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learnt to be thus ingenious! or, that they were ignorant by nature, and knowing only by education ?- None, surely, replied I. -But we have still, said he, a higher consideration. And what, said I, is that?

It is, answered he, this: not even that Divine Power which gave form to all things, then acted by art, when it gave that form. For how, continued he, can that intelligence, which has all perfection ever in energy, be supposed to have any power, not original to its nature? How can it ever have any thing to learn, when it knows all from the beginning; or, being perfect and complete, admit of what is additional and secondary? -I should think, said I, it were impossible.—If so, said he, then art can never be numbered among its attributes : for all art is something learnt, something secondary and acquired, and never original to any being which possesses it.-So the fact, said I, has been established.

If this, therefore, continued he, be true ; if art belong not either to the divine nature, the brute nature, or the inanimate nature; to what nature shall we say it does belong ?-I know not, said I, unless it be to the human.-You are right, said he; for

every nature else, you perceive, is either too excellent to want it, or too base to be capable of it. Beside, except the human, what other nature is there left? Or where else can we find

any of the arts already instanced, or, indeed, whatever others we may now fancy to enumerate? Who are statuaries, but men? Who pilots, who musicians - This seems, replied I, to be the fact.

Let us then, continued he, say, not only that art is a cause, but that it is man becoming a cause ; and not only man, but man intending to do what is going to be done, and doing it also by habit; so that its whole idea, as far as we have hitherto conceived it, is, man becoming a cause, intentional and habitual. --I confess, said I, it has appeared so.

© Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, thus accurately not of themselves. The things which they enumerates all the possible manners, either do not of themselves, they do either by direct or indirect, in which mankind may chance, or from necessity; and the things be said to act, or do any thing. Návtes done from necessity, they do either by comδή πράττουσι πάντα, τα μεν, ου δι' αυτούς: pulsion, which is external necessity, or by Tà dė, di' avtoús TV per oův denn di' aŭrojs, nature, which is internal. So that all things per già rúxny apáttovol, td & whatsoever, which men do not of themανάγκης των δ' εξ ανάγκης, τα μεν βία, τα selves, they do either by chance, or from δε φύσει ώστε πάντα, όσα μη δι' αυτούς compulsion, or by nature.

Again, the πράττουσι, τα μεν από τύχης τα δε φύσει" things which they do of themselves, and of τα δε βία. "Οσα δε δι' αυτούς, και αν αυτοί which they are themselves properly the αίτιοι, τα μεν δι' έθος, τα δε δι' όρεξιν και causes, some they do through custom and τα μεν δια λογιστικών όρεξιν, τα δε δι' acquired habit, others through original and αλόγιστον. "Έστι δε η μεν βούλησις, μετά natural desire. Further, the things done λόγου όρεξις αγαθού -άλογοι δ' ορέξεις, through natural desire they do, either οργή και επιθυμία. "Ωστε πάντα όσα πράτ- through such desire assisted by reason, or τουσιν, ανάγκη πράττειν δι' αιτίας έπτα: through such desire devoid of reason. If διά τύχην, διά βίαν, διά φύσιν, δι' έθος, διά it be assisted by reason, then it assumes λογισμόν, διά θυμόν, δι' επιθυμίαν. 6 All the denomination of will ; on the contrary, men do all things, either of themselves, or the irrational desires are anger and appe

And thus, said he, have you had exhibited to you a sketch of

You must remember, however, it is but a sketch : there is

tite. Hence it appears, that all things èK TÂv duoiwv évepyelv ai é Jets lyvavtal, whatever which men do, they necessarily" from similiar and homogeneous energies it do through one of these seven causes; is that habits are obtained.” So again, in either throngh chance, compulsion, nature, the same place: “A yèp dei valóvtas toleiv, custom, will, anger, appetite.” Arist. Rhet. TaūTA TOLOŪVTES pavėávouevo olov olkowoLi. c. JO.

μούντες οικοδομοι γίνονται, και κιθαρίζοντες It remains, agreeably to this enumera- κιθαρισταί. “ The things which we are to tion, to consider with which of these causes do, by having learnt, we learn by doing. we ought to arrange art.

