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source of all contentions about beauty, as about every other point.

The same is the case with knowledge. In the first principles of knowledge, most, who have the benefit of common sense, agree: in discussing more intricate points subordinate to them, a disagreement, presently, ensues. But, such disagreements are no disparagement to a test of knowledge; why, then, should they be so to a test of beauty?

Knowing, therefore, that ignorance is the cause of all variances respecting beauty, it is easy to ascertain, in favour of which side sentence is to be given.

I observed, that all agree in allowing shape to be beautiful, and shapelessness ugly: that the same agreement prevailed respecting certain colours. As soon as people advance; as soon as they particularise, and refine, a dissension arises. Here, who is to be supposed right? He, who knows, and feels that he is: who is conscious, from his own conviction, that he has the knowledge, which his opponent has not attained. This question is resolved by evidence, equally with every other. As all, by common sense, discern beauty in objects, in which it is most apparent : so, each individual, according to the extent of his capacity, and the degree, in which he has improved it,

acquires an insight into beauty less discernible. As one happens to be more refined than another, so, he will be able to give a preferable decision on beauty though the other may call in question his decision. Thus, as people know when they improve in knowledge, so, they know when they advance in the perception of beauty. And as, in the former case, the one can determine by his own conviction, against another; so he can in the latter. Accuracy in this particular, depends, entirely, upon refinement of taste: and, if a person could not judge whether his taste was improved, he never could judge whether he had taste at all. For, if he perceives that he has taste, he must be conscious how it is refined. It appears, therefore, that an adherence to the standard of beauty is, always, determined by evidence; that the pretensions are, always in favour of the more. polished. Consequently, such a standard remains a benefit in spite of all differences respecting it and it is never lost, nor useless, but to those, who have not capacity, or refinement, to improve it to their advantage. A loss of this sort is not greatly to be lamented.

The nature of this benefit, chiefly, consists in enabling the mind to simplify proper notions of beauty, to reduce them to one common head, and to render them, by this compression, universally applicable. It teaches it to com

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pare, to combine, to digest the acquisitions, which it derives from every beautiful object of its contemplation, to improve previous deficiencies, and to be, always, adding to its stock. It perfects its notions in this department, in proportion to the field, which is open to its observation it gives it a command of all within its compass. Thus it was, that a Phidias learned to select from the ideas, which he had acquired, that special form, which seemed to him best to determine the beauty of human

nature.

:

Having, now, considered Beauty in its most essential relations; defined its nature, its particularities, shewn to what standard they were reducible; and pointed out, in a general manner, the advantages of this standard: it seems, that I have given to this subject as compleat a form as the just extent of it appeared to admit. The reasons, why some objects are deemed beautiful, and others, ugly, I thought it unnecessary to investigate :* I shall, therefore, enter upon the topic, which next presents itself.

* See Appendix, Note F.

GENIU S.

CHAP. I.

An Explanation of the Nature and Origin of Genius.

GENIUS is defined, by Dr. Blair, the power of executing; as Taste is, according to the same author, the power of judging. Sir Joshua Reynolds explains it in terms not very different. "Genius and Taste," he says, " in their com

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mon acceptation, appear to be very nearly "related; the difference lies only in this, that "Genius has superadded to it a habit, or power "of execution. Or, we may say, that Taste, "when this power is added, changes its name, "and is called Genius." Sir Joshua's opinion has one advantage over the Doctor's, it is more explicit. He informs us, more minutely, in what consists the difference between the two, and gives us clearer ideas on the subject. Neither of these authors, however, gives us the

precise idea of the nature of Genius. In telling us that it is the power of executing, they do not at all inform us, in what this power consists; and from what origin it is derived. To do this, was a task of nicerundertaking.

:

We will endeavour, therefore, to suggest something more precise. Genius seems to belong, solely, to the power of conceiving; and to be the power of conceiving strongly I venture to be of opinion, that it would be justly defined, were it, merely, denominated the offspring of strong sensibility. It appears to be that faculty, by which the mind is enabled to conceive objects with due feeling to catch the full impression, which they are naturally calculated to communicate. Hence, the difference between the temper of mind, with which a person without genius, and one with genius, contemplate an object, will depend upon the disproportion in which the sensibility of each is excited. The man of genius will feel what he views; the man without genius will remain cold at the sight: that will perceive his feeling awakened, where this will be but a passive spectator; the one will take a delight, where he will often be welcomed, only with the derision of the other in a word, he who possesses genius, will survey nature with a sense of its beauties; he who possesses it not, with the sluggish indifference.

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