Telum imbelle sine ictu Conjecit: rauco quod protenus ære repulsum, Et summo Clypei nequicquam umbone pependit, b с Among the many long-exploded and obsolete systems, there was one, you may remember, for which I professed a great esteem. Not in the least degree convinced by all I had heard against it, I durst venture to affirm, that no system was more plausible; that grant but its principles, and the rest followed of course; that none approached nearer to the perfection of our own religion, as I could prove, were there occasion, by authority not to be controverted. As you, I knew, were the favourer of an hypothesis somewhat different, so I attempted to support my own, by reciting you a certain dialogue: not succeeding, however, so happily in the recollection, as I could wish, I have since endeavoured to transcribe, what at that time I would have rehearsed. The result of my labour is the following narrative, which I commit with confidence to your friendship and candour. II. It was at a time when a certain friend, whom I highly value, was my guest. We had been sitting together, entertaining ourselves with Shakespear: among many of his characters, we had looked into that of Wolsey.-How soon, says my friend, does the cardinal in disgrace abjure that happiness which he was lately so fond of? Scarcely out of office, but he begins to exclaim, Vain pomp and glory of the world! I hate ye.d So true is it, that our sentiments ever vary with the season; and that in adversity we are of one mind, in prosperity of another.— As for his mean opinion, said I, of human happiness, it is a truth, which small reflection might have taught him long before: there seems little need of distress to inform us of this. I rather commend the seeming wisdom of that eastern monarch, who, in the affluence of prosperity, when he was proving every pleasure, was yet so sensible of their emptiness, their insufficiency to make him happy, that he proclaimed a reward to the man who should invent a new delight: the reward indeed was proclaimed, but the delight was not to be found.-If by delight, says he, you mean some good, something conducive to real happiness, it might have been found, perhaps, and yet not hit the monarch's fancy. -Is that, said I, possible?-It is possible, replied he, though it had been the sovereign good itself: and, indeed, what wonder? Is it probable that such a mortal as an eastern monarch, such a pampered, flattered, idle mortal, should have attention or capacity to a subject so delicate? A subject, enough to exercise the subtlest and most acute? What then is it you esteem, said I, the sovereign good to be? It should seem, by your representation, to be something very b Æneid. l. ii. 544. e Viz. the Platonic. d Shakespear's Henry the Eighth. uncommon.-Ask me not the question, said he, you know not where it will carry us. Its general idea, indeed, is easy and plain, but the detail of particulars is perplexed and long; passions and opinions for ever thwart us; a paradox appears in almost every advance. Besides, did our inquiries succeed ever so happily, the very subject itself is always enough to give me pain.-That, replied I, seems a paradox indeed. It is not, said he, from any prejudice which I have conceived against it; for to man I esteem it the noblest in the world: nor is it for being a subject to which my genius does not lead me; for no subject at all times has more employed my attention: but the truth is, I can scarce ever think on it, but an unlucky story still occurs to my mind. "A certain star-gazer, with his telescope was once viewing the moon, and describing her seas, her mountains, and her territories. Says a clown to his companion, Let him spy what he pleases, we are as near to the moon as he and all his brethren." So fares it, alas! with these, our moral speculations. Practice too often creeps, where theory can soar: the philosopher proves as weak as those whom he most contemns: a mortifying thought to such as well attend it.-Too mortifying, replied I, to be long dwelt on. Give us rather your general idea of the sovereign good: this is easy, from your own account, however intricate the detail. 6 Thus then, said he, since you are so urgent, it is thus that I conceive it. The sovereign good is that, the possession of which renders us happy. And how, said I, do we possess it? Is it sensual, or intellectual?-There you are entering, said he, upon the detail; this is beyond your question.