diversified by nature herself, as those affections are found to vary. Words move only those who understand the language; and even, where the language is understood, acute sentiments often escape the comprehension of unacute hearers. But action, spontaneously indicating the motions of the soul, is a language which not only the vulgar, but even the stranger comprehends. Every one knows the external gestures and signs by which, without teaching, both himself and others indicate their several affections; so that seeing the same signs recur, he readily knows their meaning, inasmuch as nature herself supplies the place of an interpreter. But to pass from these speculations to others more general.

The primary elements of Democritus were atoms and a void. As for the variety and the specific differences, which he found to exist in things, he deduced them out of his atoms; first by figure, as A, for example, differs from N; next by order, as AN, for example, differs from NA; and lastly by position, as Z, for example, differs from N, these letters in figure being in a manner

the same.'

Thus position, according to this philosopher, stands among the principles of the universe.

A high rank this, and yet perhaps not an undeserved one, if, by attending to particulars, we contemplate its extensive influence. For not to mention the force of position in the different parts of every animal; not to mention the admirable situation even of subordinate subjects; the grateful variety of lands and waters, of mountains and plains; what shall we say to the position of the heavens above, and of the earth beneath; of the sun himself in the centre, and the several planets moving round him? If we carry our hypothesis further, and suppose (as has been well conjectured) that the solar system itself has a proper position respecting the fixed stars; and that they, presiding in other systems, maintain a certain position respecting the system of the sun; we shall have reason so to esteem the importance of this genus, that perhaps upon its permanence depends the permanence of the world.

Nor need we be surprised, though it be properly an attribute of things corporeal, if we discover the traces of it even in beings incorporeal. If the sensible world be an effect, of which the cause is a sovereign mind, all that we discover in effects we may fairly look for in their causes, since here its prior existence is in a manner necessary.m

Thus our own minds are not only the place and region of our

66

I What others called σxua," figure," Democritus called ῥυσμός : τάξις, " order,” he called dialyn: and Oéσis, “situation," or "position," he called porn. See Aristot. Metaph. p. 11. 134. edit. Sylb. See also Lib. de Gen. et Corrupt. 1. i. c. 2. where

Philoponus, in his comment, informs us, that these strange words were λέξεις ̓Αβ depukal, “Abderic words;" words used in Abdera, the city to which Democritus belonged.

m See p. 228, &c.

ideas," but with respect to these ideas, such is the influence of position, that upon this in a manner depends our whole perception of truth. Let us, for example, invert the terms of a simple proposition, and instead of saying, that "every man is an animal," say that "every animal is a man ;" and what becomes of the truth which such proposition contained? Let us derange in any theorem the propositions themselves, confounding them in their order, blending them promiscuously, putting the first last, and the last first; and what becomes of the truth which such theorem was to demonstrate? It is lost, till the propositions recover their natural situation.

Tantum series, juncturaque pollet.

Hor.

Democritus, whom we have just mentioned, in order to shew the importance of arrangement in natural subjects, and the amazing differences that arise, where the change is most minute, ingeniously remarks, that out of the same letters are formed tragedy and comedy." We may affirm as confidently, that out of the same terms are formed truth and falsehood.P

The efficacy, indeed, of this intellectual position is so great, that through it not only the wise know, but the unwise become informed. It is by the strength of this alone that all teaching is performed; all learning acquired; that the simple and uninstructed are led from truths acknowledged to truths unknown,a and thus ascend by due degrees to the sublimest parts of science. What then shall we say to that stupendous position, to that marvellous arrangement, existing within the Divine Mind; where the whole of being is ever present in perfect order; and to which no single truth is ever latent or unrevealed?

If we would comprehend the dignity of position in this its * Καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι TÓTOV eidŵv: “Well, therefore, do they conceive, who say that the soul is the region of forms, or ideas." Arist. de An. iii. 4. p. 57. edit. Sylb. See before, p. 277, note o, and

281.

• Ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τραγῳδία γίνεται, καὶ κωμῳδία γραμμάτων. De Gen. et Corrupt. 1. i. c. 2. p. 4. edit. Sylb.

P Simple terms are to be found in the several predicaments or arrangements here treated, being the first part of logic.

From different arrangements of these terms arise propositions; and from different arrangements of propositions arise syllogisms. Propositions are the object of the second part of logic; syllogisms, of the third.

There is no going further, for the most enlarged speculations are but syllogisms repeated. Such, then, in a logical and intellectual view, is the force and extent of the predicament of position or situation here

treated.

