man, or all the animals inhabiting this earth, may we not affirm of him, by way of distinction, that he is a rational animal?I replied, we might justly. Let this, too, then be remembered, said he, in the course of our inquiry, that man is by nature a rational animal.-I promised it should. XIV. In consequence of this, said he, as often as there is occasion, I shall appeal as well to reason, as to nature, for a standard. What, said I, do you mean by nature?-Its meanings, replied he, are many and various. As it stands at present opposed, it may be enough perhaps to say, that nature is that which is the cause of every thing, except those things alone which are the immediate effects of reason. In other words, whatever is not reason, or the effect of reason, we would consider as nature, or the effect of nature.-I answered, as he so distinguished them, I thought he might justly appeal to either. And yet, continued he, there is a remarkable difference between the standard of reason, and that of nature; a difference, which at no time we ought to forget.-What difference, said I, do you mean?-It is this, answered he; in nature, the standard is sought from among the many; in reason, the standard is sought among the few. You must explain, said I, your meaning, for I must confess you seem obscure. Thus, then, said he suppose, as an anatomist, you were seeking the structure of some internal part; to discover this, would you not inspect a number of individuals?—I should. And would you not inform yourself, what had been discovered by others?I should. And suppose, after all, you should find a multitude of instances for one structure, and a few singular for a different : by which would you be governed?-By the multitude, said I, undoubtedly.—Thus, then, continued he, in nature the standard, you see, exists among the many.—I replied, it had so appeared. And what, said he, were we to seek the perfection of sculpture, or of painting? Where should we inquire then? Among the numerous common artists, or among the few and celebrated?Among the few, said I.-What if we were to seek the perfection of poetry, or oratory, where then?-Among the few, still.What if we were to seek the perfection of true argument, or a sound logic; where then?-Still among the few. And is not true argument, or a sound logic, one of reason's greatest perfections? It is. You see, then, continued he, whence the standard of reason is to be sought: it is from among the few," as we said * In omni enim arte, vel studio, vel quavis scientia, vel in ipsa virtute, optumum quodque rarissimum est. Cic. de Fin. 1. ii. c. 25. p. 158. edit. Dav. Thus, too, Aristotle joins the rare and the ex cellent, τὸ εὖ, καὶ σπάνιον, καὶ ἐπαίνετον, kai kaλóv. Eth. Nic. 1. ii. c. 9. Tò yàp σπάνιον, ὦ Εὐθύδημε, τίμιον. Plat. in Euthyd. p. 304. B. edit. Serr. before, in contradistinction to the standard of nature.-I confess, said I, it appears so. And happy, said he, for us, that Providence has so ordered it; happy for us, that what is rational, depends not on the multitude; nor is it to be tried by so pitiful a test as the bare counting of noses. It is happy, said I, indeed: but whence, pray, the difference? Why are the many to determine in nature, and the few, only, in reason?-To discuss this at large, said he, would require some time. It might insensibly perhaps draw us from our present inquiry. I will endeavour to give you the reason in as few words as possible; which, should they chance to be obscure, be not too solicitous for an explanation.—I begged him to proceed his own way. b The case, said he, appears to be this: in natural works and natural operations, we hold but one efficient cause, and that consummately wise. This cause in every species recognising what is best, and working ever uniformly according to this idea of perfection, the productions and energies, in every species where it acts, are for the most part similar and exactly correspondent. If an exception ever happen, it is from some hidden higher motive, which transcends our comprehension, and which is seen so rarely, as not to injure the general rule, or render it doubtful and precarious. On the contrary, in the productions and energies of reason, there is not one cause, but infinite; as many, indeed, as there are agents of the human kind. Hence truth being but one, and error being infinite, and agents infinite also; what wonder they should oftener miss, than hit the mark? that multitudes should fail, where one alone succeeds, and truth be only the possession of the chosen, fortunate few?-You seem to have explained the difficulty, said I, with sufficient perspicuity. Let us then go back, said he, and recollect ourselves; that we may not forget what it is we are seeking. I replied, most willingly. We have been seeking, continued he, the sovereign good. In consequence of this inquiry, we have discovered, that all things whatever exist to the human species in the relations b Thus Boethius, addressing the Deity: O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas, Terrarum cælique sator, qui tempus ab ævo Ire jabes, stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri ; Quem non externa pepulerunt fingere causæ ipse Consol. Philos. 