.ברא Usu Part. from R. Nachmani, that the Hebrew language hath no CHAP. other word to signify such a production out of nothing, but It is therefore a very weak manner of arguing, that, because is sometimes used for no more than nwy, therefore the world was created out of preexistent matter; all that can rationally be inferred is, that from the mere force and importance of that word the contrary cannot be collected: but if other places of Scripture compared, and the evidence of reason, do make it clear that there could be no preexistent matter which was uncreated, then it will necessarily follow that creation must be taken in its proper sense. And in this sense it is evident, that not only Jews and Christians, but even the Heathens themselves, understood Moses, as is plain by Galen, where Galen. de he compares the opinion of Moses with that of Epicurus,. and ingenuously confesseth that of Moses, which attributed the production of things to God, to be far more rational and probable than that of Epicurus, which assigned the origin of things to a mere casual concourse of atoms but withal adds, that he must dissent from both; and sides with Moses as to the origin of such things as depend on generation, but asserts the preexistence of matter, and withal, that God's power could not extend itself beyond the capacity of the matter which it wrought upon. Atque id est, saith he, in quo ratio nostra ac Platonis, tum aliorum qui apud Græcos de rerum natura recte conscripserunt, a Mose dissidet. How true these words are, will appear afterwards. Chalcidius, in his Commentaries on Plato's Timæus, where he speaks of the origin of an, which in him is still translated sylva, and enquires into the different opinions of all philosophers about it, takes it for granted, that, according to Moses, this ŋ had its production from God. Hebræi sylvam generatam esse confitentur; quorum sapientissimus Moyses non humana facundia, sed divina, ut ferunt, inspiratione vegetatus, in eo libro, qui de genitura mundi censetur, ab exordio sic est profatus, juxta interpretationem LXX. prudentium; "Initio "Deus fecit cœlum et terram. Terra autem erat invisibilis "et incompta." Ut vero ait Aquila; " Caput rerum con"didit Deus coelum et terram; terra porro inanis erat et “nihil.” Vel ut Symmachus ; Vel ut Symmachus; "Ab exordio condidit Deus "cœlum et terram: Terra porro fuit otiosum quid, confusumque et inordinatum." Sed Origines asseverat ita sibi ab Hebræis esse persuasum, quod in aliquantum sit a vera proprietate derivata interpretatio. Fuisse enim in exempluri, terra autem stupida quadam erat admiratione. Omnia Chalcid. P. 372. III. BOOK tamen hæc in unum aiunt concurrere, ut et generata sit ea, que subjecta est universo corpori, sylva, sermonesque ipsos sic interpretantur. Where we find, by the testimony of Chalcidius, an universal consent as to the production of the universal corporeal matter by God; for that is all which is understood by his term of generata est. But this same author afterwards tells us, that by heavens and earth, in the first verse of Genesis, we are not to understand the visible heavens and earth; for, saith he, the heavens, which are called the firmament, were created after; and on the third day, when the waters were separated, the Ibid. p.374. dry land appeared, which was called earth. Qui tumultuario contenti sunt intellectu, cœlum hoc quod videmus, et terram qua subvehimur, dici putant; porro qui altius indagant, negant hoc cœlum ab initio factum, sed secundo die. And therefore by the heavens he understands incorpoream naturam, and by earth, aŋ, or the primogenial matter. And this, saith he, appears by the following words, The earth was invisible, and without form; i. e. this corporeal matter, before it was brought into order by the power and wisdom of God, remained a rude and indigested lump; and that which is so, might well be called invisible and without form and therefore it is called inanis and nihil, because of its capacity of receiving all forms, and having none of its own. Symmachus calls it otiosa et indigesta; the former, because of its inability to produce any thing of itself; the latter, because it wanted a Divine power to bring it into due order. The stupidity and admiration which Origen attributes to it, he conceives to relate to the majesty of God, who was the orderer and contriver of it, siquidem opificis et auctoris sui majestate capta stupuerit. Thus we see, that, according to Moses, the first