VOL.

II.

1. SUCH a contradicted profeffion is not wont to do fo in other cafes. No man can take him to be a friend, who calls himself one against a continued series of actions, which manifestly import habitual hatred, enmity, and malice. No one will call him a good fubject, whatever he pretends, who is at present in open hostility against his prince.

2. SUCH a profeffion in other cafes not only gives no reputation amongst men, but brings a difgrace, and cafts a reproach upon the person making pretences. When a man's actions are continued, palpable and manifest against his profeffion, as in this cafe, it brings, I fay, a reproach upon him for pretending to it. And it is fo far from being to his reputation that he draws upon himself the fufpicion of being either falfe, or foolish: of being falfe, that he would defign to deceive; of being foolish, that he could hope to fucceed in fuch a cafe, or, indeed, of both thefe together.

3. A MERE profeffion among men, in every common cafe, is fo far from fecuring reputation to him who makes it, that it even finks the reputation of the man that credits it. A very judicious perfon this to be fo eafily impofed upon ! Therefore he who attempts in fuch a way to impose upon another, either he, upon whom he makes the attempt, will but regard him as a fool; or will be fo accounted himself, because it is fuppofing him to be one who is capable of being fo impofed upon. Which is no less than an attempt

to blast the reputation of him, whom he endea-S ER M. vours to deceive.

4. A SERIES or courfe of actions is always to be taken as more fignificant and expreflive of the habitual sense and temper of a perfon's mind, than words can be thought to be. Words only speak a man's present sense of things, but a continued course of actions fhews his habitual sense of them; and is therefore the far greater, and more confiderable thing on all accounts.

IF I am to form a judgement of another man, it is of more importance to know what the bent of his mind is now, than to know what it was, at this or that particular time. It is manifeft that a series of actions is more fignificant and expref five; whether you compare words and actions together with relation to the fame thing, or apply them feverally to contrary things.

IF you apply words and actions to one and the fame thing, let it be for inftance to kindnefs and good-will: Suppose then you have for your object a very indigent and diftreffed perfon, one expofed to cold and pinched with hunger; let one fay to him in this cafe, "Come be filled, be warmed;" pray what would that fignify in comparison of giving him the things which are needful for the body, as the Apostle speaks in the fame cafe? Which is the moft fignificant expreffion, fuch fair words, or fuch effectual actions?

AGAIN; Let words and actions be applied together to the fame thing and to fignify ill-will: B 4

An

II.

Jam. 11. 16.

II.

VOL. An unkind word may fignify but a fudden paffion, and no one will infer habitual hatred from an angry word: but a course of actions may import not only unkindness, but a malicious temper of mind.

THEN if we apply these two ways of expreffing a man's mind, that is, words and actions, to contraries, the one to fignify kindness, the other unkindness; if it be manifeft that words are lefs fignificant and actions more, furely then that which has lefs fignificance in it, is never to be believed against that which has greater. Again,

5. No man's words are to be believed against his works. If a man should say and unsay the fame things, it may be a hundred times in a day, would you give any credit at all to his words? It is impoffible you fhould. For in any cafe where I am to exercife human faith, if there be much to be faid for and against the thing, I must believe, according to the greater evidence, and cannot do otherwife; I neceffarily muft take that fide in my belief on which the stronger probability lies. But in this cafe what shall I do? I can here take neither fide: for how can a thing be greater or better than itself? I have therefore nothing to do here. I can exercise no faith; for I am not to believe a man's word against his word, when there is equal evidence on the one hand and the other. I am much lefs to believe

his word against his actions, for that would be believing according to the lefs evidence. And fur

ther,

6.

6. Ir a profeffion were to prevail amongst SER M. men, against a series of actions, it would take II. away the ground and foundations of all publick human judgements. For fuppofe a man arraigned of murder, the business to be inquired into is, what evidence there is of malice prepense. This is the matter to be tried. For the bare taking away the life of a man, is not the crime to be punished. But the thing to be inquired into is, what evidence there is, or what inducements to believe that the thing was defigned or purposely done. If against plain facts, and apparent circumftances to the contrary a man's word should be believed, there could then be no fuch thing as a human judicature in the world.

7. ACTIONS cannot be opposed to a mere verbal or a scenical profeffion, with greater abfurdity, in any cafe whatsoever, than in the matter of religion. You can fuppofe no cafe wherein actions can be opposed to actions, and words or a profeffion to a course of actions with greater abfurdity than in this prefent cafe. If we were to think of things manifeftly abfurd, we could advance nothing that is more fo. Suppofe, for instance, a perfon upon a journey should pretend to be in his right road, and he is told he is going a quite contrary way, and one should follow him, from day to day, and still fee him going wrong, though he still says he is on his journey and is going right; what can be more abfurd? Now let us use our understanding and confider, whether there be not as ridiculous an abfurdity in pretending to religion,

against

VOL. against a series of actions, which have a contrary II. tendency. Do we not all know that religion, in

the common notion of it, has a tendency to bleffedness; even to glorify GoD, and to enjoy him for ever in glory, as the end? Can there be a greater contrariety fuppofed in any one thing to another, than there is in a courfe of wickedness to the glorifying and enjoying Go D? Or can any man think, without as palpable abfurdity as is poffible in any cafe, that whoredom, drunkenness and debaucheries of all forts, are means and instruments for the glorifying Go D, and faving a man's own foul? To fay, I am a Christian, is to fay, I am going to Go D, to glorify, to enjoy him for ever. But you can fuppofe no cafe wherein contrary actions can be opposed to a profeffion, with more abfurdity than in this.

8. We are exprefsly forbidden, in the holy Scriptures, to treat, and behave our felves towards Chriftians that are only fo in name and profeffion, in the fame manner as we are obliged to act towards thofe that are fincere. We are even directed to turn away from those, who have a form of godliness but deny the power of it. When perfons are unperfuadable and obftinate in an evil way and vicious courfe, and will not hear the Church they are to be counted as heathens and publicans', and are not to enjoy the reputation of Chriftians, even amongst men, according to the law and judgement of Chrift himself in this very

matter.

9.

Math. XVIII. 17.

e. 2 Tim. 111. 5.