1. iii. Metr. 9. © MÝTOTE de μnde TAÛTA [SC. TÀ TÉPAτa] παρὰ φύσιν εἰσὶν, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν μερικῇ φύσει οὐ φύσει, ἀλλὰ παρὰ φύσιν· τῇ δὲ F of either pursuable, avoidable, or indifferent. To determine these relations with accuracy, we have been scrutinizing the human nature; and that, upon this known maxim, that every species was its own proper standard; and that where the value of things was dubious, there the species was to be studied, and the relations to be deduced, which naturally flow from it. The result of this scrutiny has been, that we have first agreed man to be a social animal; and since, to be a rational. So that if we can be content with a descriptive, concise sketch of human nature, it will amount to this, that man is a social rational animal. I answered, it had appeared so. d XV. If, then, said he, we pursue our disquisitions agreeably to this idea of human nature, it will follow, that all things will be pursuable, avoidable, and indifferent to man, as they respect the being and welfare of such a social, rational animal.—I replied, they must. Nothing, therefore, in the first place, said he, can be pursuable, which is destructive of society."-It cannot.-Acts, therefore, of fraud and rapine, and all acquired by them, whether wealth, power, pleasure, or any thing, are evidently, from their very · Ζῶον λογικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν, λογικόν καὶ κοινωνικὸν, λογικὸν καὶ ἥμερον: these are descriptions of humanity, which we meet in every page of Epictetus and Antoninus. It seems, indeed, to have been a received opinion of old, that so intimate was the relation between these two attributes, that wherever there was rationality, sociality followed of course. Thus Antoninus: ἔστι δὲ τὸ λογικὸν, εὐθὺς καὶ πολιτικόν. 1. x. s. 2. And again, more fully: xal τοίνυν πᾶν τὸ τῆς νοερᾶς φύσεως μέτοχον, πρὸς τὸ συγγενὲς ὁμοίως σπεύδει, ἢ καὶ μᾶλλον· ὅσῳ γάρ ἐστι κρεῖττον παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα, τοσούτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ συγκρινᾶσθαι τῷ οἰκείῳ καὶ συγκεῖσθαι ἑτοιμότερον. 1. ix. s. 9. It is not perhaps foreign to the present subject to observe, that were the eyes of any two men whatever to view the same object, they would each, from their different place, and their different organization, behold it differently, and have a different image. But were all the minds in the universe to recognise the same truth, they would all recognise it as one, their recognition would be uniform, and themselves in a manner would be one also. The reason is, perception by the senses admits of more and less, better and worse; but perception by the intellect, like truth, its object, admits of no degrees, and is either nothing at all, or else total, uniform, complete, and one. Hence, therefore, one source of the society, and, as it were, communion of all minds, considered as minds ; namely, the unity of truth, their common object. Again, every just and perfect society stands on the basis of certain laws. But law is nothing more, than right and perfect reason, seen in bidding and forbidding, according to the nature and essence of those beings to which it is a law. If, therefore, this universe be one whole, or general society, there must be some common, ge neral law for its conduct and welfare ; and this law must, of consequence, be some right and perfect reason, which passes through all things, and extends to every part. Well therefore might Antoninus say, in the beginning of this note, that every thing rational, was of course social, since reason and law appear to be the same, and law to be the support and basis of all society. Thus, too, Cicero: Sequitur, ut eadem sit in his [sc. Diis] quæ humano generi ratio; eadem veritas utrobique sit; eademque lex, quæ est recti præceptio, pravique depulsio. De Nat. Deor. I. ii. c. 31. p. 180. See also the same author, De Leg. 1. i. c. 8, 12, 15. p. 29, 41, 51. edit. Davis. De Fin. 1. ii. c. 14. p. 123. See also Diog. Laert. 1. vii. s. 88. M. Anton. 1. v. c. 16. 1. vi. c. 23. Aristot. Polit, as quoted in note z, p. 61. e Si enim sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet, aut violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est eam, quæ maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis societatem. Cic. de Offic. 1. iii. c. 5. character, not fit to be pursued.-They are not.-But it is impossible not to pursue many such things, unless we are furnished with some habit or disposition of mind, by which we are induced to render to all men their own, and to regard the welfare and interest of society. It is impossible.-But the habit or disposition of rendering to all their own, and of regarding the welfare and interest of society, is justice. It is. We may therefore fairly conclude, that nothing is naturally pursuable, but what is either correspondent to justice, or at least not contrary. I confess, said I, so it appears. But, further, said he, it is possible we may have the best disposition to society; the most upright intentions; and yet, through want of ability to discern and know the nature of particulars, we may pursue many things inconsistent, as well with our private interest, as the public. We may even pursue what is right, and yet pursue it in such a manner, as to find our endeavours fruitless, and our purposes to fail.-I answered, it was possible. But this would ill befit the character of a rational animal. It would. It is necessary, therefore, we should be furnished with some habit or faculty, instructing us how to discern the real difference of all particulars, and suggesting the proper means by which we may either avoid or obtain them.It is. And what is this, think you, but prudence?