A review of the doctrine of personal identity, by an old ex-scholar of Trinity college, Dublin [T. Wallace]. |
Common terms and phrases
accuracy and precision act of memory adverting affirmed or taught answer argument arises ascertain attached belief an act Bishop body Brown Butler certainly complex idea consciousness is consciousness consider consists in consciousness defined definition of person disquisition doctrine doubt evidence faculties feelings find nothing affirmed guity human soul i. e. the belief idea of Personal idea of similitude ideas of memory iden identity of mind implies a reflex inquiry intel intelligent principle knowledge language live hereafter Locke Locke's meaning meant mental identity metaphysical discussion moi to represent moral nature numbers observes passage perly Personal Identity consists petitio principii philosopher of mind philosophers phrase precision present existence primordial elements produced propriety question reader reason reflex act Reid remarks says sciousness sensation shew signification sonal Identity spects Stewart substance taught of Personal tence thing tion tity triangles trifling Trinity College verbal volved word consciousness word person writers
Popular passages
Page 11 - For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this alone consists personal identity, ie the sameness of a rational being r and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person...
Page 7 - Secondly, finite spirits having had each its determinate time and place of beginning to exist, the relation to that time and place will always determine to each of them its identity, as long as it exists. Thirdly, the same will hold of every particle of matter, to which no addition or subtraction of matter being made, it is the same. For though these three sorts of substances...
Page 10 - I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places...
Page 10 - I presume it is not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone, that makes the idea of a man in most people's sense, but of a body, so and so shaped, joined to it ; and if that be the idea of a man, the same successive body not shifted all at once, must, as well as the same immaterial spirit, go to the making of the same man.
Page 9 - ... in our mouths is the sign, is nothing else but of an animal of such a certain form...
Page 39 - If you ask whether they are one and the same, or two different things, every man of common sense understands the meaning of your question perfectly. Whence we may infer with certainty, that every man of common sense has a clear and distinct notion of identity. If you ask a definition of identity, I confess I can give none ; it is too simple a notion to admit of logical definition...
Page 37 - That we may form as distinct a notion as we are able of this phenomenon of the human mind, it is proper to consider what is meant by identity in general, what by our own personal identity, and how we are led into that invincible belief and conviction which every man has of his own personal identity, as far as his memory reaches. Identity in general, I take to be a relation between a thing which is known to exist at one time, and a thing which is known...
Page 15 - For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action, so far it is the same personal self.
Page 37 - I take to be a relation between a thing which is known to exist at one time, and a thing which is known to have existed at another time...
Page 36 - Whatever was thought, or said, or done, or suffered before that period, may belong to some other person; but he can never impute it to himself, or take any subsequent step that supposes it to be his doing. From this it is evident that we must have the conviction of our own continued existence and identity, as soon as we are capable of thinking or doing anything, on account of what we have thought, or done, or suffered before; that is, as soon as we are reasonable creatures. That...