life, which we have so long been seeking; that life, where the value of all things is justly measured by those relations which they bear to the natural frame, and real constitution of mankind in fewer words, a life of virtue appears to be the life according to nature. It appears so.

But, in such a life, every pursuit, every avoiding, (to include all,) every action, will of course admit of being rationally justified. It will.-But that which, being done, admits of a rational justification, is the essence or genuine character of an office, or moral duty. For thus, long ago, it has been defined by the best authorities.-Admit it.-If so, then a life according to virtue, is a life according to moral offices or duties.-It appears so.But we have already agreed it to be a life according to nature. -We have.-Observe, then: a life according to virtue, according to moral offices, and according to nature, mean all the same thing, though varied in the expression.-Your remark, said I, seems just.

XVI. We need never, therefore, replied he, be at a loss how to choose, though the objects of choice be ever so infinite and diversified. As far as nothing is inconsistent with such a life and such a character, we may justly set existence before death, prefer health to sickness, integrity of the limbs to being maimed and debilitated, pleasure to pain, wealth to poverty, fame to dishonour, free government to slavery, power and magistracy to subjection and a private state; universally, whatever tends either to being, or to well-being, we may be justified, when we prefer to whatever appears the contrary. And when our several energies, exerted according to the virtues just mentioned, have put us in possession of all that we require;' when we enjoy, subjoined to

See pages 56, 58, 66, 82, 83.

i In the original, it is ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογον Yoxei àmodoyiouóv. Diog. Laert. 1. vii. • 107. όπερ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἔχει τὴν axoλoylar. Sext. Emp. Adv. Mathem. 1. Vii. Thus rendered by Cicero: Officium id esse dicunt, quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit. De Offic. 1. i. c. 3. The reason of its Greek name, кaðîкov, is given by Simplicius: Kathкová σTI Td γινόμενα κατὰ τὰ ἥκοντα καὶ ἐπιβάλAorra: "Moral offices are those things which are done agreeably to what is fitting and expedient." Simplic. in Ench. c. 37.

* By Tully, in his Offices, and by other authors of antiquity.

1 This was the idea of happiness adopted by the old academy, or Platonics: Secundum naturam vivere, sic affectum, ut optime affici possit, ad naturamque accommodatissime. Cic. de Fin. 1. v. c. 9. p. 370. The Peripatetics, who were originally of the same school, held the same. Εἰ δ' οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια

γίγνεται κατ' ἀρετὴν—τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ τελειοτάτην—ἐν βίῳ τελείφ: “ If this be admitted, it follows, that human good or happiness is the energizing of the soul according to the best and most consummate virtue, in a perfect and complete life." Ethic. Nic. 1. i. c. 7. A perfect and complete life, they explained to be such a life as was no way deficient either as to its duration, its bodily health, and its being attended with a proper competence of external goods, and prosperity. By the best and most consummate virtue, they not only meant that virtue which was in its kind most perfect, but which was the virtue also of that part which is in each of us most excellent. For there are virtues of the body, such as strength and agility; and there are virtues of the senses, such as accurate seeing, accurate tasting; and the same of every faculty, from the lowest to that which is supreme.

The sovereign good, or happiness, here spoken of, is again repeated, in other words

a right and honest mind, both health of body and competence of externals; what can there be wanting to complete our happiness, to render our state perfectly consonant to nature, or to give us a more sovereign good than that which we now enjoy? -Nothing, replied I, that I can at present think of.

There would be nothing, indeed, said he, were our energies never to fail; were all our endeavours to be ever crowned with due success. But suppose the contrary; suppose the worst success to the most upright conduct, to the wisest rectitude of energies and actions. It is possible, nay, experience teaches us it is too often fact, that not only the pursuers of what is contrary to nature, but that those who pursue nothing but what is strictly congruous to it, may miss of their aims, and be frustrated in their endeavours. Inquisitors and monks may detest them for their virtue, and pursue them with all the engines of malice and inhumanity. Without these, pests may afflict their bodies; inundations overwhelm their property; or, what is worse than inundations, either tyrants, pirates, heroes, or banditti. They may see their country fall, and with it their bravest countrymen; themselves pillaged, and reduced to extremities, or perishing with the rest in the general massacre.

