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the real Diftinction of Father, WORD, and Spirit (the Three Perfons of the Trinity) in the Unity of the Godhead, to which each is coeffential.

The Simplicity of God's Nature can afford no Objection against what I have written. For God's Simplicity only denies and excludes à Compofition of feparable Parts: Whereas the Father, WORD, and Spirit, are neceffarily infeparable and coeffential to the Godhead; and may therefore conftitute the most fimple Being.

As for the Incarnation, it can by no means ftagger the Faith of any reasonable Man. For fince the Perfons of the Everbleffed Trinity are really diftinct; the WORD, or fecond Perfon, might well be incarnat, altho' the Father and the Spirit, viz. the first and third Perfons are not. God is indeed incarnat; but by his fecond Perfon only: Even as a Triangle touches a Point given, if B touches it, at the fame time that A and C do not touch it; notwithstanding A and C, together with B, do coeffentially conftitute the Triangle. And why may not God, by his WORD, be united to a Man, aş well as the Body and Soul are united in each of us? We readily allow the Union of the Body and Soul; tho' we can no more comprehend or account for the manner of it, than we can for that of the Union of the Divine and Human Natures. I think, I can as eafily conceive, that God by his WORD, is perfonally united to the Man Chrift Jefus, and now governs the whole World by and thro' his Human Nature; as I can conceive, that the Soul acts by and thro' the Body. Tho' God could, and did govern the World before the Incarnation, immediatly; even as a Soul may act without the Body: yet God may alfo (and we contend, that he at prefent actually does) govern the World by and thro'

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the Man Chrift Jefus, whom he has vouchfafed to unite to himself by the Incarnation of his WORD.

And in confequence of this Mediatorial Government, the Person of our Saviour Chrift (he being Godman) is as truly an Object of Religious Adoration, as the Perfon of an earthly Prince is the Object of Civil Honor.

The Difficulty as to the Belief of the Trinity, when reveled (tho' tis ftill equally a Myftery as to our Comprehenfion of the manner) is in Reality none; unless we can find out fome good Reafon to affirm, that whatever the pofitive Subftance of the felfexiftent Being is, yet that Subftance will not admit of any real Distinction internal and neceffary (not from, but) in it self.

But I fhall not enlarge. You are fo good a Philofopher (not to mention your Skill in Divinity) that you can't need being convinc'd of the Reafonableness of believing what is above our Comprehenfion, or attended with fuch Difficulties as we are not able to clear. Nay, I do not remember any one Writer, that has exprefs'd himself upon that Point, more fully and judicioufly, than you your self have don in diverse of your Books. I will take the Liberty therefore (for the Reader will find caufe to thank me for it) of reciting fome of your Words, which tho' not penned with any View to the Do&rine of the Trinity, may notwithstanding be moft properly apply'd upon this Occafion; because they do fo exactly either obviat or anfwer the Cavils of thofe Smatterers in Knowledge, who love to decry all Mysterys in Religion, and pretend that we ought not to believe any more than we can frame adequate and complete Ideas of

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In your Demonftration of the Being and Attributes of God (b), you have what follows. Since in all Questions concerning the Nature and Perfections of God, or concerning any thing to which the Idea of Eternity or Infi nity is joined; tho' we can indeed demonftrate certain Propofitions to be true; yet it is impoffible for us to comprebend or frame any adequate or compleat Ideas of the Manner, How the Things fo demonftrated can be: Therefore when once any Propofition is clearly demonftrated to be true; it ought not to disturb us, that there be perhaps perplexing Objections on the other fide, which for want of adequate Ideas of the Manner of the Existence of the Things demonftrated, are not easy to be anfwer'd. Indeed were it poffible there fhould be any Propofition which could equally be Demonftrated on both sides of the Queftion, or which could on both fides be reduced to imply a Contradiction; This it must be confeffed, would alter the Cafe: Upon this abfurd Suppofition, all Difference of True and Falfe, all Thinking and Reafoning, and the use of all our Faculties, would be entirely at an end. But when to Demonftration on the one fide, there are opposed on the other, only Objections raised from our want of having adequate Ideas of the Things themselves; this ought not to be efteemed a Real Difficulty. 'Tis directly and clearly demonftrable, that Something has been from Eternity: All the Objections therefore raised against the Eternity of any thing, grounded merely on our want of having an adequate Idea of Eternity, ought to be looked upon as of no real Solidity. Thus in other the like Inftances: 'Tis demonftrable, for Example, that Something must be actually Infinite: All the Metaphyfical Difficulties therefore, which arise usually from applying the Measures and Relations of Things Finite, to what is Infinite; and from fuppofing Finites to be Parts if Infinite, when in

