II. pával, Täν åðuvátov, which he accounts impossible; and CHAP. gives this as his reason, μόνα γὰρ ταῦτα θετέον εὐλόγως, ὅσα iri woλawv † wárlæv ópäμev iñáрxovτa. For, saith he, nothing Arist. de else can be rationally asserted, but what we find to be in all Cœlo, I. i. things, or at least in most; now because there could no- cap. 10. thing be found in the world which was produced, (i. e. by generation,) and yet was incorruptible, therefore he concludes it impossible it should be so with the universe. By which we evidently see what the grand principles of reason among the philosophers were; viz. such observations as they had made from the present course of nature in the order of the universe. From hence arose that strong presumption among them, which hath been so taken for granted, that it hath been looked on as a common notion of human nature, viz. ex nihilo nihil fit, which Vid. Laert. was the main argument used by them to prove the eternity in Vit. Deof the world, and by others, to prove the preexistence of matter. So Ocellus argues against both the dissolution and production of the world, from this principle: If the world be dissolved, saith he, it must either be ToI EIS TÖ ÔV, A sis Tò unov, either into that which is, or into that which is not. It cannot be dissolved into that which is, because then the universe cannot be destroyed; for that which is, is either the universe, or a part of it: neither can it be dissolved into that which is not, ἀμήχανον γὰρ τὸ ὂν ἀποτέλεσθαι Ocellus Luἐκ τῶν μὴ ὄνίων, ἢ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν ἀναλυθῆναι, for it is impossible that canus,p.16. a thing should be made out of that which is not, or be dissolved into nothing. And Aristotle somewhere tells us, Aristot. that it is a principle which all the writers of Natural Phi- Physic. L. iv. losophy are agreed in (περὶ γὰρ ταύτης ὁμογνωμονοῦσι τῆς δόξης ἅπαντες οἱ περὶ τῆς φύσεως,) which is ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γίνεσθαι ἀδύvarov, that it is impossible for any thing to come out of nothing. But now when we observe upon what grounds this principle was took up by these philosophers, we have no reason to admit of it as an universal standard of nature. For we find by these naturalists, who thus asserted this principle, that when they go about to prove it, it is only from the course of generations in the world, or from the works of art, both which suppose matter preexistent; and from these short collections they form this universal maxim. And from hence, when they discoursed of the manner whereby God did produce the world, their imaginations ran presently upon that which the Epicurean in Tully enquires after, Quæ molitio? Quæ ferramenta ? Cicero de Qui vectes? Quæ machinæ ? Qui ministri tanti operis fue- Nat. Deor. runt? They apprehend God only as an artificer, that con Ed. Comm. 1. i. c. 19. BOOK trives the world first into a platform, and then useth instruments to erect it; and consequently still suppose the matter ready for him to work upon. So true is that of Ibid. 1. ii. Balbus in Tully, when he comes to discourse of the nature of God; In quo nihil est difficilius quam a consuetudine oculorum aciem mentis abducere, nothing is more difficult than to abstract our minds from the observations of this visible world, when we seek to apprehend the nature of the Deity. Thus we see upon what general grounds the philosophers proceeded, and from what they took them, and how insufficient any collections from the present order of the universe are to determine any thing concerning its production by. For supposing a production of the world, several things must of necessity be supposed in it different from what the present order of the world is; and it is an unreasonable thing to argue from a thing when it is in its greatest perfection, to what must always have been in the same thing; for by this means we must condemn many things for falsities which are apparently true, and believe many others to be true which are apparently false. Maimon. which Maimonides useth an excellent similitude. SupMore Nev. pose, saith he, one of exquisite natural parts, whose mother 1. ii. c. 17. dies as soon as he is born, and his father brings him up in an For island, where he may have no society with mankind till he be grown up to years of understanding, and that he never saw any female of either man or beast; suppose now this person to enquire of the first man he speaks with, how men are born, and how they come into the world? The other tells him, that every man is bred in the womb of one of the same kind with ourselves, thus and thus formed; and that while we are in the womb, we have a very little body, and there move and are nourished; and we grow up by little and little till we come to such a bigness, and then we come forth into the world, and yet grow still till we come to such a proportion as we are of. Here presently this young man stops him, and enquires, when we were thus little in the womb, and did live, move, and grow, did we not eat and drink, and breathe at our mouth and nostrils as we do now? Did we not ease nature as we do now? If it be answered him, No, then he presently is ready to deny it, and offers to bring demonstrations that it was utterly impossible that it should be so. For, saith he, if either of us cease breathing but for an hour, our motion and life is gone: how is it then possible for one of us, though never so little, to live and move in the womb for so many months, when it is so close, and shut up, and in the middle of the body? If one of us, saith he, should II. swallow a little bird, it would presently die as soon as it CHAP. came into the stomach how much more if it were in the ; belly? If we should be but for few days without eating and drinking, we could not live; how can a child then continue so many months without it? Again; if one doth eat, and not void the excrement of what he eats, he will be killed with it in few days; how can it possibly be otherwise with a child? If it be replied, that there is a passage open in the belly, at which the child receives his nourishment, he will presently say that it is as impossible as the other; for if our bellies were so open, we should be quickly destroyed. And again, if the child hath all its limbs perfect and sound, how comes it not to open its eyes, use the feet, mouth, and hands, as we do? And so concludes it impossible that man should ever be born after this manner. Much after this way, saith that excellent author, do Aristotle and others argue against the production of the world; for if the world were produced, say they, it must have been thus and thus; and it is impossible that it should have been so. Why? Because we see things are otherwise now in the world. Which how infirm a way of arguing, it appears from the consideration of the former similitude, in which the arguments are as strong to prove the impossibility of that which we know to be true, as in the case about which we dispute. VI. 2. Ed. Comm. And this now leads us to the second false hypothesis, which the