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And what then are the inferences from this speculation, that power necessarily arises from previous energy? One is, that all those doctrines about order springing from disorder, beauty from confusion; of night and chaos being the oldest of beings; in general, of the perfect and actual arising from the imperfect and potential; however they may be true as to the material cause of things, yet are they far from being true with respect to their real and essential origin. There is nothing, in fact, more certain, than that the actual and perfect are previous to their contraries; else there could never have been in the universe any thing actual or perfect.

Another inference is, that the most minute and contemptible energy, now actually existing, necessarily proves the existence of an eternal energy, to which, as to its cause, it is ultimately referable. And what can such eternal energy be, but something whose very essence is that energy;y something, which knows no remissions, like subordinate energies, no occasional retirings into power and dead capacity, but is ever the same immutable and perfect? Without such a principle the universe could never have begun; or when once begun, could never have been continued. And what shall we call this principle? Shall we call it body or mind? The best way to answer this, will be to search within ourselves, where we may discover, if we attend, a portion of either being, together with the several attributes appertaining to each.

And so much for the two arrangements or predicaments of action and passion. says of things eternal, unalterable, and ne- gàp voù évépyela, fwń: 'Exeivos d?, évép cessary, that is, things ever in energy-ci yera:

of mind or intellect, is Tallra unh thu, ouder av hv, “if these were life: and He (the Supreme Being) is that not, there could be nothing.” Metaph. 153, energy.” Metaph. p. 203. See also Amut supra. It is a pertinent question, stated mon. in Lib. de Interpretat. p. 198. B. &c. by the same author, in another part of the where the arrangement of beings is deeply Bame tract--Πώς γαρ κινηθήσεται, ει μηθέν and philosophically discussed and exhibited. έσται ενεργεία αίτιον; ου γαρ ήγε ύλη Εξής δε τούτοις επιδείξαι βουλόμενος, κινήσει αυτή εαυτήν:

How can

hings K. t. 1. ever be set in motion, if there be no cause It is agreeably to this reasoning we are (previously) existing in energy? Mere told, Toù xpórov del aporaußável évépzela matter itself cannot move itself.” Ibid. 201. ετέρα προ ετέρας, έως της του αεί κινούντος And soon before, in the same page, 'Evdexe apátws: “ that one energy in point of time ται γάρ το δυνάμει δν μή είναι δεί άρα always precedes another, till we arrive at είναι αρχήν τοιαύτην, ης η ουσία ενέργεια: the energy of that Being, which eternally “It may happen, that the thing, which gives motion in the first instance." Metaph. exists in power only, may not exist at all: 0. m'. p. 152. edit. Sylb. there must, therefore, be (in the universe) Which is as much as to affirm, (in other such a sort of principle, as that the very words, that there is a gradual ascent of essence of it should be energy."

active efficient principles, one above another, See the note preceding. The founder up to that one active Principle which is of the Peripatetic sect, speaking of the original and supreme. Deity, uses the following expressions :

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CHAPTER XII,

COXCERNING WHEN AND WHERE. CONCERNING TIME AND PLACE, AND

THEIR DEFINITION, WHEN AND WHERE, HOW DISTINGUISHED FROM TIME AND PLACE, HOW CONNECTED WITH THEM. DESCRIPTIONS OF WHEN AND WHERE-THEIR UTILITY AND IMPORTANCE IN HUMAN LIFE-VARIOUS TERMS DENOTING THESE TWO PREDICAMENTS-OTHERS DENOTING THEM NOT, YET MADE TO DENOTE THEM. WHEN AND WHERE, THEIR EXTENSIVE INFLUENCE-PLAUSIBLE TOPICS-CONCURRING CAUSES. OPPORTUNITY,

WHAT. CHANCE, WHAT IT IS NOT, WHAT IT IS. FATE, PROVIDENCE. COOPERATING CAUSES. SUPREME INTELLIGENCE.

We have said already, that time and place agree, as they both belong to quantity continuous. So essential is this character, that could either of them be separated, as we separate a piece of timber, there would then be intervals without time, and distances without place. Thus far then they agree, while in this they differ, that a million of different things may exist in one instant of time, but never more than one thing at once can occupy one place.

And hence the nature of place may be called distributive, while that of time may be called accumulative. Hence, too, as they agree in some respects, and differ in others, they are necessarily not simple, but compound ideas, both belonging to one genus, and each distinguished by specific differences. Having a genus and a difference, they become capable of definition, since it is on these two requisites that all definition is founded.

Time, therefore, is continuity, successive in itself, and accumulative of its proper subjects; place is continuity, co-existent in itself, and distributive of its proper subjects.

