moft perfect mean of propounding and imparting our thoughts to others. Thus verbal infpiration, or infpiration by means of oral or written words, is the first and most perfect kind. But other figns and fymbols may be employed inftead of words, to make others acquainted with our thoughts. This may be effected by fignificant geftures, or pictures, in particular. Thus we have a kind of infpiration, which, to diftinguish it from the verbal, we may ftyle figurative or fymbolical. Farther, we may impart our thoughts on a certain fubject to another, by placing him in fuch circumftances, and affording him fuch data and means of knowledge, that by their use and application he must neceffarily be led to the fame thoughts and perceptions of the subject as we have, or as we would imprefs on him. As this fpecies of inspiration differs from the preceding ones in more particularly employing the mind and understanding of the perfon infpired, we may term it co-operative infpiration. Finally, we can conceive of a communication of thoughts by an immediate influence upon the fenforium, and by its means upon the mind, whereby thoughts are excited and imparted to the intellect, directly producing conceptions, without the interference of any known means. This may be ftyled immediate infpiration. I believe that these four kinds include the whole of our notion of infpiration, and conftitute all its primary divifions: though, by variously combining them, other kinds might be formed, and fome, if not all, of these primary divifions admit of being subdivided. Instead of entering farther into this analyfis, I will inquire into the end that may be proposed by infpiration. This end must be confined to the perfon infpired, or to others, or it muft extend to both. In the first inftance the perfon inspired must receive fome information, or inftruction, neceffary or useful to himself alone. In the fecond, he will announce what what is useful and neceffary to others. In the third, the inftruction imparted to him is applicable both to others and himself, and he receives it equally for both. If inspiration have any rational end, a fourth cafe is not to be conceived. In the first case the inftruction must be perfectly understood by the perfon infpired, otherwife he could derive no benefit from its being imparted to him. In the third cafe he muft understand it likewife, at leaft in part though it may not be neceffary for him to comprehend the whole of it, as a part may concern others alone. So far, however, as he is interested in it, what it announces muft be intelligible to himself. In the second cafe which we have mentioned, it is not neceffary, that he fhould understand what he is to deliver. He is but the meffenger, conveying inftructions that may be concealed from his knowledge. In this cafe, the third kind of infpiration, which we have termed co-operative, would be inadmiffible; and the fourth, or immediate, would fcarcely be applicable. For the conceptions produced in the mind by this, which we muft fuppofe fubject to the general laws of the underftanding, though excited in an extraordinary and miraculous manner, cannot poffibly be unintelligible to the mind that forms them, and expreffes them by words: even were the words answering to the ideas imbibed or impreffed at the fame time with them, which would render this kind of infpiration the fame as to the principal point with the firft. Both the first and fecond kinds of infpiration, however, are admiffible in this cafe. In the firft and third cafe any of the kinds of inspiration might take place, though all might not be equally fuitable, which would depend on the fubject of the infpiration. If we would form an accurate judgment of the point in queftion, we fhould now inquire on what occafion each kind of infpiration might be moft conveniently employed. The The fubject of inspiration may be either hiftorical, or doctrinal; it may relate to occurrences or doctrines. Occurrences may be either past, or future; doctrines may be either credenda, or agenda, articles of faith, or rules of conduct. Let us now confider what kind of infpiration would be moft adequate to each purpose. To begin with paft occurrences. Of thefe either we had teftimonies, accounts, and traditions, prior to infpiration, and independent of it, or we had them not. If we had them not, the third kind of inspiration is evidently inadmiffible for there would exift no data, no fources of knowledge, by the ufe of which the perfon infpired might be brought to thofe notions which were to be imparted to him. Neither is the fecond fuitable to the purpose, as it would be inadequate to the defign of delivering a history in chronological order, with fcrupulous exactnefs, and hiftoric truth; confequently it ought not to be employed where this is requifite. In this case the firft kind is the most convenient, though the fourth might indeed be employed. On the other hand, if oral or written accounts of fuch occurrences exift, though either the first or fourth kind might be used likewise here, yet the third appears to deferve the preference, for the following reafons. First, as it is fufficient to the end, which, confidering that it is the most natural, whilft the others are fupernatural, renders it preferable to thefe: fecondly, as it will exercife and improve the mental faculties and understanding of those to whom hiftory is thus infpired, or to whom knowledge is thus imparted; and, more especially, in the third place, as it is the most credible, and adequate to the end of infpiration, so far as the occurrences made known are to be admitted as true by others. To conceive this the more clearly, let us fuppofe, that a writer gives a history of a certain remote period, of which we had accounts before him, and ftill exifting in his time, and exprefsly de clares, clares, that his history is not compiled from thofe accounts, but written in confequence of immediate inspiration from God. Now would fuch a writer be credited by pofterity? Would after-ages rather rely on him, than believe the accounts exifting elsewhere, in points in which his hiftory contradicted or deviated from thofe accounts? Would not rather the pretence of the divine revelation and infpiration of a history, which the narrator might have known without thefe, from the accounts exifting, from the teftimony of witneffes of the occurrences, or from his own knowledge (if he be writing the hiftory of his own time) and which he might have related with fufficient accuracy by the exercife of his own judgment, and the neceffary examination, be very improbable? Much more credible would the writer's narration be, did he, in exprefs terms, or by the actual ufe of the accounts ftill extant, limit his claim of divine inspiration to this, that he wrote his hiftory at the command of God, endued with fuch faculties, and placed in fuch circumstances, as to be enabled to give the most accurate and true account poffible, from the fources that were in existence. Should the hiftorian relate fuch circumstances and incidents as could not be the fruits of his own understanding, being fuch as a mind merely human could not discover, he must be indebted for them to a higher revelation. In this cafe the claim of fuch a revelation would not weaken his credibility, as by it he would be informed of circumftances, which his mind could not otherwife have conceived. If, however, he promulgate no circumftances or incidents undiscoverable by human inveftigation, fuch an immediate revelation would be unneceffary and improbable. As to what concerns future events, it must be confidered whether they be delivered with accuracy, and in the ordinary form of hiftory, or only under general types, with fome degree of obfcu rity, and without a precife defcription of particular circumftances. If the former, the fame may be faid as of paft occurrences of which we have no account : if the latter, no one of the kinds is more apt than the fymbolical; and in all cafes the immediate, with which the fymbolical may be united. Of doctrines, and rules of conduct, we muft obferve, that they will be either altogether arbitrary, that is not fo connected with the natural or acquired knowledge of the perfon inspired as to be a regular confequence of it; or they will not be in this fenfe arbitrary. If they be the former, they must be inspired after the firft, fecond, or fourth manner; and according as they are more or lefs precifely determined, the first and fourth, or the fecond, will be moft fuitable. If the doctrines and precepts be fuch as might flow, from the previous knowledge of the infpired perfon, the third kind of infpiration feems preferable, principally for these reasons, that thus they would render the ideas of the perfon infpired more perfect, and exalt his understanding. For this purpofe doctrines and their application must be made more clear to him, and moral precepts more engaging, and easier to practise, whilft he is inftructed in the principles on which they are founded. Before I apply what has been faid to the holy fcriptures in particular, I fhall make the two following general remarks. In the first place, I prefume, that in the inspiration of the holy fcriptures, as well as in all other measures relative to religion, its foundation, fupport, and propagation, God employs natural means, or means agreeable to the ordinary course of nature, and refrains from extraordinary, fupernatural, or miraculous ones, as long as the former are fufficient to effect the purposes of God in religion, having recourfe to miracles only when they are abfolutely neceffary. It is true, that we cannot with certainty determine by reafoning a priori when natural |