And what then are the inferences from this speculation, that power necessarily arises from previous energy? One is, that all those doctrines about order springing from disorder, beauty from confusion; of night and chaos being the oldest of beings; in general, of the perfect and actual arising from the imperfect and potential; however they may be true as to the material cause of things, yet are they far from being true with respect to their real and essential origin. There is nothing, in fact, more certain, than that the actual and perfect are previous to their contraries; else there could never have been in the universe any thing actual or perfect. Another inference is, that the most minute and contemptible energy, now actually existing, necessarily proves the existence of an eternal energy, to which, as to its cause, it is ultimately referable. And what can such eternal energy be, but something whose very essence is that energy; something, which knows no remissions, like subordinate energies, no occasional retirings into power and dead capacity, but is ever the same immutable and perfect? Without such a principle the universe could never have begun; or when once begun, could never have been continued. And what shall we call this principle? Shall we call it body or mind? The best way to answer this, will be to search within ourselves, where we may discover, if we attend, a portion of either being, together with the several attributes appertaining to each. And so much for the two arrangements or predicaments of action and passion. says of things eternal, unalterable, and necessary, that is, things ever in energy-el ταῦτα μὴ ἦν, οὐθὲν ἂν ἦν, “ if these were not, there could be nothing." Metaph. 153, ut supra. It is a pertinent question, stated by the same author, in another part of the same tract—Πῶς γὰρ κινηθήσεται, εἰ μηθὲν ἔσται ἐνεργείᾳ αἴτιον; οὐ γὰρ ἤγε ὕλη κινήσει αὐτὴ ἑαυτήν: “ How can things ever be set in motion, if there be no cause (previously) existing in energy? Mere matter itself cannot move itself.” Ibid. 201. And soon before, in the same page, 'Evdéxe ται γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ἂν μὴ εἶναι· δεῖ ἄρα εἶναι ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια: "It may happen, that the thing, which exists in power only, may not exist at all: there must, therefore, be (in the universe) such a sort of principle, as that the very essence of it should be energy." See the note preceding. The founder of the Peripatetic sect, speaking of the Deity, uses the following expressions: 66 yàp voû ¿vépyeia, Čwh' 'Ekeîvos dè, à èvép It is agreeably to this reasoning we are told, Toû xpóvov àel πpoλaμßávei évépyeia ἑτέρα πρὸ ἑτέρας, ἕως τῆς τοῦ ἀεὶ κινοῦντος πрúτws: "that one energy in point of time always precedes another, till we arrive at the energy of that Being, which eternally gives motion in the first instance." Metaph. . 7. p. 152. edit. Sylb. Which is as much as to affirm, (in other words,) that there is a gradual ascent of active efficient principles, one above another, up to that one active Principle which is original and supreme. CHAPTER XII. CONCERNING WHEN AND WHERE. CONCERNING TIME AND PLACE, AND THEIR DEFINITION. WHEN AND WHERE, HOW DISTINGUISHED FROM TIME AND PLACE, HOW CONNECTED WITH THEM. DESCRIPTIONS OF WHEN AND WHERE THEIR UTILITY AND IMPORTANCE IN HUMAN LIFE-VARIOUS TERMS DENOTING THESE TWO PREDICAMENTS-OTHERS DENOTING THEM NOT, YET MADE TO DENOTE THEM. WHEN AND WHERE, THEIR EXTENSIVE INFLUENCE-PLAUSIBLE TOPICS-CONCURRING CAUSES. OPPORTUNITY, WHAT. CHANCE, WHAT IT IS NOT, WHAT IT IS. FATE, PROVidence. COOPERATING CAUSES. INTELLIGENCE. SUPREME We have said already, that time and place agree, as they both belong to quantity continuous. So essential is this character, that could either of them be separated, as we separate a piece of timber, there would then be intervals without time, and distances without place. Thus far then they agree, while in this they differ, that a million of different things may exist in one instant of time, but never more than one thing at once can occupy one place. And hence the nature of place may be called distributive, while that of time may be called accumulative. Hence, too, as they agree in some respects, and differ in others, they are necessarily not simple, but compound ideas, both belonging to one genus, and each distinguished by specific differences. Having a genus and a difference, they become capable of definition, since it is on these two requisites that all definition is founded." Time, therefore, is continuity, successive in itself, and accumulative of its proper subjects; place is continuity, co-existent in itself, and distributive of its proper subjects. We have said thus much about these two beings, because when and where, though distinct from both," are necessarily connected with them, and cannot well be understood without reference to this connection. Men, human affairs, and universally all sensible and corporeal beings, as none of them are infinite either in duration or extent, must have something of course to limit and circumscribe them. Now place circumscribes their extent, and time their duration; and hence the necessary connection of things corporeal with these two; and not only of things themselves, but of all their 2 See before, p. 303, 304. * Omnis definitio constat genere et differentia. Fell, 218. Termini vero essentiales (definitionis scil.) genus et differentia. Sanderson, 1. i. c. 17. See also Wallisii Logic. 