sinful nature of the human will," or" an evil inherent in the will," than "sin inflicted," or a "tendency to sin implanted?" Why may we not say of each of these kinds of evils as he has said of some of them-it "may be calamity, deformity, disease, or mischief; but sin it cannot be?"

In the passage last quoted, Mr. C. has contrasted "disease" and "sin" as incompatible with each other. Yet in page 90 he has the following remark "I profess a deep conviction that man was and is a fallen creature, not by accidents of bodily constitution, or any other cause which human wisdom in a course of ages might be supposed capable of removing; but diseased in his will, in that will which is the true and only synonime of the word, I, or the intelligent self." Can a disease" of the will be less a calamity than a disease of the understanding? And why is not a disease in the will as incompatible with the idea of sin, as disease in any other faculty of the mind or the body? And if the disease be universal among mankind from their first existence as moral agents, may we not truly say "sin it cannot be," it is "another's work, not our own?" To attempt to trace back the evil through an indefinite series of volitions to the first act of the agent, and then account for this act by a self-determining power in the will, affords me neither light nor relief. If the series of volitions is to be accounted for by an "evil will," or an "evil inherent in the will," the inquiry then arises, what caused or occasioned the radical evil in the will itself? Can a self-determining power account for such a defect of the will antecedent to its first volition?

If not, how does Mr. C.'s hypothesis solve any difficulty? If it is difficult to account for the universality of man's liability to sin, without the hypothesis that all mankind commence their moral existence with an evil will, it is surely not less difficult to account for the universality of an " evil will" by a self-determining power in each individual. And of what advantage can a self-determining power be, if its first effect is to produce an evil, in the will of every human agent that possesses it? If such be the universal effect of possessing such a power, has not this power been a curse rather than a privilege to our race?

وو

If Adam became a sinner without an antecedent "evil inherent in his will," why may it not have been so with his posterity? I admit that liability to sin has been common to all the offspring of Adam. But liability to sin is not a sinful liability, and no more implies an evil will in the descendants of Adam than in himself. The very properties by which Adam was constituted a human being, capable of moral obedience and happiness, rendered him liable to both sin and suffering. Yet all these properties were "very good." They were not the effects of an evil will or any other evil cause; nor were they given for an evil purpose. The same may be said of the properties of Adam's posterity.

If Mr. C. believed that each of our race is chargeable with original sin, consisting in "an evil inherent in the will," and resulting from a selfdetermining power, I do not wonder that he deemed the fact "a mystery," and the doctrine one which can be "neither comprehended nor communicated."

But the fact that mankind are all liable to sin is no more a mystery than the facts that they have been liable to sufferings and mistakes. Questions may be asked in relation to either of the facts, which perhaps no man can answer in a manner entirely satisfactory even to himself; and the same may be said of every other fact or doctrine. Yet much of truth may be obvious respecting them. What intelligent man does not know that great favors expose men to great temptations? and who has not been himself" drawn away by his own lust and enticed?' As he is conseious of having been thus tempted himself, he may very naturally infer that it is so with others, and that it was so with Adam.

Who does not know that a man may be tempted to sin by an appetite or desire which in itself is innocent? Hunger and a desire for food are in themselves innocent. But to satisfy the cravings of hunger, a man, in certain situations, may be tempted to violate the rights of others and the law of love. If when thus tempted he acts against the dictates of conscience to satisfy his hunger, he is a transgressor; but no part of the sin consists in the hunger which exposed him to temptation. The sin is found in the volition by which he resolved to violate conscience, rather than longer to endure the cravings of an innocent appetite.

As sin is a transgression of the law, every sinner must have been a transgressor. But every person must be liable to sin before he can become a sinner; and I think it has been shown that liability to sin results from other sources than that of possessing a sinful nature or an "evil inherent in the will." It

is generally admitted that our first parents were not created sinners, nor with "an evil inherent in the will;" yet they were liable to sin. In these particulars, they were perhaps " adequate representatives" of all their offspring.

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Though in the preceding paragraphs I have used the phrase," a self-determining power," and have often seen it in the writings of others besides Mr. Coleridge, I am not certain that I clearly understand what others mean by the words; and I suspect that they are used with a variety of meanings by different persons. If by the phrase is meant that God gives to accountable beings, a power to choose their own ways, so that they are really free agents in choosing, and not machines, moved without voluntary agency on their part, then I hold to the doctrine of a self-determining power. But if by the phrase be meant, that the agent possesses a power to choose, which is independent of the all-sustaining power and agency of God, or that he chooses without any influence from motives, I am not a believer in the doctrine. For I doubt whether it is possible with God to invest a being with power to act independent of his Creator; and if a person could choose without any influence from motives, it might be questionable whether such volitions would possess any moral quality, good or evil.

NO. XII.

Parental Affection.

The peculiar affection of parents for their children is called "natural affection," and is regarded as a constitutional property of our race. It may also be called an animal affection, as it is common to various species of animals, from the elephant down to the ant. Among the inferior animals this affection is shorter in duration than among mankind; but perhaps not less ardent while it operates. In all animals which live together in pairs, something of parental affection is seen in both parents; but it is commonly stronger in the female than in the male.

Being "without natural affection," is spoken of by Paul as an odious characteristic in some of the heathen, or as a trait indicative of a vile character. But possessing this affection is not a proof of that love which is the fulfilling of the law. For some persons of a vicious character have strong affection for their offspring.

As parental affection is an animal property, like other animal properties, it is usually possessed by the vicious as well as by the virtuous. Like other animal properties, too, it should be subjected to the law of God, and when thus subjected it is subservient to human comfort and usefulness. I may add, that this affection, like other animal properties, exposes mankind to temptation and sin. In how many instances have affectionate but poor parents been tempted to steal food to relieve the hunger of their