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diversified by nature herself, as those affections are found to vary. Words move only those who understand the language ; and even, where the language is understood, acute sentiments often escape the comprehension of unacute hearers. But action, spontaneously indicating the motions of the soul, is a language which not only the vulgar, but even the stranger comprehends. Every one knows the external gestures and signs by which, without teaching, both himself and others indicate their several affections; so that seeing the same signs recur, he readily knows their meaning, inasmuch as nature herself supplies the place of an interpreter. But to pass from these speculations to others more general.

The primary elements of Democritus were atoms and a void. As for the variety and the specific differences, which he found

to exist in things, he deduced them out of his atoms; first by to figure, as A, for example, differs from N; next by order, as AN,

for example, differs from NA; and lastly by position, as Z, for example, differs from N, these letters in figure being in a manner the same.'

Thus position, according to this philosopher, stands among the principles of the universe.

A high rank this, and yet perhaps not an undeserved one, if, by attending to particulars, we contemplate its extensive influ

For not to mention the force of position in the different parts of every animal; not to mention the admirable situation even of subordinate subjects; the grateful variety of lands and waters, of mountains and plains; what shall we say to the position of the heavens above, and of the earth beneath ; of the sun himself in the centre, and the several planets moving round him? If we carry our hypothesis further, and suppose (as has been well conjectured) that the solar system itself has a proper position respecting the fixed stars; and that they, presiding in other systems, maintain a certain position respecting the system of the sun; we shall have reason so to m the importance of this genus, that perhaps upon its permanence depends the permanence of the world.

Nor need we be surprised, though it be properly an attribute of things corporeal, if we discover the traces of it even in beings incorporeal. "If the sensible world be an effect, of which the cause is a sovereign mind, all that we discover in effects we may fairly look for in their causes, since here its prior existence is in a manner necessary;"

Thus our own minds are not only the place and region of our | What others called oxaua, " figure,” Philoponus, in his comment, informs us, Democritus called prouós : rátis, “ order," that these strange words were négers ABhe called baðhyn: and béois, “ sitnation,” depurai, " Abderic words;" words used in or “ position," he called tportń. See Ari- Abdera, the city to which Democritus bestot. Metaph. p. U. 134. edit. Sylb. See longed. also Lib. de Gen, et Corrupt. 1. i. c. 2. where m See p. 228, &c.

ence.

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ideas," but with respect to these ideas, such is the influence of position, that upon this in a manner depends our whole perception of truth. Let us, for example, invert the terms of a simple proposition, and instead of saying, that “every man is an animal,” say that “every animal is a man;" and what becomes of the truth which such proposition contained? Let us derange in any theorem the propositions themselves, confounding them in their order, blending them promiscuously, putting the first last, and the last first, and what becomes of the truth which such theorem was to demonstrate? It is lost, till the propositions recover their natural situation. Tantum series, juncturaque pollet.

Hor. Democritus, whom we have just mentioned, in order to shew the importance of arrangement in natural subjects, and the amazing differences that arise, where the change is most minute, ingeniously remarks, that out of the same letters are formed tragedy and comedy.° We may affirm as confidently, that out of the same terms are formed truth and falsehood.P

The efficacy, indeed, of this intellectual position is so great, that through it not only the wise know, but the unwise become informed. It is by the strength of this alone that all teaching is performed; all learning acquired ; that the simple and uninstructed are led from truths acknowledged to truths unknown, and thus ascend by due degrees to the sublimest parts of science. What then shall we say to that stupendous position, to that marvellous arrangement, existing within the Divine Mind; where the whole of being is ever present in perfect order; and to which no single truth is ever latent or unrevealed ?"

If we would comprehend the dignity of position in this its η Και εν δή οι λέγοντες την ψυχήν είναι to them, the principle or beginning of knowTónov eidwv: “Well, therefore, do they ledge is different from what it is according conceive, who say that the soul is the to the order of nature. Hence the followregion of forms, or ideas.” Arist. de An. ing observation: 'H 8è (åpx)) 70er ii. 4. p. 57. edit

. Sylb. See before, p. 277, Kállota éKAOTOV yévotto oloy kal uabh note o, and p. 281.

