Ignorance, and the Narrowness of our Faculties. Since therefore, on the other hand, mere Matter appears quite unable to account for the fimpleft and most ordinary Phænomena, we must either fuppofe an im@material Substance, or else suppose, that Matter has fome Powers and Properties different and fuperior to those which appear. But this laft Suppofition is the fame in effect as the firft, though, on account of the Imperfection of Language, it feems to be different.

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At the fame time it ought to be obferved, that if a Perfon acknowleges the infinite Power, Knowlege, to and Goodness of God, the Proofs of which are prior to, and quite independent on, that of his Immateriality, this Perfon acknowleges all that is of practical Importance. But then, on the other hand, it is alfo to be obferved, That the Opinion of the Materiality of the Divine Nature has a Tendency to leffen our Reverence for it, and, confequently, to invalidate the Proofs of the Divine Power, Knowlege, and Goodness.

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How far the Scriptures deliver the Immateriality of God in a strict philofophical Senfe, may perhaps be doubted, as their Style is in general popular. However, there is a ftrong Prefumption, that they teach this Doctrine, fince the popular Sense and natural Interpretation of many fublime Paffages concerning the Divine Nature infer its Immateriality. There is therefore fome Evidence for this Attribute, to be taken from Revelation, confidered as ftanding upon its own diftinct Proofs.

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COROLLARY. Since God is immaterial, Matter must be one of the Works of his infinite Power. the mean time, this does not seem to me to exclude the Poffibility of its having exifted from all Eternity. But then, neither have we, on the other hand, any Reason to conclude, that the whole material System, 0 or any Part of it, could not have been created in Time. It is, perhaps, moft probable, i. e. fuitable to the VOL. II, Divine

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Divine Attributes, that infinite material Worlds have existed from all Eternity. But it becomes us, in all thefe Things, to diftruft our own Reasonings and Conjectures to the utmofl.

PROP. 7.

God is an eternal and omniprefent Being. GOD's Eternity, à parte ante, appears from the Second Propofition, in which his Independency is proved; and the Eternity, à parte poft, is infeparably connected with that à parte ante. Both are alfo included in the Idea of infinite Power, or of infinite Knowlege; and, indeed, when we say, that God is eternal à parte ante, and à parte poft, we do, we can, mean no more, than to fay, that his Power and Knowlege extend to all Times. For we must not conceive, or affirm, that he exists in Succeffion, as finite Beings do; through whofe Imaginations, or Intellects, Trains of Ideas pafs. All Time, as was faid before, is equally present to him, though in a Manner of which we cannot form the leaft Conception.

In like manner, by God's Omniprefence, or Ubiquity, we must be understood to mean, that his Power and Knowlege extend to all Places. For as Time, and its Exponent, the Succeffion of Ideas, is a Thing that relates merely to finite Beings; fo Space and Place relate, in their original Senfe, to material ones only; nor can we perceive any Relation that they bear to immaterial ones, unless as far as we feign a Refemblance between material and immaterial Beings, which is furely an inconfiftent Fiction. We cannot, therefore, difcover any Relation which Space or Place bear to the Divine Exiftence. It is a fufficient Acknowlegement both of God's Eternity and Omniprefence, that we believe his Power and Knowlege to extend to all Times and Places, though we be intirely at a Lofs how to conceive or exprefs the Manner of

this infinite Extent of these Attributes. And there is a remarkable Agreement between innumerable Paffages of the Scriptures, and this practical Notion of God's Eternity and Omniprefence.

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HIS follows from the Infinity of the Divine Power, Knowlege, and Goodnefs, i. e. from his infinite Perfection. For if the Divine Nature admitted of any Variation, it would alfo admit of different Kinds and Degrees of Perfection, and therefore could not always be infinitely perfect. This is the most abstracted and philofophical Way of confidering the Divine Immutability. In a popular and practical Senfe, it excludes all that which we call inconftant, arbitrary, and capricious, in finite Beings; and becomes a fure Foundation for Hope, Truft, and Refignation. We may confider ourselves as being at all Times, and in all Places, equally under the Direction and Protection of the fame infinite Power, Knowlege, and Goodness, which are fo confpicuous in the Frame of the visible World.

