under all circumstances, that this revolution is going forward unperceived, without any struggle or convulsion. It is produced not by the exercise of any external force but by the conviction of truth. The spread of English literature has taught men to think more liberally and act more generously. The impression of ideas that are noble and are therefore congenial to the mind of man when unbiassed by prejudices, and imbibed from early youth through the medium of an energetic language, cannot fail to have its desired effects, and accordingly the system of educating Indian youths in the literature of Europe has been the source of great benefit to the country. The remarkable aptitude of the Indian races coming in contact with the exertions of the vigorous intellect of Europeans promises the production of something wonderful. Their perseverence in always adhering to what they believe to be the right path when properly directed by those impressions which they derive through the medium of the English language, will one day make them capable of achieving great things.

MOHENDRO LAUL SHOME, Hindu College,

First College Class, Senior Scholar,

of the First Grade.

Library Examination.

Questions and Answers for Library Medal.

1. Macaulay says "the end which Bacon proposed to himself was

fruit."

"This was the object of all his speculations."

Does Bacon's Philosophy consider the physical and perishable conveniences of life man's highest good?

Support your opinion by quotations from his writings.

2. Did Bacon foresee the gradual ascent which Science was destined to make from his time?

And shew, by an example from Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, that a general law includes within it all the less general laws of the same class.

3. State the objection of Hallam to the use of the English term "idols" from the latin "idola" of Bacon.

4. Did Bacon expect that Philosophy was destined to arrive at efficient causes?

What is Hallam's opinion of Bacon's anticipation?

And Dugald Stewart's?

Why does the latter call efficient causes "metaphysical," and " neces

sary

5. The difference between the "Forms" of Plato, of Aristotle, and of Bacon ?

6. State some of the advantages for the formation of a Method of Discovery possessed by Philosophers of this age, but which were wanted by Bacon.

7. The most striking particulars in which the Logic of Bacon differs from that of Aristotle.

8. Bacon's opinion of Plato's Philosophy as compared with that of the earlier Greeks.

Macaulay's remarks on it.

Hallam's remarks on Bacon's objection to the mixture of final causes in Plato's philosophy.

Answer 1st.-Bacon's Philosophy did not consider the physical convenience of man as the highest good. The contemplation of truth was a far nobler object for the satisfaction of one that was endowed with the powers of reason. That he considered the latter as superior to our physical pursuits may be gathered from many of the passages from "the Advancement," "the Novum Organum" and others of his works. In his Essays he places the Essay on Truth before all others and even in the Novum Organum, (the work which is to be considered as the great usherer of his phylosophy) the same compliment is paid to truth by placing truth before utility. Again in his Advancement when answering the objections of some of the divines against learning he plainly says that nothing can fill, much less can it swell, the mind, but God and the contemplation of God. Lastly when speaking of the object of learning he says that in it is to be sought a house for the relief of man's self, and the glory of the creator. Macaulay has said that the great object of Bacon's works, was the discovery of works. But in laying tress upon this he has, as Whewell well observes, left out the first and the better part of the passage. Bacon's great object was, first ascending up to axioms and then descending to works. But yet it may be asked why he laid so much tress on the discovery of works? The truth seems to be that Bacon was no less a sincere worshipper of truth than any of the ancient philosophers; but he liked to devote his time for the advancement of useful knowledge. The reason is obvious. All his predecessors have given themselves up to the contemplation of truth; in them truth has found many sincere and zealous devotees; but the temple of Nature was entirely forsaken. Truth could not lose much by the falling off of a single votary. So Bacon in a truly chivalric spirit took the neglected and oppressed beauty under his protection, fought for her and restored her to a throne from which she had been violently thrusted out.

