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To solve this question, we must first remark, that every animal, however exquisite in its frame, is nevertheless far from being perfect, being still the part of a greater and more perfect whole," to which it is connected by many necessary wants.
One of these, for example, is common to all animals, that of food or aliment. Suppose then this want were not to be gratified, what would be the consequence? The animal would perish. And how has Providence obviated this danger? It has given to every animal, however base, however young, not only a consciousness of this want, but an obscure sensation of some distinction in things without; and a preconception or anticipation in favour of that aliment which it is to prefer, from an inward feeling of its proper constitution. It is thus without either teaching or experience, but merely from an innate feeling of what is conducive to their proper being, that infants are able to distinguish milk from vinegar; and silk-worms the leaf of a mulberry from that of a laurel or an ash.P Now the consequence
• Ipse autem homo—nullo modo perfectus, Dente lupus, cornu taurus petit, unde, nisi sed est quædam particula perfecti. Cic. de intus Nat. Deor. ii. 14. See chap. x, and the end Monstratum. of the present chapter.
As to innate ideas, there is certainly What is applied by Cicero in the above nothing so true, (and it requires no great passage to man, may with equal propriety logic to prove,) that, if by innate ideas be be applied to all other animals, and needs meant innate propositions, there never were, no proving. It was a fundamental doc- nor ever can be, any such things existing. trine of the Stoics.
But this no ways tends to subvert that • Πρώτον οικείον είναι παντί ζώω την innate distinction of things into eligible αυτού σύστασιν, και την ταύτης συνεί- and ineligible, according as they are suitonowy: “The thing primarily intimate to able to every nature, or not suitable ; a every animal, is its own constitution, and distinction which every being appears to a consciousness of it.” Diog. Laert. vii. recognise from its very birth. 85.
Hence the author above quoted, in the P Simul atque natum sit animal—ipsum same epistle: Tenera quoque animalia, a sibi conciliari, et commendari ad se conser- materno utero, vel quoquo modo effusa, vandum et suum statum, et ad ea, quæ quid sit infestum ipsis protinus norunt, et conservantia sunt ejus status, diligenda; mortifera devitant. alienari autem ab interitu, iisque rebus, And it is upon this reasoning we may quæ interitum videantur adferre. Cic. de venture to affirm, that every such being in Fin. iii. 5.
its earliest moments perceives itself to be an Thus Seneca : Omnibus (sc. animalibus) animal, though it may not be philosophically constitutionis suæ sensus est, et inde mem- informed what an animal really is : Quid brorum tam expedita tractatio. Epist. cxxi. sit animal, nescit ; animal esse se sentit. Soon after: Constitutionem suam [animal] Ibid. crasse intelligit, summatim, et obscure. And Whatever others, in ancient, or even in again: Ante omnia est mei cura: hoc ani- modern days, may have thought concerning malibus inest cunctis: nec inseritur, sed this subject, that philosopher surely can be innascitur. And soon after, speaking of hardly suspected of favouring innate ideas, the terror which some animals feel in their who held the human soul, or rather its inearliest state, when they first behold a tellective part, “ from its comprehending all hawk, or a cat, he adds-Apparet illis inesse things to be for that very reason something scientiam nocituri, non experimento col- pure and unmixed,”—emei Távta voen, åuiri lectam ; nam, antequam possint experiri, elvat—and this, because (in any compound)
" that which is alien, by shewing itself Even the ferocious tribes of animals, along with other objects impedes and obwhen their powers become mature, are structs "-παρεμφαινόμενον γάρ κωλύει το shewn how to employ them, by an innate, αλλότριον, και αντιφράττει. " That there internal instinct.