1. i. c. 23. Of μèv yàp ὁρισμοὶ ἐκ γένους καὶ τῶν συστατικῶν εἰσι διαφορῶν, τουτέστι τῶν εἰδοποιῶν. Amm. in quinque voces, p. 67. b How they are distinct, see below, particularly in note d, also p. 337. motions, of all their accidents; in short, of all they are able to do, and of all they are able to suffer. For example, certain persons are to meet for a certain purpose. They must be informed of the time and place, or their meeting would not be practicable. First, then, for the time: When shall we three meet again, In thunder, light'ning, or in rain? Shaksp. Macbeth. The answer to this question connects their meeting with a certain time; and in the relation between these two, we behold the rise of the predicament, when : Again: When the battle's lost and won, Where's the place? The answer to this question connects their meeting with a certain place; and in the relation between these two, we see the rise of the predicament, where : Upon the heath, There we go to meet Macbeth.d Let us take another example. Virgil, we are informed, wrote his Georgics at Naples. By Naples, in this instance, is the place of Virgil circumscribed, which might else have been at Rome, at Mantua, &c. The connection therefore of Virgil with this city gives us an answer to the question, where? Again, he wrote them, we are told, while Cæsar Augustus was on his Oriental expedition. Here the time of this expedition circumscribes the time of writing, which might else have been (for aught we know) during the wars with Brutus, with Antony, &c. This relative connection gives an answer to the question, when? Dum Cæsar ad altum · Οὐ μέντοι οὔτε τῷ χρόνῳ ταυτὸν τὸ ποτὲ, ἀλλ ̓ εἴπερ ἄρα, ἐν σχέσει τῇ πρὸς Tov xpóvov: "Nor is when the same with time; but if any thing, it consists in the relation which it bears to time." Simpl. in Præd. p. 87. Β. ed. Bas. 1551. And again: Οταν δέ τι πράγμα, ἕτερον ἂν τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ οὐχ ὡς μέρος χρόνου λαμβανόμενον, σχέσιν ἔχει πρὸς χρόνον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἐν Σαλαμίνι ναυ μαχία ἐν τῷδε χρόνῳ· τότε ἄλλη κατηγορία γίγνεται, ἡ τοῦ ποτὲ, ἄλλη οὖσα Tара TO TоσÓν: "But when any particular thing, which is assumed from time, and which is not assumed as any part of time, has a relation to time, and for this reason is in time; as, for example, the sea-fight at Salamis, which happened at such a parti Georg. iv. sub. fin. cular time: then there arises a diferent predicament, that of when, a predicament different from that of quantity." Simplic. in Præd. p. 88. ejusd. edit. «Αλλ ̓ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ χρόνου ἄλλο μὲν ἦν ὁ χρόνος, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κατὰ χρόνον, ἢ χρόνου τί· οὕτως ἄλλο μὲν ὁ τόπος, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κατὰ τόπον, ἢ τόπου τί: “ For as in time, time itself is one thing, and that which is according to time, or something belonging to it, is another thing ; so also is place one thing, and that which is according to place, or something belonging to it, another thing." Simpl. in Præd. ut sup. Ubi non est locus, sed esse in loco. Quando non est tempus, sed esse in tempore. Fell, p. 104, 107. These elegant lines, which we so justly admire, are in fact nothing more than the common date of an epistle; as if the author, having finished his work, had subjoined Naples, such a month, such a year: so great, even in trivial matters, is the force of numbers, and sublime ideas. Hence, then, we perceive the nature both of when and of where. When is not mere time, nor is it beings and events; but it is beings and events, as they stand related to time. Again, where is not properly place, nor is it beings and events; but it is beings and events, as they stand related to place. If therefore the when only be given, and not the where, then might the thing have happened either here, or at the antipodes: and, by parity of reasoning, if the where only be given, and not the when, then might the event have happened, either yesterday, or before the flood. It is then only comes precision, when we view the two united.f And hence, by the way, the utility and praise of those two subordinate accomplishments (for sciences I cannot call them) geography and chronology. By acquainting us with the relations borne by illustrious persons and great events to the different portions both of time and of place, they afford us proper means to contemplate human affairs; to view the general order and concatenation of events, and our own connection with this order, as members of the same universe. In general it may be observed, that whatever is an answer to the question where, belongs to the genus or predicament of where; and whatever is an answer to the question when, belongs in like manner to the predicament of when. When did such a thing happen?