This is an awkward beginning. Who is to be the judge, whether the owner is reasonable or unreasonable in wishing to keep his goods himself? If he is likely to have a prejudice on the side of possession, the thief is at least as likely to have a prejudice on the side of abstraction. We suppose that it will be necessary to call in the Director to settle the point between them.1

Having got our definition of theft, we may see what acts of taking other people's goods are not thieving, which unenlightened consciences might conceive to be such. Five kinds of such acts are at once enumerated. The first is that of a man who takes what is another's by way of joke. We may let that pass. 'I only did it in fun,' has always been accounted a sufficient excuse to save a schoolboy from anything beyond a reprimand. At the same time such jokes might be unpleasant and, if we are to judge from this and from the other case, already mentioned, of the man who swore only externally, and therefore did not swear but joked, Liguori must have a very dismal notion of jesting.

The next is that of one who takes what is another's for the latter's good or advantage, As if a wife take away money from ' her husband, that he may not waste it on games or feasting, or 'take away wine from him that he may not get drunk, or an 'heretical book that he may not read it; or if a servant gives a very poor man alms of no very great amount, which his master ' would not be reasonably unwilling that he should give, although for shame, or some other reason, he does not dare to ask him.' This is a principle which might be extensively applied, especially if it should happen that a lady were married to an heretical husband. But we shall have occasion again to consider the case of wives, children, and servants separately.

The third case of taking not thieving carries us up at once to first principles.

It is certain that a man who is in extreme necessity may purloin other people's goods, enough to free himself from such a necessity. So the doctors hold, "in common,"2 with S. Thomas. The holy Doctor's reason is, that in such a case all things are common, for the law of nations by which a division of goods was made, cannot derogate from natural law by which every man is allowed to provide for himself, so long as he labours under extreme necessity. The same is said when the necessity is next to extreme or equivalent to it, for in such a necessity, which is called very grave or quasi-extreme, a man may also provide for himself,' (mark the euphemism)

1 In the Homo Apostolicus, the cases in which the owner is regarded as unreasonable in his unwillingness to part with his goods to the thief are when the latter is in extreme necessity, or when he is justly compensating himself, but no such limit to his unreasonableness is laid down in the Theologia Moralis.

2 For the technical meaning of 'common opinion,' and of 'probable and more probable opinion,' we must refer our readers to the Christian Remembrancer, No. LXXXIII. Jan. 1854, p. 44.

by ordinary means, but not by strange and extraordinary. So, "in common," Lugo, Lessius, Sporer, the Salamanca Doctors, Navarrus, Soto, Cajetan, Prado, &c., Viva, Sylvius, Azorius, Croix, Cardenas, Haunoldus, and Tamburini, the last of whom calls the opinion certain. But a very grave necessity of this kind is supposed to exist when a man is in probable risk of incurring death, or indeed in danger of losing some principal member, or some sense, such as an eye; also when a man is in danger of falling into perpetual captivity, or being sent to the galleys, or catching a very grave or lasting disease, or incurring loss of character. For it is not necessary that evils of this kind should be actually upon the man, but it is enough that they are very near him, and morally certain, or indeed-Holzmann says-if there is certainly probable danger of them. But it is doubted whether a father is supposed to labour under the same necessity if he is in danger of prostituting his daughter through want. Bonacina says Yes, and Mazzotta, Cajetan, Suarez, &c., agree. But "with greater probability" the Salamanca Doctors say No, because no necessity can compel a man to sin when there is any other way of relieving his necessity, such as at least he has in begging. But what, if a nobleman is very much ashamed to beg or to work, can he provide for himself out of other people's goods? The Salamanca Doctors say No, with Soto and Prado, on the ground that this must be rather counted grave than extreme necessity, temporal goods being ordained only for preserving life, not for keeping honour. But Viva says Yes, and Roncaglia and Mazzotta, as well as Lessius, Palao, and Diocastillo in Croix : so do Bannez and Serra. And this seems to me the "more probable," if he is so ashamed of begging that he would rather die than beg.'-L. iv. 520.