fore the human intellect in its nature was
of this consciousness, of these preconceptions or anticipations, is
-και άρα καλούμενος της ψυχής νούς- ουδέν his History of Animals, but from the fol-
" that the intellect, as he had said be- intellective part, this he held in its original
πάμπαν μικράς, αίσθησιν γάρ έχουσιν ή δ' As to the simile of tasa tabula, or (to αισθησις, γνώσις τις. Ταύτης δε το τίμιον speak in a language more modern and fa- και άτιμον πολύ διαφέρει σκοπούσι προς miliar) that of a sheet of fair writing paper, φρόνησιν, και προς το των αψύχων γένος. though it be sufficiently evident of itself, it Προς μέν γάρ φρόνησιν ώσπερ ουδέν είναι may be illustrated in the following manner. δοκεί το κοινωνείν αφής και γεύσεως μόνον
The human intellect is pure unmixed, προς δε αναισθησίαν, βέλτιστον. 'Aγαπηuntainted capacity, as a sheet of fair writ- τον γάρ αν δόξη το ταύτης τυχεϊν της ing paper is pure unmixed, untainted γνώσεως, αλλά μη κείσθαι τεθνεώς και μη whiteness. The pure unmixed character öv: "All animals share a degree of knowof this intellectual capacity renders it fit ledge; some of them, a greater ; others of for every object of comprehension, as the them, a less; and some of them, an exceedpure unmixed character of the paper makes ingly small degree ; for they have all of it adequate to every species of writing. them sensation, and sensation is a sort of The paper would not be adequate to this knowledge. But the value and the no purpose, were it previously scrawled over value of sensation is widely different, when with syllables or letters. As far only as it we compare it with rational comprehension is clear, it is capable; and if we suppose it on the one side, and with the race of beings perfectly clear, then is it perfectly capable. inanimate on the other. With regard to The same sort of reasoning is applicable to rational comprehension, the mere partaking the human understanding.
of taste and touch alone appears to be as Such we take to be the sentiments of this nothing ; but with regard to pure insensiancient sage on this important subject. bility, it is something most excellent. For
The sentiments and subject, being both [when compared to beings insensible] it of them curious, will (it is hoped) be an may surely appear a blessed event, to be
ception is the proper cause of spontaneous impulse ; that it is so the animal impels itself, because it is so that it perceives; it does not so perceive, because it is so impelled."
The impulse hitherto spoken of is of earliest date, commencing in a manner with the animal itself; and, as it merely respects the body and bodily pleasure, is distinguished from other impulses by the name of appetite."
As animals advance, the scene of perception enlarges, and the number of spontaneous impulses increase, of course, with it. Yet while pleasure corporeal continues the sole object, and there appears no danger, either in acquiring or preserving it, the impulse is still an appetite, varying only in its name, as the pleasure, to which it is referred, varies in the species.
Yet, besides these preconceptions, the sources of simple appetite, there are also preconceptions of offering violence, and others of resisting danger, and these naturally call forth another power, I mean the power of anger. Few animals, when young, feel any such preconceptions; but the more ferocious and savage are sure to find them at maturity; and the irascible impulses soon spontaneously attend, prompting the lion to employ his fangs, the vulture his talons, the boar his tusk, and every other animal of prey his proper and natural preparations.
All these spontaneous impulses, as well of anger as of appetite, are equally included under the common name of irrational, being called by this name, because they have nothing to do with
But when reason becomes strong enough to view its proper objects; that sight, to which no being here but man alone is equal; when the moral and the intelligible rise before his mental eye, and he beholds the fair forms of good and of truth; then, too, arise impulses of a far more noble kind, those to friendship, to society, to virtue, and to science.*
possessed of this knowledge, and not (re- agendarum ordinem, et, ut ita dicam, consernbling them) to lie as dead and a non- cordiam ; multo eam pluris æstimavit, quam entity.” Aristot. de Animal. Gener. lib. i. omnia illa, quæ primum dilexerat: atque sub. fin. p. 197. edit. Sylb.
ita cogitatione et ratione conlegit, ut statuη Όρεγόμεθα ότι δοκεί, μάλλον ή δοκεί, eret in eo conlocatum summum illud hominis 8167ı ópeyóuedd. Arist. Metaph. 1. 5. p. per se laudandum et expetendum bonum. 203. edit. Sylb.
Cic, de Fin, iii, 6. 'Επιθυμία.
Unicuique ætati sua constitutio est: alia i Ovuós.
infanti, alia puero, alia seni: omnes enim 1 'Aλογος, as well as λογικός and λόγος, constitutioni conciliantur, in qua sunt. Inare terms too well known to need more than fans sine dentibus est: huic constitutioni to be mentioned.
suæ conciliatur. Enati sunt dentes: huic, * This progression from the lower to &c. Sen. Epist. cxxi. The whole epistle the superior faculties is well described by is worth perusal, in particular what follows: Cicero.
