a moral sense, which we think is implied in the existence of the soul, then they may have enough to sin." p. 35.

According to the common acceptation of language, an infant is as truly "a child of Adam" several months prior to his birth, as after it is born; nor do I see any more difficulty in his being a moral agent prior to his birth, than immediately subsequent. But in one part of the dissertation Dr. Spring has limited his meaning so as to exclude the idea of sin prior to birth. I shall therefore examine his hypotheses according to his own explanation.

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In favor of his hypothesis, Dr. S. has said many things which the advocates for " Native Depravity will probably regard as forcible; but all he has said depends on the correctness of the hypothesis, that children are born with such knowledge and such matured faculties as render them capable of moral agency. If this hypothesis is incorrect, his superstructure must fall, sooner or later, according to the progress of light.

That there are several passages of scripture, which, literally understood, are in favor of his hypothesis, I shall not deny. He, however, was aware that an objection would occur to a literal interpretation of such texts. For after having marshalled the texts on which he relied, he says "No doubt it will be said that some of the preceding passages are to be received in a figurative, and not in a literal sense❞—and then frankly adds - ." and this is true. So is a vast proportion of the passages which describe the sinful character of adults highly figurative, as will at once be remembered by every

attentive reader of the Bible." p. 32. This is a concession of great importance in this inquiry. For it is on the supposed literal meaning of such passages that hypotheses are advanced, and urged with great confidence, which seem to contradict the common sense of mankind, and many well known facts. It is therefore very proper to inquire what facts or reasons exist in favor of a figurative interpretation of all such passages of scripture as seem to be in favor of the doctrine, that infants are moral agents from the moment of their birth. Some such facts and reasons I shall state, and such only as appear to me of considerable weight.

1. "The infant of a day old" exhibits not the least evidence that he possesses the knowledge necessary to moral agency; on the contrary, all the appearances in the child, which relate to this subject, are in opposition to the hypothesis. We indeed regard the child at its birth as a being who may hereafter be a moral agent; and also as a being who may hereafter be able to walk and to speak; but at present he appears perfectly incapable of either. Indeed I suspect that Dr. Spring himself would be as much surprised to see such a child give evidence that he "knoweth to do good," as he would to see it spring from its mother's arms and walk about the house, or to hear it converse in the language of its parents in a rational manner.

2. So far as we are able to judge by experience or observation, children at two years of age have no knowledge, but what they have acquired by the aid of their senses and the teachings of parents or others, since they were born. After they have

become able to talk, and to understand much of what is said to them, it does not appear that they have one idea of moral right or wrong which they brought into the world with them not one besides those which have been inculcated by others.

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3. Analogy seems to me clearly to be against the idea that the infant soul at its first existence, or the child at its birth, is possessed of the knowledge and faculties which are requisite for moral agency. Vegetables and animals first exist in an embryo state, from which they gradually advance to a state of maturity, their properties, and powers unfolding and gradually becoming more and more mature, till their true character becomes obvious. Nor have we any evidence that the human soul or the human child is an exception from this apparently general rule of divine operation. When the child is born it exhibits no evidence that its mental faculties or organs are in a state of greater maturity than those which pertain to the body. In both respects it appears an infant, in a state of great imbecility and immaturity, as perfectly ignorant as it is helpless. Like many other animals it sucks by instinct, but with less appearance of knowledge than colts and calves.

4. There is much evidence of a great diversity as to the age at which different children become moral agents. How remarkable is the difference which is often perceived in different children of the same age! While one appears to have a clear perception of moral right and wrong in several distinct cases, another will appear as destitute of any such perceptions as a kitten or a puppy. In some instances

this diversity may result from a diversity of mental faculties; in others from a diversity of education.

5. So dependent are infants on the instructions they receive after they are born, for all they know of moral right or wrong, that children of different countries, and even of the same country, possess opposite ideas in many particulars relating to duty. Each will regard as God whatever he has been taught so to regard, whether it be Jehovah, an animal, or a senseless statue, each will regard his own worship as right, and the worship of the other as wrong. So the child of a savage may regard revenge as a duty; while the Christian child, duly educated, will regard it as an odious vice.

6. There is abundant evidence that the first perceptions of children are very imperfect, indistinct and incorrect. It is so in regard to natural objects; and perhaps still more so respecting things of a moral nature. What parents regard as the first indications of conscience in their children, may possess nothing more of a moral nature than the appearances of guilt or shame in the dog, when he finds himself detected in doing mischief, or doing something for which he had been previously chastised. The dog had learned from experience what was offensive to his master; so the child may learn what is offensive to his parents, before he has any clear perception of moral right or wrong.

7. Much more knowledge is requisite to moral agency than it seems reasonable to suppose a child to possess at its birth. One, two, or three ideas cannot be a competent stock for this purpose. Voluntary disobedience to a divine law, as such,

naturally implies some ideas of the precept violated

of what it requires and what it forbids; and some idea of a Lawgiver by whom the precept was given. To love God with all the heart, and our neighbor as ourselves, is the sum of the divine precepts. To love or to hate any being or object, implies some ideas of the being or object loved or hated. Now what does the new born infant know of God, or of any human being, even its mother, to render it capable of loving or hating? How is it possible that it should violate conscience in respect to a command of which it has not the least perception?

8. Disobedience of a moral precept implies not only some knowledge of the precept, and of the lawgiver, but of something which operates as a temptation or a motive to do wrong. If a child sins, he must be influenced by some motive so to do; or what morality can there be in the action? But what temptation or what motive was ever presented to the mind of an infant immediately after its birth, which could have any influence to induce it to transgress? When human beings transgress the divine laws, they are generally induced so to do, to gratify some animal or fleshly appetite or propensity; but what appetite or propensity of the infant can be gratified by acts of disobedience? and how can he know what will or will not gratify his animal appetites?

9. The remarkable account of Caspar Hauser may furnish facts in opposition to the hypothesis of Dr. Spring. Caspar appears to have been a child of good mental faculties, capable of receiving instruction. But such had been his confinement in a