opinion of the world's eternity was founded on, which is, That there is no other way of production but by generation. Most of the arguments which are used by Ocellus and Aristotle against the production of the world, run upon this supposition, that it must be generated, as we see things are in the world. So Ocellus argues, Taν Tε Ocell. Luc. τὸ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν εἰληφὸς, καὶ διαλύσεως ὀφεῖλον κοινωνῆσαι, δύο Ρ. 8. ἐπιδέχεται μεταβολάς· μίαν μὲν τὴν ἀπὸ μείονος ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον, καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ χείρονος ἐπὶ τὸ βέλλιον· καλεῖται δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀφ ̓ ἕπες ἂν ἄρξηται μεταβάλλειν, γένεσις· τὸ δὲ εἰς ὃ ἀφικνεῖται, ἀκμή δεν τέραν δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶ μείζονος ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖον, καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ βελλίονος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον· τὸ δὲ συμπέρασμα τῆς μεταβολῆς ταύτης ὀνομάζεται &dopà nai diáλvois. Every thing that comes into being, and is subject to dissolution, hath two observable mutations in it: the one is whereby it grows from less to greater, and from worse to better; and this is called generation, and the height of this mutation, perfection. The other begins from better to worse, and from bigger to less; and the conclusion of this is corruption and dissolution. But now, saith he, if the world had a beginning, there would be such a mutation BOOK in it; and it would have grown by degrees greater, till III. it had come to its perfection, and from thence it would sensibly decay till it came to dissolution: but nobody hath ever observed such a mutation in the world, neither is there any appearance of it; ἀλλ ̓ ἀεὶ κατ' αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαυτῶς διατελεῖ καὶ ἴσον ὅμοιον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ : but the world is semper idem ; it varies not, nor alters any thing from itself. For which he particularly instanceth in the courses, symmetries, figures, positions, intervals, proportions of motion which are in the world; which things are all capable of such a mutation : yet we see no such thing in the universe: from whence he infers that the universe was always, and will be, as it is. Upon the same principle doth Aristotle dispute for the eternity of the world, from the nature of his materia prima; because if the first matter were generated, it must be generated of other matter, and so in infinitum ; and so he argues from the nature of the heavens, that they are not capable of generation and corruption as other bodies are. All which arguments signify no more than this, that the world was not generated as plants or animals are; and who ever, right in his wits, asserted that it was? But do any of these arguments prove it impossible that God, having infinite power, should produce the universe after another way, than any of those things are produced in, which we observe in the world? For we assert an infinite and eternal Being, which was the efficient cause of the world, who by his omnipotent power produced it out of nothing, and continues it in its being; which is well expressed by the author of the Refutation of Aristotle, in Justin Martyr's works. We assert, saith he, one God who is eternal himself, that hath nothing else coequal with himself, neither by way of subjection or opposition, whose power is so great that nothing can hinder it; by which power he produced the world, ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος τοῦ εἶναι, Dogmat. καὶ τὸ τὶ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ πῶς διαμένειν, τὴν ἐκείνε θέλησιν; which hath no other cause either of its beginning, or of its being, or continuance, but only his will. Who fully answers, in a philosophical manner, the particular allegations out of Aristotle, concerning the eternity of the world; his design being, as he saith, to shew μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπισήμην, καθ ̓ ἣν ἐπαίγέλλονται Ἕλληνες περὶ Θεοῦ τε καὶ κλίσεως τες λόγες ποιεῖν, τοῦτο πεποιηκότας, ἀλλ ̓ εἰκασμῷ τὸ δοκοῦν διορισαμένες, that the Greek philosophers, in their discourses concerning God and the creation, were very far from being as good as their word to observe the laws of demonstration; but instead of them, proceeded only upon opinions and conjectures. And Aristot. Confut. in Ed. Par. Ibid. II. as to this particular of the possibility of another way of CHAP. production, besides that of generation, he proves it from Aristotle's own opinion, from the equal necessity of the existence of matter, as of God. For, saith he, if God can Just. Mar. produce any thing out of matter, which is as necessarily ex- Ep. istent as himself, he may produce something out of nothing; for the same repugnancy that there is in that which is absolutely nothing to be produced, the same must there be in that which is necessarily existent. How then can God produce something out of matter which necessarily exists, and not be able to produce something out of nothing? For if matter have its original from itself, how can it be subject to the power of another? And besides, if we acknowledge God to have his being from himself, and on that account attribute infinite power to him, by the same reason we must attribute it to matter, But whatever hath infinité power in itself, hath a power upon something beyond itself; but if God and matter have it both, they can never have power upon each other, or without themselves; which is a far greater absurdity than the mere asserting a power to produce something out of nothing, which is implied in the very notion of infinite power; for if it be confined to any matter, the power is not infinite, because we cannot but conceive the bounds of it; for it extends no farther than matter doth. So that a power of creation is implied in the very notion of a Deity; and therefore it is a mere sophism to argue, because the world could not be generated, therefore it could not be produced, unless any other way of production, but by generation, be proved impossible. A third false hypothesis they proceeded on was this, That the being of the world was no effect of God's will, but of the necessity of nature. For although the philosophers we now speak of did assert a Deity, which in some sense might be called the cause of the world, yet they withal asserted, that the world was coequal with God himself; and so, though there might be some priority in order of causes between them, yet there was none in order of time or duration; as we see the light, though it flows from the sun, yet the sun is never without light. This Aristotle proves from the necessity of motion and time. For, saith he, whatever is moved, must be moved by something else, and consequently there must be a running in infinitum; but this runs on a false supposition of the necessity of a continual physical motion in things, which we deny, since God, by his infinite power, may give motion to that VII. 3. |