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that event; so that having previously learned the like relation between that event and Charles the Great, we of course recognise the time when that prince existed; that is to say, the temporal relation between our own existence and his. The same, too, happens in ascertaining the place where.

And hence it follows, that such measures of time and place as a year, a century, a foot, a furlong, though they belong not of themselves to the present predicaments or arrangements, may yet be made a part of them by being properly associated. Such they become, when we say a furlong hence, a century since, a foot below, a year after. The reason is, they are brought by such association to define relative existence, in doing which the very essence of these predicaments consists.

And now a word as to the force of these two predicaments, their influence in the world, and more particularly in human affairs.

Cæsar, when he was assassinated, fell at the feet of Pompey's statue. The celebrated Hampden received his death's wound upon that field where he had first executed the ordinance for levying troops to serve the parliament. From a royal banqueting house, built by himself in prosperity, was an unfortunate prince led to an unjust execution. In each of these instances, the place where is a plausible topic; a topic equally suited either to raise compassion, or, if we would sophisticate more harshly,' to insinuate judgments, divine vengeance, &c. But to quit topical arguments, which, in fact, demonstrate nothing:

It was by an unfortunate fall so near the conclusion of the race, that the swift-footed Salius lost the prize to young Euryalus. It was by being attacked when asleep, and overpowered with liquor, that the gigantic Polypheme fell a sacrifice to Ulysses. It was by living in an age when a capricious audience ruled, that the elegant Menander so often yielded to Philemon, his inferior by the confession of all succeeding ages. “The race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor yet favour to men of skill; but time and chance happeneth to them all."p

The same concurring causes, which acted in these cases like adversaries, can become in others the most powerful allies. Los MOL TOÙ OTÔ, “Give me where to stand," was a well-known saying of the famous Archimedes. He wanted but a place where to fix his machine, and he thought himself able to move even the world. Shakspeare tells us,

Clarendon's History, book vii. gratiaque, et factionibus sæpenumero vince1 Luke xiji. 4.

batur, m Æneid. v. 286, &c.

p Ecclesiastes ix. 11. Odyss. ix, sub. fin.

9 See the Life of Archimedes, in Ri• Vid. Quinctil. I X. C. 1. A. Gell. valtus's edition of his works. Paris, 1615. 1. xvii. c. 4. who says of him, Ambitu, folio.

ጊ 2
z 2

There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune:
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows.

Julius Cæsar, act iv. sc. 5. When Horace sent a messenger with some of his works to Augustus, his charge was to deliver them if Augustus was in health; and not only so, but in good humour; and not only so, but in a humour to call for them : Si validus, si lætus erit, si denique poscet.

Hor. Epist. 1. ii. ep. 13. Such a stress did this polite author lay on the propriety of the when. Virgil mentions finely the

Mollissima fandi
Tempora.

Æneid. iv. 293. He makes, too, his Fury suspend her powers of mischief, till she could catch a lucky moment to make her influence more extensive :

At sæva e speculis tempus dea nacta nocendi,
Tartaream intendit vocem, &c.

Æneid. vii. 511. And hence we may collect a just idea of the term opportunity. It is not merely time, concurring with events, for time attends them all, be they prosperous or adverse ; but it is time, concurring favourably; it is time, cooperating as an auxiliary cause."

Time (it is said) and chance happeneth to all. And what is this chance? Is it the chance mentioned by Milton as residing at the court of Chaos?s Or is it the same which some philosophers suppose to have framed the world, and to have maintained in it ever since no inconsiderable sway? If such chance be the strict opposite to a rational principle, it is hard to conceive how it should have supplied its place, and without the least ingenuity have produced a work so ingenious. It is hard, also, to conceive, how without a reason that should exist, which it requires so much reason (even in part only) to comprehend.' There is, however, another sort of chance, which, under the name of fortune, we find described as follows: “ a cause not manifest to human reasoning ;“ not a cause devoid of reason, but a cause which human reason wants the means to investigate.”

