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method here, by telling us, it is a simple idea, and therefore cannot be defined. Others, with more reason, have called it hard to be defined ;? a circumstance not unusual with other subjects equally obvious, there being nothing more different both in accuracy and truth, than that apprehension which is adequate to the purposes of the vulgar, and that which ought to satisfy the investigation of a philosopher.

In the first place, if we consider motion as an object of sensation, we shall discover it to be the object not of one sense, but of all. In a ring of bells we hear it; in a succession of savours we taste it ; of odours, we smell it; and that we feel or see it, there needs no example. Thus is it distinguished from those objects, that are peculiar to one sense alone; as from colours, which we only see, or from sounds, which we only hear. Simple therefore as it is, it is not only an object of sensation, but stands distinguished, as a common object, from other objects that are peculiar.

And are there then it may be demanded) no other objects of the same character? It is answered, there are ; as bulk and figure, common objects to the sight and feeling; rest and number, common objects, like motion, to every sense.a

And how (it is asked again) is motion distinguished from these? We reply, from rest, by contrariety; from number, by continuity; from bulk and figure, as the parts of motion are never permanent, never co-exist. What speculations does this idea, simple as it is called, open, even while we consider it no further than as an object of sensation?

But we must not stop here, even while we consider it as physical. As such we shall find it connected with a body which moves; and as such, necessarily performed through space, and in time; so that these also, and their attributes of infinite and continuous, must be added to its theory, as so many necessary speculations.

We cannot therefore but observe, that if it be a simple idea, it is strangely complicated with a multitude of others; such

2 Xanendv dabei aůthy (scil. kívnouv) other subjects it is necessarily connected, Tl COTIV: “It is hard to comprehend what such as continuous, infinite, place, time, &c., it is:" so says the Stagirite, and gives his and where accordingly, after he has given reasons, which we postpone for the present, us the opinions of his predecessors in phithat we may not anticipate. Phys. l. iii. losophy concerning these subjects, he proc. 2. p. 45. edit. Sylb.

ceeds in due order to explain what he 8 Κοινά δε, κίνησις, ήρεμία, αριθμός, thinks himself. His words are, as they σχήμα, μέγεθος τα γάρ τοιαύτα ουδεμιάς lhere follow : Δοκεί δ' η κίνησις είναι των έστιν ίδια (scil. αισθήσεως :) “The common συνεχών το δ' άπειρον εμφαίνεται ευθύς εν objects of sensation are motion, rest, num- τω συνεχεί· διό και τους οριζομένους το ber, figure, bulk : for these are peculiar to ouvezès, ovußalvel apoo xpobai TomáKIS

» Arist. de Anima, 1. ii. c. 6. τω λόγω τω του απείρου, ως εις άπειρον p. 34. These common objects are well διαιρετόν το συνεχές όν. Προς δε τούτοις worthy of attention in explaining the άνευ τόπου, και κενού, και χρόνου αδύνατον doctrine of the senses and sensation. kívnou elvar: “Motion appears to be in

b See the beginning of the third book of the number of things continuous: now inAristotle's Physics, ch. i. where being about finite immediately shews itself in that which to treat of motion, he shews with what is continuous ; for which reason, when they

no one sense.

as space, time, infinitude, continuity, together with body, and its visible attributes both of quantity and of quality. But to proceed in our speculation.

That there are things existing in act, in reality, in actuality, (call it as you please,) we have the evidence both of our senses and of our internal consciousness; so that this is a matter of fact, which we take for granted. That there also are things which actually and really are not, is equally evident as the former, and requires no proving. A Sphinx, for example, actually is not; a Centaur, actually is not; for these we may call phantoms, in the language of Lucretius :

Quæ neque sunt usquam, neque possunt esse profecto. Lastly, every substance that actually is, by actually being that thing, actually is not any other. A piece of brass, for example, actually is not an oak; an acorn, not a vine; a grape-stone, not a statue.

There is a difference however here; I mean, a difference in the last mode of actually not being; for though the brass is no more a statue than it is an oak, yet has it a capacity to become the one, and none to become the other. The same may be said of the acorn, with respect to the oak; of the grape-stone, with respect to the vine. Were it not for this definite nature of capacity, which as much distinguishes the invisible powers, as actuality distinguishes the visible attributes, there would be no reason why an acorn should not produce a statue, as well as it produces an oak; or why any thing (to speak more generally) should not be able to produce any thing."

What, then, if there were no capacity existing in the universe ? Could there be generations, corruptions, growths, diminutions, aliations, or change of place? Impossible. But if these are all the species of physical motion, it follows, that without capacity there can be no such motions.

And is motion, then, for this reason, pure capacity, and that only? Let us examine. A man, being in Salisbury, has a capacity of travelling to London. Is he, therefore, for merely possessing such capacity, upon the road thither? He is not.