σεως, ουκ από του πρώτου και της του ο 'Εκ των αυτών γάρ τραγωδία γίνεται, πράγματος αρχής ενίοτε αρκτέον, αλλ' όθεν και κωμωδία γραμμάτων. De Gen. et Cor- δάστ' αν μάθοι : “There is another species rupt. 1. i. c. 2. p. 4. edit. Sylb.

of beginning, and that is the point from P Simple terms are to be found in the which any thing may be done after the best several predicaments or arrangements here manner; for example, in the affair of learntreated, being the first part of logic. ing any thing, we are sometimes not to

From different arrangements of these terms begin from what is first, and which is the arise propositions; and from different ar- principle or beginning of the thing itself

, rangements of propositions arise syllogisms. but we are to begin from that point whence

Propositions are the object of the second any one may learn the most easily.” Mepart of logic; syllogisms, of the third.

taph. 1. iv. c. 1. There is no going further, for the most In the Meno of Plato there is a striking

rged speculations are but syllogisms re- example of an arrangement of truths, which peated. Such, then, in a logical and intel- lead an uninstructed youth to the knowlectual view, is the force and extent of the ledge of a fine and important theorem in predicament of position or situation here geometry. See the dialogue of that name treated.

in Plato, and Sydenham's elegant and ac4 There is an order or arrangement pecu- curate translation, enriched with diagrams. liar to learners ; and of course, with respect See before, p. 281, 296, &c.

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archetypal form, let us view it at the same instant with something its perfect contrary : let us compare it, for example, to the sick man's dream, or to that chaos of ideas which fills the mind of one delirious. As we can find few situations more unfortunate than these latter; so we can conceive no one more respectable, or divine, than the former.

And so much for the genus or arrangement of position, which arises from the genus or arrangement of where, as this from the genus or arrangement of relation, both position and where being in their nature relatives.

CHAPTER XIV.

CONCERNING HABIT, OR RATHER THE BEING HABITED. ITS DESCRIPTION.

ITS PRINCIPAL SPECIES DEDUCED AND ILLUSTRATED. ITS PRIVATION. CONCLUSION OF THE SECOND OR MIDDLE PART OF THE TREATISE.

The genus of habit, or rather of being habited, is of so little importance, when compared to the other predicaments, that perhaps it might be omitted, were it not in deference to ancient authority.

Thongh it have respect both to habits which are worn, and to persons who wear them, yet is it not recognised either in the one or the other, but is a relation, which arises from the two taken together.'

Now as every such habit, as well as every such wearer, are both of them substances, the relation must necessarily be a relation existing between substances. It cannot, therefore, be the relation existing between mind and its habits, (such as virtue or science,) nor that between body and its habits, (such as agility or health,)" for these habits are not substances, but inherent attributes.

Again; it cannot be the relation existing between a man and his possessions; for though these are both of them substances, and though a possessor may be said to have an estate, he cannot be said to have it upon him; he does not wear it.*

* The authority alluded to is that of the substantia ; res habita fere est forma artiPythagoreans and Peripatetics.

ficialis de quarta specie qualitatis ; appli"Quod non ita intelligendum est, ac si catio hujus ad illud est habitus hujus præres ipsæ, quæ sic habentur, sint hujus præ- dicamenti. Lib. i. c. 14. dicamenti (puta vestitus ipsi, &c.) quæ ad u Simplicius, when he gives the reason, alia prædicamenta spectant, sed habitio why habit and the body habited cannot coharum, seu ipsum habere, td & XELV Tallta. exist, as substance and its attributes coWallis. Logic. 1. i. c. 14. Soon after he exist, says, ovudun yap taūtá doti, kal explains habitio, and informs us it means, aŭtd ékeivo: “for these attributes are conVestitum esse, tunicatum esse, togatum natural, (that is, grow with the being,) and esse, corona cingi, calceo indui, &c.

are the being itself.” Simplic. in Præd. p. 93. Sanderson in his Logic explains the pre- * Διο ουδέ τα κτήματα, και ανδράποδα, dicament as follows: Corpus habens est και φίλους, ή πάτερας, η υιείς κατά τούτο το γένος έχειν λεγόμεθα, διότι ουκ εν περι- φυείς ούσαι, και ουκ επίκτητοι: “The having θέσει ταυτά έστι, καίτοι κτήματα όντα: any thing on, appears to be a sort of mediuτη “ For which reason we are not said, in the between possessing, and the being habitually sense of this genus, to have possessions, or disposed. As far as it is had, after the slaves, or friends, or fathers, or children; same manner as whiteness is had, (or any for these none of them are said to exist in inherent attribute,] it is distinguished from their being thrown round us, or super- possessions without, with which we are not induced, although they are all (in some said to be enveloped or clothed. As far as sense or other] our possessions." Simplic. it is corporeal, and from without, it is dis

The being habited therefore is, in its strictest sense, something less than the first relation, that between a substance and its attributes; something more than the second relation, that (I mean) between a possessor and his possessions."

It is to be hoped that these reasonings on a subject so trite will be pardoned for their brevity. They are to shew, not what the relation is, but what it is not.

If it be demanded, And what then is it? The answer must be, It is a relation existing after a peculiar manner; when an artificial substance is superinduced upon a natural one,” and becomes contiguous to it, though it be not united in vital continuity.

Such was the very armour he had on,
When he th' ambitious Norway combated.

