tion arises from many passions at once, and the soul is like a sea when agitated by contrary winds. Estuat ingens Imo in corde pudor, mixtoque insania luctu. En. x. 870. Here the motion is tempestuous, and reason, during the storm, appears to be overwhelmed. At other times she interposes, but without success; and in such case the motion is equally turbid and irregular. Thus Medea, when she is about to murder her children: Καὶ μανθάνω μὲν, οἷα δρᾷν μέλλω κακά· Euripid. Med. 1078. There are times, too, when reason acts with greater success, and when the motion becomes of course more placid and serene. But whenever she is so far able to establish her authority, as to have the passions obey her uniformly without murmuring or opposition, then follows that orderly, that fair and equal motion, by which the Stoics represented even happiness itself, and elegantly called it "the well-flowing of life." d Besides, the well-flowing here mentioned, which is of a kind purely moral, there is another highly valuable, which is of a kind purely intellectual. It is under this motion, that the man of speculation passes, through the road of syllogism, from the simplest truths to the most complicated theorems. And here it may be remarked, that as pure and original truth is the object of our most excellent volition, (it being all that we seek, considered as beings intelligent,) so is it as strictly and properly the object of our most excellent perception; there being no perceptive power, but our intellect alone, that can reach it. It is here, then, we behold the meaning of an ancient and important doctrine, that "the primary objects of perception and of volition are the same." 99 e It is hence, also, we may learn, that not only all good is truth, (as there can be none such without a reason, from which it is so denominated,) but also that all truth is good, as it is the sole pursuit of the contemplative, the natural object of their wants, equally as honours are to the ambitious, or as banquets to the luxurious.f Arrian. Epict. 1. i. c. 28. p. 144. edit. Upton. d Eupola Blov. See Diog. Laert. vii. 88. Hinc intellecta est illa beata vita, secundo defluens cursu. Senec. Epist. 120. See also p. 325. • Τὸ ὀρεκτὸν καὶ τὸ νοητὸν κινεῖ, οὐ κινούμενον· τούτων δὲ τὰ πρῶτα, τὰ αὔτα: "The desirable and the intelligible move, without being moved; and of these two genera those objects, that are highest and first, are the same." Arist. Metaph. A. C. p. 202. edit. Sylb. When a theorem of Archimedes moves within us a desire to understand it; or when, being understood, it raises within us our necessary assent: we do not conceive the theorem itself to be moved, either by the desire or by the assent, as the horses are moved that give motion to the waggon, or the waggon moved that gives motion to its load. Though we seldom hear of goods in our common intercourse with mankind, but what have reference to the body, or at best to the lower affections; yet has the highest Having said thus much concerning perception, and that highest species of animal impulse, I mean volition, it must not be forgot, that there are other internal motions of a very different character, where both perception and spontaneous impulse are in a manner unconcerned. Within every animal there is an innate and active power, which ceases not its work, when sense and appetite are asleep; which, without any conscious cooperation of the animal itself, carries it from an embryo or seed to the maturity of its proper form. Now so far this power may be called a principle of motion. At maturity it stops, (for were the progress infinite, there could be no maturity at all,) and so far it may be called a principle of cessation or rest. From this point of rest it deserts the being gradually, and in consequence of such desertion the being gradually decays. Subeunt morbi, tristisque senectus; Et labor, et duræ rapit inclementia mortis. Georg. iii. 67. As the local motion of animals is derived from sense, and spontaneous impulse; so from the principle, just described, are derived their other motions: from its activity, their generation, their augmentation, and changes to better; from its cessation, their change to worse, their diminution, and, lastly, death." It is this is that internal principle which descends from animals even to vegetables; and which, as these last possess no other, is commonly called vegetative life, though sometimes it is denoted by the more obvious name of nature. faculty of the soul a peculiar good, as much as the other faculties have from the intellectual possession of which good it seeks felicity and peace. "I loved her," (says the wise man, speaking of wisdom; and what is wisdom, but the most exalted truth?) "I loved her above health and beauty, and chose to have her instead of light: for the light that cometh from her never goeth out." Wisd. vii. 10. Speaking of the difference between the operation of the elements and mere matter, and that of nature, and an internal principle, the Stagirite observes-Tav dè púσei συνεστώτων πέρας ἐστὶ καὶ λόγος μεγέθους καὶ αὐξήσεως· ταῦτα δὲ ψυχῆς, ἀλλ ̓ οὐ πυρὸς, καὶ λόγου μᾶλλον ἢ ὕλης : “ As to things which derive their constitution from nature, there is a bound and proportion in their magnitude and growth; and these proceed from their soul, not from the element of fire ; and are caused rather by reason, than by matter.” De An. ii. 4. p. 30. edit. Sylb. And, not long