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tion arises from many passions at once, and the soul is like a sea when agitated by contrary winds.
Æn. x. 870. Here the motion is tempestuous, and reason, during the storm, appears to be overwhelmed. At other times she interposes, but without success; and in such case the motion is equally turbid and irregular. Thus Medea, when she is about to murder her children:
Και μανθάνω μεν, οία δραν μέλλω κακά:
But passion overrules my better thoughts." There are times, too, when reason acts with greater success, and when the motion becomes of course more placid and serene. But whenever she is so far able to establish her authority, as to have the passions obey her uniformly without murmuring or opposition, then follows that orderly, that fair and equal motion, by which the Stoics represented even happiness itself, and elegantly called it "the well-flowing of life."
Besides, the well-flowing here mentioned, which is of a kind purely moral, there is another highly valuable, which is of à kind purely intellectual. It is under this motion, that the man of speculation passes, through the road of syllogism, from the simplest truths to the most complicated theorems.
And here it may be remarked, that as pure and original truth is the object of our most excellent volition, (it being all that we seek, considered as beings intelligent,) so is it as strictly and properly the object of our most excellent perception; there being no perceptive power, but our intellect alone, that can reach it. It is here, then, we behold the meaning of an ancient and important doctrine, that “ the primary objects of perception and of volition are the same."e It is bence, also, we may learn, that not only all good is truth, (as there can be none such without a reason, from which it is so denominated,) but also that all truth is good, as it is the sole pursuit of the contemplative, the natural object of their wants, equally as honours are to the ambitious, or as banquets to the luxurious."
• Arrian. Epict. l. i. c. 28. p. 144. edit. When a theorem of Archimedes moves Upton.
within us a desire to understand it; or Eớpora Blov. See Diog. Laert. vii. 88. when, being understood, it raises within Hinc intellecta est illa beata vita, secundo us our necessary assent: we do not condefluens cursu. Senec. Epist. 120. See ceive the theorem itself to be moved, either also p. 325.
by the desire or by the assent, as the • Το ορεκτών και το νοητόν κινεί, ου horses are moved that give motion to the κινούμενον τούτων δε τα πρώτα, τα αύτα: Waggon, or the waggon moved that gives “The desirable and the intelligible move, motion to its load. without being moved ; and of these two * Though we seldom hear of goods in genera those objects, that are highest and our common intercourse with mankind, but first, are the same. Arist. Metaph. 1. 5'. what have reference to the body, or at best p. 202. edit. Sylb.
to the lower affections ; yet has the highest
Having said thus much concerning perception, and that highest species of animal impulse, I mean volition, it must not be forgot, that there are other internal motions of a very different character, where both perception and spontaneous impulse are in a manner unconcerned.
Within every animal there is an innate and active power, which ceases not its work, when sense and appetite are asleep; which, without any conscious cooperation of the animal itself, carries it from an embryo or seed to the maturity of its proper form. Now so far this power may be called a principle of motion. At maturity it stops, (for were the progress infinite, there could be no maturity at all,) and so far it may be called a principle of cessation or rest. From this point of rest it deserts the being gradually, and in consequence of such desertion the being gradually decays.
Subeunt morbi, tristisque senectus ;
Georg. iii. 67. As the local motion of animals is derived from sense, and spontaneous impulse ; so from the principle, just described, are derived their other motions: from its activity, their generation, their augmentation, and changes to better; from its cessation, their change to worse, their diminution, and, lastly, death. It is this is that internal principle which descends from animals even to vegetables; and which, as these last possess no other, is commonly called vegetative life, though sometimes it is denoted by the more obvious name of nature.
faculty of the soul a peculiar good, as much possesses within itself a principle of moas the other faculties have from the intel- tion and of rest." De An. ii. 1. p. 23. lectual possession of which good it seeks edit. Sylb. felicity and peace.
It is by this principle that the magni“ I loved her,” (says the wise man, tude of the thistle, the oak, the bee, the speaking of wisdom ; and what is wisdom, elephant, and every other natural producbut the most exalted truth?) “I loved her tion, whether animal or vegetable, is to a above health and beauty, and chose to have certain degree circumscribed and limited ; her instead of light: for the light that and when that limit either fails or exceeds cometh from her never goeth out.” Wisd. in a conspicuous manner, the being becomes vii. 10.