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PRO P. 9.

God is a free Being.

HE Authors who have treated upon the Divine Nature and Attributes, ufually afcribe. Liberty or Freedom to God, and suppose it to be of a Nature analogous to that Free-will which they afcribe to Man. But it appears to me, that neither the philofophical, nor popular Liberty, as they are defined below in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Propofitions, can be at all applied to God. Thus, we can neither apply to God the Power of doing different Things, the previous

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previous Circumftances remaining the fame, nor a voluntary generated Power of introducing Ideas, or performing Motions; nor any thing analogous to either of thefe Powers, without the groffeft Anthropomorphitism.

But Liberty is also used in another Senfe, viz. as the Negation of, and the Freedom from, a superior, compelling Force; and in this Sense it may and must be applied to the Deity; his Independency and Infinity including it. And in this Senfe it is contrary to the Notion of thofe Heathens, who fuppofed even God himself subject to Fate.

Upon the Whole, if by Liberty, Freedom, or Freewill, be meant any thing great or glorious, God certainly has it; if otherwife, certainly not. Thus, if it mean Freedom from a fuperior compelling Caufe of any kind, as in the laft Paragraph, God certainly has it, he being the Cause of Causes, the universal, the one only Cause. If it mean, that God could have made an Universe lefs perfect than that which actually exifts, he certainly has it not, because this would make God lefs perfect alfo. And here it feems to be a Thing established amongst Writers on this Matter, to maintain, that God is fubject to a moral Neceffity, and to the Perfection of his own Nature; which Expreffions, however, are to be confidered as nothing more than particular Ways of afferting the Infinity of the Divine Power, Knowlege, and Goodness. If it be faid, that God might have made a different Univerfe, equally perfect with that which now exifts, and that his Freedom confifts in this, the Answer feems to be, that we are intirely loft here, in the Infinities of Infinities, &c. ad infinitum, which always have exifted, and always will exist, with refpect to Kind, Degree, and every poffible Mode of Exiftence. One cannot, in the least, prefume either to deny or affirm this Kind of Freedom of God, fince the abfolute Perfection of God feems to imply both intire Uniformity,

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and infinite Variety in his Works. We can here only fubmit, and refer all to God's infinite Knowlege and Perfection.

Holiness, Juftice, Veracity, Mercy, and all other moral Perfections, ought to be afcribed to God in an infinite Degree.

Have in the last Four Propofitions treated of fuch Attributes of the Divine Nature, as have a more immediate Connexion with the natural ones of Independency, infinite Power, and infinite Knowlege. I come now to thofe, that are deducible from, and explanatory of the moral one, viz. of the Divine Benevolence.

The chief of these feem to be Holiness, Juftice, Veracity, and Mercy. These are ascribed to all earthly Superiors, to whom we pay Respect and Love, and therefore must belong, in the popular and practical Senfe, to him, who is the highest Object of Reverence and Affection. Let us fee how each is to be defined, and what Relation they bear to Benevolence.

First, then, Holiness may be defined by moral Purity and Rectitude. And these, when applied to the Deity, can only denote the Rectitude of his Actions towards his Creatures. If therefore he be benevolent to all his Creatures, he cannot but have moral Purity and Rectitude.

The fame Thing may be confidered thus: All moral Turpitude in us proceeds from our felfish Fears or Defires, made more irregular and impetuous through our Ignorance, and other natural Imperfections. But none of these Caufes can take place with respect to the Deity; he must therefore be free from all moral Turpitude.

Juftice is that which gives to every one according to his Deferts, at least as much as his good Deferts require,

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