dition of a third; the highly civilized and rapidly progressive condition of another;-and then compare them with the differences which constitute genera, and sub-genera, of different zoological families, we might experience some difficulty, upon zoological principles, to find sound arguments to maintain the generic identity of the human family. The ape (Pithecus) family, for instance, is composed of animals having the same dentition, the same organs of sense, the same physical formations, the same habitats, manners of life, and modes of subsistence; and yet Illiger, and other good zoologists, regard the rudimentary callosities on the buttocks of the gibbons, of sufficient importance to separate these animals, by a sub-genus, from the chimpanzee and orang, although they are so slightly developed as to have apparently little influence on the habits of the respective animals.

But although the specific distinctions are, in our estimation, strong, especially when extremes are contrasted, yet we do not deem them of sufficient importance to establish generic differences; because as we will hereafter show, they only amount to modifications of generic character, and that all the races possess essentially the same psychical elementary attributes, specifically modified.

We proceed, therefore, to the consideration of the "modifications of generic character in regard to form," which we have already exhibited to be as distinctive in the human family as it is in the species of most of the generic families of animals. The texture and form of the hair are frequently of specific

value; as in the silky monkey (Cebus Rosalia) or the full bottom monkey (Cercopithecus Comosus). There are few animals more permanently or more strikingly contrasted by the hair than several of the human species.

"Color" is the next modification mentioned in our definition; and in this respect also, the several races of men are permanently distinguished from each other.

But important as all of the preceding characteristics are in a zoological point of view, they are absolutely insignificant compared with the modifications of "intellectual power," which is the last item in our definition. We know of no animals in zoology which are only separated by specific distinctions, so strongly contrasted in their instincts, as the several human races are by their respective intellectual powers. These differences are so remarkable that they have not failed to make a deep impression on the several races, when they have been brought to their notice. Mr. Lawrence, in his Lectures, p. 420, remarks, "The superiority of the whites is universally felt and readily acknowledged by the other races. The most intelligent negro, whom Mr. Park met with, after witnessing only such evidences of European skill as the English settlement of Pisania afforded, and being acquainted with two or three Englishmen, would sometimes appear pensive, and exclaim with an involuntary sigh, "black men are nothing." The narratives of travellers "abound with similar traits." A similar example is mentioned by a missionary on the upper Ganges, who seeing a

Hindoo attentively watching a British steamboat rapidly ascending his sacred river, accosted, and asked him "what God he worshipped?" He immediately replied with emphasis, "I worship the English; for," pointing to the boat, "none but Gods can make such things." Nor was it in the power of the missionary to convince him that Hindoos could be taught to make such a vessel. But we have devoted another chapter to the consideration of the attributes of the several species, which makes it unnecessary to dwell upon the subject at present.

And now, lastly, is it necessary to show that all the kinds of evidence required by zoology-required by a judicial tribunal-can be furnished, to prove that all these specific differences have prevailed from time immemorial? Need we rely on the probable presumption of specific differences, arising from specimens of different colors, and different hair? Are we compelled to rest the issue of this question upon the violent presumption arising from slight anatomical and physiological differences, supported by slight differences of manners, habits, dispositions, hostilities, and sexual aversions? On the contrary, can we not say that, step by step, through every grade and kind of evidence, from the inspired volume, from the tombs of Egypt, from all history, from living examples now known to exist in different quarters of the world,―man is, by stronger distinctions than can be found to prevail between the species of any generic family in zoology, of at least four distinct species?

But a part of the proof yet remains to be furnished in detail, which we will lay before our readers in the succeeding chapters.

CHAPTER VIII.

WHETHER THE DIFFERENCES OF PHYSICAL ORGANIZATION, AND OF MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL QUALITIES WHICH CHARACTERIZE THE SEVERAL RACES OF MEN ARE ANALOGOUS IN KIND AND DEGREE TO THOSE WHICH DISTINGUISH THE BREEDS OF DOMESTIC ANIMALS, AND MUST THEREFORE BE ACCOUNTED FOR ON THE SAME PRINCIPLE.

THE whole scientific theory of the unity of the human species depends upon the decision of the question we have above proposed; for unless domestic animals are the analogues of man, none of the theories can be maintained. It is strange that eminent men who have elaborately written upon this subject, should build upon an assumed foundation, without any effort to discover, or to disclose its solidity, or efficiency to support the superstructure. "If" says Dr. Prichard in his Natural History of Man, pp. 26, 27, "we could obtain a complete and satisfactory account of all the phenomena connected with the variation of breeds or races in the different tribes of organized beings, of the utmost extent to which it reaches, of its precise nature, and of the circumstances under which it takes its rise, we should experience little or no difficulty in determining the question whether the diversities which exist between different races of men are specific charac

ters, or only examples of similar deviation." This is undoubtedly true; for as all the races of men are "organized beings," if he had their history "to the utmost extent," he would "experience little or no difficulty in determining the question." But he had it not, and therefore he proceeds--" We have no hope of immediately obtaining the former of these objects to the fullest extent, but we must endeavor to approach it as nearly as possible. In proceeding in this attempt, we are first led to advert to the general fact that in the domesticated races of animals, and the cultivated tribes of plants, the phenomena of variation have been most remarkably displayed."

This is again undoubtedly true; but what does it affirm? Nothing but "the general fact that in the domesticated races of animals, and the cultivated tribes of plants, the phenomena of variation have been most remarkably displayed;" but not one word about the propriety of making them the analogues of man, which is the object of his whole chapter, and without which his work would be of little value. This is the important matter which should have been exhibited in the clearest light, be. cause it is the foundation of his theory. But he attempts nothing of the kind. He passes immediately from this, to the enumeration of the varieties of domestic animals, and makes them the foundation for all of his subsequent reasoning.

We have quoted Dr. Prichard as an example of the mode adopted by the whole class of authors who advocate the unity of the species; for they all freely use animals as analogues of man, without attempt