« PreviousContinue »
subject, "thou deckest thyself with light, as it were with a garment."s
Though from all these instances we may perceive the force of this genus, yet another still remains, I mean the force of its privation. Nakedness is found to heighten other circumstances of distress:
Nudus in ignota, Palinure, jacebis arena.
Æn. v. 871.
Though the sense be metaphorical, yet Shakspeare avails himself of the same privation in the pathetic speech which he gives to Wolsey:
O! Cromwell, Cromwell!
Had I but serv'd my God with half the zeal
I serv'd my king, he would not in mine age
Have left me naked to my enemies. Henry VIII. act iii. se. 6.
The same privation has its effect, also, in a way more comic and contemptuous. It is thus Aristophanes talks about philosophers:
Τοὺς ὠχριῶντας, τοὺς ἀνυποδήτους λέγεις.
"You mean those pallid, those barefooted fellows." It is thus the author of the Dunciad describes friars:
Dunciad. iii. 113.
In some instances, such partial privations of habit become an indication of reverence. Thus Moses, when on holy ground, was ordered to stand barefooted;" and among Europeans it is a mark of respect to appear bareheaded.
And so much for the genus or predicament of habit, which we divide into species from its different ends of protection, distinction, decency, and ornament, to all of which is alike opposed their contrary, privation. So much also for the ten universal arrangements, genera, or predicaments, with the discussion of which we conclude the second, or middle part of this treatise.
CONCERNING THE APPENDAGES TO THE UNIVERSAL GENERA OR AR
RANGEMENTS; THAT IS TO SAY, CONCERNING OPPOSITES, PRIOR, SUBSEQUENT, TOGETHER OR AT ONCE, AND MOTION, USUALLY CALLED POST-PREDICAMENTS THE MODES OR SPECIES Of all these (MOTION EXCEPTED) DEDUCED, AND ILLUSTRATED-PREPARATION
THEORY OF MOTION.
HAVING now gone through each of the predicaments or philosophical arrangements, and considered its character, and distin
8 Psalm civ. 2.
h Exod. iii. 5.
guishing attributes, there remains nothing further to complete the theory, but an explication of certain terms, which have occasionally occurred; and which, from their subsequent place, and subsequent contemplation, have been called by the Latin logicians post-predicaments, and form the third, or last part of this treatise.
Thus, for example, things have been sometimes mentioned in the former part of this work, as opposed to one another; and hence it becomes expedient to consider the doctrine of opposites.
At other times, things have been treated as being some prior, some subsequent, and others existing together or at once; and hence it becomes expedient to examine these several terms, and to investigate the different meanings, of which each of them is susceptible.
Lastly; motion, in its various species, is so widely diffused through some of the most important genera already treated, that it cannot be omitted in a speculation, where the professed end is to scrutinize universals.
It appears, therefore, that there still remain, as subjects of our inquiry, opposites, prior and subsequent, co-existent or at once, and last of all, motion.
Now in the first place, as to opposites, the reader must be reminded, that, having already spoken of them in a former treatise,TM we omit them here, and refer to that.
The doctrine of prior and subsequent follows: " and these perhaps may appear to be sufficiently discussed, if we enumerate and explain the following modes.
The most obvious mode of priority is the temporal, according
Toy Xpóvov," according to time;" the priority, depending on the quantity of time being larger with respect to the subject, which is called older, or more ancient, T yàp Tov Xрóvov Tλelw elvai kai waλaιÓTEρov καὶ πρεσβύτερον λέγεται. Præd. p. 53. edit. Sylb.
Ammonius, in commenting this passage, observes an elegance in the Greek tongue, peculiar to itself: παλαιότερον, he tells us, is applied indiscriminately to beings animal and inanimate; πρεσβύτερον is applied only to the animal genus. Simplicius on the same occasion makes the same observation, in Præd. p. 106.
The last author has also the following remark concerning the different modes of temporal priority: Tà dè kaтà xрóvoν πроτερά, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν γενομένων τὰ ποῤῥώτερον ὄντα τοῦ νῦν· ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐσομένων, τὰ ἐγγύTepov: Simpl. in Præd. p. 106. B. “Things prior in time among the past are those the furthest from the present now; among the future, are those the nearest to it." Simpl. in Loc.
to which we say, that the Trojan wars were prior to the Punic, and the battle of Marathon to that of Blenheim.