We have said thus much about these two beings, because when and where, though distinct from both, are necessarily connected with them, and cannot well be understood without reference to this connection.

Men, human affairs, and universally all sensible and corporeal beings, as none of them are infinite either in duration or extent, must have something of course to limit and circumscribe them. Now place circumscribes their extent, and time their duration; and hence the necessary connection of things corporeal with these two; and not only of things themselves, but of all their ? See before, p. 303, 304.

ορισμοί εκ γένους και των συστατικών εισι 2 Omnis definitio constat genere et dif- diapopôv, TOUTÉOTI Tâv cidonoLWv. Amm. ferentia. Fell, 218. Termini vero essen- in quinque voces, p. 67. tiales (definitionis scil.) genus et diffe- • How they are distinct, see below, parrentia. Sanderson, l. 1. c. 17. See also ticularly in note d, also p. 337. Wallisii Logic. 1. i. c. 23. Oi uèy gàp

motions, of all their accidents; in short, of all they are able to do, and of all they are able to suffer.

For example, certain persons are to meet for a certain purpose. They must be informed of the time and place, or their meeting would not be practicable. First, then, for the time:

When shall we three meet again,
In thunder, light'ning, or in rain ?

Shaksp. Macbeth. The answer to this question connects their meeting with a certain time; and in the relation between these two, we behold the rise of the predicament, when :

When the battle's lost and won,

When the hurly burly's done. Again :

Where's the place ? The answer to this question connects their meeting with a certain place; and in the relation between these two, we see the rise of the predicament, where :

Upon the heath,

There we go to meet Macbeth.d Let us take another example. Virgil, we are informed, wrote his Georgics at Naples. By Naples, in this instance, is the place of Virgil circumscribed, which might else have been at Rome, at Mantua, &c. The connection therefore of Virgil with this city gives us an answer to the question, where ?

Again, he wrote them, we are told, while Cæsar Augustus was on his Oriental expedition. Here the time of this expedition circumscribes the time of writing, which might else have been (for aught we know) during the wars with Brutus, with Antony, &c. This relative connection gives an answer to the question, when ?

Dum Cæsar ad altum
Fulminat Euphraten bello, victorque volentes
Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo :
Illo Virgilium me tempore dulcis alebat
Parthenope, studiis florentem ignobilis oti. Georg. iv. sub. fin.

• Οι μέντοι ούτε τω χρόνω ταυτόν το cular time: then there arises a different ποτέ, αλλ' είπερ άρα, εν σχέσει τη προς predicament, that of uhen, a predicament Tov xpóvov: “Nor is when the same with different from that of quantity." Simplic. time ; but if any thing, it consists in the in Præd. p. 88. ejusd. edit. relation which it bears to time.” Simpl. in d'Aλλ' ώσπερ επί του χρόνου άλλο μεν Præd. p. 87. B. ed. Bas. 1551. And again : Rv xpovos, čito od to Kate xpórov, * “Οταν δέ τι πράγμα, έτερον δν του χρόνου, χρόνου τί· ούτως άλλο μέν ο τόπος, άλλο και ουχ ως μέρος χρόνου λαμβανόμενον, δε το κατά τόπον, ή τόπον τί: “ For as in oxtowy éxel apos xpovov, kal did tOÛTO ev time, time itself is one thing, and that χρόνω εστίν, ώσπερ ή εν Σαλαμίνι ναυ- which is according to time, or something μαχία εν τώδε χρόνο τότε άλλη κατη- belonging to it, is another thing; s0 also is γορία γίγνεται, ή του ποτέ, άλλη ούσα place one thing, and that which is according napd td moobv: “But when any particular to place, or something, belonging to it, thing, which is assumed from time, and another thing." Simpl. in Præd. ut sup. which is not assumed as any part of time, Ubi non est locus, sed esse in loco. has a relation to time, and for this reason Quando non est tempus, sed esse in temis in time; as, for example, the sea-fight at pore. Fell, p. 104, 107. Salamis, which happened at such a parti

These elegant lines, which we so justly admire, are in fact nothing more than the common date of an epistle; as if the author, having finished his work, had subjoined Naples, such a month, such a year: so great, even in trivial matters, is the force of numbers, and sublime ideas.

Hence, then, we perceive the nature both of when and of where. When is not mere time, nor is it beings and events ; but it is beings and events, as they stand related to time. Again, where is not properly place, nor is it beings and events ; but it is beings and events, as they stand related to place. If therefore the when only be given, and not the where, then might the thing have happened either here, or at the antipodes : and, by parity of reasoning, if the where only be given, and not the when, then might the event have happened, either yesterday, or before the flood. It is then only comes precision, when we view the two united.