Ergo infans ei constitutioni suæ conciliatur, Prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quæ tunc infanti est, non quæ futura juveni quæ sunt secundum naturam: simul autem est. Neque enim, si aliquid illi majus in cepit intelligentiam, vel notionem potius quo transeat, restat; non hoc quoque, in (quam adpellant évvolav illi) viditque rerum quo nascitur, secundum naturam est.
And thus is man not only a microcosm in the structure of his body, but in the system, too, of his impulses, including all of them within him, from the basest to the most sublime. He includes them all, as being possessed of all perception; and per
See also his elegant application of this τοίς. Πάλιν δε, άνευ μεν του άπτικού των doctrine to the different stages of that well- άλλων αισθήσεων ουδεμία υπάρχει, αφή δε known vegetable, corn, from its first ap- άνευ των άλλων υπάρχει πολλά γαρ των pearance above the ground, to its state of ζώων ούτε όψιν ούτε ακοήν έχουσιν, ούτε maturity. Nam et illa herba, que in sege- οσμής όλως αίσθησιν και των αισθητικών tem, &c. Epist. p. 603. edit. Varior. τα μέν έχει το κατά τόπον κινητικόν, τα δ
See also how elegantly Cicero applies ουκ έχει τελευταίον δε και το ελάχιστον, , the same doctrine to the vine, where to the λογισμών και διάνοιαν οις μεν γαρ υπάρχει vegetative powers he first supposes sense λογισμός των φθαρτών, τούτοις και τα λοιπά superadded; and then to sense, reason και πάντα οις δε εκείνων έκαστον, ου πασι λοeach superaddition still increasing in value, γισμός-αλλά τοις μεν ουδέ φαντασία, τα though not robbing the former powers of dè taúty uóvov swoi: “Without the nutheir due regard and attention: Et nunc tritive power there is no sensitive; but quidem, quod eam tuetur, ut de viti potissi- then the nutritive is separated from the mum loquar, est id, &c. De Fin. v. 14. sensitive in plants. Again: without touch
See the Dialogue concerning Happiness, there can be none of the other sensations, part ij, and the notes, p. 72, &c.
but there may be touch without any of the The number and subordination of the rest ; for thus are there many animals which animating powers are well distinguished in have neither sight, nor hearing, nor even a the following extracts.
sensation of smells. Further still: of the Τών δε δυνάμεων της ψυχής αι λεχθείσαι sensitive beings some possess the locomotive τοις μεν ενυπάρχουσι πάσαι (καθάπερ εί- power, and others possess it not: the last πομεν) τοις δέ τινές αυτών, ενίοις δε μία order of beings, and those the fewest in μόνη δυνάμεις δε είπομεν θρεπτικών, αισ- number, are those which possess the powers θητικόν, ορεκτικόν, κινητικών κατά τόπον, of reasoning and discussion ; and among διανοητικόν υπάρχει δέ τοις μεν φυτούς το the mortal and perishable beings, those who θρεπτικών μόνον, ετέροις δε το αυτό τε και possess these powers possess all the remainτο αισθητικόν ει δε το αισθητικών, και το ing species ; but those who possess any one ορεκτικόν όρεξις μεν γαρ επιθυμία, και θυ- of these powers in particular, do not all of μός και βούλησις τά δε ζώα πάντα μίαν them therefore possess the reasoning power, έχει των αισθήσεων, την αφήν· η δε αίσ- but some of them want even the power of θησις υπάρχει, τούτη ηδονή τε και λύπη, fancy or imagination ; others of them conκαι η επιθυμία, του γάρ ήδέος όρεξις εστίν duct themselves, and live by that [inferior aórn: “With regard to the powers of the power) alone.” Arist. de Anim. l. ii. c. 3. soul that have been enumerated, to some p. 28. edit. Sylb. See before, p. 280, note t. beings they appertain all of them ; to others, It must be here observed, that plants are only some of them; and to others, only one said to live, (Gnv,) though not to be animals, of them. The powers we have mentioned (swa): the character of animal being de are the nutritive, the sensitive, the power rived from the power of sensation, of which of desire, of local motion, of ratiocination. plants are supposed destitute ; while that Now to plants there appertains only the of life appertains to them, because they nutritive power; to other beings both this grow, and produce each of them seed after and the sensitive: but if the sensitive, then their kind. the power of desire ; for appetite, and re- These different powers, as they stand sentment, and volition, (the three great united in one subject, may be better comleading powers,) are each of them a species prehended by marking their clear and disof desire, and all animals have at least one tinct character, when they exist apart, in of the senses, I mean the sense of touch. different subjects. Now to the being which possesses sensation, y. The preceding speculations have respect to this appertain also pleasure and pain, and to the threefold division of the soul, adopted that which is pleasurable and painful. But by the Pythagoreans and Platonics, by if these, then appetite ; for appetite is the which they made it
be rational, irascible, desire of that which is pleasurable.” Arist. and concupiscible ; and called its three fade Anim. I. ii. c. 3.