A second mode of priority is, when a thing is prior to some other, because it does not reciprocate in the consequence of
A few examples will illustrate the apparent difficulty of this character. The number one according to this doctrine is prior to the number two, because if there exist two, it is a necessary consequence that there should be one; but if there exist one, does not reciprocate, that there should be two. Thus every genus is prior to any one of its various species; because, if there be such a species as man, or lion, there is necessarily such a genus as animal; but if there be such a genus as animal, there is not necessarily such a species as man, or lion.
This mode of priority, which we call priority essential, will be found of great importance in all logical disquisitions, and may therefore perhaps merit some further attention.
According to this, that thing of any two or many things is prior, which, by being taken away, annihilates the rest; or which, if the rest are, must necessarily be."
For example: if there were no theorems of science, to guide the operations of art, there could be no art; but if there were no operations of art, there might still be theorems of science. Therefore is science prior to art. Again, if there were no such things as syllogized truths, there could be no such sciences as optics or astronomy. But, though neither of these, there might notwithstanding be such things as truths syllogized. Therefore is logic prior to these, and, by parity of reasoning, to every other particular science. Again, if there were no such principles as self-evident truths, there could be no such things as truths syllogized. But, though no truths syllogized, there might still be truths self-evident. Therefore the first philosophy, which treats of these primary and original truths, being prior to logic, is prior also to the tribe of sciences, as are these to the tribe of arts; so that of course the whole structure of logic, of sciences, and of arts, may be said to rest upon this first philosophy, as upon that only firm and solid base, against which the powers of ignorance and sophistry can never totally prevail.
P The words in Aristotle are, Tò un ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούOnow. Prædic. p. 53. edit. Sylb.
He alleges the same instance from numbers, which is given here.
9 What is here said, is explained in what immediately follows. Simplicius says, agreeably to the explanation here given, kaλeîv dè évébaσw of veάτepoi to TOLOÛTOV πρότερον, συνεπιφερόμενον μὲν, μὴ συνεπιφέρον δὲ, καὶ συναναιροῦν μὲν, μὴ συναναιpovμevov dé: "The latter logicians are accustomed to call this mode of priority, that
which is co-inferred, but does not co-infer; that which co-annihilates, but is not coannihilated." Simpl. in Præd. p. 106.
Nihil est enim, quod ad artem redigi possit, nisi ille prius, qui illa tenet, quorum artem instituere vult, habeat illam scientiam, ut ex iis rebus, quarum ars nondum sit, artem efficere possit. Cic. de Orat. i. 41. edit. Pearce, &c. p. 63. edit. Oxon.
This citation well proves a part of what is here asserted, viz. the necessary priority of some science to every art.
There is a third mode of priority, seen in order and arrangement. Thus in the demonstrative sciences, definitions and postulates are prior to theorems and problems; in grammar, syllables are prior to words, and letters to syllables. It is thus in a wellcomposed oration, the proëme is prior to the state and argument; and these last, to the peroration."
A fourth mode of priority, is that of honour and affection, when we prefer objects, that we revere or love, to others that less merit, or at least that we esteem less to merit our regard and attention.'
̓Αθανάτους μὲν πρῶτα θεοὺς, νόμῳ ὡς διάκεινται,
Τούς τε καταχθονίους σέβε δαίμονας, ἔννομα ῥέζων·
"The gods immortal, as by law divine
Th' illustrious heroes, and terrestrial race
Of genii, paying each the legal rites:
Honour thy parents next, and those of kin
Pythag. aurea carmina.
Hierocles, in his comment on these verses, commonly called for their excellence the golden verses of Pythagoras, has largely expatiated on this divine precedence and subordination.
Thus Horace, with respect to that priority of beings, founded on the religion of his country:
Quid prius dicam solitis parentis
Proximos illi tamen occupavit
Od. 1. i. 12.
He adopts priority, derived from the same principle, when he speaks of the favourite topics which his genius led him to cultivate:
Quid prius illustrem satiris, musaque pedestri?
