mixture of moral and religious obligations, and the consequent abasement of religion in the scale. Locke was not the first who thus lowered religion; but from the extended influence of his writings, has been the greatest propagator (if we may except Paley) of this fatally erroneous view.

The profound author says, "there is another sort of relation, which is the conformity or disagreement men's voluntary actions have to a rule to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of, which I think may be called moral relation; as being that which denominates our moral actions." The actions, therefore, of which he speaks, are men's voluntary moral actions. But he makes religion a part of morals; therefore religious actions are voluntary moral actions; (whence men call morality, religion). But those actions which the "divine law" requires of us, are neither voluntary nor moral. They are not voluntary, as men cannot will them without the previous change of affections which religion (grace) will superinduce in their hearts; and they are not moral, because they thus arise from a principle of spiritual life, with which moral nature is not endued. It is by overlooking this distinction, that the philosophical use of the word moral is so erroneously extended. It is surprising that it escaped the penetrating thought of Locke; but he is not to be charged with the whole blame

of the oversight. Preceding writers had insisted upon the religious capability of nature, and he seems in this instance to have taken religion upon the popular notion of only being a superior code of morals; a negligence which we may well pardon when we find Tillotson, in his preface to the bishop of Chester's book, thus expressing himself respecting the design of it. "Secondly, to convince man of the natural and indispensable obligation of moral duties: those, I mean, which are comprehended by our Saviour under the two general heads of love of God, and our neighbour. For all the great duties of piety and justice are written upon our hearts, and every man feels a secret obligation to them in his own conscience which checks and restrains him from doing contrary to them, and gives him peace and satisfaction in the discharge of his duty, or in case he offend against it, fills him with guilt and terror.”

It would be impossible to describe the religion of a great portion of mankind, better than is done in the words of the foregoing quotation. The duties of the Gospel, and the one which gives light and life to all the other - the love of God, are looked upon as moral duties, and the understanding of them is thought to be natural to the heart; and the effect of them is only referred to the peace or terror of conscience. Thus all the doctrines of scripture are discarded,

and there is no necessity, either for a revelation of the will of God, and of the fall of man; or of the sacrifice of Christ; or of the regeneration and sanctification of the heart.

It is also an instance of the want of clear and definite views on this subject, to see such men as Locke and Tillotson using the word moral in a widely different sense. The metaphysician thereby expressing a certain relation under which men stand with respect to the duties they owe each other; and the divine, the principle which both renders that duty obligatory, and furnishes man with a knowledge of its laws. In what state should we consider the science of mechanics if one able mathematician, whilst he treated on the relative motion of bodies, was to neglect the moving force; whilst another, in treating of the principle of motion, only spoke of their relative position? We should conclude that it was necessary for the professors of such a science to define their terms, and understand them themselves, before they attempted to teach them to others. Moral philosophy is still in such a state of confusion, arising from the want of distinct views and understanding on the part of its teachers. At one time, we see that moral light was considered to be inferior to, and almost superseded by, revealed religion; but now we see it usurping a mastery over religion itself. This change appears to have been introduced as an answer to

the extravagances which were erected upon the doctrines of Calvin; for, probably, the extravagant tenets with which that doctrine was burdened by some of the followers of its learned author, was the cause of the re-action, which drove an opposite party to give, in their arguments, an undue authority to the principles and laws of nature; and to hand down to posterity the moral virtues as having religious claims, both in their nature and in their merit. Unfortunately for mankind, by a looseness of thought on this momentous subject, all distinction between morals and religion became confused; religion being degraded to the level of the popu lar notion of morality, and morality exalted to the dignity of religion. Thus the moralist has the hope of heaven without its promise, and his religion has the weight of the duty, without the spiritual aid of the Gospel to sustain it.

Dr. Ellis, in his work "The knowledge of divine things from revelation, not from reason and nature," treats the subject in a most learned and masterly manner, and as Bishop Horne says, fairly demolishes natural religion; and yet his labour appears to be almost entirely overlooked by subsequent writers. A very learned Irish prelate, indeed, eulogises the book; but his lordship, in his own elaborate work, uses an expression, "the moral nature of God;" which shows that the error of the moral system, had insinuated

itself, at least, into the language of a writer, whose mind had thrown its shackles far away. Dr. Ellis most successfully quotes Locke and Clarke against themselves, and had the error which they have assisted to perpetuate, been confined to their own works, we might have been satisfied with the entire demolition which Dr. Ellis gave to the system from whence it arose; and might see, without regret, some of these works, from the unreadable style in which they are written, sinking into oblivion. But as the error, like a fatal malaria, has affected the whole body of our sacred literature, I must yet ask for the further exercise of your patience whilst I offer a few remarks on two or three later writers.

I am, &c.