Six times in the course of three pages in his Homo Apostolicus, sixteen times in the course of one section of a chapter in his Theologia Moralis, Liguori lays down the principle that, as soon as a man is reduced to extreme necessity, all goods become common, and, more than this, that the thief- we beg pardon, the clandestine taker-has a right to what belongs to others. We need not say that we here find ourselves referred to the fundamental principle of Communism, just as Mariana appeals to the fundamental principle of Red Republicanism, when he asserts that every private man has a right to stab the king who has been declared a public enemy.1

Now that a case might arise in which circumstances would justify appropriation is a proposition which we do not deny, and

Any private man, whoever he may be, has a right equal to the best, to kill the king declared a public enemy: let him only have the will to fling away hopes of impunity, despise the risk, and dare attempt to serve his country. I never will believe that he who makes essay to slay him has done anything whatever which he has not a right to do. . . . It is indeed more virtuous and more magnanimous openly to satisfy the grudge and fall upon the country's enemy before the eyes of all the world. But there is more prudence in trying to catch him, as in a trap, by artifice. For then the happy issue comes without tumult and with the certainty of less danger, public as well as private. ... Whether open force is resorted to, and he is struck down in the midst of insurrection and arms publicly taken up.. or with greater caution he dies by stratagem or device, a single man devoting himself, or a few sworn together secretly against his life and struggling each at his own peril to redeem his country safe! Suppose that they escape! Like great demi-deities they are revered their whole life long. And if they fall, they fall a sacrifice grateful to the gods and grateful unto men, in a noble undertaking, and are illustrious to all posterity !'-Mariana, pp. 60, 65, as quoted in Cases of Conscience, p. 51.

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it is this modicum of truth which blinds Liguori and his followers in the instance before us. If it be true that it might happen, under very peculiar circumstances, that a man might be justified in appropriating what was not his, it does not follow that it should be laid down as a general rule to guide practice that as soon as a man is reduced to extreme necessity he is relieved from paying any regard to the laws of property and then that the term 'extreme necessity' should be so liberally interpreted as to include under it every distressed nobleman. Take this last case and analyze it. It is precisely the case of the Unjust Steward, provided that the latter was a man of high birth, or indeed even that would not be necessary, for vir honoratus would scarcely mean more than a man holding a respectable position. This parable has caused much difficulty to such commentators as did not mark that the lord' there spoken of is like the Steward himself, a man of the earth, earthy, and, in addition, that the commendation does not belong to the morality of the act done, but to the cleverness displayed in doing it. No such difficulties need be felt by them if they will take Liguori for their guide. 'I cannot dig, to beg I am ashamed.' Then says S. Alfonso, you are justified in clandestinely taking. If a man in an honourable position is very much ashamed to beg or to work, may he provide for himself out of other persons' 'goods? The Salamanca Doctors &c. say No-but Viva &c. say Yes, and this seems to me the " more probable." The ingenuity which has contrived to bring the distressed nobleman into the category of those labouring under extreme necessity, is as commendable as the Unjust Steward's own cleverness. The method in which it is done is as follows:-It was necessary to make some kind of explanation of what extreme necessity is. In doing this it appeared hard to be too strict and rigid, and so extreme necessity was softened down into grace necessity. So Lessius, Malderus, &c. Here, however, Innocent XI. stepped in that same Innocent who, as we have seen, attempted to put a stop to the practice of Mental Restriction. But he and his Jansenist morality has fared no better in the matter of Theft than in that of Untruthfulness. Then, as we may recollect, on his condemning mental restriction, mental restriction was divided into two classes, morally undistinguishable, pure mental restriction, and non-pure mental restriction, and his condemnation was confined by the Casuists to the former. Here he condemns the proposition that it is allowable to steal not only in extreme but also in grave necessity.' The Casuists hear and obey the Papal voice. But the Pontiff spoke only of grave, he said nothing of very grace necessity so graci is changed into gravissimâ, and the Jansenist Pope's decree goes for nothing. To permit a man to

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steal in grave necessity is immoral, says Innocent. True, but to permit a man to steal in very grave necessity is moral, reply the Casuists, and we have the privilege of explaining what very grave' means. This they accordingly proceed to do. And first a man is to be considered labouring under very grave necessity, if he is in probable danger of incurring death-next, if he is in danger of losing a principal limb-then, if he is in very near risk of being imprisoned for life—or of being sent to the galleys -or of catching a very bad disease-or of incurring disgrace. This last heading covers the case of the distressed nobleman. He would feel disgraced if he were to dig or to beg; therefore he is unable to have recourse to this method of relieving his wants, and is labouring under very grave or quasi-extreme need. That is all that is necessary. At once the laws of meum and tuum, so far as he is concerned, have perished. He may take what he wants. In providing for his needs out of other people's goods he cannot steal if he would. But if a man's want is so pressing that he is in risk of prostituting his daughter, the same authority tells us that that does not justify him in 'providing for himself. To save his own character in the eyes of men he may take clandestinely. To save his daughter's ruin of body and soul he may not.