Cadit et Ripheus, justissimus unus

Qui fuit in Teucris, et servantissimus æqui."

-It must be owned, said I, this has too often been the case.

Or grant, continued he, that these greater events never happen; that the part allotted us be not in the tragedy of life, but in the comedy. Even the comic distresses are abundantly irksome : domestic jars, the ill offices of neighbours; suspicions, jealousies, schemes defeated; the folly of fools; the knavery of knaves:

page 71, where it is called, "the attaining the primary and just requisites of our nature, by a conduct suitable to virtue and moral office."

The primary and just requisites here mentioned, are all things requisite to the use and enjoyment of our primary and natural perfections. These primary and natural perfections, mean the natural accomplishments of both our mind and body. They were called by the Latins, prima naturæ, prima secundum naturam; by the Greeks, та прŵта катà púow, rà πρῶτα τῆς φύσεως. In them were included health, strength, agility, beauty, perfect sensations, memory, docility, invention, &c. See Stob. Ecl. Eth. p. 163. Cic. de Fin. 1. v. c. 7. p. 364. A. Gell. 1. xii. c. 5.

A like sentiment of happiness, to this here spoken of, is that mentioned by Cicero: Virtute adhibita, frui primis a natura datis. De Fin. 1. ii. c. 11. p. 113. It is there

called, the opinion of the old Academics and Peripatetics. It is again repeated by the same author: Honeste vivere, fruentem rebus iis, quas primas homini natura conciliet. Acad. 1. ii. c. 42. p. 240.

It is to be observed, that Cicero, speaking of this hypothesis, says, that it proposed an idea of happiness, which was not properly in our own power. Hoc non est positum in nostra actione: completur enim et ex eo genere vitæ, quod virtute finitur, et ex iis rebus quæ secundum naturam sunt, neque sunt in nostra potestate. De Fin. l. iv. c. 6. p. 287.

Hence, therefore, the deficiency of this doctrine. However justifiable, however laudable its end, it could not insure a due success to its endeavours. And hence, too, the force of what is objected to it in the Dialogue, in this and the following page.

in Eneid. 1. ii. 426.

from which, as members of society, it is impossible to detach ourselves.

Where, then, shall we turn, or what have we to imagine? We have at length placed happiness, after much inquiry, in attaining the primary and just requisites of our nature, by a conduct suitable to virtue and moral office. But as to corresponding with our preconceptions, (which we have made the test,) does this system correspond better than those others which we have rejected? Has it not appeared, from various facts, too obvious to be disputed, that, in many times and places, it may be absolutely unattainable? That in many, where it exists, it may in a moment be cancelled, and put irretrievably out of our power, by events not to be resisted? If this be certain, and I fear it cannot be questioned, our specious long inquiry, however accurate we may believe it, has not been able to shew us a good, of that character which we require; a good durable, indeprivable, and accommodate to every circumstance: far from it, our speculations (I think) rather lead us to that low opinion of happiness which, you may remember, you expressed," when we first began the subject. They rather help to prove to us, that instead of a sovereign good, it is the more probable sentiment, there is no such good at all.-I should indeed, said I, fear so. For where, continued he, lies the difference, whether we pursue what is congruous to nature, or not congruous; if the acquisition of one be as difficult as of the other, and the possession of both equally doubtful and precarious? If Cæsar fall in attempting his country's ruin; and Brutus fare no better, who only fought in its defence?-It must be owned, said I, these are melancholy truths; and the instances which you allege too well confirm them.

We were in the midst of these serious thoughts, descanting upon the hardships and miseries of life, when, by an incident not worth relating, our speculations were interrupted. Nothing at the time, I thought, could have happened more unluckily; our question perplexed, its issue uncertain, and myself impatient to know the event. Necessity, however, was not to be resisted, and thus for the present our inquiries were postponed.