(b) Prop. 1.

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deed they are not properly fo,but only as Mathematical Points to Quantity, which have no Proportion at all; ought to be eft eemed vain and of no Force. Again, 'tis in like manner demonftrable, that Quantity is infinitely Divifible: All the Objections therefore raised by comparing the imaginary Es quality or Inequality of the Number of the Parts of Unequal Quantities, whofe Parts have really no Number at all, they all having Parts without Number; ought to be lookt upon as weak and altogether inconclufive.

In your fecond Defense of an Argument made use of in a Letter to Mr. Dodwell, you (c) write thus; there are many Demonftrations even in abftract Mathematicks themselves, which no Man who understands them, can in the least doubt of the certainty of, which yet are attended with difficult Confequences that cannot perfectly be cleared. The infinite Divifibility of Quantity, is an Inftance of this kind. Also the Eternity of God, than which nothing is more felf-evident; and yet the Difficulties confequent upon it, are fuch as bave reduced most of the Schoolmen to entertain that unintelligible Notion of a Nunc Stans. And bis Immenfity, attended with much the like Difficulties.

And (d) again, Even abftract Mathematical Demonftrations; as thofe concerning the Infinite Divifibility of Quantity, the Eternity of God, and his Immensity; have almost infuperable Difficulties on the other fide: And yet no Man, who understands thofe Matters, thinks that thofe Difficulties do at all weaken the Force, or diminish the Certainty of the Demonftrations.

In your third Defense of the fame Argument, you (e) fay; Difficult Confequences that cannot perfectly be cleared, may be, and very often are, found to attend Things which are Demonftrated to be True. The

(c) Pag. 38, 39. of the first Edition.

(d) Pag. 54.

(e) Pag. 82. of the firft Edition.

Reafon

Reason is; because Difficulties that cannot perfectly be cleared, do not (like Abfurdities and Contradiations) arife from a Perception of the Disagreement of Ideas, but barely from the Defect or Imperfectness of the Ideas themfelves. Our Reason is able to apprehend clearly the Demonftration of the Certainty of the Existence of fome Things, where the Imagination is not able to comprehend the Ideas of the Things themselves. This is plainly the Cafe of the infinite Divisibility of Quantity, of Infinity and Eternity in general, of the Actions of Immaterial Subftances upon Matter, and of many other Things.

And in your fourth Defense of it, you (ƒ) say ; A Difficulty which cannot be perfectly cleared, is a Difficul ty arifing, not from the Perception of any Difagreement of Ideas, but from the Want or Defectiveness of Ideas in the Imagination; which therefore we cannot compare so as to Imagin diftinctly how they agree, though we can by our Reafon and Understanding demonftrate it is impoffible they fhould difagree. This is plainly the Cafe in most Questions, concerning Eternity, Immensity,

These feveral Paffages do abundantly demonftrat,that how widely foever we may differ in other Respects; yet what I have advanc'd, ought not even in your own. Opinion to be therefore rejected, because I don't pretend throughly to explain the Doctrin of the Trinity. 'Tis fufficient, if I have fhewn, that the Holy Scriptures do teach it. For if that appears, I am fure, you are a better Scholar, as well as a better Chriftian, than to make any Objection against it, upon the account of fuch Difficulties, as this great Myftery muft needs perplex us with, whose Capacitys are fo narrow, and whose

(f) Pag. 15. of the first Edition.

Facultys

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