Thus, by building, men become builders ; As to chance, it may be observed, in and by practising music, they become mugeneral, of all casual events, that they al- sicians." ways exclude intention or design : but in- Thus, therefore, is art distinguished from tention and design are from art insepara- all natural power of man, whether natural ble. Thus is the difference between art and 'necessity, will, anger, or appetite. But chance manifest.

art has been already distinguished from As to external compulsion, we have it chance and compulsion. So that being thus described: Βίαιον δε ου η αρχή έξωθεν: clearly not the same with six of those seven that is, “ an act of compulsion, the efficient causes, by which all men do all things, it principle of which is from without, inde- must needs be referred to the seventh ; that pendent of the doer.” Arist. Ethic. 1. iii. is, to custom or habit. c. 1. Again, in the same treatise, I. vi. c. 4. It must be observed, the natural causes we are told of the works of art, that they or powers in man, considered as distinct are such, v ý åpx) èv TỘ HOLOWVT, “ the from art, are treated in the Dialogue, page efficient principle of which is in the doer, 3. or agent.” Thus, therefore, is art distin- And now, as we have shewn art to be a guished from compulsion.

certain cause working in man, it remains to These two causes, chance and compulsion, shew how it is distinguished from those are mentioned and considered in the Dia- other causes beside man, which we suppose logue, page 2

to operate in the universe. These are either Nature, or rather natural necessity, is such causes as are below him, like the vegethat cause through which we breathe, per- tative power, which operates in vegetables, spire, digest, circulate our blood, &c. Will, the sensitive in animals; or else such causes anger, and appetite, are (as already observed) as are above him, like God, and whatever but so many species of natural desire, con- is else of intelligence more than human. sidered either as assisted by reason, or else The causes below us may be all included as deroid of it. Now though natural de- in the common genus of nature ; and of sire and natural necessity differ, because nature we may say universally, as well of in the one we act spontaneously, in the nature without us as within us, that its seother not spontaneously, yet both of them veral operations, contrary to those of art, meet in the common genus of natural power. are not in the least degree derived from Moreover this is true of all natural power, custom or usage. Thus the author above that the power itself is prior to any ener- cited: Ουδέν γάρ των φύσει όντων άλλως gies or arts of that power. Ου γαρ εκ του εθίζεται: οίον ο λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος, πολλάκις ιδείν και πολλάκις ακούσαι τας ουκ αν εθισθείη άνω φέρεσθαι, ουδ' άν μναισθήσεις ελάβομεν, άλλ' ανάπαλιν, έχοντες ρίακις αυτόν εθίζη τις άνω ρίπτων, ουδέ το εχρησάμεθα, ου χρησάμενοι έχομεν. « For πυρ κάτω. « None of those things, which (to instance in the natural powers of sensa- are what they are by nature, can be altered tion) it was not from often seeing, and often by being accustomed. Thus a stone, which hearing, that we acquired those senses; but, by nature is carried downward, can never on the contrary, being first possessed of be accustomed to mount upward, no, not them, we then used them, not through any though any one should ten thousand times use or exercise did we come to possess attempt it, by throwing the stone upward. them.” Arist. Ethic. 1. ii. c. l.

The same may be said of accustoming fire Now the contrary to this is true in the to move downward.” Ethic. l. ii. c. l. case of any powers or faculties not natural, Again, in the works of nature, such as but acquired by custom and usage. For trees, animals, and the like, the efficient here there are many energies and acts, principle is vitally united to the subjects which must necessarily precede the exist- wherein it operates: év autois éxovor ence of such power or habit, it being evi- taūta Tiv åpxúv. Ethic. I. vi. c. 4. But in dent (as is said in the same chapter) that the works of art, such as statues or houses, still something wanting to make it a finished piece.- I begged to know what this was.-In order to that, replied he, I cannot do better, than remind you of a passage in your admired Horace. the efficient principle is disunited from the Here we see (agreeably to what is said in subjects, and exists not in the things done the Dialogue, page 4,) that as to acquired, or made, but in the doer or artist, áp ý or secondary habits, some beings are too exαρχή εν τω ποιoύντι αλλά μη εν τω ποιου- cellent for them, and others too base ; and névq. Ethic. I. vi. c. 4. It is, indeed, pos- that the Deity, above all, is in the number of sible, that, even in works of art, the subject those transcendent, and is thus, as a cause, and efficient cause may be united, as in the distinguished from art. Vid. Amm. Tepl'Epcase of a physician becoming his own pa- uer. p. 26. omnino eis katory.p. 127,128. tient, and curing himself. But then it There are, besides the Deity and nature must be remembered, that this union is now spoken of, certain other external causes, Katà ouußeBroads, merely accidental, and which are mentioned in the first note as no way essential to the constituting of art, distinct from art ; namely, chance and neconsidered as art. By this, therefore, is art cessity. But of these hereafter, when we clearly distinguished from nature, whose consider the subject of art. definition informs us that it is åpxh tis The Peripatetic definition of nature, given και αιτία του κινείσθαι και ηρεμείν εν ω above, though in some degree illustrated Únápxel apátws, kab' aŭtd kal uit natd page 11, (note 9,) yet being still, from its ovußeBnkós: “a certain principle or cause brevity, perhaps, obscure, the following exof moving and ceasing to move, in some plication of it is subjoined. subject wherein such principle exists im- In the first place, by “nature," the Perimediately, essentially, and not by way of patetics meant that vital principle in plants, accident." Arist. Natur. Ausc. 1. i. c. 1. brutes, and men, by which they are said to

