foot, under Colonel Walton Cromwell's brother-in-law. The whole force at his disposal was reckoned at 14,000, nearly all being now in or around Boston, the horse somewhat scattered, and the foot about the town.

*

To understand what followed, it is necessary to keep the county map in view. Nearly due north from Boston, at a distance of about fifteen miles, lies the town of Horncastle, at the foot of the Wolds. Nine miles east-south-east from Horncastle is Spilsby, and about half-way between them is the hamlet of Winceby. Thus the three places lie in the base of an acute angled triangle, of which the apex is at Boston. Within the triangle, three miles west-south-west of Spilsby, is Bolingbroke village, on a hill, then boasting a castle capable of defence, and held by a Royalist garrison. The enemy were reported to be converging in the direction of Horncastle, drawing force from Lincoln and Newark, and gathering in their outlying detachments. Lord Manchester had his eye on Bolingbroke Hill, and when he drew a part of his infantry out of Boston he sent ten companies to that place under Major Knight, with orders to take the castle. Another body was stationed three miles southward, at Stickford, under Colonel Russell; and a few companies of Manchester's own regiment were two miles still further south, at Stickney. Thus what infantry he had was scattered in weak groups over a long distance-its right occupied with a hostile garrison and its left stretched out towards Boston, about which the General would seem to have been nervous. The horse soldiers were scattered over a wide district, including Spilsby, Horncastle, and even Thimbleby, still nearer to Lincoln.

On Tuesday, October 10th, Lord Manchester met Cromwell and Lord Willoughby by appointment, within a mile of Bolingbroke. The castle had not yielded. The garrison flouted the summons of Major Knight with the reply that "his bugbear words would not take castles." Partly perhaps for this reason, the earl decided that Horncastle should be the place of rendezvous, and that they would await the enemy there. After this

By Carlyle Winceby is placed west of Horncastle, which quite confuses the account of the fight.

The narrative of Vicars, on which I draw, is trustworthy as to main facts, but it does not account for half of Manchester's foot. The probability is the earl was anxious to keep a "firm grip" of Boston, and left a large force there.

decision, the three commanders rode on towards Horncastle to look up Sir Thomas Fairfax. They met him half-way. But hardly had they greeted him when a loud alarm arose behind him. They galloped back with him towards Horncastle, the crack of musketry and shouts of men increasing as they neared the town. The enemy were upon them unexpectedly,* and were received so stoutly that after a brief skirmish they retired ; but the outlying troops about Thimbleby barely escaped capture. The earl now changed the place of rendezvous to Bolingbroke Hill, and Horncastle was abandoned to the Royalists.

All that night the scattered troops of horse were being gathered in towards Bolingbroke. Even Cromwell doubted whether both men and horses would not be too wearied for a fight. Strenuous exertion for a definite object might be cheerfully endured; but confused and worrying movements without a visible issue wear out both nerve and muscle far more. Besides, nothing like a complete concentration had been effected. The whole stress of the attack must be borne by the extreme right of the Parliamentary line, where the horse were huddled together, with scarcely a full regiment of foot to co-operate. The numbers engaged were about equal on either side, neither

army bringing its whole force into action. The Royalists brought into the field ninety-five colours of horse and dragoons, which ought to have represented 6,000 men.† The Parliament army had not much more than half so many colours, but their troops were better filled up. Perhaps there were between 4,000 and 5,000 on each side.

Cromwell and his men had the van, with a "forlorn hope" of five troops in advance, and Sir Thomas Fairfax in support. About noon they pushed from the direction of Spilsby and Bolingbroke towards Horncastle. Soon the advancing lines of the enemy were seen, and about Winceby the dragoons on either side dismounted and closed up. After they had fired Cromwell sprang forward with his cavalry. But when he was within half-pistol shot of the foe the enemy's dragoons fired again. His horse fell dead beneath him, and partially rolled upon him. As he dragged him

There had been an earlier alarm, but it was believed delusive.

I.e., taking the horse at sixty to a troop, and dragoons at one hundred, besides officers.

self loose and rose to his feet, a troop of the enemy's cavalry was upon him, and he was knocked down again by its leader. Rising once more, shaken and dizzy, but not stunned, he received a sorry nag from a soldier at hand, and mounting joined again in the fight. The weight of the charge made by his men scattered the hostile dragoons, drove in the enemy's first line upon its supports, threw these into confusion, and produced a general rout. The chase passed through Horncastle and beyond it, the panic of the enemy spreading far and wide through their whole army. One road there, called Slash* Lane, is said to take its name from the execution done as pursued and pursuers rushed along it on that day. Wounded and falling horsemen were drowned in ditches; heedless fugitives were overwhelmed in quagmires. Out of ninety-five colours thirty-five were captured. At least 1,000 Royalists were killed, 1,000 more surrendered as prisoners, 2,000 horses were obtained, and 1,500 arms of various kinds. The result seems altogether disproportionate to the brief struggle of half-an-hour by Winceby hamlet. But the completeness of the disaster to the Royalists was such that Sir William Widdington, of the defeated army, writing to Lord Newcastle, apprehended that the siege of Hull would have to be raised, and Yorkshire would be in danger. "Their horse," he said, speaking of the victors, "are very good, and extraordinarily armed. They are at present at liberty to dispose of their forces whatever way they please, either to Hull or Derby."