matter of the world was produced by God, which is largely manifested by Origen against the Marcionists, a fragment of which is extant in his Philocalia; and by Tertullian against Tertull. ad Hermogenes, and others, who, from the opinion of the Hermog. preexistence of matter, are called Materiarii. Origen. C. 24. per tot. IX. Having thus cleared the sense of Moses, it is far more difficult to find out the true opinions of the ancient philosophers concerning the production or eternity of corporeal matter, there having been so great dissensions, not only about the thing itself, but about the opinions of some Plutarch. about it; for it is plain by Plutarch's uxoyovía, as well as de Animæ the discourses of the later Platonists, how eager some have been to interpret Plato's Timæus in favour of the eternity, at least of matter, if not of the world. But Procreat. e Tim. although Plato doth assert therein a preexistence of rude CHAP. matter before the formation of the world, yet I see no II. reason why he should be otherwise understood, than in the same sense that we believe a chaos to have gone before the bringing the world into the order it is now in. And in that sense may those places in Plutarch be interpreted, & γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἡ γένεσις, ἀλλ ̓ ἐκ τῶ μὴ καλῶς καὶ ἱκανῶς ἔχοντος· and so likewise those following words, ὁ γὰς θεὸς ἔτε σῶμα τὸ ἀσώματον, ἔτε ψυχὴν τὸ ἄψυχον ἐποίησεν· for the meaning may be no more than that Plato conceived that all the productions of the kinds of things which are in the world was out of a preexistent hyle: the one spiritual and intelligible, out of which he supposed souls to be formed; the other sensible and corporeal, out of which other beings, which were more gross and material, were produced. So Chalcidius tells us, that both Pythagoras Chalcid. in and Plato looked upon constitutionem sylva to be opus Tim. p. providentiæ; which I suppose relates not only to the 377. bringing of matter into form, but to the production of matter itself. But after this he takes a great deal of pains to search out the true meaning of Plato concerning the Pag. 401. origin of hyle, and mentions the great dissensions among the Platonists about it, and the obscurity of the Timæus in it. To him therefore I refer the reader; who likewise brings in Numenius, largely discoursing concerning the opinion of Pythagoras about it, who condemns all those, as not understanding Pythagoras, who attribute to him the production of the indeterminate hyle. These are his words, Numenius ex Pythagoræ magisterio Stoicorum hoc Pag. 393. de initiis dogma refellens, Pythagoræ dogmate, cui concinere dicit dogma Platonicum, ait Pythagoram Deum quidem singularitatis nominasse, (nomine appellasse) sylvam vero duitatis. Quam duitatem, indeterminatam quidem, minime genitam, limitatam vero, generatam esse dicere. Hoc est, antequam exornaretur quidem, formamque et ordinem nancisceretur, sine ortu et generatione; exornatam vero atque illustratam, a digestore Deo esse generatam. Atque ita, quia generationis sit fortuna posterior, inornatum illud minime generatum, æquævum Deo, a quo est ordinatum, intelligi debeat. Sed nonnullos Pythagoreos, vim sententiæ non recte assecutos, putasse, dici etiam illam indeterminatam, et immensam, duitatem, ab una singularitate institutam, recedente a natura sua singularitate, et in duitatis habitum migrante. But however these Pythagoreans might be deceived, who thought the Unity itself became the Deity, yet it is evident by Numenius, that he looked on BOOK the undetermined and confused matter to have been coIII. eval with God himself, and not produced by him. And if Numenius be as much to be credited in this, as when he calls Plato Moses Atticus, then the creation of universal matter can be no part of Pythagoras's philosophic cabala. But whatever were the opinions of Plato and Pythagoras concerning the first origin of matter, we are certain that the Stoics generally asserted the improduction of matter, and make that to be as necessary a passive principle for the being of the world, as God is the active and efficient cause. So Diogenes Laertius reports of the Stoical principles concerning the origin of the universe: Aoxeï dè autoîS ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιῶν καὶ τὸ πάσχον· τὸ μὲν ἐν πάσχον, Ea. Lond. εἶναι τὴν ἄποιον ἐσίαν τὴν ὕλην· τὸ δὲ ποιῶν, τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν V. Lipsium Jóv. They make two principles of the universe, one active, in Physiol. and the other passive; the passive, an essence without Laert. V. Zenon. p. 196. Sto. 1. i. c. 4. Senec. Quæst. Physic. quality, called hyle, or confused matter; the active, the reason which acts on the other, which is God. These two principles Seneca calls causa et materia. Esse vero debet, Epist. 