The causes which are of rank superior to live, and to be distinguished from things man, such as the Deity, can have nothing to inanimate. Nature, therefore, being ando with art, because being (as is said in the other name for “ life,” or a vital principle, Dialogue, p. 4,)“ perfect and complete, and throughout all subjects, is universally found knowing all from the beginning, they can to be of the following kind ; namely, to adnever admit of what is additional and se- vance the subject, which it enlivens, from condary.” Art, therefore, can only belong a seed or embryo, to something better and to beings like men ; who, being imperfect, more perfect. This progression, as well in know their wants, and endeavour to remove plants as in animals, is called “growth.” And them by helps secondary and subsequent. thus is it that nature is a principle of meIt was from a like consideration that Py- tion. But then this progression, or growth, thagoras called himself a philosopher ; that is not infinite. When the subject is mais to say, (according to his own explication ture, that is, hath obtained its completion of the name,) “a lover and seeker of what and perfect form, then the progression was wise and good,” but not a possessor, ceases. Here, therefore, the business of which he deemed a character above him. the vital principle becomes different. It is Consonant to this we read in Plato's Ban- from henceforward no longer employed to quet, θεών ουδείς φιλοσοφεί, ουδ' επιθυμεί acquire a form, but to preserve to its subgoods yevéolai dot! yap, etc.: “no god ject a form already acquired. And thus is philosophizes, or desires to become wise, it that nature is a principle of rest, stability, for he is so already. Nor, if there be any or ceasing to move. And such indeed she other being wise, doth he philosophize, for continues to be, maintaining, as long as the same reason. On the other hand, nei- possible, the form committed to her care, ther do the indocile philosophize ; for this is till time and external causes in the first the misfortune of indocility, without being place impair it, and induce at length its virtuous, good, or prudent, to appear to dissolution, which is death. oneself sufficient in all these respects. In And thus it has been shewn how nature general, therefore, he who thinketh himself may be called a principle both of motion in no want, desireth not that which he and ceasing to move. thinks himself not to need. Who, then,' As to the rest of the definition, namely, said Socrates to Diotima, (the speaker of that nature is a principle, which inheres in this narration,) 'who are those who philo- its subject immediately, essentially, and not sophize, if they are neither the wise nor by way of accident; no more is meant by the indocile?' * That (replied she) may this, than that the nature or life in every be now conspicuous even to a child. They being, which hath such principle, is really are those of middle rank, between these ex- and truly a part of that being, and not detremes.'” Plat. vol. iii. p. 203. edit. Serrani. tached and separate from it, like the pilot

It is concerning Alfenus ; who, (if you remember,) he tells us, though his tools were laid aside, and his shop shut up, was still an artist as much as ever:

Alfenus vafer omni
Abjecto instrumento artis clausaque taberna,

Sutor erat. I remember, said I, the passage ; but to what purpose is it quoted ?-Only, replied he, to shew you, that I should not be without precedent, were I to affirm it not absolutely necessary to the being of art, that it should be man actually becoming a cause ; but that it was enough, if he had the power or capacity of so becoming.–Why then, said I, did you not settle it so at first ?Because, replied he, faculties, powers, capacities, (call them as you will) are in themselves, abstract from action, but obscure and hidden things. On the contrary, energies and operations lie open to the senses, and cannot but be observed, even whether we will or no. And hence, therefore, when first we treated of art, we chose to treat of it as of a thing only in energy. Now we better comprehend it, we have ventured somewhat further.-Repeat, then, said I, if you please, the alteration which you have made.-At first, answered he, we reasoned upon art, as if it was only man actually becoming a cause intentional and habitual. Now we say it is a power in man of becoming such cause; and that, though he be not actually in the exercise of such a power.—I told him, his amendment appeared to be just.