before, describing a physical or natural substance, he makes it to be something-xovros άpxny κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως ἐν αὐτῷ“ which possesses within itself a principle of motion and of rest." De An. ii. 1. p. 23. edit. Sylb. It is by this principle that the magnitude of the thistle, the oak, the bee, the elephant, and every other natural production, whether animal or vegetable, to a certain degree circumscribed and limited; and when that limit either fails or exceeds in a conspicuous manner, the being becomes a monster. See page 65, note c. h See before, p. 361, 2. i See the definition of nature, among the notes, p. 6. The vegetative life here mentioned is sometimes called ψυχὴ φυτική, sometimes θρεπτική, and at other times θρεπτικόν, "the nutritive principle;" that principle which, passing through plants as well as animals, never ceases to nourish and support them, through the period of their existence : 'Αεὶ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖ ἡ φυτική ψυχή καὶ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις, ἔνθα αἱ λοιπαὶ τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις ἠρεμοῦσι· τότε γοῦν μáλiora ai méveis: "The vegetative soul energizes at all times, and more during sleep, when the other powers are at rest; and therefore it is then mostly are per We must remember, however, that while we speak of motion here, we mean the invisible cause, not the visible effects; for these are purely physical, and belong to another speculation. After the same manner are we to speak of those other motive powers, the powers of magnetism and electricity; the visible motions, which they produce, being of a species merely physical, but the cause of these motions lying itself totally concealed. Whether, then, we suppose it a species of inferior life, and say with Thales, that the magnet and the amber are animated; or whether we content ourselves with calling it an internal active quality, (occult we must not call it, for that is now forbidden,) we may safely pronounce it a quality, which, though we are sure of its existence, is not otherwise comprehensible, than by reference to its effects; as we know Homer, who is out of sight, by his Iliad, which lies before us. There is yet another motive principle, far greater in local extent than all yet mentioned; I mean that, by which not only every atom of this our earth has its proper tendency, but by which even planets, satellites, and comets describe their orbits. Astronomers will inform us as to the force of motion here, and how much on its due order depends this immense uni verse. The best of ancient philosophers, when they saw so many inferior motions not to be performed without counsel or design, could not think of imputing such superior ones to the efficacy of blind chance; and, therefore, whatever they might conceive of the immediate cause, (call it gravitation, or attraction, or by any other name,) they justly supposed the primary cause to be a principle of intellection: Totam infusa per artus Æn. vi. 727. They indeed so far considered mind to be the source of all motion, that it was through its motive powers that they distinguished it from body; which last was no more than a passive subject, possessing nothing motive within itself, but deriving all its motions from something else. formed the digestions." Philop. in Arist. de An. 1. ii. Tò ěpyov тd avтoÛ TOLEî TÒ θρεπτικὸν μόριον ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι· τρέφεται γὰρ καὶ αὐξάνεται τότε μᾶλλον ὡς οὐδὲν προσδεόμеvа пρòs таûтa Tŷs aiothσews: "The nutritive part of the soul performs its work in sleeping more than in waking; for then, more than at any other time, are animals nourished and enlarged in bulk, as they have no need of sensation for these purposes." Aristot. de Somno, cap. 1. sub. fin. See before, p. 279. This opinion of Thales concerning the magnet's having a soul, because it moved iron, (vxìv exei, őtɩ tòv oídnpov kiveî) may be found in Arist. de An. 1. i. c. 2. p. 7. Philoponus, in his comment on this passage, gives us from Thales the following sentiment, which, though not immediately to our purpose, we have transcribed for its importance: λeyev, &s ǹ πрóvoιa μéxp↓ τῶν ἐσχάτων διήκει, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτὴν λαν θάνει, οὐδὲ τὸ ἐλάχιστον: “ He used to say, that Providence extends to the lowest of all beings, and that nothing is hid from it, no not even that which is most minute." See before, p. 287. It was hence, too, that they inferred the immortality of the soul. They reasoned thus: "Vital motion may forsake the body, because to the body it is not an essential; and in such case the body is said to die. But vital motion cannot forsake the soul, because to the soul it is an essential, and it is not possible that any thing should be forsaken by itself." But this by way of digression. As to the rise and duration of motion, the founder of the Peripatetic sect thus states the question. "Was motion (says he) ever generated without existing before; and is it ever again so destroyed, that there is nothing moved; or was it neither generated, nor is destroyed, but ever was, and will be; something appertaining to beings, which is immortal and unceasing; a kind of life, as it were, to all things that exist by the power of nature ?"m Those who meditate an answer to these queries, will remember that motion is coeval with the