Hamlet, act i. sc. 1. The primary end of being habited seems to have been protection; and that either by way of defence against the inclemencies of nature, as in the case of common apparel ; or by way of defence against insults, as in the case of helmets, breastplates, coats of mail, &c.

Further than this: as habits were various, both in their materials and shapes; and, as among the number of those who wore them, some were superior to the rest by their dignity and office: hence it was found expedient, that many of these superior ranks should be marked by the distinctions of peculiar habits; so that this established another end of being habited, over and above protection, an end which gave robes to peers, uniforms to admirals, &c.

Further still: some regard, when either of the sexes habited themselves, was had to decency, some to beauty and adventitious ornament; of which last we may be more sensible, if we contemplate the elegant draperies of the Grecian statues, or those in the capital pictures of the great Italian masters, and compare these truly graceful and simple forms to the tasteless and ever mutable ones of ourselves and our neighbours.*

tinguished from [inherent attributes or] Y Και έοίκε μέσον πως είναι το έχειν, του habits which belong to us, as things conκεκτήσθαι, και του καθ' έξιν διακείσθαι" ή natural, and not as things adventitious.” μεν γαρ έχεται, ώς ή λευκότης. χωρίζεται Simplic. ut supra. από τών έξωθεν κτημάτων, και του περικείμεθα z See the preceding notes in this chapter, ή δε σωματικόν έστι και έξωθεν, χωρίζεται particularly the second. από τών έξεων, αι συμβεβήκασιν ημίν, συμ- a The same simplicity which contributes

ut supra.

As there are many sorts of habit which have respect to this last end, I mean to beauty or adventitious ornament, so when a man is found to cultivate this end to an excess, it constitutes the character which we call a fop. Nay, even the conveniencies of dress, when too minutely studied, degenerate into an effeminacy, which carries with it a reproach. It was hence that Turnus upbraided the Trojans for wearing a covering over their hands, and for tying their caps on with strings; that is to say, in modern language, for using gloves and chinstays.

Et tunicæ manicas, et habent redimicula mitræ. Æn. ix. 616. We have already mentioned the use of habit as to distinction. In almost all countries something of this hath taken place, to distinguish the noble from the ignoble, the scholar from the mechanic; to mark the sacerdotal, the military, the juridical, &c. It is to the fallibility which sometimes attends this method of distinguishing, that we owe those proverbial sayings, "the cloak makes not the philosopher; the cowl makes not the monk.”_

It is in a sense less strict and precise, that we take the word habit, when we say of the plains, they are clothed with grass ; of the mountains, they are clothed with wood ;d and more remotely still, when we apply the notion of habit to the mind: having on the breast-plate of righteousness,” “taking the shield of faith," &c.

In the language of poetry there is sometimes much elegance derived from this arrangement; as, for example, when the morn, at day-break, is said to be clad with “russet mantle;" or when the moon, in diffusing her pallid light, is said “ to throw o'er the dusk her silver mantle ;" or when the psalmist says, on a greater

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v. 13.

to the decoration of our persons, contributes by the name of Vappa; which Baxter inalso to the decoration of nature.

geniously explains, Quod insano sumptu stoThe following anecdote, communicated lidas sequeretur delicias. Non hujuscemodi to me by the late lord Lyttleton, appears homunciones fopps dicimus ; an et hoc a to be worth preserving. When sir John vappa, quærant alii. Vanbrugh had finished Blenheim-house, the Vappa meant originally, the juice of the then duchess of Marlborough asked him grape in a state of perfect insipidity, when for the plan of a garden. Sir John told it was neither wine nor vinegar. Vappa her, he could give no plan himself, and he proprie dicitur, quod nec vinum, nec acetum feared she might apply to others as incapable est. Vet. Scholiast. in Horat. Satir. l. i. s. 2. as he was, naming certain gardeners of the time, that are now unknown. “But," con- c Pallium non facit philosophum-Cutinued he, “ if your grace would have a cullus non facit monachum. garden truly elegant, you must apply for a d Thus Cicero: Spatia frugifera atque plan to the best painters of landscape.” immensa camporum, vestitusque densissimos

So happily did this ingenious man pre- montium, pecudum pastus, &c. De Nat. dict (as it were) a taste, which, taking its Deor. ii. 64, p. 253. edit. Davis. And before, rise not inany years after from Kent, has in the same treatise, he speaks of the earth been since completed by Brown, and no- as Vestita floribus, herbis, arboribus, fruwhere with greater beauty and magnificence gibus, &c. ii. 39. p. 195. Yet all this, we than on the very spot of which we are must remember, is but metaphorical. now writing, I mean Blenheim.

e Ephesians, vi. 14. 16. b Horace, in the first satire of his first | Hamlet, act i. sc. l. Paradise Lost, book, calls the wild and extravagant Nævius iv. 608.

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