Answer 2nd.-That Bacon foresaw the gradual ascent which science was destined to make from his time evidently appears from some parts of his writings when he positively and exultingly speaks of the advances which it was to make. He says that the work to which he was the first to direct the attention of mankind, could not be finished by the endeavours of a single individual but required the joint labours of ages to bring it to perfection. He himself acknowledges that the tables which he constructed were not perfect, nor could it expected that they should be so. Ages were to be spent in collecting materials, ages more in digesting them into tables and classifications, so that these classifications large and extensive as they are, were to be disposed of in laws of the lowest degrees of generality; and from these and other facts were to be collected laws which were next to it. In this way all the advances in the experimental sciences are but the successive steps of a great generalisation. Excellent examples of this generalisation are given in Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. The law of universal gravitation is a general law which has been arrived at by the successive generalisation of a variety of facts and laws less general. In the earliest dawn of

the Greek Philosophy the motions of the heavenly bodies were considered as subject to no definite law; after the Greeks made some progress in it they found that all of them appeared to move round the earth, some in an equal, others in an unequal and varying interval of time. But even their irregular motions were classified by them, and Ptolomy supposed that they moved in epycycles. Here was a law which seemed to explain a great variety of phenomena; but though it succeeded in explaining a great many facts, the retrograde, stationary and direct motions of the planets could not be occounted for. So when Copernicus flourished he supposed the whole system to revolve round the sun and not round the earth. This was in his time merely a hypothesis which was afterwards confirmed by facts. But although Copernicus rightly supposed the whole system to revolve round the sun he could not explain how these bodies were retained in space. Neither did his successors Galilio and Keplar, (the former of whom supposed the moon to be attracted by the earth, and the latter discovered their laws, of the elliptic motions of the planets, the equal description of areas in equal times, and the periodic times of the planets,) arrive at a general law by which the whole system of the world was regulated. It was left for Newton who from the observations and laws found out by his predecessors, and also from his own observations proved the universal law of gravitation. So in this law all the former laws, those of the elliptic motion, the description of areas and the periodic times of the planets were included.

Answer 3rd. The chief objection of Hallam to the use of the English word idol for idola seems to be that the English word does not express the same thing which the author means to be signified by idola. Of this distinction the author himself was perfectly conscious; but the error into which some of the later writers have fallen renders it necessary that the distinction between these words should be sufficiently explained. The idolas or the false appearances of the mind are those by which we are misled not knowing that they exist. They deceive us unknowingly. But the term idol signifies a false deity to which we bow down and offer our worship in preference to what is true. The idea of a idol seems to signify that we are conscious of its existance though we take it in a mistaken sense. But the existance of the idolas or the false appearances is never known to us. The one seems to deceive us unconsciously, the other by its appearance though in a false dress.

Answer 4th.-Bacon it seems inclined to the opinion that the enquiry and the discovery of the efficient causes of things was within the province of human knowledge. In his advancement he says that the enquiry about the final causes is useful, but the enquiry about the forms of things, that is, their internal organizations and formations, was useful in the production of works. According to this view of the question he seems to think it possible that we may know the internal structure of gold, and thus produce gold, that we may find out the forms of motion, heat, &c.

To this opinion Hallam consents. He says that though we have not yet arrived at what is called the efficient causes of things, the discovery of the modern philosophers have advanced much nearer to what was so sanguinely anticipated by Bacon; so that though it has not yet been done the possibility of such a work may be entertained. To this Stewart objects saying that Bacon was led too much beyond the limits of the physical sciences by an uncommon success in his speculations; a fault which as we know great intellects are liable to fallin.

We may mention the name of Lebnetz as having the same turn of mind. But to proceed, efficient causes as Stewart observes, cannot be exactly explained. Physical causes are what we may be said to know; but they do not explain the phenomena. Physical causes are but forerunners of particular events; we see them constantly conjoined; but how they are so linked together, whether the connection is necessary, we know nothing about. Hence they cannot be called necessary causes. The idea of an efficient cause exists in the mind only. When we see an action we necessarily and as it were, by the constitution of our mind, think there must be a cause of that action; but what that cause is we cannot determine. Hence efficient causes are called metaphysical causes since they exist in the mind alone.