r According to the Stagirite, good passes . Paradise Lost, book ii. 965. through all the predicaments, and, as it 1 Hanc igitur in Stellis constantiam, hanc stops at each, assumes a different denomina- tantam tam variis cursibus in omni æternition. In substance, it is mind and deity; tate convenientiam temporum, non possum in quality, it is that which is just ; in intelligere sine mente, ratione, consilio. Cic. quantity, that which is exact, and according de Nat. Deor. ii. 21. Dubitant de mundo, to measure ; and in the predicainent when, ex quo et oriuntur et fiunt omnia, casune it is opportunity; ev od TTÓTE, 8 Kaupós ipse sit effectus aut necessitate aliqua, an that is to say, good or favourable, acceding ratione ac mente divina : et Archimedem to the time when, and characterizing it, arbitrantur plus valuisse in imitandis sphæræ gives it by such accession the name of op- conversionibus, quam naturam in efficiendis. portunity. Aristot. Ethic. Eudem. p. 86. Cic. de Nat. Deor. ii. 34. edit. Sylb. Locum autem actionis, oppor- υ Δοκεί μέν αιτία ή τυχή, άδηλος δε ανtunitatem temporis esse dicunt; tempus au- @pwnlun diavoia. Arist. Phys. ii. 4. p. 33. tem actionis opportunum Græce evkalpía, edit. Sylb. Instead of slavola, they used Latine appellatur occasio. Cic. de Offic. i. 40. afterwards the terin doriouq.

We may learn from experience, that whatever opening there may be left for human freedom, (and enough is there left, both for merit and demerit,) it is not so uncontrolled as in the least. to affect the universe. It is not in our power to interrupt the course of nature; nor can we, like the giants of old, heap mountain upon mountain. There is an irreversible order of things, to which we necessarily submit; an indissoluble concatenation of successive causes with their effects, by which both the being and the well-being of this whole are maintained.

This divine order or concatenation has different denominations: referred to the Supreme Being as to its author, we call it fate; referred to his foresight for the good of all, we call it providence."

It is this which mingles itself with all our actions and designs; which cooperates with the pilot, the husbandman, and the merchant; nor with these alone, but with all of every degree, from the meanest peasant, up to the mightiest monarch. If it cooperate favourably, they succeed; if otherwise, they fail. And hence the supposed efficacy of time and place, so often of such importance in this cooperation. It is hence, “the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong," &c.

A pilot sails, with intention to reach a certain port. All that the skill of a good navigator can suggest, is done; yet he sails at a time when hurricanes arise, and, instead of gaining the destined port, is dashed upon the rocks. A farmer with proper industry manures and sows his fields; yet the seasons destroy his harvest, and (according to his own phrase) “ the times fight against him.” A merchant travels, for the sake of gain, to a distant country, and there contracts a pestilential disease, which carries him off.

These incidents, thus connected with time and place, are referred in common language to chance, as to their cause ; and so indeed they may, as far as chance implies a cause, which human reasoning was not able either to foresee or obviate. But if we go further, and suppose it a cause, where there is, in fact, no reason at all; in such case we do nothing less than deify chance, committing the affairs of the world to the blindest of guides, instead of that One, All-good, All-powerful, Divine Intelligence, which, in the same undivided instant, both sees and hears all things.

And so much for the two genera or arrangements of when and where.

* Three terms are here employed, chance, servient to the cause of Providence, and fate, and providence ; the two first of which by making them wholly dependent on the have been often improperly asserted, the supreme intelligent principle, to make them last has been often hardily denied, and weaken the system of Atheism, rather than all this to favour the Atheistic system. contribute to its support.

The author of these notes has endea- y See Epicharmus, quoted in note a, p. voured to give such meanings to the terms 282. chance and fate, as may reader them sub

.

CHAPTER XIII.

CONCERNING POSITION OR SITUATION. WHAT IT IS, AND HOW DE

DUCED-HOW IT EXISTS IN BEINGS INANIMATE-IN VEGETABLESIN MAN-ANIMAL PROGRESSION. WORKS OF ART. ATTITUDESILLUSTRATIONS OF ATTITUDE-FROM POETS-FROM ACTORS-FRON ORATORS. ITS EFFICACY, WHENCE. POSITION, AMONG THE ELEMENTS OF DEMOCRITUS-ITS INFLUENCE AND IMPORTANCE IN THE NATURAL WORLD-IN THE INTELLECTUAL.

The arrangement or predicament of position or situation has a near affinity with that of place. They are both of the relative order, and are both conversant, when taken strictly, about corporeal substances only. They differ, however, inasmuch as the simple possession of space constitutes place ; the manner of possessing it, position, or situation,

Now the manner, in which a body possesses space, has respect to certain relations, which exist, some within, and some without it; relations, which arise from its parts, its whole, its immediate place, and the place surrounding it.

We shall explain what we assert, (which perhaps may appear obscure,) by beginning from bodies the most simple, and passing from these to others, more complex and diversified.