a monster. See page 65, note c. & Speaking of the difference between the b See before, p. 361, 2. operation of the elements and mere matter,
i See the definition of nature, among the and that of nature, and an internal prin- notes, p. 6. ciple, the Stagirite observes—Twv dè qúo el The vegetative life here mentioned is συνεστώτων πέρας έστι και λόγος μεγέθους sometimes called ψυχή φυτική, sometimes και αυξήσεως ταύτα δε ψυχής, αλλ' ού θρεπτική, and at other times θρεπτικών, πυρός, και λόγου μάλλον και ύλης: “ As to " the nutritive principle ;” that principle things which derive their constitution from which, passing through plants as well as nature, there is a bound and proportion in animals, never ceases to nourish and suptheir magnitude and growth; and these port them, through the period of their existproceed from their soul, not from the ele- ence : 'Αεί γαρ ενεργεί η φυτική ψυχήment of fire ; and are caused rather by και μάλλον εν τοίς ύπνοις, ένθα αι λοιπα reason, than by matter.” De Αn. ii. 4. p. της ψυχής δυνάμεις ήρεμούσι τότε γούν 30. edit. Sylb. And, not long before, de- uáriota ai Tétels : “ The vegetative soul scribing a physical er natural substance, he energizes at all times, and more during makes it to be something-xovtos åpxiy sleep, when the other powers are at rest ; κινήσεως και στάσεως εν αυτώ-“which and therefore it is then mostly are per
We must remember, however, that while we speak of motion here, we mean the invisible cause, not the visible effects; for these are purely physical, and belong to another speculation. After the same manner are we to speak of those other motive powers, the powers of magnetism and electricity; the visible motions, which they produce, being of a species merely physical, but the cause of these motions lying itself totally concealed. Whether, then, we suppose it a species of inferior life, and say with Thales, that the magnet and the amber are animated ;* or whether we content ourselves with calling it an internal active quality, (occult we must not call it, for that is now forbidden,) we may safely pronounce it a quality, which, though we are sure of its existence, is not otherwise comprehensible, than by reference to its effects; as we know Homer, who is out of sight, by his Iliad, which lies before us.
There is yet another motive principle, far greater in local extent than all yet mentioned; I mean that, by which not only every atom of this our earth has its proper tendency, but by which eren planets, satellites, and comets describe their orbits.
Astronomers will inform us as to the force of motion here, and how much on its due order depends this immense universe.
The best of ancient philosophers, when they saw so many inferior motions not to be performed without counsel or design, could not think of imputing such superior ones to the efficacy of blind chance; and, therefore, whatever they might conceive of the immediate cause, (call it gravitation, or attraction, or by any other name,) they justly supposed the primary cause to be a principle of intellection :
Totam infusa per artus
Æn. vi. 727. They indeed so far considered mind to be the source of all motion, that it was through its motive powers that they distinguished it from body; which last was no more than a passive subject, possessing nothing motive within itself, but deriving all its motions from something else. formed the digestions.” Philop. in Arist. iron, (tuxiv čxel, 8T1 Toy oidnpoy kiven) de An. 1. ii. To éprov to aŭroll Tolel td may be found in Arist. de An. 1. i. c. 2. θρεπτικών μόριον εν τω καθεύδειν μάλλον p. 7. η εν τώ εγρηγορέναι τρέφεται γάρ και Philoponus, in his comment on this pasαυξάνεται τότε μάλλον ως ουδέν προσδεό- Sage, gives us from Thales the following peva apos tauta mais aloohoews : “ The sentiment, which, though not immediately nutritive part of the soul performs its work to our purpose, we have transcribed for its in sleeping more than in waking ; for then, importance : éneyev, ós ý spórola Méxeu more than at any other time, are animals των εσχάτων διήκει, και ουδέν αυτήν λαnourished and enlarged in bulk, as they Odvel, oude to èÁXIOTOY: “ He used to have no need of sensation for these pur- say, that Providence extends to the lowest poses.” Aristot. de Somno, cap. 1. sub. fin. of all beings, and that nothing is hid from See before, p. 279.
it, no not even that which is most minute." * This opinion of Thales concerning the See before, p. 287. magnet's having a soul, because it moved
It was hence, too, that they inferred the immortality of the soul. They reasoned thus : * Vital motion may forsake the body, because to the body it is not an essential; and in such case the body is said to die. But vital motion cannot forsake the soul, because to the soul it is an essential, and it is not possible that any thing should be forsaken by itself.”! But this by way of digression.
As to the rise and duration of motion, the founder of the Peripatetic sect thus states the question. “Was motion (says he) ever generated without existing before ; and is it ever again so destroyed, that there is nothing moved; or was it neither generated, nor is destroyed, but ever was, and will be ; something appertaining to beings, which is immortal and unceasing ; a kind of life, as it were, to all things that exist by the power of nature ?”m
Those who meditate an answer to these queries, will remember that motion is coeval with the universe, since we learn that, in its first and earliest era, “the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters."" They will remember, too, that motion is as old as time, and their co-existence so necessary, it is not possible to suppose the one, without supposing the other.