Motion, therefore, though capacity, is not capacity alone : there must be some degree of actuality, or else motion can never exist. Shall we, then, call it pure actuality? We cannot assert that, when we have made capacity one of its requisites. Besides, how should motion be seen in pure actuality; an actuality which never exists, till motion is at an end? A man surely can no more be called moving towards London, who is actually arrived there, than he who, possessing the capacity of going thither, forbears to exert any of his motive powers.

define continuous, they have often occasion taur, &c.) immediately preceding, and from to employ withal the character of infinite, that strongest of all nonentities, the noninasmuch as continuity is that which is entity of impossibility, such as that the divisible to infinite. Add to this, without diameter of the square should be commenplace, and vacuum, and time, it is impossible surable with its sides, or that the same that motion should have existence.” Physic. number should be both even and odd. See 1. iii. c. 1.

before, p. 362. • This last species of nonentity should d This distinction of το έντελεχεία and be carefully attended to, as the doctrine of td ouvduel, " of that which is in actuality, motion wholly depends upon it, and as it is and that which is in power," is the basis of so essentially distinguished both from the all the Peripatetic reasoning upon this subfantastic nonentities (the Sphinx, the Cen- ject. See p. 333, &c. also p. 292, 3.

If motion, therefore, be neither capacity alone, nor actuality alone, and yet both (as it appears) are essential to it; it is in both we must look after it, as deriving its existence from both.

Such, in fact, it will appear; something more than dead capacity, something less than perfect actuality: capacity roused, and striving to quit its latent character: not the capable brass, nor yet the actual statue, but the capacity in energy; that is to say, the brass in fusion, while it is becoming the statue, and is not yet become. Thus, too, when a complexion is actually red, we say not that it reddens; much less do we assert so, while it remains perfectly pale; but as every pale complexion implies a capacity to become red, it is in the energy of this capacity exists the reddening, that is, the motion.

In the account of motion here given, we see the doctrine of the Peripatetics. The more ancient sects of Pythagoreans and Platonics, though they give different descriptions, seem to have deduced them all from the same principles. Thus, because whenever any thing is moved, it is some way or other diversified either in quantity or in quality, or at least in place; for this reason they called motion diversity. Again, because while opposite forces are equal, then is motion suspended, and revives not till inequality destroys the equilibrium; for this reason they called motion inequality. Again, because every thing which is moving is not, in some certain attributes, either what it was or what it will be ; for this reason they called motion nonentity, not nonentity absolute, but with a peculiar reference.

All these descriptions of motion naturally flow from one source, and that is, from its indefinite and unascertainable appearance. Now the reason why it so appears, is, as we have said, because we cannot place it either in the simple capacity of things, or in the simple actuality. The bow, for example, moves not, because it may be bent; nor because it is bent; but the motion lies between ; lies in an imperfect and obscure union of the two together; is the actuality (if I may so say) even of

€ Έλεγον δε οι Πυθαγόρειοι την κίνησιν ότι αόριστόν τι δοκεί είναι η κίνησις. είναι ετερότητα, και ανισότητα, και το μή Phys. p. 45. edit. Sylb.: «The cause of ov. Philop. in Physic. p. 144. For non- their placing motion among these things, entity, see before, p. 365.

is, that it appears to be something indefiΑίτιον δε του είς ταυτα τιθέναι αυτούς nite.”

capacity itself;s imperfect and obscure, because such is capacity to which it belongs.

And so much for motion physical, its different species, and its general character. We are now to inquire concerning motion of another kind.




Our contemplation hitherto may be called physical, because it is about physical motions that the whole has been employed, and it is from physical observations that the whole has been deduced. But he who stops here, has but half finished his work, if it be true that corporeal masses only move, because they are moved ; and therefore cannot be considered as the original source of motion.