culties λόγος, θυμός, and επιθυμία, “reas07, And soon after: "Avev pèr gydp tow Open- anger, and concupiscence," or appetite. See TIKOÛ Td aloonTIKDY Ook &oti roll sè aio. Diog. Laert. iii. 90. Plato's Republic is θητικου χωρίζεται το θρεπτικών εν τοις φυ- founded on this division.
ception we have now found to be the cause of all spontaneous impulse.
We must remember, however, that it is not perception simply which causes such impulse, but it is perception of want within, aud of adequate good without; and that as this good is sometimes an object of sense, sometimes of intellect, sometimes a mistaken good, at other times a real one, (inasmuch as sensation is fallible, and reason may be deceived,) so the whole amounts to this: "the cause of spontaneous impulse is the perception of absent good, and that either sensible or intelligible, either real or apparent."
After this manner we perceive one of the most important unions; the union of those two capital motions, the physical and the metaphysical. The soul perceives those goods which it is conscious that the animal wants. Hence an impulse to obtain them by employing the organs of the body; and this, as far as the soul only is concerned, we call motion metaphysical. Hence the bodily organs actually are employed, and this we call motion physical.' Perception leads the way; spontaneous impulse follows; and the body supplies the place of an instrument or tool.a
As every animal motion has a view to good, so, if it miss that good, the motion ceases, and the animal is left discontented : if it obtain it, the animal is happy, but then, too, the motion
for the end is obtained to which the motion tended. And thus is all animal motion in its nature finite, as it has a beginning and an end; as it begins from the want of good, and ends in its acquisition. Hence, too, as it ends where it begins, it bears an analogy to motion circular, where we run a complete round, by returning to the point whence we began.
It is no unentertaining speculation to attend to these internal motions, as they arise from the different prevalence of their different internal causes. Within the soul of man there are passions, and a principle of reason: sometimes the internal mo
? See Treatise on Happiness, and notes pares those feelings; that desire is prepared on the same, page 90, and 108.
by some fancy or appearance ; and this * Ούτως μεν ούν επί το κινείσθαι και last arises either through intellection or Apátteiv tà <wa Spuwon, rîs uèv doxátns sensation.” Ejusd. c. viii. p. 157. edit. Sylb. αιτίας του κινείσθαι ορέξεως ούσης, ταύτης If it be asked, why nothing has been said dè yovouévns y dialoohoews, H dià pav- concerning aversion and evil, as well as Taglas kal vohoews : " And thus it is that concerning volition and good ; the answer animals proceed to move themselves and is, that to fly evil is to seek good ; and to act, a desire being the last and immediate escape evil is to obtain good ; so that in cause of their moving, and this desire being the present inquiry they are both included. occasioned either by sensation, or else by b Πάντα γάρ τα ζώα και κινεί και κινείimagination and intellection.” Arist. de ται ένεκά τινος ώστε τούτ' έστιν αυτοίς Animal. Motu, c. vii. p. 155. edit. Sylb. πάσης κινήσεως πέρας, το ού ένεκα: « “All
Τα μεν γάρ οργανικά μέρη παρασκευάζει animals both move, and are moved for the επιτηδείως τα πάθη, ή δε όρεξις τα πάθη, sake of something ; so that this something, την δε όρεξιν η φαντασία αυτή δε γίγνεται that is to say, the final cause, is the bound ή διά νοήσεως, ή δι' αισθήσεως: “The cor- or limit of all their motion." Arist. de Aniporeal feelings prepare in a proper manner mal. Mot. c. 6. p. 153. edit. Sylb. the organic parts of the body; desire pre