PROP. XCIII. p. 407. On the Terms of Salvation. OUR author here handles the difficult and impor tant queftion, how far faith in Chrift is to be confidered as the means of falvation. Many things that he fays on the fubject are good and juft; but as he has not developed and defined the idea of faith, what he afcribes to it will fcarcely appear fufficiently clear and methodical to the reader. "Chrift our Saviour," fays he, "is fent from heaven, God manifeft in the flesh, that whofoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life; that, though our fins be as fcarlet, they fhould by him, by means of his fufferings, and our faith, be made as white as wool; and the great punishment, which muft other wife have been inflicted upon us, according to what we call the course of nature, be averted. Faith then in Chrift, the righteous, will supply the place of that righteoufnefs, and finless perfection, to which we cannot attain. And yet this faith does not make void the law, and ftrict conditions, above described; but, on the contrary, establishes them. For no man can have this faith in Chrift, but he who complies with the conditions. If our faith do not overcome the world, and fhew itfelf by works, it is of no avail. It contains all the other chriftian graces; and we can never know that we have it, but by having the chriftian graces, which are its fruits." Hence he infers, that a mere affurance, or ftrong perfuafion, of a man's own falvation, or, as it is elfewhere expreffed, a mere confident acceptation and imputation of the merits of the blood of Chrift, is neither a condition, nor a pledge Y y 2 pledge of it. Such a strong perfuafion may be generated, whilft a man continues in many grofs corruptions: and, on the contrary, a man may poffefs every chriftian virtue, without having a firm affurance of his own falvation. Fear, in particular, cannot well be confiftent with fuch an affurance. On the question concerning the privilege and advantage of faith, he observes, first, that the righteousness and fufferings of Chrift, with our faith in them, are neceffary to fave us from our fins, and to enable us to perform our imperfect righteoufnefs: and, fecondly, that faith is propofed by the fcriptures as the means appointed by God for rendering imperfect righteoufnefs equivalent, in his fight, to perfect, and even of transforming it into perfect, as foon as we are freed from this body of flesh and death. Faith, he adds, improves righteoufnefs, and every degree of righteousness is a proportional preparative for faith; and, if it do not produce faith, will end in felf-righteoufnefs, and fatanical pride. To reduce thefe various affertions into due order, and to fhew how far they are confiftent with each other, with the nature of man, and with the most obvious interpretations of the fcriptures, we will endeavour to give as juft, inftructive, and comprehenfive a notion of the nature of faith in general, and of faith in Chrift in particular, as an hypothetical explanation will admit. Faith, or belief, both in common language, and in the language of the fcriptures, fignifies the receiving and admitting fomewhat as true, from the, teftimony and authority of others, and on account of that teftimony and authority. When I confider as true any fact teftified to me by others, without any experience of it myself, or when I admit any propofition in mathematics or philofophy on the authority of a man acquainted with either fcience, without my being capable of perceiving the proofs or demonftrations of it, I may be be faid to believe this fact, or propofition, in the true fense of the word. On the other hand, if I have experienced the fir myself, or proved the latter in my own mind, I do not merely believe, I know and perceive the truth. In what follows, I fhall endeavour to prove that this notion is conformable both to the common ufe of words, and to the fcriptures: at the fame time, 1 fhall endeavour, as much as poffible, to remove any objections that may be made to it. Thus faith is oppofed to our own knowledge and judgment, and is properly a truft in the knowledge and judgment of another, which is more or lefs effectual, in proportion to the nature of the object, and the fcope of the faith. I fay, more or less effectual: for faith has always fome end, and, as on every occafion it is intended to produce fome good, must be confidered as an active principle. Let us now confider the natural frame of man, which renders it neceffary, that he fhould be led to a certain end by knowledge and judgment. This is most naturally effected by his own: but, when his own are infufficient, he must employ thofe of others. There are two ways in which a man may be guided by the knowledge of another. Either whilft his intellectual faculties are totally paffive, and at reft, as the machine of the world is governed and led by the wisdom of God; which blind guidance excludes faith, as well as all activity of the understanding: or a man may be so guided, that his mind may be employed, improved, and perfected, whilft he is himself an agent. This laft mode of being guided by the knowledge of another prefuppofes and requires faith; without which it is impoffible. In this cafe, the understanding, enlightened by a fuperior knowledge, receives the conclufions and inftructions of this fuperior knowledge, following and obeying them from its own choice, not indeed on internal evidence drawn from its own ftores, but from a confidence in that wifdom Y y 3 wisdom which guides it, and gives it these inftructions, arifing from a conviction of the benefits of this guidance, and its obedience to it. Whenever it happens, that a weaker understanding is guided by a fuperior one, it must be effected by faith, if not in an irrational manner, and by mere phyfical powers. Thus the faith, by which God would lead man to falvation, is nothing lefs than a pofitive and arbitrary ordinance of God. It is by no means confined to religion. It is the abfolutely neceffary and fole mean by which every child is instructed and governed, and by which every ignorant and unexperienced man must be guided. . According to this hypothefis, there appears to me to be no proper ground of contention between faith and reafon. A rational or well-founded faith (and who would not reject a faith unfounded and irrational) is fo little repugnant to reason, that, in a multitude of cafes, and under proper reftrictions, it would be highly unreasonable not to believe. The cafe where faith is rational is where we want the judgment, knowledge, and experience neceffary to the attainment of our purposes; where a prefent weakness of our intellectual faculties, or a disadvantageous fituation, is a clog upon our action; or where we are compelled to determine and act, before we have acquired due knowledge and experience for the government of our determinations, and guidance of our actions. Still more is it rational, when we cannot acquire a knowledge and judgment of our own, without the greateft difadvantages, and moft hazardous delay, unless under the guidance of fome fuperior power, and in the fchool of faith. In these cafes, we must have faith if we would feek our own good, and not be blind to it. But when, according to the fuppofition, our own knowledge with respect to the object of faith is defective, how can we rightly judge and determine whom we are to believe, to walk walk with fafety? Amongst the guides offering themselves to us, are we not in danger of trufting to fuch, whofe want of skill or honefty will mislead us? To avoid this danger, our faith must be well founded, or we must have a rational affurance both of the capacity and good-will of our guide. Now it is easy to fee that, with refpect to the latter, we may have fufficiently ftrong and independent proofs: that is, we may have proofs fufficient to convince us, that our guide has the good will to lead us right, though we have no knowledge of the circumstance itself in which we are led. If, for inftance, I know nothing of agriculture, I may yet be able to judge, whether he, to whom I intruft the management of my farm, means me well, or not. As to the other point, the capacity of the guide, it would feem, that, to judge rightly of it, fuch a knowledge is requifite, as would render faith unneceffary. But if we apply it to any practical art, we shall find, that the most inexperienced may have a well grounded judgment of the ability of his guide, or at least a knowledge fufficient to enable him to form a rational determination. He has only to inquire, whether he in whom he would confide have given incontestable proofs of his abilities, have himself arrived at the point to which he would bring him, or have already performed what he requires of him. If I be defirous of building a houfe, yet know nothing of architecture, I must trust to the architect. However incapable I may be of proving his fcience and skill, I am able to judge whether he have executed, in other buildings, what I require in mine; and, if I find he have, I should act very abfurdly to question his ability. Muft not the greater part of mankind who trust their lives to a phyfician, found their confidence in him folely on the cures he has performed? Were it neceffary that the fick man fhould firft examine the theoretical skill and fcience of his phyfician, how few would Y y 4 |