65. saith he, aliquid unde fiat; deinde, a quo fiat; hoc causa Idem Præ- est, illud materia. Although Seneca seems to make a fat. ad Nat. query of it elsewhere; quantum Deus possit? materiam Stob. Eclog. pse sibi formet, an data utatur? But Zeno is express in Stobæus, Οὐσίαν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ύλην, ταύτην δὲ πᾶσαν ἀΐδιον, ἔτε πλείω γιγνωμένην ἔτε ἐλάττω. The first essence of all is matter, which is eternal, and not capable of accession or diminution. To the same purpose Chalcidius Chalcid. in speaks, Stoici ortum sylvæ rejiciunt, quin potius ipsam et Deum, duo totius rei sumunt initia; Deum, ut opificem; Sylvam, ut quæ operationi subjiciatur. Una quidem essentia præditos facientem, et quod fit ac patitur, id corpus esse ; diversa vero virtute, quia faciat, Deum; quia fiat, Sylvam Tim. p. 388. X. esse. Having now found out the certain assertors among the Heathen philosophers of the eternity and improduction of matter as the passive principle of things, we come to examine the reason of this hypothesis, and whether there were foundation enough for this matter to subsist upon to all eternity. It might be sufficient prejudice against this opinion, that it was built on the same infirm conclusions which that of the eternity of the whole world was, viz. that maxim which Lipsius attributes to Democritus, but was embraced by all those philosophers who denied production of matter, μηδὲν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος γίνεσθαι, μηδὲ εἰς τὸ un öv peipsodai, that nothing could be produced out of nothing, nor could return into nothing; which, as we have II. already said, was only taken up from the established order CHAP. of the universe, and the manner of production of material beings. But this is not all we have to charge this hypothesis with; for, 1. It is repugnant to the natural notion of a Deity, which must imply in it an omnipotent power; for otherwise we degrade him to the imbecility of finite creatures, if he cannot produce any thing which doth not imply a contradiction: but what contradiction is there in this, that God should give a being to that which had none before? For that is all we understand by creation, viz. the producing of something out of nothing, or which had nothing out of which it was produced. Now what repugnancy is there to any free principle of reason, that a power infinite should raise an insect into being, without any passive principle out of which it was caused? And if an infinite power can do that, it may as well produce the world out of nothing, else the power would not be infinite; for it would have its bounds set, that thus far it could go, and no further. and no further. Now if such a power in God implies no contradiction in itself, I say, the asserting the necessary existence of matter implies a contradiction to this power. For, 1. A power to produce something out of nothing would be to no purpose, if a passive principle or preexistent matter be necessary to the production of any thing; and so that Being which hath a power to produce something out of nothing, hath only a power to produce something out of something; which is a plain contradiction. 2. If God hath power to produce something out of nothing, either this power doth extend to the production of this matter, or not; if it doth, then it depends on him; if not, his power is not infinite, and so the same power is infinite and not infinite; which is another contradiction. So that it is plainly repugnant to the notion of a God, to assert the necessary and eternal existence of matter. 2. If matter be unproduced, then necessary existence must belong to it as well as to God; and if necessary existence belongs to matter, infinite power must belong to it too; for whatever necessarily exists is self-originated; whatever is self-originated could not by any cause whatsoever be hindered from being; what cannot by any cause be hindered from being, hath infinite power; what hath infinite power may produce any thing, and is God; and so matter cannot be a mere passive principle, but must be an active, and must be God himself, or else there must be |