4 There is an order or arrangement peculiar to learners; and of course, with respect

to them, the principle or beginning of knowledge is different from what it is according to the order of nature. Hence the following observation: 'H dè (apxǹ) 80ev àv κάλλιστα ἕκαστον γένοιτο· οἷον καὶ μαθή σεως, οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ἀρχῆς ἐνίοτε ἀρκτέον, ἀλλ ̓ ὅθεν ῥᾷστ ̓ ἂν μάθοι: “ There is another species of beginning, and that is the point from which any thing may be done after the best manner; for example, in the affair of learning any thing, we are sometimes not to begin from what is first, and which is the principle or beginning of the thing itself, but we are to begin from that point whence any one may learn the most easily." Metaph. 1. iv. c. 1.

In the Meno of Plato there is a striking example of an arrangement of truths, which lead an uninstructed youth to the knowledge of a fine and important theorem in geometry. See the dialogue of that name in Plato, and Sydenham's elegant and accurate translation, enriched with diagrams. See before, p. 281, 296, &c.

archetypal form, let us view it at the same instant with something its perfect contrary: let us compare it, for example, to the sick man's dream, or to that chaos of ideas which fills the mind of one delirious. As we can find few situations more unfortunate than these latter; so we can conceive no one more respectable, or divine, than the former.

And so much for the genus or arrangement of position, which arises from the genus or arrangement of where, as this from the genus or arrangement of relation, both position and where being in their nature relatives.

CHAPTER XIV.

CONCERNING HABIT, OR RATHER THE BEING HABITED. ITS DESCRIPTION. ITS PRINCIPAL SPECIES DEDUCED AND ILLUSTRATED. ITS PRIVATION. CONCLUSION OF THE SECOND OR MIDDLE PART OF THE TREATISE.

THE genus of habit, or rather of being habited, is of so little importance, when compared to the other predicaments, that perhaps it might be omitted, were it not in deference to ancient authority.s

Though it have respect both to habits which are worn, and to persons who wear them, yet is it not recognised either in the one or the other, but is a relation, which arises from the two taken together.

Now as every such habit, as well as every such wearer, are both of them substances, the relation must necessarily be a relation existing between substances. It cannot, therefore, be the relation existing between mind and its habits, (such as virtue or science,) nor that between body and its habits, (such as agility or health,)" for these habits are not substances, but inherent attributes.

Again; it cannot be the relation existing between a man and his possessions; for though these are both of them substances, and though a possessor may be said to have an estate, he cannot be said to have it upon him; he does not wear it.*

• The authority alluded to is that of the Pythagoreans and Peripatetics.

Quod non ita intelligendum est, ac si res ipsæ, quæ sic habentur, sint hujus prædicamenti (puta vestitus ipsi, &c.) quæ ad alia prædicamenta spectant, sed habitio harum, seu ipsum habere, rò exeш Taûтa. Wallis. Logic. 1. i. c. 14. Soon after he explains habitio, and informs us it means, Vestitum esse, tunicatum esse, togatum esse, corona cingi, calceo indui, &c.

Sanderson in his Logic explains the predicament as follows: Corpus habens est

substantia; res habita fere est forma artificialis de quarta specie qualitatis; applicatio hujus ad illud est habitus hujus prædicamenti. Lib. i. c. 14.

"Simplicius, when he gives the reason, why habit and the body habited cannot coexist, as substance and its attributes coexist, says, σvμquî yàp Taûтá ẻσti, kal avтd EKЄivo: "for these attributes are connatural, [that is, grow with the being,] and are the being itself." Simplic. in Præd. p. 93.

* Διὸ οὐδὲ τὰ κτήματα, ἢ ἀνδράποδα, ή φίλους, ἢ πάτερας, ἢ υἱεῖς κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ

The being habited therefore is, in its strictest sense, something less than the first relation, that between a substance and its attributes; something more than the second relation, that (I mean) between a possessor and his possessions.

It is to be hoped that these reasonings on a subject so trite will be pardoned for their brevity. They are to shew, not what the relation is, but what it is not.

If it be demanded, And what then is it? The answer must be, It is a relation existing after a peculiar manner; when an artificial substance is superinduced upon a natural one, and becomes contiguous to it, though it be not united in vital continuity.

Such was the very armour he had on,
When he th' ambitious Norway combated.

Hamlet, act i. sc. 1.

The primary end of being habited seems to have been protection; and that either by way of defence against the inclemencies of nature, as in the case of common apparel; or by way of defence against insults, as in the case of helmets, breastplates, coats of mail, &c.

Further than this: as habits were various, both in their materials and shapes; and, as among the number of those who wore them, some were superior to the rest by their dignity and office: hence it was found expedient, that many of these superior ranks should be marked by the distinctions of peculiar habits; so that this established another end of being habited, over and above protection, an end which gave robes to peers, uniforms to admirals, &c.

Further still some regard, when either of the sexes habited themselves, was had to decency, some to beauty and adventitious ornament; of which last we may be more sensible, if we contemplate the elegant draperies of the Grecian statues, or those in the capital pictures of the great Italian masters, and compare these truly graceful and simple forms to the tasteless and ever mutable ones of ourselves and our neighbours."

