langage) has still been retained and encouraged as appertaining to the aristocratic guild of 'hommes de lettres.' The scholar-guildsman is no longer outwardly distinguishable from the joiner-guildsman, but still great emphasis is laid upon the 'dignity of science.' Science is for human beings, and reflects upon human life; and there is no reason for disconnecting the two. In the field of the knowable, nothing transcends human life, nothing is more dignified than human life. Hume (in the first Section of his Enquiry), has well said: 'Man is a reasonable being, receives from science his proper food and nourishment. Man is a sociable being, no less than a reasonable being -and man is an active being.' We must be sociably-scientific and scientifically-sociable; as Hume proceeds, 'Be a philosopher; but amidst all your philosophy, be still a man.' In one case this so-called dignity, or rather unpopularity, is admissible, nay, even advisable and necessary:-when it means a saving of time and trouble, when it is a matter of convenience, hastening the progress of knowledge and culture. Science has invented symbols which simplify and facilitate the thinking process. It has a terminology which contributes to exactness and speed, and in many cases it would be impracticable to translate these symbols into a relatively great mass of terms of common language. But the final test of the utility of scientific truths must be their translation into the language in which our forefathers and we have thought from very infancy. These being my views, it is highly probable that many scientific readers (should they accord the book any notice) will consider many propositions, examples, and analogies as superfluous and trite; while some of the unscientific will find that certain portions require far greater exertion and expense of comprehensive energy than others. But I think that it is rather a disciplinary advantage when a book varies in the easiness of its style. If possible, a book is to be like life: varied and chequered, appealing to the different faculties and inclinations of man. I contest the view that 'style' means sameness in the manner of expression-nay, I even believe that the desirable style is that which adapts itself to the subjects with which it deals at different moments. In This book has not grown up uniformly; but several facts have contributed to make it a whole. A part has been delivered as a lecture. the lecture I attempted to counteract one out of the whole group of fallacies which I considered were vitiating correct thought and actions based upon thought, namely, the false opposition of Emotion and Intellect. Later on, I felt that there was need of counteracting other fallacies of the same group, namely, those with regard to the opposition of Science and Common Thought and Philosophy and the Exact Sciences. This being the origin of the book, there will necessarily be several immediate aims. But they all combine in the one ultimate aim to bring forth the feeling for philosophy, the philosophical spirit and mood, 'der philosophische Sinn,' as the Germans would call it. Contrary to recently-expressed views, I found that the best means of producing this mental attitude was to give a short history of Philosophy, after giving a matter of present discussion as a fixed point of departure on the historical journey into remote ages. The further removed the subject, the greater is the appeal to the sympathetic power, and therefore I have dealt more explicitly with the earlier philosophers and their systems; assuming that the novice can proceed more easily alone, after he has been led, until he has become acquainted with the aim philosophers had posited to themselves, the spirit with which they were imbued, and the language they spoke. Though there exist several excellent short histories of philosophy, there may still be need of a book treating the subject more as an introduction and incentive to that study than those which have hitherto appeared. It was therefore deemed inexpedient to encumber the body of the work with exhaustive expositions and numerous references. However, I feel bound to remark that the works and teachings of Professor Kuno Fischer of Heidelberg have strongly influenced me in the composition of this essay. It may be a mistake to write a book with any aim besides that immediately contained in the question it discusses; and it may be impolitic to challenge comparison between the loftiness of the |