Page images
PDF
EPUB

to be), I am not disposed to question. The inquiry, however, immediately suggests itself, How are the doctrines of any pretended revelation to be proved irrational? It is very manifest, that the reason of any individual man can never be assumed as the standard of reason for mankind in general, and still less of reason in the abstract." The term mystery hath "a relative sense, and implies a respect to that person's un"derstanding to whom a thing is mysterious. It will appear "from hence, that a doctrine is so far to any man mysterious, "as he cannot, or does not, comprehend it. And if a mys"terious doctrine be therefore false, these consequences will "follow:-That the knowledge of the most ignorant person "is the standard of truth;-that there can be no real dif"ference in men's intellectual attainments;-and no real pro66 gress made in knowledge. For if every mysterious doctrine "be false, and if every doctrine not comprehended by the "most ignorant person be to him mysterious; then every such "doctrine is false. It follows, that all truth is by him com"prehended, i. e. that his understanding is the measure of "truth; that no one man can be really more knowing than "another; and no man really more knowing at one time than "another. So fruitful is one absurdity of many more." * That, then, may be pronounced irrational by a Socinian, which may not appear so to a Trinitarian: who, in this case, is to decide? Could we ourselves construct a brain that should concentrate all the individual rationalities of the species, we might then possess an oracular standard of the reason of mankind. Yet, even if we had within the reach of our appeal this extracted essence of all human minds, there might still be articles of

* The Mysteries of the Christian Religion credible-a Sermon preached before the University of Oxford, at St. Mary's, on Sunday, October 21st. 1722. By John Conybeare, M. A. &c.

[ocr errors]

faith above its reach, although not contrary to its dictates: and, as an intellect so vast, would, we may presume, be proportionally humble, it would not reject the claims of a professed revelation from God, because in some points it might find its comprehension baffled.

66

Accordingly," Mr. Yates adds, "those authors who have "stated the evidence of the Christian faith have, in general, "laid it down as an axiom, that even miracles cannot estab❝lish a doctrine which is in itself absurd, which is contrary "to known facts, to the fundamental articles of natural religion, or to other doctrines of the same pretended revela❝tion.”—An axiom is a self-evident proposition, requiring no proof, but perceived intuitively to be true. An axiom, the proposition now stated must be acknowledged to be. But it is in every respect a merely hypothetical axiom. First of all, it assumes our having previously ascertained and defined, what is "in itself absurd," what are "known facts," what are the "fundamental articles of natural religion," and what are "the other doctrines of the same pretended revelation." But more than this-It supposes a case which can never possibly be realized I mean the case of real miracles (that is, “works "such as no man can do, except God be with him,") of such miracles being wrought in confirmation of a doctrine of the description specified. But if there be any thing whatever of which we are warranted to affirm, that it is" in itself absurd,” it seems to me to be this. I would rather state it as an axiom, that, supposing the reality of the miracles clearly ascertained, the doctrine attested by them must be true. Miracles are the seal of Heaven appended to the statements which they accompany:-they are "God bearing witness;" and He can bear witness to nothing but truth. If, therefore, onthe other hand, falsehood, absurdity, and contradiction, were made out

to be the qualities of any doctrine-to say that "miracles "themselves would not prove it," is only to introduce the useless supposition of a greater falsehood, absurdity, and contradiction, than itself; a supposition, of which all right notions of the moral character of God forbid the admission for a moment. The proper inference is, that miracles cannot be wrought in its support; and that any which have been pretended to be wrought, have not been real, but only apparent. So that, if we are convinced that the Scriptures are a Divine revelation, fully ascertained to be such by clear, and indisputable miraculous evidence,—even the above-supposed intellectual representative of our species, and standard of its rationality, would certainly pronounce it unreasonable not to bow, with implicit assent, to its plain and infallible decisions; inasmuch as nothing which such a revelation contains can be contrary to reason in general, although it may be expected that some things in it should be beyond the range of comprehension embraced by the reason of men.

