of the fubject they will admit only of a proof of this kind, which, though it is not fo pleafing to the mind, is, however, just as valid as a direct demonftration.'

The treatise confifts of nine propofitions, with their demonftrations, corollaries, obfervations, or illuftrations. The demonstrations are fimple, clear, and fome of them mathematically close and concife, all founded either on the above axiom, or on the proof of preceding propofitions. The author has given us a contracted view of his propofitions under the article of contents, as follows.

• There must be fome one being, at leaft, who is unoriginated, and has exifted without a caufe, without a beginning, and cannot ceafe to exift.-There is nothing in the nature of this Being that could poffibly have been otherwife than it is.— He is impaffive.-Truths relating to his nature are as capable of ftrict demonftration as any other truths.-All the attributes he poffeffes are unlimited or perfect.-He exifts every where in the fame manner he does any where.-He is an individual fubftance, without parts, every where identically the fame.—He is poffeffed of power and knowledge unlimited, and all other natural attributes that can be called abfolute perfections. He is a maximum of existence. But one unoriginated Being in the univerfe. All things owe their exiftence to his power opetating according to his will.-The unoriginated Being is

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the God and father of all.-And is poffeffed of goodness, mercy, justice, and all other moral perfections, fuch as become the fupreme author and governor of the univerfe.'

Dr. Hamilton having laid a good deal of stress on the failure of his metaphyfical predeceffors, in their endeavours to prove the unity, we have paid particular attention to his feventh propofition, and shall prefent it, with its demonftration, to our readers.

There is in the univerfe but one unoriginated Being, who must therefore be the original fountain of all existence, and the firft caufe of all things.

t

The first propofition demonftrates that there must neceffarily be one unoriginated Being; but neither the argument there used, nor any other argument, can prove there must neceffarily be more than one. Because, when we have admitted one fuch Being, it is poffible that all others may be derived from that one. This, however, does not prove that all others must be derived from that one, or that there may not be many unoriginated Beings in the universe of whofe existence we have no knowledge or apprehenfion. The only way, therefore, by which we can determine whether it be poffible there fhould be more than one, is by trying whether we can conceive, or confiftently fuppofe, a fecond unoriginated Being. Now I fay that fuch a fuppofition is inconfiftent and untenable, and must come to nothing.

For let us fuppofe there is a fecond Being, fuch as the first, unoriginated or felf-exiftent and uncaufed, having its nonexistence impoffible, or having neceffity as the mode of its exiftence. Now from what has been demonftrated it appears that both thefe Beings must be eternal, immutable, impaffive, omniprefent, indivifible, and unlimitedly poffeffed of all natural perfections or attributes; infomuch that it is impoffible one of thefe beings fhould want any attribute the other has. Thus we find our idea of the fecond fuppofed Being (turn it as we will in our thoughts) is no other than the very idea we had of the firft. For all the attributes of the fecond are as much the fame with thofe of the first, as the properties of one circle (abstractedly confidered) are the fame with thofe of another. And fince thefe Beings are both eternal, and both every where alike prefent, they cannot differ from each other even in any circum ftance of time or place. Confequently there can be no poffible difference, nor any ground of diftinction between them ; and therefore they cannot be diftinct Beings, but must be one and the fame.

This way of arguing, I apprehend, may be admitted as conclufive, being exactly of the fame kind and equivalent with that which geometricians have allowedly used. For instance, two right lines, fay they, cannot have a common fegment: for in that cafe, thefe lines muft evidently have all their other feg

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