And hence, by the way, the utility and praise of those two subordinate accomplishments (for sciences I cannot call them) geography and chronology. By acquainting us with the relations borne by illustrious persons and great events to the different portions both of time and of place, they afford us proper means to contemplate human affairs; to view the general order and concatenation of events, and our own connection with this order, as members of the same universe.

In general it may be observed, that whatever is an answer to the question where, belongs to the genus or predicament of where ; and whatever is an answer to the question when, belongs in like manner to the predicament of when. When did such a thing happen?—Now; this instant; to-day; yesterday; a century ago; in such a year of our Lord ; such a year of the Hegira ; such a year of Rome ; such an Olympiad, &c. To these may be added such terms in the past as lately, formerly, long ago, &c.; and such also in the future as immediately, soon, hereafter, &c. Again: where did such a thing happen?Here; there; in England; in Europe; in China; in the moon; in the sun, &c. To these may be added such terms as near, far oft

, above, below, &c. All these terms, by thus answering these questions, serve to indicate the relation of some being or event, either to time or to

• The force of this arrangement or pre- όλην την γένεσιν, και τους κινουμένοις την dicament where, is finely contrasted with yony xpelav ovuBambueva : “And thus it the predicament of quantity, in that laconic is that when and where are a sort of brothers apopthegm of Agis. “ The Lacedæmonians one to another, affording equally a common (said he) do not ask how many the ene- perfection to all things that are generated, mies are, but where they are : " Oủk čon and contributing an utility of equal value δε τους Λακεδαιμονίους έρωτας πόσοι είσιν to all things that are in motion. Simplic. oi Foléulol, axà Toù elow. Plut. Lacon. in Præd. p. 87. ed. Basil. 1551. Apophth. p. 215. D. edit. Xyland.

& See many of these terms elegantly and ''Ούτως δε και το που και το ποτέ accurately explained in Aristotle's Physics, , αδελφά πως έστι προς άλληλα, κοινήν 1. iv. c. 13. The terms alluded to are νυν, επίσης παρέχοντα την συντέλειαν προς ποτέ, ήδη, άρτι, πάλαι, εξαίφνης, κ.τ.λ.

z

place; and though some of them do it with greater precision, and some with less, yet did they not all do it in some degree, they could not belong to these two predicaments.

We cannot assert the same of such terms as an inch, a foot, or a cubit; a day, a month, or a year. The reason is, they indicate no relation of time or place to particular things, but only measure out definite portions in these two infinite natures.

With regard to the human body, not only the whole fills its proper place, but so, too, does every limb. Hence, as its particular place is a measure to each limb, so is this limb in its turn made a measure to that place, in order to define a like portion of it, existing elsewhere." And hence the origin of such measures as an inch, a foot, a cubit, and the like, which are all of them deduced from certain limbs in the human body.

But though the limbs of man were tolerably adequate to measure place, yet were his motions by no means adequate to the mensuration of time, derived (as they appear) from such a number of appetites; from such a variety of fancies and contradictory opinions. Here, therefore, were mankind obliged to quit themselves, and to recur to motions more orderly than their own; to the real motion of the moon, to the apparent motions of the sun, in order to obtain such orderly measures as those of days, and months, and years.

And thus, from the nature and origin of these terms, we may perceive how they are distinguished from the predicaments of where and when.

There is (if I may use the expression) an enlarged when, such as to-day, during this month, this year, this century; and a precise when, the indivisible instant in which the event happened. So also is there an enlarged where, as in London, in England, in Europe, &c.; and a precise where, that is to say, the exact place which each individual fills.

Now as every man exists in such a precise where, and during such a precise when, so is it with reference to these two relations of his own, that he recognises the when and the where of all other beings. When lived Charles the Great ?-Almost three hundred years before the first crusade. Though this answer tells us the distance between Charles and that expedition, yet are we still uninformed as to the time when he lived, unless we have something given us to connect him with ourselves. And when, we demand, happened the first crusade ?- About seven hundred years ago. Here we have the temporal relation between ourselves and

h This is, indeed, a common property to See before, the quotation given in note all mensurati that the measurer and the P, page 254. Eéorns is there rendered a thing measured should reciprocate ; so that • quart,” not as if this last represented that while the gallon measures the wine, the Greek measure, but as it was a measure wine should measure the gallon ; while familiar to an English reader. the ell measures the silk, the silk should i See Hermes, p. 151, note. measure the ell.

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