-Not a small advance, said I, to indulge poor curiosity? Will you raise me a thirst, and be so cruel not to allay it? It is not, replied he, of my raising, but your own. Besides, I am not certain, should I attempt to proceed, whether you will admit such authorities as it is possible I may vouch.-That, said I, must be determined by their weight and character.-Suppose, said he, it should be mankind, the whole human race; would you not think it something strange, to seek of those concerning good, who pursue it a thousand ways, and many of them contradictory?-I confess, said I, it seems so. And yet, continued he, were there a point in which such dissentients ever agreed, this agreement would be no mean argument in favour of its truth and justness.-But where, replied I, is this agreement to be found? He answered me by asking, What, if it should appear that there were certain original characteristics and preconceptions of f See sect. 7. and note o. 8 Κτήσει γὰρ ἀγαθῶν, οἱ εὐδαίμονες, evdalμoves: “By the possession of things good are the happy made happy." Platon. Conviv. vol. ii. p. 204. edit. Serrani. Phileb. Plat. p. 60. B. See Arrian Epict. 1. iii. c. 22. The reader will be pleased to observe, that in all quotations from the Dissertations of Epictetus, collected by Arrian, the author refers to the late edition in two volumes quarto, published by his learned and ingenious friend, Mr. Upton. good, which were natural, uniform, and common to all men; which all recognised in their various pursuits; and that the difference lay only in the applying them to particulars?—This h The preconceptions here spoken of are called by the Latins prænotiones, or anticipationes; by the Greeks προλήψεις, οι ἔννοιαι, with the occasional epithets of κοιναὶ, ἔμφυτοι, οι φυσικαί. It is evident, that all men, without the least help of art, exert a kind of natural logic ; can in some degree refute, and prove, and render a reason. Now this cannot be (as the meanest proficient in logic well knows) without general ideas, and general propositions, because a syllogism of particulars is an impossibility; there must be therefore some natural faculty to provide us these generals: this faculty cannot be any of the senses, for they all respect particulars only; nor can it be the reasoning or syllogizing faculty, for this does not form such generals, but use them when formed. There only, therefore, remains the faculty called vous, that is to say, the inductive faculty; the faculty, which, by induction of similar individuals, forms out of the particular and the many, what is general and one. This species of apprehension is evidently our first and earliest knowledge; because all knowledge by reasoning dates its origin from it; and because, except these two, no other knowledge is possible. As, therefore, every ear, not absolutely depraved, is able to make some general distinctions of sound ; and, in like manner, every eye, with respect to objects of vision; and as this general use of these faculties, by being difused through all individuals, may be called common hearing, and common vision, as opposed to those more accurate energies, peculiar only to artists ; so fares it with respect to the intellect. There are truths, or universals, of so obvious a kind, that every mind, or intellect, not absolutely depraved, without the least help of art, can hardly fail to recognise them. The recognition of these, or at least the ability to recognise them, is called κοινὸς νοῦς, 66 common sense,” as being a sense common to all, except lunatics and ideots. Further as this power is called Kowds νοῦς, so the several propositions, which are its proper objects, are called προλήψεις, οι preconceptions, as being previous to all other conceptions. It is easy to gather from what has been said, that these προλήψεις must be general, as being formed by induction; as also natural, by being common to all men, and previous to all instruction. Hence, therefore, their definition : Ἔστι δ ̓ ἡ πρόληψις, ἔννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου: a preconception is the natural apprehension of what is general, or universal.” Diog. Laert. l. vii. s. 54. See also Arrian. Εpict. 1. i. c. 22. 1. iii. c. 6. Cic. de Natura Deor. 1. i. c. 16, 17. Plut. de Placit. Philosoph. 