In connexion with this subject of extreme necessity, there are, says Liguori, many difficult questions. They are, 1., whether men in captivity to the Turks may purloin what is not theirs, and whether rich men are bound to redeem them. To this question Rome's oracle replies: In this doubt, which 'has heaped upon me a mighty confusion, and on which the 'Doctors speak so obscurely, I dare not decide anything. It is enough to have put forward the arguments of both sides. Let the wiser judge.' Question 2. is, whether a poor man in extreme necessity may secretly purloin (occulte alienum surripere) without going through the previous ceremony of begging. To this Coninchius answers in the negative; Lessius, Layman, and Concina, in a qualified affirmative; Cardinal Lugo and Liguori have recourse to a distinguendum. In reply to Question 3. we learn that no one is bound to spend so much as 600l. or '8007. to save another man's life, although the donor should 'not lose his station by giving more.' Question 4. asks if the thief who consumes what he has taken away in extreme necessity has to restore it. Palao, Concina, Navarrus, Diana, Sporer, Lessius, and Tamburini, are on the negative side, ' On 'the grounds that, as in extreme necessity all things become common, the thief has not only the right of taking others' goods, but also of consuming them, just as he has the right of purloining again.' Lessius, Sylvius, Armilla, Azorius, and

Concina, are on the other side. Liguori thinks both probable." The 5th question is whether the purloiner is bound to restore when his extreme necessity has ceased. Here there are three opinions. The first, affirmative, supported by seven Doctors; the second, negative, supported by eight Doctors; the third, a distinguendum, supported by twelve Doctors. Question 6. asks, If a rich man, who does not help a poor man in extreme necessity, is afterward bound to restore? Here there are eight Doctors on the affirmative side, nine on the negative, which Liguori says is the 'more probable;' for, though the poor man has a right to take the rich man's goods, yet the same justice 'does not require the rich man to give.''

The next case of purloining not thieving, is when a man 'takes by way of just compensation, if he cannot otherwise get what is due to him; e. g. if a servant cannot get just wages ' otherwise, or if he has been unfairly induced to undertake the place at an unfair price.' This being a liberty given especially to domestics (though not confined to them), we shall defer its consideration till we are able to take a panoramic view of the indulgences granted by Rome to wives, children, and servants, to take clandestinely at the expense of the master of the house. At present we will content ourselves with Pascal's illustration of the principle in the story of John d'Alba.

"Father Bauny," said the monk, " has established a prime maxim in favour of those who are not content with their wages: May servants who are dissatisfied with their wages use means to raise them, by laying hands on as much of the property of their masters as they may consider necessary to make the said wages equivalent to their trouble? They may, in certain circumstances; as when they are so poor that, in looking for a situation, they have been obliged to accept the offer made to them; and when other servants of the same class are gaining more than they elsewhere.' "Ha, Father!" cried I, "that is John d'Alba's passage, I declare." "What John d'Alba?" inquired the Father; "what do you mean?" "Strange, Father," returned I," do you not remember what happened in this city in the year 1647? Where in the world were you living at that time?" "I was teaching Cases of Conscience in one of our colleges at a distance from Paris," he replied.

"I see you don't know the story, Father: I must tell it you. I heard it related the other day by a man of honour whom I met in company. He told us that this John d'Alba, who was in the service of your fathers, in the College of Clermont, in the Rue St. Jacques, being dissatisfied with his wages, had purloined something to make himself amends; and that your fathers, on discovering the theft, had thrown him into prison on the charge

Elsewhere we find :-'If a man gets something by borrowing, hiring or asking, and then consumes it in extreme necessity, he is not bound to make restitution. Nay, "probably" he is not bound to restore what he has previously stolen and afterwards consumed in this necessity, because his stealing does not take away from him the right which in such a case he had to the thing, no more than if he had taken it when actually in the necessity and consumed it.'-L. iv. 623.

2 L. iv. 520.