& We have just before styled it, the is capable of becoming a certain quantity; energy of capacity; here, the actuality of nor that which is a certain quantity in capacity. These expressions are difficult, energy and act. Indeed, the motion itself unless we attend to the manner in which appears to be a certain sort of energy, but they are used. The original Greek ex- then it is an imperfect one ; and the reason presses the sentiment thus: 'H TOû duvá- of this is the capacity itself is imperfect, of μει όντος εντελέχεια, ή τοιούτον, κίνησίς which it is the energy. Hence, therefore, TOTW: “The energy of what exists in it becomes hard to comprehend its nature: power, considered as so existing, is mo- for it is necessary to place it either in prition.” Arist. Physic. 43. edit. Sylb. And vation, or in capacity, or else in simple soon after, p. 45, Toll dokeiv åóplotov energy, and yet no one of these appears to είναι την κίνησιν αίτιον ότι ούτε εις δύναμιν be possible. The manner, therefore, which των όντων, ούτε είς ενέργειάν εστι θείναι we have mentioned, is the only one reαυτήν απλώς ούτε γάρ το δυνατόν είναι maining, which is, that it should be a peποσόν κινείται εξ ανάγκης, ούτε το ενερ- culiar sort of energy, and that such a one γεία ποσόν ήτε κίνησις ενέργεια μέν τις as we have described; hard to discern, and είναι δοκεί, ατελής δέ αίτιον δ' ότι ατελές yet possible to exist.” Page 45, ut supra. το δυνατόν ου έστιν ενέργεια κίνησις" και edit. Sylb. διά τούτο δή χαλεπόν αυτήν λαβείν τί h To κινούν φυσικώς, κινητόν παν γάρ εστίν ή γαρ είς στέρησιν αναγκαίον θείναι, το τοιούτον κινεί, κινούμενων και αυτό: ή εις δύναμιν, ή εις ενέργειας απλήν τού «That which gives motion physically, is των δ' ούθεν φαίνεται ενδεχόμενον· λεί- itself moveable: for every thing which πεται τοίνυν ο ειρημένος τρόπος, ενέργειαν gives motion in this manner, is moved also μέν τινα είναι, τοιαύτην δ' ενέργειαν, οίαν itself.” And soon after, Τούτο δε ποιεί θίξει: είπομεν, χαλεπήν μεν ιδείν, ενδεχομένην δ' ώστε άμα και πάσχει: “This (namely, the eivai. Arist. Phys. 1. iii. c. 2.: “The rea- giving motion) it does by contact ; so that son why motion appears to be indefinite, is, at the same time (while it acts) it is acting that there is no placing it simply, either in upon.” Aristot. Physic. l. iii. c. 1. p. 44, the capacity of things, or in their energy: 45. edit. Sylb. for neither is that necessarily moved which

When a boy carries about with him an insect in a box, we call not this motion the insect's motion as an animal, because a nut or a pebble would have moved in like manner. When the same boy, piercing a wing of this insect, makes it describe a circular motion round a pin or needle, even this cannot well be called the insect's motion; for its motion, as an animal, is not, like a planet, round a centre. So far however the motion differs from that in the box, that by being a mixed motion, the centrifugal part is the animal's own, the centripetal is extraneous. But if ever the wing detach itself, and the fortunate insect fly off; at that instant the mixture of extraneous is no more, and the motion thenceforward becomes properly and purely animal

. And what is it which gives the motion this proper and pure character? It is spontaneity,' that pure and innate impulse arising from the animal itself, by which alone its flight is then produced and conducted.

And thus, while we pass from flying to innate and spontaneous impulse, that is to say, in other words, from flying to its cause, we pass also insensibly from motion physical to metaphysical; for metaphysics are properly conversant about primary and internal causes. We call not such impulse metaphysical, as if it were μετά την φυσικής κίνησιν, “ something subsequent to natural motion,” that is, to flying, (for this would set effect before cause, a preposterous order indeed ;) but we call it metaphysical," because though truly prior in itself, it is subsequent in man's contemplation, whose road of science is naturally upward, that is, from effect to cause, from sensible to intelligible.'

Spontaneous impulse" is to the insect the cause of flying ; so it is to the dolphin, of swimming; to the man, of walking. But what is the cause of this impulse itself? And why do animals possess it, more than stocks or stones?


1 Εοίκε δή το βίαιον είναι, ού έξωθεν ή the first philosophy, for it is a subject beαρχή, μηδέν συμβαλλομένου του βιασθέν- longing to theology, and to that speculation

“That seems to be forced, or com- which is metaphysical, that is to say, subpelled, of which the principle or moving sequent to matters physical, or rather indeed cause is from without, while the being com- it is a subject prior to matters physical, inpelled contributes nothing from itself.” asmuch as those things with regard to us Ethic. Nic. I. ij. c. 1. p. 37. edit. Sylb. are subsequent, which are by nature prior." Td exobolov 8ótelev av elvai, og ý Philop. in Aristot. de Gen. et Corr. P.

12. åpxò év aŭrợ: “That should seem to be edit. Ald. Venet, 1527. spontaneous, of which the principle or See Hermes, p. 119. See also p. 26, moving cause is in the being itself.” Eth. note ; and of the present treatise, p. 350, Nic. 1. iii. c. 1. p. 38. edit. Sylb.

k Philoponus, in a very few words, well m 'Opuń. Diog. Laert. vii. 85. Una explains the term metaphysical. Speaking pars in appetitu posita est. Cic. de Offic

. of the first and supreme cause of all things, i. 28. Appetitionesque, quas illi ápuds vohe adds, Niepl Mèv oův ékelvou elmeiv, this cant, obedientes efficere rationi. De Offic. πρώτης έστι φιλοσοφίας" θεολογία γάρ ii. 5. Animalia, que habent suos impetus oikelov, kal tņuetà quoikà a payuatelą. et rerum appetitus. Ejusd. ii. 3. Naturalem μάλλον δε προ των φυσικών, προς ημάς γάρ enim appetitionem, quam vocant ορμήν, Űotepa tội púder apótepa : “ To speak itemque, &c. De Fin. iv. 14. Seneca uses concerning this principle, is the business of the words, spontaneos motus. Epist. cxxi.


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