The Harleian Miscellany, Or, A Collection of Scarce, Curious, and ...

With some Thoughts on the Interest of this Nation, as to a Naval War, and of the only true way of manning the fleet. Dedicated to the Parliament of Great Britain.

[From the second edition in Quarto, containing thirty-seven pages, printed at London, 1707.]

May it please your Honours:

IF Croesus's dumb son could speak, when he saw the knife at his father's throat, I hope I may be justified, when I plead in behalf of my country, our common mother, whose reputation, wealth, and security are now so highly concerned.

How it comes to pass, I need not say; but it is a melancholy reflexion to consider, that from the beginning of the war with France in King William's reign, to this day, a naval war seems to have been neglected, and accounted only a thing by the bye; and a war by land, carried on in foreign countries, has been regarded as our principal business, though nature and reason plainly dictate the contrary. Nature has assigned us an island, and kind Providence furnished us with materials to build ships, and with men of able bodies and stout hearts to man them; nor has the divine goodness been wanting to supply us with navigable rivers, and safe harbours; by which we may be enabled to defend ourselves, and annoy our enemies. By all this it is plain, we have had it in our power, by a right management of our fleet, to reduce our common enemy of France, and to have had the whole trade of the Spanish West-Indies, as the reward of the blood and treasure we have expended in defence of our own, and the liberties of Christendom. It has been in our power, not only to seize the French colonies in North and South America, but to establish our trade in the Spanish West-Indies, beyond whatever our ancestors could do. We have been engaged in defence of the

monarchy of Spain, from the usurpations of France; and this intitled us to fix a place of arms in any part of their dominions, as would best suit such a design. It is therefore strange, that when our attempt upon Cales miscarried (the reason of which is still a mystery) we did not immediately sail up the Streights, and take possession of Port Mahone in Minorca, and make it a harbour for our fleet, a magazine for our naval stores, for careening and refitting our men of war, as we did in the reign of King Charles the Second, during our war against Algiers.

This neglect deserves so much the more inquiry, that it is common for those, who design an invasion, to secure a place of arms and retreat in the country they invade, without which an invasion seldom proves successful; for, if there be no such place, the invaders by a cross accident may be left to the mercy of the invaded, or obliged to return home in winter, and lose all the advantages gained, during the

summer.

Had we possessed Port-Mahone, and kept a fleet there superior to the French, it would naturally have had the following consequences. 1. We might have prevented their sending forces to Italy by sea, which would soon have put an end to the war in that country; and, having no way to recruit their troops there, they must have surrendered prisoners of war.

2. We should have ruined the trade of Marseilles with the Italians, Spaniards, and Turks; and not only have secured, but considerably advanced our own trade in the Mediterranean.

3. The Isle of Majorca would have declared immediately for the Emperor, as they have since; and the inhabitants, who are accounted the best seamen, for privateers, of any in the Streights, would have been of considerable use to us, having a natural aversion to the French and Castilians.

4. When Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia had seen us masters of the Mediterranean, in winter as well as summer, they would have cast off the French yoke, on our sending a squadron to visit their coasts, whereby King Charles might easily have taken possession by land; and, consequently, the charge and hazard of this voyage, which we were put to, had been prevented.

5. We should have had a considerable trade with the Spaniards, even before they had been reduced, by means of neutral ships fetching our goods from Port Mahone, and bringing Spanish goods thither for us to carry home.

6. When the Rovers of Barbary had once found us masters of those seas, they must have given over their piracies, and applied to a fair way of trading; by which we should have enlarged our trade to Barbary, to our great advantage.

7. By being masters of Port-Mahone, we should naturally become guarantees of all treaties betwixt the Turks and any Christian nation: for the Turks, seeing us sovereigns in those seas, would never find it their interest to break treaties. The French first acquired their reputation at the Ottoman Porte, by pretending to be sovereigns of the Mediterranean: but, since the Turks have been partly undeceived,

by seeing us masters of that sea in the summer season, the French have sunk, at least, one half, at the Ottoman court; which clearly proves they must have sunk intirely, had we kept a fleet all the year in the Streights.

8. We should have saved the lives and ships lost in the great storm, had we wintered in Port Mahone; and, likewise, prevented the vast charge of making good those ships, and repairing the damage others have sustained, by coming home late in tempestuous seasons; to say nothing of our great loss of seamen, occasioned by want of good provisions, and particularly of clothes, on returning home from a hot country in the winter season. How it may fare with Sir Cloudesly Shovel, God only knows; but a great many hearts ake for him, considering how indifferently he was provided when he came from before Thoulon, and that it is now a season of long nights, subject to stormy and foggy weather; whereas, had Port-Mahone been in our hands, we might have been supplied with all necessary stores, both from Africa and Europe.

9. To mention no more, had we been masters of Port-Mahone, we might have maintained our fleet in the Streights with little or no expence to ourselves, by obliging the pope, princes, and states of Italy to contribute towards their maintenance. This would have been but reasonable, considering we prevented their falling under the French yoke, which all of them in their turns have found unsupportable. In this case, it had been just, that the court of Rome, who have fomented all the wars, which now destroy Christendom, should have borne the greatest share. And, had the pope pretended his apostolical treasure was low, it is known he can raise money to carry on a war against us, whom he calls hereticks, and for that end can suppress monasteries; which therefore would be more reasonable he should do now, to help to maintain those who preserve his dominions from being swallowed up by the power of France. But, had he proved stubborn, we could soon have made him comply, by blocking up the mouth of the Tiber, and bombarding Ancona and Civita Vecchia: for, as † Algernon Sidney says, Rome was more afraid of Blake, and his fleet, than they had been of the great King of Sweden, when ready to invade Italy with a hundred-thousand men. About which time, the Duke of Florence, by Blake's means, was glad to pay six-hundred thousand scudi's for our friendship. Another omission, in the beginning of the war, was our not having ten or twelve men of war constantly cruising in the latitude of Martinico, and Guardalupa, which would have cut off their communication of supplies from France, and soon have obliged those islands to surrender

to us.

We might likewise with five or six men of war, two or three bombvessels, and two or three thousand men, not only have recovered Placentia, which is our own, by right, and have seized the great fleet of ships, commonly there to catch fish in the summer; but like

• He was lost on the banks of Scilly, near the Land's-End, on his return to England. + Discourses of Government, second edit. p. 199.

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