There is, too, another alteration, added he, which, for the sake of accuracy, is equally wanting; and that is with respect to the epithet, "intentional or voluntary.”—And what, said I, is that?–We have agreed it, replied he, to be necessary, that all art should be under the guidance of intention or volition, so that no man acting by compulsion, or by chance, should be called an artist. We have.-Now though this, said he, be true, yet it is not sufficient. We must limit this intention or volition to a peculiar kind. For were every little fancy, which we may work up into habit, a sufficient foundation to constitute an art, we should make art one of the lowest and most despicable of things. The meanest trick of a common juggler might, in such case, entitle a man to the character of an artist.—I confessed, that without some limitation, this might be the consequence. But how limit intentions to a kind or species ?—What think you, replied he, if we were to do it, by the number and dignity of the precepts, which go to the directing of our intentions? You must explain, said I ; for your meaning is obscure.- Are there not precepts,e replied he, in agriculture, about ploughing and sowing? Are there not precepts in architecture, about orders and proportions? Are there not the same in medicine, in navigation, and the rest ?

from the ship, the musician from the in- Nivooûuev. “If we are to explain what strument. For to these subjects though each of these things are, as for instance, those artists are principles of motion and what the intelligent principle, what the rest, yet do they in no sense participate sensitive, we must first inquire what it is with them in vital sympathy and union. to think, what to see, hear, and use the

1 Ει δε χρή λέγειν τι έκαστον τούτων, senses. For with respect to us men, the οιον τι το νοητικόν, ή τι το αισθητικών, energies are prior and more evident than πρότερον επισκεπτέον, τι το νοείν, και the powers, because it is in the energies we τι το αισθάνεσθαι· πρότεραι γαρ και are first conversant, and comprehend the capértepat tpos nuas Tîv Suvdueór powers from them.” Themist. in lib. ii. de eisi ai įvépyelai. poevtuyxdvojev yap Anima, p. 76. ed. Ald. Fol. Aristot. de An. αυταίς, και τας δυνάμεις από τούτων ii. 4.

There are.—And what is your opinion of these several precepts? Are they arbitrary and capricious, or rational and steady? Are they the inventions of a day, or well-approved by long experience ?-I told him, I should consider them for the most part as rational, steady, and well-approved by long experience. -And what, continued he, shall we say to their number? Are they few? Or are they not rather so numerous, that in every particular art, scarce any comprehend them all, but the several artists themselves; and they only by length of time, with due attendance and application I replied, it seemed so.-Suppose then we were to pronounce, that to every art there was a system of such various and well-approved precepts: should we err?No, certainly.—And suppose we should say, that the intention of every artist, in his several art, was directed by such a system: would you allow this ?-Surely.--And will not this limiting of intentions to such only, as are so directed, sufficiently distinguish art from any thing else which may resemble it? in other words, is it likely, under this distinction, to be confounded with other habits of a trifling, capricious, and inferior kind ?-1 replied, I thought not.

Let us then see, said he, and collect all that we have said together. We have already agreed, that the power of acting after a certain manner is sufficient to constitute art, without the actually operating agreeably to that power. And we have now further held the intentions of every artist to be directed by a system of various and well-approved precepts. Besides all this, we settled it before, that all art was founded in habit; and was peculiar to man; and was seen by becoming the cause of some effect. It should seem, then, that the whole idea of art was this, “an habitual power in man of becoming the cause of some

e Vid. Plat. in Min. vol. ii. p. 316, 17. quædam, id est, supervacua artis imitatio, edit. Serran, et in Gorgia, vol. i. p. 465. A. quæ nihil sane nec boni nec mali habeat, du téxunu karw, 8 ay i trovov sed vanum laborem : qualis illius fuit, qui πράγμα. .

grana ciceris, ex spatio distante missa, in As to those low habits here mentioned, acum continuo et sine frustratione inserefrom which we distinguish art by the num- bat: quem, cum spectasset Alexander, dober and dignity of its precepts, they fall, in nasse dicitur ejusdem leguminis modio. general, under the denomination of wataio- Quod quidem præmium fuit illo opere digTexvian of which Quintilian gives the fol- nissimum. Inst. Orat. I. ii. c. 20. lowing account. Matalotexvia quoque est

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