910. C. Aristot. de Anim. iii. 11. i This was called ἐφαρμογὴ τῶν προλή ψεων ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις—τὰς φυσικὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐ σίαις. Arr. Εpict. l. i. c. 22. ed. Upt. See an eminent instance, illustrating the truth of this reasoning, in the same author, 1. iv. c. 1. p. 545. Εννοοῦμεν γὰρ, ὅτι, &c. Boet. de Cons. l. iii. Prosa. ii. p. 106. So Proclus, in his manuscript comment on the first Alcibiades of Plato, p. 139. 'H κοινὴ καὶ ἀδιάστροφος ἔννοια τὴν εὐδαι μονίαν τῇ αὐταρκείᾳ χαρακτηρίζει παρ' ὧν γὰρ τὸ εὖ, παρὰ τούτων καὶ τὸ αὔταρκες. καὶ ὁρᾶς δὴ πάλιν ὅπως ἐνταῦθα καὶ ὁ ̓Αλκι βιάδης κατορθοῖ μὲν κατὰ τὴν μείζονα, σφάλλεται δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐλάττονα πρότασιν. Συλλογίζεται γὰρ οὕτως· ἐγὼ διὰ σῶμα, καὶ γένος, καὶ φίλους, καὶ πλοῦτον εὐδαίμων· ὁ εὐδαίμων ἀνενδεής· ἐγὼ (φησίν) ἀνενδεής, οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν ὁ εὐδαίμων ἀνενδεὴς, ἀληθές ὅτι δὲ αὐτὸς εὐδαίμων, ψευδές· τὸ γοῦν συμπέρασμα ψευδὲς διὰ τὴν ἐλάττονα. καὶ οὕτως εὑρήσεις καὶ τὸν φιλήδονον, καὶ τὸν φιλοχρήματον, διὰ ταύτην ψευδομένους. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἡδονὴν, ὁ δὲ χρήματα τίθεται τὸ ἀγαθόν. ὅτι δὲ πᾶν τὸ ἐφετὸν ἀγαθὸν, κοινόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς. καὶ συνελόντι φᾶναι, τὰς μὲν μείζους τῶν προτάσεων ἕκαστοι τιθέασιν, ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν καὶ τοῦ λόγου ταύτας προβάλλοντες, τὰς δὲ ἐλάττους ἀπὸ φαν τασίας, ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλόγων προφέρονται παθῶν· διὸ καὶ ταύταις μὲν διαφέρονται πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐκείναις δὲ ὁμοφρονοῦσι. τὰ μὲν γὰρ πάθη μερισμοῦ καὶ διαστάσεώς ἐστιν αἴτια ταῖς ψυχαῖς· τι τανικὰ γάρ ἐστι, καὶ διασπᾶ, καὶ σπαράττει τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦν· ὁ δὲ λόγος κοινός ἐστι πᾶσι, καὶ ἡ τοῦ λόγου προβολή· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ΚΟΙΝΟΣ Ο ΕΡΜΗΣ ἵνα δὴ καὶ ἠθικῶς αὐτοῦ ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἐξήγησιν. 66 "The universal and unperverted idea of man characterizes happiness by self-sufficiency: for with whomever well-being exists, with them the self-sufficient exists also. You see, therefore, how here again Alcibiades is right as to his major proposition, but mistaken as to the minor. For thus it is he syllogizes: I, on account of my per son, and family, and friends, and wealth, am happy. The person happy is superior to want ; therefore am I superior to want.” Now that the person happy is superior to requires, said I, to be illustrated.-As if, continued he, a company of travellers, in some wide forest, were all intending for one city, but each by a rout peculiar to himself: the roads, indeed, would be various, and many, perhaps, false; but all who travelled would have one end in view.-It is evident, said I, they would. So fares it, then, added he, with mankind in pursuit of good: the ways, indeed, are many, but what they seek is one. For instance: did you ever hear of any one, who, in pursuit of their good, were for living the life of a bird, an insect, or a fish ?— None. And why not?-It would be inconsistent, answered I, with their nature. You see, then, said he, they all agree in this, that what they pursue, ought to be consistent, and agreeable to their proper nature. So ought it, said I, undoubtedly. If so, continued he, one preconception is discovered, which is common to good in general; it is, that "all good is supposed something agreeable to nature.”—This, indeed, replied I, seems to be agreed on all hands. But again, said he, is there a man scarcely to be found of a temper so truly mortified, as to acquiesce in the lowest, and shortest necessaries of life? who aims not, if he be able, at something further, something better?—I replied, scarcely one.Do not multitudes pursue, said he, infinite objects of desire, acknowledged every one of them to be in no respect necessaries? exquisite viands, delicious wines, splendid apparel, curious gardens; magnificent apartments adorned with pictures and sculpture; music and poetry, and the whole tribe of elegant arts?— It is evident, said I.-If it be, continued he, it should seem that they all considered the chief or sovereign good, not to be that which conduces to bare existence, or mere being; for to this the necessaries alone are adequate.-I replied, they were.-But if not this, it must be somewhat conducive to that which is superior to mere being. It must.