1. That we are secretly convinced in our own minds, that the doctrine of the Trinity cannot, after all, be maintained, in consistency with that of the Divine unity.-This is false.

2. That, being much more strongly attached to the former of these doctrines than to the latter, we feel no great scruple at surrendering, or purposely weakening, the evidence of the latter, for the sake of supporting the former. "He there"fore," says Mr. Yates, "carries the argument no further "than to the proof of unity of counsel."-This is equally false.

3. That we profess to believe both the doctrine of the Unity, and the doctrine of the Trinity, to be express articles of the Christian revelation;-and yet our system of Christian faith inclines us to doubt and to deny the former, and to question, and limit, and invalidate, those proofs from nature by which it is confirmed.

4. Dr. Paley was a Trinitarian, "at least professedly."It is here insinuated, that his profession of Trinitarian principles was of at least doubtful sincerity. Be it so. It is very likely the suspicion is not entirely without foundation. Yet, one should think, it would require a person to be a very warm friend indeed to Trinitarian principles (on the supposition of their being at variance with the Divine unity) before he would, for the sake of them, intentionally introduce confusion and dubiety into any of the arguments for the fundamental doctrine of the unity of God.

5. After all, Mr. Yates has said nothing to show the incorrectness of Dr. Paley's view of the argument. Is it not true, that unity of counsel may subsist amongst a plurality of counsellors? Is it not, then, true also, that from the simple consideration of unity of design, it is impossible to infer, with conclusive certainty, the existence and operation of one designer? Mr. Yates answers such questions,

by substituting an argument of a totally different description, -namely "the competence of one omnipotent and infinite "Designer to produce every effect which is discernible "throughout the universe," connected with "the princi"ple, that no more causes ought to be supposed than are 66 necessary to account for the effects."

Now, supposing this ground of reasoning unobjectionable, still my remark would be well-founded, that it is recondite, and far from obvious and palpable to the great majority of mankind. But further; though we may be able, from other considerations, to show the absurdity of supposing the existence of more than one infinite and almighty Being; I am not sure how far the inference is warrantable from this consideration alone,-viz. the sufficiency of one such Being to account for all discernible effects. The power of one man is sufficient to account for the existence of a watch. Yet we know we should be wide of the truth, were we to conclude that one such agent only was employed in the production of it. And numberless, indeed, amongst mankind, are the instances of such harmony of design and of effect, while there is a plurality of designers and efficient agents. How, then, is the mind, and especially the untutored mind, that is a stranger to the reasonings of philosophy, to infer with certainty, the existence of only one Almighty Agent, merely from the circumstance of one only being necessary to account for existing effects?

The remarks under this last particular are introduced merely by the way. They belong to the doctrine of the Divine unity; with that of the Trinity they really have no connexion. Mr. Yates may allege what he pleases about my system of Christian faith inclining me to consider uniformity of plan as proving only unity of design, maintained

"by three designers:" but I feel myself entitled to be believed, both by Mr. Yates and by every other person, when I assure him, that when, in writing my observations on the proofs from nature of the unity of God, I introduced Dr. Paley's qualification of the argument derived from harmony of design, I had no thought of the doctrine of the Trinity in my mind; that the possibility never once entered my imagination, of Mr. Yates, or any other reader, mistaking or perverting my remarks on this point, in the manner he has done; that I am as firm a believer in the unity of God as Mr. Yates himself; that I hold, in connexion with this, the doctrine of a threefold distinction in the Divine essence, because the inspired records assure me of its existence; that, while I cannot pretend to explain how this distinction subsists, and how it is consistent with unity, I believe, on the authority which affirms both, that there is no contradiction between them, and reckon it quite enough, that, from the nature of the case, as one entirely beyond the comprehension of our minds, such contradiction can never be proved.

Mr. Yates next proceeds to the argument in support of a plurality of persons in the Godhead, from the plural termination of Aleim, Adnim, and other Hebrew names for God.

The force of this argument should be viewed as arising rather from the combined effect of the different considerations which I have so briefly touched upon. Mr. Yates takes them one by one, makes a distinct and formal argument for me out of each of them, discusses them in this insulated statc, so as to prevent the reader from observing the support which they mutually afford to each other.

Let us take his remarks, however, as they stand.

He first of all thinks it necessary, formally to acquit me of any intention to burlesque the Scriptures, in giving as a

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"translation" or "version" of my text, "Hear, O Israel, "Jehovah OUR GODS (Aleim) is one Jehovah."-Now, surely Mr. Yates could hardly fail to be aware, that I never meant to propose this as a preferable translation or version of this and similar passages; but used the term Gods in the plural, for no other purpose than to show to the eye of the mere English reader, that the Hebrew Aleim was in that number. I had originally written it, and perhaps it would have been better to have kept it so,-" Jehovah, our ALEIM (Gods) is "one Jehovah."

Mr. Yates goes on to observe" 1. First, if the plural "termination of ALEIM, &c. indicates plurality at all, it de"notes not only a plurality of persons or subsistences, but a plurality of Gods; for on this supposition, Mr. Wardlaw's "translation is undoubtedly correct, Jehovah, our Gods.' "But this, I presume, is more than even Trinitarians will be "disposed to admit." (P. 135.)

Yes, indeed. It is more, certainly, than even Trinitarians, with all their voracious credulity, are disposed to admit. My very first remark on the text was in these words: "Unity and

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plurality are both kere asserted; and the plurality is empha

tically declared to be consistent with the unity." (P. 12.) · The unity is not disputed. It is affirmed in the Scriptures:-it is pointedly asserted in the very text on which the observations are founded:-it is alike maintained by Trinitarians and Unitarians. The only inference that can be drawn, if any is to be drawn at all, from the plural name for God, is, that this unity is a unity of such a nature as admits distinction; that God is one, but that, at the same time, there is a plurality in the Godhead. The text itself, in which the Divine unity is so peremptorily affirmed, necessarily precludes all inference beyond this.

2. Mr. Yates next quotes a rule, as "resolving the whole

"mystery," from "that useful book the Hebrew Grammar." The rule quoted in this tone of sarcastic triumph is:"Words that express dominion, dignity, majesty, are com"monly put in the plural.”

On this I observe, 1st. The rule, supposing it to be one, is, beyond all doubt, stated in terms by far too general. If it were a rule of any thing like common application, one should expect to find it in all the Hebrew Grammars. Now, although I find it in Wilson, and in Robertson, I do not find it in Parkhurst, nor in Pike, nor in an anonymous grammar used by the teacher from whom I got the rudiments of the language. This appears somewhat strange as to a common rule of syntax.

2dly. All the instances adduced of the application of this rule, in which the reference is to Jehovah, must be set aside as not at all in point. It is from these that we derive our evidence: and therefore, to bring forward these, as exemplifications of a rule, which is alleged to subvert this evidence, is to beg the question in dispute. The rule, if established, must be established from other cases.-Now the particular words enumerated by Wilson are, ALEIM, Gods, ADNIM, Lords, BOLIM, Husbands, Masters:—and the exemplification of the rule which he adduces, is Isa. liv. 5. "For thy Maker (Heb. "Makers) is thy Husband (Heb. Husbands) Jehovah (God) "of hosts is his name," &c.-one of the very passages on which we ground our inference; and which, therefore, can never go to disprove that inference, until it has been otherwise shown, that the phraseology is common in Hebrew syntax, and that there is nothing at all peculiar in the case of its application to Jehovah. The remark applies to all passages similarly circumstanced.

3dly. If the rule were one of common application, we might