"Let it be remembered, then," says Mr. Yates, (the "then" refers to my assent to the important proposition which he is so anxious that his readers should keep in mind)" Let it be "remembered, then, that even the clearest declarations of "the Scriptures would not authorize us to believe in mysteries, "if mysteries be propositions which directly contradict first "principles, known facts, or indisputable truths." (P. 40.) Let this be remembered, by all means. Let it be recorded as an axiom. If mysteries be such propositions-they should not be believed. This is tolerably clear. "It needs no seer to "tell us that, Horatio ;"-that we should not believe what is contrary to known facts and indisputable truths-i. e. that we should not believe known falsehoods:-No, not even "if" they were asserted in the Scriptures themselves. This is ano

ther notable" if." It is perfectly true, however, that if this "if" were not a mere if, but a matter of fact, instead of the Scriptures warranting the reception of such mysteries, such mysteries would warrant the rejection of the Scriptures. But "let it be remembered," that we know of no person who understands the word mystery in this sense,-and that we do not believe the Bible to contain any mysteries of this sort.

66

"But besides being applied to doctrines which are under"stood and seen to be absurd, the term mystery is also used, "to denote those which cannot be understood, and which, "therefore, without the testimony of revelation, cannot pos66 sibly be proved to be either false or reasonable. In this sense the word appears to be employed by Mr. Wardlaw. "He defines a mystery to be "something that is either diffi"cult to be understood, or entirely incomprehensible. I pro66 pose the following definition, as more exact, and also bet❝ter accommodated to the general tenor of Mr. Wardlaw's reasoning and language: A mystery is a proposition, to the "terms of which no distinct ideas are annexed." (P. 41.)

66

That those doctrines which are denominated mysteries by Trinitarians “are understood and seen to be absurd" by Unitarians, we know:-but who they are who apply the word mysteries to doctrines which are "understood and seen to be "absurd" by themselves, we do not know. In the ear of a Unitarian a mystery and an absurdity may sound as synonimous. Most readers, however, will be able to discern a difference between them.

I should have been much obliged to Mr. Yates for his kind intention to make my definition and my reasoning more consistent with each other, and, by improving the former, to give greater force and conclusiveness to the latter:-but "timeo Danaos."-I felt it difficult at first to understand, what my

opponent could intend by his proposed alteration of the definition. It seems to transfer the mystery from the subject of the proposition, to the terms of it;-and yet it depends on a very simple circumstance, whether his definition be not, after all, the very same with mine. The circumstance is, whether by "the terms" of the mysterious proposition, he means the terms taken abstractly, or the terms as applied to the particular subject of the proposition. If the latter be his meaning, his definition and mine are perfectly the same. For it is all one whether you say the mystery is in the subject of the proposition, or in the terms considered with reference to that subject. From the illustrations which Mr. Yates presents of his meaning, it should seem that when he speaks of " affix"ing no distinct ideas to the terms of the proposition," he means the terms taken abstractly. "A man," says he, " may an"nounce to me something in an unknown tongue; and, being "assured of his general veracity, I may believe that he "speaks the truth, and give my assent. Or a person may ❝enunciate a proposition having a relation to the doctrine "of porisms, the philosophy of Kant, or some other sub"ject foreign to my studies; and knowing him to be well in"formed on the subject, I may be convinced that his asser"tion is true, without connecting any ideas with the terms "employed." And again: "I may affirm, for example, in "the hearing of a man ignorant of mathematics, that the "ellipse is one of the conic sections. To these words he "annexes no distinct conceptions. The proposition is to him "a mystery."-But the cases are not parallel. In the proposition "God is one and three,”—what is announced is neither in an unknown tongue, nor are the terms themselves at all unintelligible, or even obscure. The mystery is, beyond question, in the subject; or, which is the same thing, it is in the

« PreviousContinue »