clearness, certainty, and ftrength in his mind. How-› ever dubious and uncertain the calculation of the number, nature, and degree of his pains and pleafures may be, and however unable we may be to determine whether he be more happy or miferable, when we contemplate his happiness and mifery in a given point of time, we cannot in the leaft hesitate to allow him a balance of happiness when he has a profpect of a boundless futurity, in which he has to expect a happier fate, and in general more good than he has ever yet enjoyed. When the understanding of a man is fo exalted as to look into futurity, and make himself an intereft there through fear and hope, in calculating his happiness we muft no longer confine ourselves to his prefent pains and pleafures, but we must take into the reckoning his hopes and fears, add them to or fubtract them from his prefent pleasures and pains, and take the balance of the whole for the true fum of his actual happiness. This operation, it is true, offers great difficulties ; as to calculate accurately the good or evil of thofe hopes or fears, their duration, intenfity and degree of certainty must be estimated. Thus to compute them with mathematical exactitude is not practicable. It is fufficient for our purpofe, that, as we learn from general experience, the greater part of mankind fear a change of circumftances when they are happy less than they hope it when unhappy, and are more inclined to form pleafing and confolatory than comfortless and unpleafing profpects of futurity. This, I believe at least, is the general propenfity of mankind; and as the gloomy profpect of the future is naturally more unwelcome to the mind than the joyful one, it is not fo lafting, or retained fo long in it, if the body enjoy but a tolerable state of health. All pleasures of the imagination, indeed, depend on the ftate of the body, and are fo connected with its well being, that whilft its degree of health over

balances

balances that of ficknefs, pleafing images, particularly of the future; muft predominate over unpleafing and mournful ones. The folution of the question, therefore, depends in great measure on this, whether there be more healthy or fick men in the world, and whether men upon the whole experience most painful or agreeable fenfations from their bodies. To this experience gives us a clear and precife answer. What our author fays of the gaiety and joyfulness of youth, whilft their bodies are in a growing ftate, in answer to the question, agrees with this. It is unnatural and unusual to obferve a lafting difcontent or forrow in children or young perfons. Their griefs are tranfient, and their predominant propenfity is to mirth and jollity. Even though we should not allow, with fome philofophers, that the agreement between the welfare of the body and cheerfulness of the mind is owing to fome obfcure perceptions which the latter has of the order and perfection of the former (which however appears to be very juft) ftill the fact itself is fufficiently ascertained by experience. Thus the greater part of mankind are far more inclined to hope than fear, in their views of futurity. Were it not fo, it would appear, that our minifters, whose bufinefs it is to fhew man the road to true happiness, would be far more fuccefsful, and would have much more occafion to comfort and confole, than to admonish and reprove.

But were the propenfity of the greater part of mankind rather to hope than fear the future allowed to determine the balance of happiness over mifery, it might be objected, that happiness built upon this foundation would be very infecure and uncertain, that on a jufter knowledge and more extenfive infight into things it must diminish, and that by enlightened reafon it must be deftroyed. To this I reply, first, however feeble the foundation on which this happiness is built may be, ftill, whilft it ftands, it is as effectual 114

as

as if it were ever fo true and fubftantial: for a falfe imagination, as long as it is conceived to be true, procures as great a pleafure as if it were true in reality. Secondly, before a man's hopes or fears with their foundations become fufpected, he must have acquired an improved understanding, and this particularly when fupported by the chriftian revelation, muft have relieved him from the difquiets which he previously felt, and, in the fame proportion in which thefe difquiets were ftrong and well-founded, have led him to true comfort, to a fure profpect of the future, and to fuch a well-founded hope, as, added to the fum of his actual happiness, must give it an infinite fuperiority over his actual mifery.

Were I inclined to admit a fituation in which the balance of mifery fhould preponderate, it would be that middle condition between half and complete knowledge of a future, between certainty and uncertainty of fuch a ftate, in which a man forefees and conjectures that there is a futurity, but doubts of his participation in it, or is fearful of his deftination therein. Moft miferable of all muft I think him who has made it his intereft to deftroy this futurity, and who is forced to exert all the powers of his mind to reason it away. Such a man has only the mournful refource of plunging into beaftly fenfuality, abduring all moral and mental enjoyments, and confining all his happinef. to fenfual pleafures; or, fhould he unfortunately fucceed in convincing himself by his fophiftry of the non-existence of a future ftate, he muft feek an indemnification in an imaginary futurity, form to himself fome pleafing intereft in it, and fashion out gorgeous images of the fame and honour bestowed on him by pofterity, to fupply the place of reality. Imperfect as this attempt to create an overbalance of pleasure must ever be, ftill it is a proof, that the mind is fo conftituted as always to fly to happiness whilft under the preffure of mifery.

PROP.

of Hartley on Man!VERSITY 489 CALIFORNIA

PROP. IV. p. 13.

On the Proofs of God's Benevolence.

THE five propofitions which our author has advanced (p. 23.) to enable us to comprehend the exercife of God's benevolence to man, and in particular to explain how finite proofs of the infinite attributes of God are conceivable, include all that can be conceived of them, and are ufeful to throw light on the fubject. On thefe, however, it may not be uselefs to add fome remarks.

The first fuppofition, that each individual should be always happy infinitely, is impoffible, fince in that cafe every individual must be an infinite being, must be God. If we take the word infinitely in another fense, as an unceafing duration of an immutable and limited, or of an increafing happiness, it could only apply to the infinite moft perfect being, and confe quently is impoffible.

The fecond, that each individual should be always finitely happy, that is, in a limited degree, without any mixture of mifery, and infinitely fo in its progress through infinite time, is equally impoffible, as requiring a pure or perfect happinels of which no finite being is capable. But that infinity here meant, which confifts in an infinite number of finite happineffes, is nothing more than a mathematical infinity, or number continually increasing, which may properly be applied to a finite being.

The third, that each individual fhould be infinitely happy, upon the balance, in its progress through infinite time, but with a mixture of mifery, differs from the preceding in admitting a portion of evil. This is

alfo

also poffible whilft it requires only such an infinity as a finite being is capable of.

According to the fourth, that each individual should be finitely happy in the course of its existence, whatever that be, but with a mixture of mifery, and the universe be infinitely happy upon a balance, we must suppose, that the being of man, fo far as he is fufceptible of happiness, may ceafe or be annihilated. In the fenfe in which infinitely is here taken, or ought to be taken, this only can render his happiness finite. This differs from the foregoing fuppofition in admitting a total end to man's happiness, or an annihilation of his nature. It is difficult, however, to reconcile the latter part of this fuppofition with the former, that the universe is upon a balance infinitely happy, whilst beings capable of happinefs are annihilated, unless we fuppofe happiness and non-entity to mean the fame thing. The univerfe here spoken of can be nothing but the fum total of intelligences, or beings capable of happiness. How infinite happiness can in any sense be ascribed to this intellectual world, when fo confiderable a part of it as the human race is blotted out of it, is inconceivable. On fuch a fuppofition, the happiness of the universe cannot be infinite, either in a metaphyfical or mathematical fenfe of the word. Confidered in a certain point of time it is not fo great as it might be; fince if mankind existed, and were happy, the fum would be augmented, and this augmentation is poffible. What has been, and been happy, may be again, and be again happy. In a mathematical fenfe alfo, the continual progreffive feries of happinefs of intelligent beings cannot be fo infinite, if a part of them be annihilated, as it might be if that part ftill continued to exist. Our author remarks, that many thinking, ferious, benevolent and pious perfons are much inclined to this fuppofition. Those who favour it, however, will not willingly admit a limited duration

of