PART II.

"BRUTUS perished untimely, and Cæsar did no more." These words I was repeating the next day to myself, when my friend appeared, and cheerfully bade me good-morrow. I could not

" See page 44.

return his compliment with an equal gaiety, being intent, somewhat more than usual, on what had passed the day before. Seeing this, he proposed a walk into the fields.-The face of nature, said he, will perhaps dispel these glooms. No assistance on my part shall be wanting, you may be assured.-I accepted his proposal; the walk began, and our former conversation insensibly renewed.

Brutus, said he, perished untimely, and Cæsar did no more. It was thus, as I remember, not long since you were expressing yourself. And yet, suppose their fortunes to have been exactly parallel, which would you have preferred? Would you have been Cæsar or Brutus?-Brutus, replied I, beyond all controversy. -He asked me, why? Where was the difference, when their fortunes, as we now supposed them, were considered as the same? There seems said I, abstract from their fortunes, something, I know not what, intrinsically preferable in the life and character of Brutus.-If that, said he, be true, then must we derive it, not from the success of his endeavours, but from their truth and rectitude. He had the comfort to be conscious that his cause was a just one: it was impossible the other should have any such feeling.—I believe, said I, you have explained it.

Suppose, then, continued he, (it is but merely an hypothesis,) suppose, I say, we were to place the sovereign good in such a rectitude of conduct; in the conduct merely, and not in the

• As the conduct here mentioned implies a conduct under the direction of a befitting rule or law, and that, as opposed to wrong conduct, which has either no rule at all, or at least one erroneous, it may not be an improper place to inquire, what was the ancient opinion concerning law universal; that great and general law, which stood opposed to the municipal laws of particular cities and communities.

Est quidem vera lex, recta ratio, naturæ congruens, diffusa in omnes, constans, sempiterna, quæ vocet ad officium jubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat-nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et omnes gentes, et omni tempore una lex, et sempiterna, et immortalis continebit; unusque erit communis quasi magister, et imperator omnium Deus. Ille hujus legis inventor, disceptator, lator. Cui qui non parebit, ipse se fugiet, ac naturam hominis aspernabitur; hoc ipso luet maximas pœnas, etiamsi cætera supplicia, quæ putantur effugerit. Fragm. Cic. de Rep. 1. iii.

Lex est ratio summa, insita in natura, quæ jubet ea quæ facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria. What follows is worth remarking. Eadem ratio, cum est in hominis mente confirmata et confecta, lex est. Cic. de Leg. 1. i. c. 6. p. 22.

Again: Lex vera-ratio est recta summi

Jovis. To which he subjoins, as above, Ergo ut illa divina mens summa lex est ; ita cum in homine est, perfecta est in mente sapientis. De Leg. 1. ii. c. 4, 5. p. 88.

It is in this sense the apostle tells us of the Gentiles, or mankind in general, that they "shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another." Rom. ii. 15.

As Cicero, in his book of laws above cited, follows the Stoic discipline, so is it agreeable to their reasoning, that he makes the original natural law, of which we here treat, to be the sovereign reason of the Deity himself. Thus Chrysippus: Idem [scil. Chrysippus] legis perpetuæ et æternæ vim, quæ quasi dux vitæ et magistra officiorum sit, Jovem dicit esse. Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 15. p. 41.

So, by the same philosophers, in Laertius, we are ordered to live according to nature: οὐδὲν ἐνεργοῦντας ὧν ἀπαγορεύειν εἴωθεν ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινὸς, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διὶ, καθηγεμόνι τούτῳ τῆς τῶν ὄντων (for ὅλων) dlouhoews VTI: "doing nothing forbidden by the universal law; that is to say, by that right reason which passeth through all things, and which is the same with Jove

event. Suppose we were to fix our happiness, not in the actual attainment of that health, that perfection of a social state, that fortunate concurrence of externals which is congruous to our nature, and which we have a right all to pursue; but solely fix it in the mere doing whatever is correspondent to such an end, even though we never attain, or are near attaining it. In fewer