terms, as applied to the subject.-In a word, if Mr. Yates means that the mystery lies in the terms themselves of the proposition, he means what is evidently not true:—if he means, that the mystery lies in the terms, as applied to the particular subject, he makes a distinction without a difference; for this is perfectly the same with its lying in the subject itself. What is it which prevents our affixing distinct ideas to the terms of the proposition, but the mysterious nature of its subject?

Under the present particular, I must offer a few remarks on Mr. Yates's three observations relative to mysterious propositions.

"In the first place," he observes, "it appears scarcely "possible, that a blind assent to an unintelligible proposition "can be of any use in the regulation of the conduct, the "amendment of the heart, or the alleviation of distress."

Does Mr. Yates mean by this to affirm, that we can derive no profit, and no comfort or satisfaction, from the assurance that any thing is, unless we can distinctly comprehend how it is? Unless he means this, he means nothing to the purpose: and if he does mean this, he means what is, in innumerable instances, obviously false. I have no distinct conception of the nature or the principle of gravitation:—yet the doctrine of gravitation is a very useful, and a very comfortable doctrine. The doctrine of the omnipresence of God involves in it difficulties which I am unable to explain:-but am I to banish the sacred and salutary awe, and to renounce the peace, and confidence, and joy, which the faith of his omnipresence is fitted to inspire, because I cannot clearly comprehend how it is that the infinite Being is present, in the full possession and exercise of all his infinite attributes, in every part of space, every successive moment of time?

in

Referring to my observations" on the unavoidable difficulty

G

"of conceiving the manner of the Divine existence," Mr. Yates says, that "whatever force is attributed to them, it must be "allowed, that there is great force in the following remarks "of one of the best Divines whose works enrich the English ❝ library. 6 If,' observes Dr. James Foster, you say that 66 you cannot account for the manner of God's creating the "world, or for the manner in which he exists every where, "of the general resurrection, and the like, I answer, It is

"NO PART OF YOUR RELIGION TO ACCOUNT FOR IT.

WHERE

THE MYSTERY BEGINS, RELIGION ENDS.-Mysteries yield "neither pleasure nor profit,'" &c.

Here we have a celebrated, and, amongst Unitarians, a favourite maxim, blazoned in all the emphasis of capitals:and when this capital maxim is taken by itself, it wears, no doubt, a very forbidding aspect towards every thing mysterious in religion. It seems to affirm, without qualification, that religion and mystery are incompatible. But taken in its connexion, and with Dr. Foster's own explanations, I am so far from being dissatisfied with it, that I am perfectly ready to adopt it, as a just expression of my own sentiments. " If

you cannot account," says the Doctor, " for the manner of "God's creating the world, or for the manner in which he ex"ists every where, of the general resurrection, and the like, I "answer, It is no part of your religion to account for it." Perfectly right. But is it no part of the man's religion to believe the facts, that God created the world, that he exists every where, and that there is to be a general resurrection,— although of creation out of nothing, of infinite presence, and of the identity of the resurrection body, his ideas may be extremely indistinct, and perplexed with many difficulties? Where is it, in this case, that "MYSTERY BEGINS?" It is at the mode or manner of the facts. But this is precisely what is not re

vealed. To say, therefore, that "where mystery begins, reli"gion ends," is neither more nor less than to say that "where "WHAT IS NOT REVEALED begins, RELIGION ENDS: -a maxim, certainly, which no Trinitarian will feel any disposition to controvert. "We have no great objection," says Mr. Brown, "to "apply the quotation to the Trinity, which Mr. Yates intro"duces with so absurdly exaggerated praise on its author, "Dr. Foster. 'If you say, that you cannot account for the "manner of the existence of the one Divinity in Trinity, I an"swer, it is no part of your religion to account for it. Where mystery (i. e. unrevealed mystery) begins, (which is equi"valent to, where revelation ends) religion ends.'"*

