ance is considered, as the foreseen self-originating act of man; or as it is considered as the gift of God, by that special grace, which he decreed to confer on his elect people. "If God peradventure will give "them repentance, to the acknowledging of the "truth."1 "Him hath God exalted with his right "hand, to be a Prince and Saviour, to give repent"ance to Israel, and forgiveness of sins."" Create ' and make in us new and contrite hearts, that we worthily lamenting our sins, and acknowledging our wretchedness, may obtain of thee, the God ' of all mercy, perfect remission, and forgiveness, through Jesus Christ our Lord.' 'Take from them all hardness of heart, and contempt of thy word. Let us beseech him to grant us true re'pentance and his Holy Spirit.' That it may please thee, to give us true repentance,

&c.'+

But lest any one should imagine, that I am asserting that things happen according to the necessity of fate, because I have said that things are foreknown, I proceed to refute that opinion also. That punishments and chastisements and good rewards are given according to the worth of the actions of every one, having learnt it from the prophets, we declare to be true: since if it were not so, but all things happen according to fate, 'nothing would be in our own power; for if it were decreed by 'fate, that one should be good and another bad, no praise would 'be due to the former, or blame to the latter.

And, again, if

'mankind had not the power, by free-will, to avoid what is disgraceful, and to choose what is good, they would not be re'sponsible for their actions. But that man does what is right, and what is wrong, by his own free choice, we thus prove:

to deny, that Justin held sentiments, very different from those of the Calvinists: but his argument, addressed to heathens, and to heathen princes, did not at all relate to the christian doctrine of God's predestination; or the predetermination of infinite wisdom, justice, truth, and love; by which freeagency is not in the least interrupted, or responsibility diminished; as it has been shewn: but to heathen fate; which was a sort of necessity, independent on the gods; which their supreme God himself could not bend or alter. O genetrix, quo fata vocas, aut quid petis istis? Cui tanta deo permissa potestas? Philosophers indeed spake of it, in more guarded, though less perspicuous, language: but this was the popular doctrine. Fate was a necessity, superior to the will of the gods; and totally unconnected with the good or bad conduct of the persons concerned, in every sense; but intimately connected with auguries, divinations, and all kinds of fortunetelling, sorcery, and witchcraft, which in Scripture are considered as the worship of devils. It

we see the same person passing from one thing to that which is contrary to it; but if it were fated that he should be either 'bad or good, he would not be capable of doing contrary things,

or so often change; but neither would some be good and others bad, since we should so declare fate to be the cause of bad 'things, and to act contrary to itself. Or that which was before' mentioned would appear to be true, that neither virtue nor vice is in reality any thing, but is only imagined to be good or bad; 'which in truth is the highest impiety and injustice. But we 'say that there is this immutable fate, namely, to those who 'choose the contrary, a worthy punishment.'

I

* Virgil, ninth book Eneid, 93-97. The words of Jupiter to Cybele.

does not clearly appear, from what source it was supposed to arise; or whence it had it's name. Fatum only signifies, What hath been spoken.Who would not dread a God, who foresees and 'considers, and attends to all things; and thinks that all things belong unto him, one who is inquisitive, and full of employment? Hence arose to you that fatal necessity, which ye call papan; ἐιμαρμένη; 'that whatever may take place, ye should say, flowed 'froin eternal truth, and a continued succession of 'causes. But at how much is this philosophy to be 'estimated; to which, as to old women, and those indeed unlearned, all things seem done by fate?' (Cicero de Natura Deorum. Liber 1.) You say, that all things are done by fate: but that, which from all eternity was true, that is fate.' (Ibid. 1. 3.) 'Therefore, it appears to me-first, that the whole 'strength and reason of divination is to be sought 'from God, of whom sufficient has been spoken; then from fate, then from nature. But I call that 'fate, which the Greeks call paper; that is, the order and series of causes: when cause connected with cause, of itself produces the thing; this is the perpetual truth, flowing from all eternity.'Besides, as all things are done by fate;-if there 'could be any mortal, who was able to perceive in 'his mind, the connexion of all causes, nothing, indeed would deceive him,' (or, be concealed from him ;) which when none but God is able to do; it must be left to man, that by certain signs, de'claring following events, he should perceive beforehand future events.' (Cicero de Divinatione, L. 2.)

Whatever Cicero thought of fate, (for he does not seem to think that even fatal events always take place:) it is plain, that he considers it, as something distinct from God, and independent on his purpose: but that God could, and man could not, view all the connexion of causes and effects, from all eternity.

'But thou deemest that it is fortune; and thou sayest, that all things which are done, and whatever things are future, were fatally determined 'from all eternity.' If nothing If nothing can be done, nothing happen, nothing take place; which it was 'not certain, would be, at a fixed time; what can 'fortune be.' (Ibid. Ibid.)

'All things, which take place, take place from 'preceding causes: but if this be so; whatsoever things are done, ared one by fate.' (Cicero de Fato.) From this kind of causes, hanging together from eternity, fate is framed (nectitur) by the Stoicks.' (Cicero.)-What Cicero's own sentiments on the subject were, it is not very easy to determine; as he generally puts the sentiments, which he brings forward, into the mouths of the Stoicks, or Epicureans, or others: but nothing can be plainer, than that, according to all the parties, fate, was not the decree of an infinitely wise, just, and good God; and that it was something, when philosophically considered, of a necessary concatenation of causes and effects, from eternity; which the Deity could foresee, and make known, by auguries, divinations, &c, if he chose; but which he did not form, and could not rule, or alter, or prevent: something,

one would almost say, antecedent to God, at least to his counsels, plans, and purposes. Now ought this sentiment, which, stripped of its false colourings, amounts to little better, than direct atheism, be confounded with the most wise and holy counsel, plan, and purpose of God, who could not, possibly, either decree, or do, any thing, which viewed in all its bearings, was not the very best thing which could take place? The one reduces the Deity, to insignificancy, almost to non-entity: the other considers, God as "doing according to his will, in the armies "of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth, " and that none can stay his hand, or say to him "what doest thou ?" Against this, however, and not against the predestination of God, Justin was contending.Ειμαρμένη. Είμαρτο. Μοιρα from Μείρω 10 divide, or allot; none of the terms here employed, are once found in the New Testament; but are taken from the pagan writers: and it is worthy of notice; that the sacred writers, in speaking on a subject, often confounded with the heathen doctrine of a fatal necessity; never once used any of the heathen terms; but adopted another phraseology: Пpoops(w. IIpoypapw, &c. And likewise, that they did not use these words, or any words derived from them; in the manner, in which heathen fate was spoken of, as if it were something, existing of, and by itself, antecendently to the will of any being: but entirely as the purpose and determination of the everlasting, omniscient, infinitely wise, holy, and good Creator

Dan. iv. $5.