Sat. 1. ii. 6. v. 17.
The Stagirite, who records these various modes of priority, observes on this fourth mode (and apparently with reason) that it was in a manner the most alien and foreign of them all."
He mentions also a fifth mode, but he introduces it with a sort of doubt. It should seem,' says he, besides the modes here mentioned, there was another mode of priority even in things reciprocating; although, so far as they reciprocate, they may be said to co-exist.
The fact is, if either of them in any sense can be called cause
* Τρίτον δὲ κατά τινα τάξιν τὸ πρότερον λέγεται, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τῶν λόγων· ἔν τε γὰρ ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις, κ. T. λ. Arist. Præd. p. 53. edit. Sylb. This is not translated, being expressed in the text.
ι Ετι παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τιμιώτερον πρότερον τῇ φύσει δοκεῖ· εἰώ θασι δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ τοὺς ἐντιμοτέρους͵ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀγαπωμένους ὑπ ̓ αὐτῶν, προτέρους
παρ ̓ αὐτοῖς φάσκειν εἶναι. Arist. Præd. ibid. not translated for the reason before given.
" His words are, ἔστι δὲ δὴ καὶ σχέδον aλλorPIŃτATOS TŵV TрÓжwv ovтos. Arist. Præd. ibid. p. 54.
* Δόξειε δ ̓ ἂν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους ἕτερος εἶναι τοῦ προτέρου τρόπος· τῶν γὰρ ἀντιστρεφόντων τὸ αἴτιον, κ. τ. λ. Ibid. p. 54.
to the other, it may for that reason be called prior, if not in time, at least in efficacy and power.
For example: the actual existence of a man reciprocates with the proposition, which affirms him actually to exist. For if the man actually exist, then is the proposition true; and reciprocally, if the proposition be true, then does the man actually exist. And yet, though these things in this manner reciprocate, is not the proposition cause to the man's existence, but the man's existence to that of the proposition; since according as the man either is or is not, in like manner we call the proposition either true or false."
This last mode of priority we call causal priority, or the being prior by causality.
We must not however quit this speculation, without observing, that cause and effect do not always thus reciprocate, but that, for the greater part, the cause is naturally prior. For example: hunger and thirst are the natural causes of eating and drinking; and thus, by being their causes, are naturally prior to them. Crimes, too, are the natural cause why punishments are inflicted; and therefore crimes, by parity of reason, are prior to punishments. The sentiment, though obvious, is well expressed by Pætus Thrasea. Nam culpa quam pæna tempore prior est; emendari, quam peccare, posterius est.
Nor are crimes only prior to punishment, but so is judicial process; since to punish first, and then to hear, is what sir Edward Coke chooses to call, (in a language somewhat strong,) "the damnable and damned proceedings of the judge of hell :"a
Castigatque, auditque dolos.
Æneid. vi. 567.
And thus it appears there are five principal modes of priority; that is to say, the temporal, the essential, that of order, that of precedence, and that of causality; which five being known, the modes of what is subsequent (its natural opposite) are easily known also.b
We are now to examine the modes of co-existence, or that of being at once and together; and these modes have evidently great connection with the preceding.
The most simple mode among these, as well as among the modes of priority, is the temporal, perceived in things or events, which exist during the same time.d
Una eurusque notusque ruunt.
̔Ομοῦ πόλεμός τε δαμᾷ καὶ λοῖμος ̓Αχαιούς.
"War and the plague at once destroy, the Greeks."
y The words of Aristotle are, τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ μὴ, ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ἢ Yevons Aéyeral. Ibid. p. 54. edit. Sylb.
z Tacit. Annal. xv. 20.
a Coke's Institutes, vol. ii. p. 54, 55.
Æn. i. 89.
Iliad. A. 61.
σαυταχῶς ἂν καὶ τὸ ὕστερον λέγοιτο. Sintplic. ut supra, p. 106. B.
c Aristot. Præd. p. 54. edit. Sylb. d ̓͂Ων ἡ γένεσις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ χρόνῳ. Prædic. p. 54. edit. Sylb.