inducement to men, regardless of religion, to enjoy every pleasure of sense which constitution could suffer, and " prudence and care" keep within the bounds of personal security.

That the body is subject to pain, is not a proof of the moral nature of that pain. The body is also subject to destruction. Hence reason deduces from experience, certain cautions against fire and water, and ardent spirits, and such food, and accidents, and economy in life, as may tend to disorder or destroy the body. The pains attached to the effects of imprudence and carelessness, are very necessary preservatives against their destructive influence. But this is not moral reasoning. The physical laws of nature are constantly in operation, upon both the human body, and the affairs of men: but where is the proof that physical effects have a moral design? That neglected youth will produce ignorant manhood, and, probably (for it is far from being a certain consequence), poverty in age, is true: but again, is this a moral truth? or is it not rather a simple statement of a proposition involving no moral relation. The ultimate consequence of it is only a probability. To complete the moral argument, ignorance and poverty must be moral evils, and must be consequent upon neglect in youth; and therefore, as in this case, from the nature of the argument, the converse will hold, a rich old age is taken as the moral

reward of a virtuous youth! A consequence which in life we see so entirely contingent, as at once to overthrow the argument; for loss of health, of friends, and of riches, are such common evils, and so frequently seen, without involving any moral cause, that no moral argument can be deduced from them. We also as frequently see the profligate enjoying health, the unjust acquiring possessions, and the vicious abounding with friends! And then we are told that these are exceptions to the rule!

Now, to place this argument in a clearer point of view, I will restate it in words, rather more definite and comprehensive, (which I borrow from a friend most learned on the subject); "Virtue is naturally rewarded by health, peace of mind, and inward content; and vice is as naturally punished by secret discontent and disquiet." We must here understand, that natural (not religious) virtue is meant. And the argument amounts to this, that moral life will be rewarded by health, peace of mind, and inward content; and that immoral life will be punished by secret discontent and disquiet. In this punishment the loss of health is evidently included.

In the extreme of vice, certain consequences will arise destructive of both mental and bodily health; and these consequences arise from the action of certain bodily functions on the mind,

and from the natural liability of the body to disorder and destruction. But certain indulgences of allowed gratification will produce the same consequences. And, where these indulgences are tolerated by the cover of the law, or by the tacit consent of society, they become the evils of folly, but not of immorality. But, to approach more closely to the argument; if it can be shown, that in all cases, without indulging to that excess which produces mental and bodily pain, immorality may be the safe and constant habit of men, as too generally and too truly it is, under one palliating disguise or another, the habit of those who are not decidedly religious, then the argument of moral rewards and punishments must be abandoned.

The instability of human affairs, and the inequalities of fortune, have long been the favourite themes of the poet and moralist, because all hearts feel their truth. The fabled goddess of fortune, who had in her gift the blessings of life, was blind and inconstant! Merit and worth as such are seldom the grounds of earthly blessings : and no moral cause can generally be assigned for weakness of constitution and bodily pains. There are certain disorders to which the poor are the most subject; particularly rheumatism, scurvy, and (perhaps) the tooth-ache, which produce extreme bodily suffering; the only cause of which arises from the lot in life of the

sufferer. And there are also maladies to which whole districts of people are subject, from mere location; and not once in ten times are those distempers which afflict the body with pain, and leave it lingering in weakness and suffering, to be attributed to immoral habits. And we are also taught by our blessed Redeemer (who certainly is authority), that the accidents of life are not the consequence of wickedness. *

Upon what moral scale also of rewards and punishments shall the varied effects of a debauch upon different individuals be estimated? Without exceeding the bounds of moderation, how many will suffer tenfold more than others, who have indulged to a degrading excess? And instead of the supposed punishment being increased upon the repetition of the crime, with

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prudence and care" the quantity of secure indulgence may be increased, even to such a degree, that medical writers have said, there is a time in life with some constitutions, when it ceases to be detrimental. Besides, the pain attendant upon a debauch is a chemical effect upon certain functions of the body, the cause of which is purely physical. The indulgence,

therefore, when it offends no known law, is determined not by moral evil, but by constitutional strength.

Now, to narrow this argument and apply it to

* Luke, xiii. 1—5.

the realities of life, let us look upon the effect of some sensual indulgence, and attempt to fix the bounds of its moral action. An inebrious or libidinous excess will weaken the mind and impair the body. But the excess of an innocent gratification will do the same. A fortuitous disease will also frequently injure the constitution, and leave a mortal organic complaint upon the body. But, on the other hand, both inebriety and lust may be indulged to a certain extent without any evil consequences arising to the health. The moral effect, therefore, of those immoral habits upon the health of the body depends upon their excess being greater than the constitutional ability of the body to resist that effect. Hence the question of the action of moral evil upon the health, becomes a question of constitutional strength. And hence it is evident that the feelings of pain and weakness, which are the physical indications of disease, are not essentially moral punishments. And in those cases where impaired health is the effect of evil habits, that effect is not essentially a moral effect, seeing that it arises not from the moral nature of the cause, but from a certain proportionate energy of that cause; thereby making constitutional weakness the measure of moral punishAnd thus, whilst moral nature would lead us to provide for the security of the body, it entirely abandons the care of the soul.

ment.