γένος ἔχειν λεγόμεθα, διότι οὐκ ἐν περιθέσει ταῦτά ἐστι, καίτοι κτήματα ὄντα: “For which reason we are not said, in the sense of this genus, to have possessions, or slaves, or friends, or fathers, or children; for these none of them are said to exist in their being thrown round us, or superinduced, although they are all [in some sense or other] our possessions." Simplic. ut supra.

* Καὶ ἐοίκε μέσον πῶς εἶναι τὸ ἔχειν, τοῦ κεκτῆσθαι, καὶ τοῦ καθ ̓ ἕξιν διακεῖσθαι· ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ἔχεται, ὡς ἡ λευκότης. χωρίζεται ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν κτημάτων, ἃ οὐ περικείμεθα ῇ δὲ σωματικόν ἐστι καὶ ἔξωθεν, χωρίζεται ἀπὸ τῶν ἕξεων, αἱ συμβεβήκασιν ἡμῖν, συμ

φυεῖς οὖσαι, καὶ οὐκ ἐπίκτητοι: “The having any thing on, appears to be a sort of medium between possessing, and the being habitually disposed. As far as it is had, after the same manner as whiteness is had, [or any inherent attribute,] it is distinguished from possessions without, with which we are not said to be enveloped or clothed. As far as it is corporeal, and from without, it is distinguished from [inherent attributes or] habits which belong to us, as things connatural, and not as things adventitious.” Simplic. ut supra.

2 See the preceding notes in this chapter, particularly the second.

a The same simplicity which contributes

As there are many sorts of habit which have respect to this last end, I mean to beauty or adventitious ornament, so when a man is found to cultivate this end to an excess, it constitutes the character which we call a fop. Nay, even the conveniencies of dress, when too minutely studied, degenerate into an effeminacy, which carries with it a reproach. It was hence that Turnus upbraided the Trojans for wearing a covering over their hands, and for tying their caps on with strings; that is to say, in modern language, for using gloves and chinstays.

Et tunicæ manicas, et habent redimicula mitræ.

Æn. ix. 616.

We have already mentioned the use of habit as to distinction. In almost all countries something of this hath taken place, to distinguish the noble from the ignoble, the scholar from the mechanic; to mark the sacerdotal, the military, the juridical, &c. It is to the fallibility which sometimes attends this method of distinguishing, that we owe those proverbial sayings, "the cloak makes not the philosopher; the cowl makes not the monk."

It is in a sense less strict and precise, that we take the word habit, when we say of the plains, they are clothed with grass; of the mountains, they are clothed with wood;d and more remotely still, when we apply the notion of habit to the mind: "having on the breast-plate of righteousness,” “taking the shield of faith,” &c.

In the language of poetry there is sometimes much elegance derived from this arrangement; as, for example, when the morn, at day-break, is said to be clad with "russet mantle;" or when the moon, in diffusing her pallid light, is said "to throw o'er the dusk her silver mantle;' or when the psalmist says, on a greater

to the decoration of our persons, contributes also to the decoration of nature.

The following anecdote, communicated to me by the late lord Lyttleton, appears to be worth preserving. When sir John Vanbrugh had finished Blenheim-house, the then duchess of Marlborough asked him for the plan of a garden. Sir John told her, he could give no plan himself, and he feared she might apply to others as incapable as he was, naming certain gardeners of the time, that are now unknown. "But," continued he, "if your grace would have a garden truly elegant, you must apply for a plan to the best painters of landscape."

So happily did this ingenious man predict (as it were) a taste, which, taking its rise not many years after from Kent, has been since completed by Brown, and nowhere with greater beauty and magnificence than on the very spot of which we are now writing, I mean Blenheim.

b Horace, in the first satire of his first book, calls the wild and extravagant Nævius

by the name of Vappa; which Baxter ingeniously explains, Quod insano sumptu stolidas sequeretur delicias. Non hujuscemodi homunciones fopps dicimus; an et hoc a vappa, quærant alii.

Vappa meant originally, the juice of the grape in a state of perfect insipidity, when it was neither wine nor vinegar. Vappa proprie dicitur, quod nec vinum, nec acetum est. Vet. Scholiast. in Horat. Satir. 1. i. s. 2. v. 13.

c Pallium non facit philosophum-Cucullus non facit monachum.

d Thus Cicero: Spatia frugifera atque immensa camporum, vestitusque densissimos montium, pecudum pastus, &c. De Nat. Deor. ii. 64, p. 253. edit. Davis. And before, in the same treatise, he speaks of the earth as Vestita floribus, herbis, arboribus, frugibus, &c. ii. 39. p. 195. Yet all this, we must remember, is but metaphorical. e Ephesians, vi. 14. 16.

f Hamlet, act i. sc. 1. Paradise Lost, iv. 608.