-And what, continued he, can this be, but well-being? well-being, under the various shapes in which differing opinions paint it? Or can you suggest any thing else?— want, is true; but that he was happy, was false. The conclusion, therefore, is false through the minor proposition. "It is thus also you will find the lover of pleasure, and the lover of money, erring in their reasonings through the same proposition. For one of them lays down the good of man to be pleasure, the other to be riches; but that every thing desirable is good, this they possess in common, and assent to on both sides. "It may be said, indeed, universally, that all individuals produce the general propositions, which they lay down, from their common or universal ideas, and from the faculty of reason: but that their minor pro positions are produced from imagination, from sense, and from irrational passions. And hence it is, that about these last they differ one with another, while in the former they all agree. The passions, indeed, may be considered within the souls of men as the causes of division and distance; for they are Titanic, and distract and tear our intellect to pieces. But reason is the same and common to all, as is also the faculty of speech, the medium of its promulgation. And hence it is that Hermes (the type of rational discourse) is called 'common and universal,' if we may be allowed to give of him an ethical explanation." I replied, I could not.-Mark here, then, continued he, another preconception, in which they all agree: the sovereign good is somewhat conducive, not to mere being, but to well-being.—I replied, it had so appeared. Again, continued he, what labour, what expense, to procure those rarities which our own poor country is unable to afford us? How is the world ransacked to its utmost verges, and luxury and arts imported from every quarter? Nay, more, how do we baffle nature herself; invert her order; seek the vegetables of spring in the rigours of winter, and winter's ice during the heats of summer?—I replied, we did. And what disappointment, what remorse, when endeavours fail?-It is true.-If this, then, be evident, said he, it should seem, that whatever we desire as our chief and sovereign good, is "something which, as far as possible, we would accommodate to all places and times." I answered, so it appeared.-See, then, said he, another of its characteristics, another preconception. But further still; what contests for wealth? what scrambling for property? what perils in the pursuit, what solicitude in the maintenance? And why all this? To what purpose, what end? Or is not the reason plain? Is it not, that wealth may continually procure us whatever we fancy good; and make that perpetual, which would otherwise be transient?—I replied, it seemed so. Is it not further desired, as supplying us from ourselves, when, without it, we must be beholden to the benevolence of others, and depend on their caprice for all that we enjoy?— It is true, said I, this seems a reason. Again; Is not power of every degree as much contested for as wealth? Are not magistracies, honours, principalities, and empire, the subjects of strife, and everlasting contention ?-I replied, they were. And why, said he, this? To obtain what end? Is it not to help us, like wealth, to the possession of what we desire? Is it not further to ascertain, to secure our enjoyments; that when others would deprive us, we may be strong enough to resist them?-I replied, it was. Or to invert the whole, Why are there who seek recesses the most distant and retired? fly courts and power, and submit to parsimony and obscurity? Why all this, but from the same intention? From an opinion that small possessions, used moderately, are permanent; that larger possessions raise envy, and are more frequently invaded; that the safety of power and dignity is more precarious than that of retreat; and that there * Multi autem et sunt, et fuerunt, qui eam, quam dico, tranquillitatem expetentes, a negotiis publicis se removerint, ad otiumque perfugerint. His idem propositum fuit, quod regibus; ut ne qua re egerent, ne cui parerent, libertate uterentur: cujus pro prium est sic vivere, ut velis. Quare cum hoc commune fit potentiæ cupidorum cum iis, quos dixi, otiosis: alteri se adipisci id posse arbitrantur, si opes magnas habeant ; alteri si contenti sint et suo, et parvo. Cic. de Offic. 1. i. c. 20, 21. |