Answer 5th. The forms or ideas of Plato were the architypes of things. "The idea of a thing," says Plato "is that which makes one of many, which running into and mixing with things infinite, preserves its integrity and nature, so that under whatever disguise it may be concealed we may find it out." According to Plato there were some perfect models made by the Divine Hand which the things in nature partook. These models were called by Plato the ideas of the Divine Mind; so that there were ideas of beauty, greatness, wisdom, &c., and the things which partook of these ideas were called by these names. Things which partook of beauty were called beautiful, things, partaking of greatness great, and those of wisdom and nobleness, wise and noble. The forms of Aristotle were the architypes of natural things. The ideas and forms of Plato and Aristotle may be at first thought synonymous. But there was this distinction among them. The ideas of Plato did not exist in things; they had an independant existance; but the forms of Aristotle were impressed in matter. They existed with matter but they were not eternal like the Platonic ideas; matter could exist without form, but form could not exist without it.

66 we

The forms of Bacon were quite different. By the word form Bacon meant laws of nature. "When we mention form" says Bacon, mean nothing more than laws in subjects of simple nature capable of having them; so that the forms of heat, weight and light are the laws of heat, weight and light" Bacon's Novum Organum, part II. as quoted by Stewart part II. sec. VII.

Answer 6th.—The advantages which philosophers of the present day possess are various. Bacon in forming a method of discoverying the laws of nature had none to assist him. Nay he could not disclose his design to any body without meeting with a sure rebuke for his presumption. In his times science was not formed so he could not take a single example to prove the truth of his rules but was obliged to find out the rule and the example himself.

At present great discoveries have been made in the different branches of science by different persons, so one may just refer to the works of these without much difficulty; and these discoveries are the principal things which throw light on a rational system of logic. So fully has the prophecy of Bacon been fulfilled that the art of discovery will grow with the arts themselves.

Answer 7th.-The Inductive logic of Aristotle and that of Bacon agreed in one thing that both referred the discovery of the laws of nature to observation; but otherwise they differed greatly. The method of Aristotle collected laws from the simple innumeration of a great

many instances without rejections of those which seem contradictory. But Bacon would not be satisfied with such a system of logic. He required a method which would sift nature by proper examinations and rejections, guard the senses, from giving false reports, and correct their incompetency by substitution and rectification. He would then proceed gradually from one law to another always considering the negative instances as of greater authority than the affirmatives, till he arrived at laws of the highest degree of generality. But with Aristotle the case was otherwise. He took some vague and imperfect notions from external natures, formed laws according to his own conceptions, and applied them to explain all the phenomena of nature. But if any phenomenon happened which seemed to overset these laws, he instead of correcting them would endeavour to strain it to these or save them by subtle distinctions to preserve the first authority of his choice. Well might a philosopher say that the induction which proceeded this way by simple enumeration is a childish thing.

Answer 8th.-The philosophy of Plato which aimed at the contemplation of final causes, was not a philosophy destined to produce fruits, but like a virgin devoted to the contemplation of God, remained barren.

All the Greek schools of philosophy except his, had some thing which smelled of natural philosophy. The atoms of Luceppus and Democritus, the Hoiememora of Anaxagoros, the amity and enmity of Empedocles, the heaven and earth of Permenides, all bespoke something of natural philosophy. But the philosophy of Plato was not of that kind. Undoubtedly if the tree, which, as Macaulay well observes, Socrates planted, and Plato watered and cherished, is to be judged by its flowers and blossoms it is the most beautiful and pleasing, but it did not produce much good fruits.

Bacon says that the contemplation of the final causes cannot be of any use in the discovery of the laws of nature; but in this Bacon, it seems, was somewhat mistaken. The consideration of final causes as Stewart and Hallam have shewn, led to some of the most important discoveries. The discovery of the circulation of blood by Dr. Halley was made by the consideration of the final cause of the valves in the veins and arteries. The consideration of the final causes as Stewart has shewn by a great number of quotations and examples is of great use in animal anatomy.

BHUGWAN CHUNDER BOSE, Dacca College.

Senior Scholar, First College Class,