constitutes them moral agents, they are no more accountable for their actions than kids or lambs of the same age. During this period, they become habituated to indulgence and self-gratification, in regard to their animal appetites, and too often they are pampered much to their injury. They see many things which gratify their appetites, and others which allure by their beauty. When, therefore, they arrive at some knowledge of right and wrong, they are of course exposed to temptation. For they learn that restraints are now to be laid on the appetites and passions, which till then had been freely indulged; that it will be wrong any more to take what belongs to others, without leave; and wicked to practise falsehood and deception to obtain what they wish, or to excuse what they have done amiss. Their appetites may still crave what is now to them forbidden fruit; and temptation is unavoidable. If while in this state their minds should be so impressed by the affectionate entreaties and admonitions of their parents, as shall occasion them to resolve to resist the temptation; their volitions so to do are virtuous and commendable. But if they resolve to violate conscience, their volitions to transgress are selfish and sinful. On the one hand, by a succession of obedient volitions, they may form a virtuous and benevolent habit and character. On the other, by a series of selfish volitions, they may form a vicious and selfish habit and character.

Prior to moral agency, children perhaps evince no other properties than such as are found in many of the inferior tribes of animals; nor any more sense of moral obligation, or of right and wrong. While

in this state, to ascribe to them a selfish nature, meaning by this a sinful nature, and thus account for their imprudent or disagreeable actions, appears to me a proceeding not only unauthorized by scripture or reason, but repugnant to both. What can be more unjust than to impute moral blame to a being that is not a moral agent?

Should an objector say, that children, prior to moral agency, evince a selfish disposition by seizing playthings, food, and plumbs which they see in the hands of others; I would ask, Do we not see the same disposition in pigs and chickens? And what evidence have we of blamable selfishness in one of the cases more than in the other? If we may apply the term selfishness in either case, why not in both? In both it may be animal selfishness, but not moral. For by the supposition there is no moral agency in either.

On reviewing the last paragraph, I found that, with little premeditation, I had used the phrase animal selfishness. The phrase is new to me; but it appears pertinent to characterize a disposition or propensity which is common to the young of various tribes of animals; and a phrase that suggests a distinction, which has perhaps been too little regarded, if understood; a distinction between animal selfishness and moral selfishness. It may be expressed in the following manner:

Animal selfishness is that in the young of different tribes of animals which disposes each individual to appropriate to itself whatever it desires, without regard to the rights, the wants, or the feelings of others. Moral selfishness is that propensity in

moral agents which disposes them to act on the same animal or brutal principle, in opposition to the dictates of conscience, or in violation of the known laws of equity, love and mercy,

Until a child becomes a moral agent, his volitions • have no moral character. For where there is no moral light, there can be no moral obligation; and where there is no moral obligation there can bẹ no moral evil. But when by the light of moral truth, a child becomes a moral being, his actions have a moral character, to the extent of this moral illumination. The character of his actions becomes changed by the change of circumstances under which they occur. This principle is recognised by every reasonable law, and every reasonable being, Reasonable parents impute no moral blame to their children, so long as they are believed to be destitute of any knowledge of right and wrong. A maniac may kill his father, or his wife, or any other person, and yet be guiltless. However intelligent a person is expected to be in time to come, or has been in time past, he is not deemed accountable for what he does while destitute of the faculties necessary to moral agency.

To the extent that a child has attained moral light he is accountable. But when he first arrives at the stature of moral agency, he is but an infant in that state. Of course many of his actions will still be mere animal actions, not moral. He may know right from wrong in one case, while in fifty others he is not a moral agent. As his light increases, his duty increases; and he becomes more and more blamable, if he is in the habit of violating the dictates of conscience.

That a change of circumstances may occasion a change in the character of human actions, is very clear from the language of Christ relating to the unbelieving Jews—" If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin; but now they have no cloak for their sin." Had it not been for the divine prohibition, Adam and Eve might have eaten of the tree of knowledge without guilt. So until God in some way communicates to children moral light respecting their duty, their actions are destitute of any moral quality.

As each of the natural appetites and propensities disposes the animal in which it is found to seek selfgratification, the aggregate of this influence or tendency may, I think, be properly denominated animal selfishness. But God has distinguished the young of our race from other young animals by intellectual faculties, which are capable of such cultivation as to constitute them moral agents, and accountable beings. When they arrive at this state they are capable of receiving light, and of being influenced by moral precepts, moral truths, and by the examples of others. Our reason and moral faculties are given us to enable us to govern the animal part of our nature; to subject our appetites and passions to the law of love.

Our animal properties continue after we become moral agents; and it is true to a lamentable extent, that they are still suffered to reign in opposition to the dictates of conscience, and the requirements of God. Hence moral selfishness not only finds a place, but becomes habitual; and if the habit be not broken by some effectual call to repentance, it may

become like the Ethiopian's skin and the Leopard's spots.

It may also be observed, that when children are suffered to grow up to adult age without religious instruction, and in the unrestrained indulgence of their animal propensities and passions, if they are then awakened to repentance, their animal propensities still remain; and the more they have been indulged, the greater difficulty will naturally be found in subjecting them to the laws of temperance and equity.

What I have denominated animal selfishness, em braces all that the apostles mean by fleshly lusts Paul in his epistles made a distinction between “the flesh" and "the mind" or "the outward man" and

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"the inward man. He could use the following language: "For I know that in me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man; but I find another law in my members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin, which is in my members- so then with mind I myself serve the law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin." Rom. vii. 18, 22, 23, 25. 'For the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh." Gal. v. 17. He evidently regarded the flesh or the animal part of his nature as the source of temptation, sin and danger. On this account he said "I keep under my body and bring it into subjection, lest by any means after I have preached unto others, I myself should be a cast1 Cor. ix. 27. away."

Peter appears to have been of Paul's opinion.