universe, since we learn that, in its first and earliest era, "the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters."" They will remember, too, that motion is as old as time, and their co-existence so necessary, it is not possible to suppose the one, without supposing the other. And thus, having before considered physical motion, have we now considered what may be called metaphysical, or (if I may use the expression) causative motion; including under this name every animating power, whether rational or irrational, which, though different from body acts upon body, causing it to live, to grow, and move itself and other bodies. These animating powers are only known from their effects, as the painter's art is known from his pictures. And hence, as it is the effect which leads us to recognise the cause, hence these animating powers, though prior in existence to physical effects, are necessarily subsequent in human contemplation, and are thence, and thence only, called metaphysical. 1 Quod autem motum adfert alicui, quodque ipsum agitatur alicunde, quando finem habet motus, vivendi finem habeat necesse est. Solum igitur, quod seipsum movet, quia nunquam deseritur a se, nunquam ne moveri quidem desinit. Quinetiam, &c. Cic. Tuscul. Disp. i. 23. The whole passage, which is rather too long to transcribe, is the translation of an argument taken from Plato's Phædrus: Τὸ δὲ ἄλλο κινοῦν, καὶ ὑπ ̓ ἄλλου κινούμενον, K. T. A. Plat. edit. Ficini. p. 1221. B. See Macrobius in Somn. Scipionis, c. 13. Cicero has used the same argument, in his tract de Senectute: Cumque semper agitetur animus, nec principium motus habeat, quia se ipse moveat, ne finem quidem habiturum esse motus, quia nunquam se ipse sit relicturus. Cap. 21. Quinctilian has brought the argument into the form of a syllogism: Quicquid ex seipso movetur, immortale est: anima autem ex seipsa movetur: immortalis igitur est anima. Inst. Orat. v. 14. 1 Πότερον δὲ γέγονέ ποτε κίνησις, οὐκ οὖσα πρότερον, καὶ φθείρεται πάλιν οὕτως, ὥστε κινεῖσθαι μηδέν· ἢ οὔτε ἐγένετο, οὔτε φθείρεται, ἀλλ ̓ ἀεὶ ἦν, καὶ ἔσται, καὶ τοῦτ ̓ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἄπαυστον ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσιν, οἷον ζωή τις οὖσα τοῖς φύσει συνEσTWσι nãow; Arist. Phys. 1. viii. c. 1. p. 144. edit. Sylb. n Genesis, chap. i. See p. 368. As to the character and subordination of the several animating powers, see before, p. 372, and so on to p. 377, as well in the text as in the notes. See also chap. vi. And now, having done with motion, we must take some notice of rest. The most obvious species of rest is that opposed to the most obvious species of motion; such, for example, as the cessation of gales, after they have been fresh and blowing: Ingrato celeres obruit otio Horat. Od. I. i. 16. The cessation of billows, after they had been loud and tempestuous: Silence, ye troubled waves, and thou deep, peace. Par. Lost, vii. 216. But it is expedient to be more particular. The two instances of rest, that we have alleged, are of motion purely local. So is it, when the flight of an arrow is spent; when a bowl, that has been running, stops. But rest is also connected with the other species of motion. The cessation of growth is maturity; of the vital energies, is death. So, too, with respect to the higher faculties of the soul, sense and reason. The rest of the sensitive powers, after the labours of the day, is sleep : Dulcis et alta quies, placidæque simillima morti. Æn. vi. 522. The rest of the passions, after having been agitated, is composure and equanimity; the rest of the deliberative and reasoning powers, after sedulous investigation, is the discovery of the thing sought, or rather the acquiescence in truth discovered, either real or apparent, either practical or speculative. And hence, in the last mode of rest, or acquiescence, the rise of our English phrase, I am fixed; and of the Latin phrase, Stat: Stat conferre manum." Æn. xii. 678. Hence science in Greek is called éπioτnun, every theorem being, as it were, a resting place, at which the man of science stops." P Both these species of rest are denoted in English by the common name of calm. The Greeks, with their usual precision, have given a different name to each the first, that is, the "wind-calm," they call νηνεμία, and define it ἠρεμία ἐν πλήθει dépos, "tranquillity in a quantity of air;" the second, that is, the "sea-calm," they call yaλhn, and define it dμaλóτηs aλáтτης, evenness in the sea's surface." These definitions are of Archytas, and may be found in Aristotle's Metaph. p. 136. edit. Sylb. 66 Plato has brought the two terms together, in those harmonious lines, delivered by Agatho in the Banquet. Εἰρήνη μὲν ἐν ἀνθρώποις, πελάγει δὲ γαλήνην, Νηνεμίαν ἀνέμων, κοίτην ὕπνον τ ̓ κήδει. ἐνὶ See Platon. Symp. p. 1190. edit. Fic. See also the learned and ingenious translation of Mr. Sydenham, p. 118. 4 See before, Hermes, p. 132, and of this treatise, p. 348. The incomparable Sanctius, in his Minerva, gives the following excellent explanation of this passage: Quamdiu enim deliberatur, consilium vacillat, et sententia fluctuat; ubi certum ac statutum est, quod quis facere vult, consistit consilium, et stat sententia. Sanct. Minerv. 1. iv. c. 4. p. 637. edit. Amst. 1733. In Perizonius's note upon this part of Sanctius, it appears that sedet is used in the same signification, and for the same reasons. See the note following. |