And thus, having before considered physical motion, have we now considered what may be called metaphysical, or (if I may use the expression) causative motion ; including under this name every animating power, whether rational or irrational, which, though different from body acts upon body, causing it to live, to grow, and move itself and other bodies. These animating powers are only known from their effects, as the painter's art is known from his pictures. And hence, as it is the effect which leads us to recognise the cause, hence these animating powers, though prior in existence to physical effects, are necessarily subsequent in human contemplation, and are thence, and thence only, called metaphysical.°
i Quod autem motum adfert alicui, quod- Quinctilian has brought the argument que ipsum agitatur alicunde, quando finem into the form of a syllogism : Quicquid ex habet motus, vivendi finem habeat necesse seipso movetur, immortale est: anima au
Solum igitur, quod seipsum movet, tem ex seipsa movetur : immortalis igitur quia nunquam deseritur a se, nunquam ne est anima. Inst. Orat. v. 14. moveri quidem desinit. Quinetiam, &c. Πότερον δε γέγονέ ποτε κίνησις, ουκ Cic. Tuscul. Disp. i. 23.
ουσα πρότερον, και φθείρεται πάλιν ούτως, The whole passage, which is rather too ώστε κινείσθαι μηδέν και ούτε εγένετο, long to transcribe, is the translation of an ούτε φθείρεται, αλλ' αεί ήν, και έσται, και argument taken from Plato's Phaedrus: Το τούτ' αθάνατον και άπαυστον υπάρχει τους δε άλλο κινούν, και υπ' άλλου κινούμενον, ουσιν, οίον ζωή τις ουσα τους φύσει συνK. T. 1. Plat. edit. Ficini.
p. 1221. B.
WOTWOL Tãowv; Arist. Phys. 1. viii. c. 1. See Macrobius in Somn. Scipionis, c. 13. p. 144. edit. Sylb. Cicero bas used the same argument, in n Genesis, chap. i. his tract de Senectute : Cumque semper • See p. 368. As to the character and agitetur animus, nec principium motus ha- subordination of the several animating beat, quia se ipse moveat, ne finem quidem powers, see before, p. 372, and so on to habiturum esse motus, quia nunquam se p. 377, as well in the text as in the notes. ipse sit relicturus. Cap. 21.
See also chap. vi.
And now, having done with motion, we must take some notice of rest.
The most obvious species of rest is that opposed to the most obvious species of motion ; such, for example, as the cessation of gales, after they have been fresh and blowing:
Ingrato celeres obruit otio
Horat. Od. I. i. 16. The cessation of billows, after they had been loud and tempestuous :
Silence, ye troubled waves, and thou deep, peace. Par. Lost, vii. 216. But it is expedient to be more particular. The two instances of rest, that we have alleged, are of motion purely local. So is it, when the flight of an arrow is spent; when a bowl, that has been running, stops. But rest is also connected with the other species of motion. The cessation of growth is maturity; of the vital energies, is death.
So, too, with respect to the higher faculties of the soul, sense and reason.
The rest of the sensitive powers, after the labours of the day, is sleep:
Dulcis et alta quies, placidæque simillima morti. Æn. vi. 522. The rest of the passions, after having been agitated, is composure and equanimity; the rest of the deliberative and reasoning powers
, after sedulous investigation, is the discovery of the thing sought, or rather the acquiescence in truth discovered, either real or apparent, either practical or speculative.
And hence, in the last mode of rest, or acquiescence, the rise of our English phrase, I am fixed ; and of the Latin phrase, Stat: Stat conferre manum."
Æn, xü. 678. Hence science in Greek is called Trlotņun, every theorem being, as it were, a resting place, at which the man of science stops."
P Both these species of rest are denoted See Platon. Symp. p. 1190. edit. Fic. in English by the common name of calm. See also the learned and ingenious translaThe Greeks, with their usual precision, tion of Mr. Sydenham, p. 118. have given a different name to each : the 4 See before, Hermes, p. 132, and of this first, that is, the “ wind-calm,” they call treatise, p. 348. νηνεμία, and define it ήμεμία εν πλήθει The incomparable Sanctius, in his Miåépos, “ tranquillity in a quantity of air ;” nerva, gives the following excellent erthe second, that is, the 5 sea-calm,” they planation of this passage: Quamdiu enim call yashvn, and define it duarórns Bardt- deliberatur, consilium vacillat, et sententia της, , evenness in the sea's surface.” These fluctuat ; ubi certum ac statutum est, quod definitions are of Archytas, and may be quis facere vult, consistit consilium, et stat found in Aristotle's Metaph. p. 136. edit. sententia. Sanct. Minerv. 1. iv. c. 4. p. 637. Sylb.
edit. Amst. 1733. Plato has brought the two terms to- In Perizonius's note upon this part of gether, in those harmonious lines, delivered Sanctius, it appears that sedet is used in by Agatho in the Banquet.
the same signification, and for the same Ειρήνη μεν εν ανθρώποις, πελάγει δε
See the note following. γαλήνην,
και "Ετι δε και η νόησις έoικεν ηρεμήσει Νηνεμίαν ανέμων, κοίτην ύπνον τ' ενί τινι, και επιστάσει μάλλον και κινήσει: κήδει.
“ Intellection appears to resemble a certain