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66

Mysteries," adds Dr. Foster, às quoted by Mr. Yates, yield neither pleasure not profit. For as with respect to "the works of nature, all our pleasure arises from the percep"tion of beauty, harmony, and usefulness; and however "we may imagine innumerable secret beauties, which we "have not discovered, yet, till they are known, they afford "no real satisfaction, nor can we reap any advantage from "them; 'tis just the same with respect to mysteries in re❝ligion; we can neither be delighted nor profited by them, "because we do not understand them. The utmost that can "be said is, that we are confounded and puzzled. And is "there any pleasure in that, or any advantage merely in beડ ing in the dark, and having no ideas?”

Here there seems to be strange confusion. To take again Dr. Foster's own cases:-Can we derive neither delight nor profit from the belief of God's having created the world, from the belief of the Divine omnipresence, or from the belief of the general resurrection, without being able to comprehend

* Strictures, &c. page 24.

the manner of these things? If these are matters in which the fact is believed, while the manner of it is not comprehended, are they not "mysteries in religion" in the very same sense, although not, perhaps, to the same degree, in which the doctrine of the Trinity is a "mystery in religion?"— with respect to which, the case is perfectly alike, the fact being declared, while the manner of it remains an undiscovered and incomprehensible secret. In neither case does the pleasure or profit arise from "being in the dark, and having no "ideas," but from that which we know, and of which we have ideas; that is, from the fact, which is revealed, not from the manner of it, which is not revealed.

Mr. Yates's second general observation is—" that, if an "incomprehensible proposition be inculcated in Scripture as "an article of implicit faith, it must be delivered in the very "terms of the proposition."

Ah! here I seem to perceive something like a reason for my antagonist's desire to substitute a new definition of mystery, and to transfer the incomprehensibility from the subject of the proposition to its terms. If the terms themselves are unintelligible, Mr. Yates is clearly right; for in that case it would be impossible for us to substitute other terms, with any degree of certain assurance that we were enunciating the same doctrine. The man who knows not at all the meaning of the words Ellipse, Conic, and Sections, would in vain attempt to convey, in other terms than those in which it has been announced to himself, the proposition that "An Ellipse is one of the Conic Sections :"—he must satisfy himself with repeating the ipsissima verba.

But in application to our subject of controversy, the observation seems to me unworthy of my opponent's good sense.The terms themselves here are not unintelligible. And al

though "reasoning" may be "out of the question," with any view to explain the manner of the existence of a Trinity in unity, reasoning (I mean "reasoning from the Scriptures") may be far from being out of the question, in proof of the revealed facts, that God is one, and yet that the Father is God, that the Son is God, and that the Holy Spirit is God. Respecting the manner in which Deity is at once One and Three, there is no proposition whatever presented to us in the Bible, to be the object of our faith ;-no proposition,—nothing which we are called to believe, with regard to that in which the mystery properly lies.-But this leads me to

Mr. Yates's third observation, which is expressed in the form of a question :-" We may ask respecting propositions, "to the terms of which we annex no distinct conceptions, is it "proper to give to such propositions the name of Revelation?”

I really expected Mr. Yates would have shown himself above having recourse to this trite and puerile objection. There never was a more complete instance of playing with words.-How often must we be obliged to repeat, that all that we affirm to be revealed is the fact; and that the fact alone is, therefore, the object of our faith:-that the plain answer to the question, so often put to us, How can a thing be revealed, and yet mysterious?-is, "the truth of the proposition is "revealed; the manner how 'tis true, is not revealed." *. "We think it evident," says Mr. Yates, "that subjects which "we cannot understand or comprehend, to us are not reveal"ed." But are there no subjects (for the mystery after all, it seems, lies in the subject)—are there no subjects which we do not comprehend as to their manner or modus, while yet they are perfectly well known to us as facts? Mr. Yates is a believer, I

* Conybeare's Sermon on Mysteries, formerly quoted.