—Now; this instant; to-day; yesterday; a century ago; in such a year of our Lord; such a year of the Hegira; such a year of Rome; such an Olympiad, &c. To these may added such terms in the past as lately, formerly, long ago, &c.; and such also in the future as immediately, soon, hereafter, &c. Again: where did such a thing happen?-Here; there; in England; in Europe; in China; in the moon; in the sun, &c. To these may be added such terms as near, far off, above, below, &c. be All these terms, by thus answering these questions, serve to indicate the relation of some being or event, either to time or to The force of this arrangement or predicament where, is fnely contrasted with the predicament of quantity, in that laconic apopthegm of Agis. "The Lacedæmonians (said he) do not ask how many the enemies are, but where they are:" Ovк on δὲ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐρωτᾷν πόσοι εἰσὶν oi moλéμioi, àλλà Toû elow. Plut. Lacon. Apophth. p. 215. D. edit. Xyland. · Οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ ποῦ καὶ τὸ ποτὲ ἀδελφά πως ἐστὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, κοινὴν ἐπίσης παρέχοντα τὴν συντέλειαν πρὸς ὅλην τὴν γένεσιν, καὶ τοῖς κινουμένοις τὴν ἴσην χρείαν συμβαλλόμενα : "And thus it is that when and where are a sort of brothers one to another, affording equally a common perfection to all things that are generated, and contributing an utility of equal value to all things that are in motion. Simplic. in Præd. p. 87. ed. Basil. 1551. See many of these terms elegantly and accurately explained in Aristotle's Physics, l. iv. c. 13. The terms alluded to are vῦν, ποτὲ, ἤδη, ἄρτι, πάλαι, ἐξαίφνης, κ.τ.λ. Ꮓ place; and though some of them do it with greater precision, and some with less, yet did they not all do it in some degree, they could not belong to these two predicaments. We cannot assert the same of such terms as an inch, a foot, or a cubit; a day, a month, or a year. The reason is, they indicate no relation of time or place to particular things, but only measure out definite portions in these two infinite natures. With regard to the human body, not only the whole fills its proper place, but so, too, does every limb. Hence, as its particular place is a measure to each limb, so is this limb in its turn made a measure to that place, in order to define a like portion of it, existing elsewhere." And hence the origin of such measures as an inch, a foot, a cubit, and the like, which are all of them deduced from certain limbs in the human body. But though the limbs of man were tolerably adequate to measure place, yet were his motions by no means adequate to the mensuration of time, derived (as they appear) from such a number of appetites; from such a variety of fancies and contradictory opinions. Here, therefore, were mankind obliged to quit themselves, and to recur to motions more orderly than their own; to the real motion of the moon, to the apparent motions of the sun, in order to obtain such orderly measures as those of days, and months, and years. And thus, from the nature and origin of these terms, we may perceive how they are distinguished from the predicaments of where and when. There is (if I may use the expression) an enlarged when, such as to-day, during this month, this year, this century; and a precise when, the indivisible instant in which the event happened. So also is there an enlarged where, as in London, in England, in Europe, &c.; and a precise where, that is to say, the exact place which each individual fills.' Now as every man exists in such a precise where, and during such a precise when, so is it with reference to these two relations of his own, that he recognises the when and the where of all other beings. When lived Charles the Great?-Almost three hundred years before the first crusade. Though this answer tells us the distance between Charles and that expedition, yet are we still uninformed as to the time when he lived, unless we have something given us to connect him with ourselves. And when, we demand, happened the first crusade?-About seven hundred years ago. Here we have the temporal relation between ourselves and |