But even while Colonel Widdington was writing his disconsolate letter, Lord Newcastle had already determined to abandon Hull. Early intelligence of the disaster at Horncastle perhaps hastened his resolve. But that resolve was suggested by a vigorous and victorious sally of Lord Fairfax, which showed the siege to be hopeless; for the defenders, being supplied and reinforced by water, might renew such sallies at their leisure. Accordingly on October 12th, the day after Winceby fight, Lord Newcastle drew off his army. The Eastern Counties' Association after long and laborious self-discipline and preparation had delivered Lincolnshire at one blow. And this change in the position of affairs in the east, together with the relief of Gloucester in the west, led to a new phase of the war.

* One cannot help suspecting that it is really "Slush Lane."

CHAPTER IX.

MARSTON MOOR.

THE Solemn League and Covenant, inaugurated at St. Margaret's Church, Westminster, on September 25th, 1643, had a very important influence, not only on the course of the war, but on later events. It turned out ultimately to be the greatest mistake ever made by the leaders of the Long Parliament; and Cromwell particularly was embarrassed by its results. Why then did he sign it? The obvious answer is that with his usual attention to one main issue he wanted to bring the war to an end, and for the accomplishment of this he thought an alliance with the Scots to afford the speediest and surest means. But the only condition on which this alliance could be secured was the adoption of the Covenant. And accordingly Cromwell signed it, though with him probably it went against the grain.

The Scots had watched with mingled feelings the outbreak and progress of the war in England. They congratulated themselves on the security of their own kirk, while the godly in the south had to fight for Reformation. But sometimes the painful question would obtrude itself, what would become of their kirk if King Charles should get the upper hand? They knew their "native-born prince" far too well to trust him; and though they might have confidence that they would always be able to fight their own battles, it was time their Reformation should be so secured that there would be no more battles to fight. In their view the most effectual way of accomplishing this would be to extend their own ecclesiastical polity to England. And Presbyterianism was so widely favoured by English Puritans that the attempt seemed not only practicable but easy.

But it should be remembered that the document agreed upon was not the original Scotch League and Covenant. It committed no one to any detailed creed, or to any particular theory of Church government. It was certainly regarded by the Scots as promising all they wanted. Still, by whatever influences the

language was moulded, it did not literally bind England to accept the Scotch model of the kirk and its activities.

Yet, when all is said, it must be admitted that the form of the agreement greatly narrowed the scope desired by the Independents for a free development of the revolution according to any fresh light they might receive, and any circumstances that might arise. It not only conferred on the presbytery an indisputable title to succeed to the spiritual throne of prelacy, but it engaged all the signatories "to preserve and defend the king's person and authority," an undertaking which, at least in reference to Charles I., had already become impossible. Far better would it have been for the English Parliament to have persisted in fighting its own battle alone than to accept aid on such terms. This fatal document was the fruitful cause of dissensions, recriminations, and plausible charges of faithlessness against the Independent army. And amongst the causes which overthrew the Commonwealth, postponing for generations the full fruition of Cromwell's victories, no insignificant place must be assigned to this Solemn League and Covenant.

If Cromwell had added to his earnest sincerity that last perfection of a great character, simplicity, he would have dared all consequences, both to himself and to the cause, rather than sign.

Subtlety might deceive him; integrity never would." But he was not simple. His great soul was a chaos of seething thoughts, impulses, and half-formed ideals, with some one immediate issue always emerging into glaring light and concentrating all his giant powers on itself. In September, 1643, "weak counsels and weak actings" were still threatening ruin. The Parliament was strong nowhere except in London and the Eastern Counties. The country was bleeding to death. Victory must be had. And the Scots could bring into the field 20,000 trained and resolute men. The document left much to after discussion and interpretation, and meantime the two kingdoms would be united against the curse of Popery and despotism.

In the interval between Winceby fight and the battle of Marston Moor, though there are traces of Cromwell's incessant activity, it is often difficult to arrange in an intelligible sequence his transient appearances here and there. We catch sight of him, not only in his proper domain of the Eastern Counties' Association, but about Bedford and Leicester and Oxford, at West