The simplest and most perfectly similar of all bodies is the sphere. If, therefore, we take a sphere, and place it upon

the ground, the part furthest from the earth's centre we call its top; that the nearest, its bottom; and all lying between we call its middle. These distinctions in the sphere regard external objects only, because the sphere, being everywhere similar, contributes nothing to them itself. If we roll it, therefore, along, the distinctions are not lost; only, while the motion continues, they perpetually vary, and that merely with reference to local distinctions, existing without.

2 Differt situs ab ubi' in hoc, quod ubi “We are not to understand the genus of est locatio totius, situs est ordinatio partium lying, or position, by taking into our disin loco. Ubi est simpliciter esse in loco; cussion either the body lying, or the place situs secundum partium ordinationem. Fell, in which it lies, but singly and solely by

taking into our account the peculiar mode Ad situm omnem requiritur triplex ha- of site in the genus of lying, as it runs bitudo, quæ conjuncta constituit situm ; through all those ranks of beings, which habitudo partium alicujus totius inter se ; are formed by nature to be supported some partium alicujus totius ad ipsum totum ; of them by others, or to be seated some partium et totius ad locum. Sanderson, p. of them upon others; for it is this connec 49. I. i. c. 14.

tion between things that are seated, and Prædicamentum situs (nelo Dal) respicit things that afford the seat, which makes positionem rei, tum respectu partium suarum the primary and the strictest description of inter se, tum respectu loci, aliarumque re- lying, or position.” Simpl. in Præd. p. 85. rum. Wallis, 1. i. c. 13.

edit. Basil. 1551. Ούτε ούν το κείμενον σώμα, ούτε τον a The sphere, and other solid figures, τόπον, εν ώ κείται, τη διανοία περιλαμβά- soon after mentioned in this chapter, are, νοντα, δεί νοείν το κείσθαι, μόνην δε την for the greatest part, well known. He, έχουσάν πως θέσιν εν τω γένει του κείσθαι however, who wishes for ocular inspection, λογιζόμενον κατά πάντα τα όντα, όσα may find them all (the sphere alone ex: πέφυκεν έτερα υφ' ετέρων ανέχεσθαι, ή cepted) among the diagrams of the eleventh ενιδρύεσθαι τα έτερα εν τοίς ετέροις ή and twelfth books of Euclid, to which books γάρ τοιάδε συμπλοκή των ενιδρυμένων και we refer him, as they are easy to be had, των την έδραν παρεχόντων κυριωτάτη under various editions. . και πρωτίστη εστί του κείσθαι υπογραφή:

p. 104.

And hence it follows, that the sphere, though it have place, yet according to these reasonings has in strictness no position, because it has no peculiar parts deducible from its own figure, which parts can be called top or bottom, as contradistinguished one to another.

What is true of the sphere, may be asserted almost as truly of the five Platonic bodies, the equilateral pyramid, the cube, the octoedron, &c., and that, because they are not only regular, but because their several faces are every way similar.

What is true of these bodies, is true also of their opposites, the bodies I mean, which are not only dissimilar, but universally irregular. Fragments of rock, and hillocks of sand, have neither top nor bottom, but what is merely casual; and therefore, though of necessity they exist in place by being bodies, yet, as they have no internal local distinctions under the meaning here adopted, it of course follows they cannot properly have position.

But if we pass to those bodies which are neither irregular, like the broken rock, because they have order and proportion ; nor yet every way similar, like the sphere, because they have extensions that are unequal, (such, for example, as the cylinder, or the parallelipopedon ;) here we shall find the very bodies, from their own attributes, to concur with the world around, both in acquiring to themselves position, as well as in diversifying it.

The cylinder, for example, extends further one way than another, and therefore possesses within itself three such parts, as two extremes, and one mean. If we so place it, therefore, that one of these extremes (no matter which) shall be most remote from the earth's centre, and the other most near; in such case, by this manner of blending external and internal relations, the cylinder is said to stand. If we remove in part the higher extreme from its perpendicular, and thus differently blend relations, the cylinder is said to incline. And if we pursue this inclination, till the two extremes of top and bottom become horizontal, then it is said to lie. The motion which leads from standing to lying, we call falling ; that from lying to standing, we call rising. Every one of these affections may well happen to the cylinder, because its peculiar figure, taken with its peculiar place, cooperates to the production of the positions here described.

It is not so with those bodies already mentioned, where these internal characters are not distinguished. The sphere and the

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