-I believe, said, I, it can be no other.-If it be, said he, then it is evident from this reasoning, that nothing is pursuable, which is not correspondent to prudence.-I replied, he had shewn it could not. But further still, said he, it is possible we may neither want prudence nor justice to direct us; and yet the impulses of appetite, the impetuosities of resentment, the charms and allurements of a thousand flattering objects, may tempt us, in spite of ourselves, to pursue what is both imprudent and unjust.-They may.—But if so, it is necessary, would we pursue as becomes our character, that we should be furnished with some habit which may moderate our excesses; which may temper our actions to the standard of a social state, and to the interest and welfare, not of a part, but of the whole man.-Nothing, said I, more necessary. And what, said he, can we call this habit, but the habit of temperance?-You name it, said I, rightly.—If you think so, replied he, then nothing can be pursuable, which is not either correspondent to temperance, or at least not contrary. I replied, so it seemed. : Once more, continued he, and we have done it is possible that not only resentment and appetite, not only the charms and allurements of external objects, but the terrors, too, and dread of them, may mar the rectitude of our purposes. It is possible.-Tyranny and superstition may assail us on one hand; the apprehensions of ridicule, and a false shame, on the other: it is expedient, to withstand these, we should be armed with some habit, or our wisest best pursuits may else at all times be defeated. They may.-And what is that generous, manlike, and noble habit, which sets us at all times above fear and danger; what is it but fortitude?—I replied, it was no other.-If so, then, continued he, besides our former conclusions, nothing further can be pursuable, as our inquiries now have shewn us, which is not either correspondent to fortitude, or at least not contrary. I admit, said I, it is not. Observe, then, said he, the sum, the amount of our whole reasoning: nothing is truly pursuable to such an animal as man, except what is correspondent, or, at least, not contrary to justice, prudence, temperance, and fortitude.-I allow, said I, it appears so. But if nothing pursuable, then nothing avoidable or indifferent, but what is tried and estimated after the same manner. For contraries are ever recognised through the same habit, one with another. The same logic judges of truth and falsehood; the same musical art, of concord and discord. So the same mental habitudes, of things avoidable and pursuable. I replied, it appeared probable. To how unexpected a conclusion, then, said he, have our inquiries insensibly led us? In tracing the source of human action, we have established it to be those four grand virtues, which are esteemed, for their importance, the very hinges of all morality. We have. But if so, it should follow, that a life, whose pursuings and avoidings are governed by these virtues, is that true and rational · Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη, καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῶν ἐναντίων, ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι : “There seems to be one and the same error, and one and the same science, with respect to things contrary." Arist. de Anim. l. iii. c. 3. This, by Themistius, in his Paraphrase, is thus illustrated: Tav évavríwv μía éσriv èrστήμη, καὶ μία ἄγνοια· ὁ γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς ὠφέλιμον γινώσκων, καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὅτι βλαβερὸν συνεπίσταται· καὶ ὁ περὶ θάτερον ἐξαπατώμενος, ἐξαπατᾶται καὶ περὶ θάτεpov: "Of things contrary there is one science, and one ignorance. For thus, he who knows good to be something beneficial, knows evil, at the same time, to be something pernicious ; and he who is deceived with respect to one of these, is deceived also with respect to the other." See the Io of Plato, p. 531. vol. i. edit. Serr. Stobæus, having told us, that of the virtues some were primary, some subordinate, adds: πρώτας δὲ τέτταρας εἶναι, φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, ἀνδρείαν, δικαιο σύνην καὶ τὴν μὲν φρόνησιν, περὶ τὰ καθήκοντα γίνεσθαι· τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· τὴν δὲ ἀνδρείαν, περὶ τὰς ὑπομονάς· τὴν δὲ δικαιο σύνην, περὶ τὰς ἀπονεμήσεις: “ The primary virtues are four; prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice: prudence is employed in moral offices; temperance, in men's natural appetites and pursuits; fortitude, in endurings ; and justice, in dis tributions.” Ecl. Ethic. p. 167. That the life according to virtue, was deemed the life according to nature, appears from what is said by the same author, in the page following: Naoŵv dè toútwv tŴY ἀρετῶν τὸ τέλος εἶναι, τὸ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζῇν· ἑκάστην δὲ τούτων διὰ τῶν ἰδίων παρέχεσθαι τυγχάνοντα τὸν ἄνθρω που : "The end of all these virtues is, to live agreeably to nature; and each of them, by those means which are peculiar to itself, is found to put a man in possession of this end." So likewise Cicero: Etenim quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, "convenienter naturæ vivere," id habet hanc, ut opinor, sententiam, “cum virtute congruere semper." De Offic. l. iii. c. 3. |