than B, without knowing that B is less than A; and if with more precision I know that A is double, I necessarily know withal that B is half: and if with still further precision I know the measure of A to be eight, I know with equal precision the measure of B to be four."

And this naturally leads to that fundamental property of relation, on which the rest all depend, namely, the necessary and universal co-existence of relatives," which always commence together, subsist together, and cease together. Ulysses, in his speech to Thersites, says in anger, May I lose my son Telemachus, if I do not seize, &c. And how does he express this sentiment?

Μηδέτι Τηλεμάχοιο πατὴρ κεκλημένος εἴην.

Iliad. B. 260.

May I no longer be called the father of Telemachus." He well knew he could only lose that relative denomination, by losing his son, with whose birth and duration it was indissolubly connected. It was not that Ulysses might not have survived Telemachus, or Telemachus, Ulysses; the co-existence being only attached to the relative characters, those of father and son. And hence we may collect, that the co-existence here mentioned is not like that of substance, and its essential properties, (as rationality, for example, co-exists with man, or sensation with animal;) but a co-existence less intimate by far than that is, because it subsists between beings actually distinct one from another.

And hence it has followed, that some logicians have treated it as possessing less of the real, than any one of the other genera. They tell us, Relatio est ens minima entitatis.b

C

Yet we must be careful how we undervalue it, in consequence

will know also the other relative which it refers to, with equal precision." Arist. Prædic. p. 39. edit. Sylb.

And here, by the way, it is worth observing, that as all relatives are recognised in combination, while every object of sense is perceived distinct and independent; it follows, that all relatives are properly objects of the intellect, and that, if it were not for this faculty, we should know nothing concerning them. Let A, for example, be supposed the master of B, and let A be tall, well-proportioned, ruddy, &c. These last characters only are visible to the eye, nor does the eye see more, while the relation subsists, or less, when the servant dies, and the relation is at an end. Were there a change in the master's person, were he to become deformed from being well-shaped, or pale from being ruddy, then would the eye be able to recognise what had happened. But it is a singular property of this genus, that a relative may change, or lose its rela

tions, without change or loss within itself. Let the corresponding relative but vary, or cease to exist; let the master lose his servant, or the preceptor his disciple; let those who stood on my right remove themselves to my left; or those who stood above me, place themselves below; and it is easy to conceive a subject, after having lost or varied every one of these relations, still to remain itself invariably the same.

* Δοκεῖ δὲ τὰ πρός τι ἅμα τῇ φύσει elva. Arist. Præd. p. 37.

b Fell's Logic, p. 92.

• Thus Simplicius, in his comment on this categorie: Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ, ὡς παραφυομένην ταῖς ἄλλαις κατηγορίαις, τὴν τοῦ πρός τι ἐπεισοδιώδη νομίζουσι· καί τοι προηγουμέ νην οὖσαν, καὶ κατὰ διαφορὰν οἰκείαν θεωρουμένην. Αὕτη γὰρ κοινότης ἐστὶ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα, τῶντε ἐναντίων, καὶ τῶν δποσοῦν διαφερόντων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων γενῶν, καὶ τῶν ὑπ ̓ αὐτὰ τεταγμένων· ἥτις εἰ μὴ παρῆν, διεσπάσθῃ ἂν πάντη (1. πάντα) ἀπὸ

of such a notion; since with those who well attend to its amazing efficacy, it is more likely to acquire a rank perhaps above its real merit.

What ought we to think, should it appear the basis of morality? Moral duties (says Epictetus) are in general measured by relations. Is he a father? The relation ordains, that he must be taken care of: that thou yield to him in all things; bear with him, when he reproaches, when he strikes, &c. But he is a bad father. And wert thou then by nature connected with a good father? No; but with a father. Thus, therefore, out of neighbour, out of citizen, out of magistrate, wilt thou trace the moral duty, if thou make it a custom to contemplate the relations."

The Stoic emperor Antoninus inculcates the same doctrine: "There are (says he) three relations; one to the proximate cause, which immediately surrounds us; one to the divine cause, from which all things happen to all; and one to those, along with whom we live." So important is the knowledge of relations (according to these philosophers) in a subject which so much concerns us, I mean an upright and a virtuous conduct.

It is to a subordinate end, that Horace applies this knowledge, when he makes it an essential to dramatic poets, and as a philosophical critic teaches them, that it is through this knowledge

πάντων : “ And hence some conceive the predicament of relation, by its growing on, as it were, to the rest, to be something episodic and adventitious, although it be in fact truly principal, and an object of contemplation from its own distinctive character. It is this, indeed, is that band of community which passes through all things; through contraries, through things in any way different, through whole genera, and through the several beings, arranged beneath them; that principle, which, were we to suppose away, all things in that instant would be dissipated and torn from all things." Simplic. in Prædic. p. 44. B. edit. Basil. 1551.

See also the same author in the same comment: Οὔτε γὰρ τὰ γένη, οὔτε τὰ ὑπ ̓ αὐτῶν ὄντα, κοινωνίαν ἕξει τινὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα, εἰ μή τις σχέσεως ᾗ λόγος ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν. Ατοπον δὲ τὴν κοινωνίαν ἀναιρεῖν τῶν διαφερόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα· ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἀναίρειν, οὐ τὴν ἐν τοῖς φθόγγοις μόνην, οὐδὲ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ δυνάμεσι πάσαις καὶ ἐνεργείαις, ἥτις ἐγγινομένη τοῖς οὖσι, συνήγαγεν εἰς ταυτὸν, καὶ σχέσιν ἔχειν πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπειργάσατο· ἀναιρεθήσεται δὲ καὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ ἴσον, καὶ ἐπιστητὸν, καὶ ἐπιστήμη. Εἰ δὲ καὶ γεωμετρία καὶ μουσικὴ περὶ σχέσεις ἔχουσιν, ἀνυπόστατοι δὲ αὐταί· καταγέλαστοι ἂν

εἶεν ἐκεῖναι περὶ τὰ ἀνυπόστατα κατατριβό μεναι. Πῶς δὲ καὶ ἐφετὸν πᾶσιν δ ̓ θεὸς λέγεται, εἰ μηδεμία σχέσις ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ ἐφετὸν τῷ ἐφιεμένῳ: “ For neither the universal genera, nor the things included under them, can have any connection one with another, if there exist not in things the ratio of habitude or relation. But it is absurd to take away the connection of things that differ one from another: absurd also to take away harmony, not that only which exists in sounds, nor that which exists in numbers, but that also which exists in substances, and in all the variety of capacities and energies; that, which having been implanted in beings, has brought them together, and effected, that they should have the relation here spoken of to each other. [Further than this, by taking away relation] there will be taken away the proportionate, the equal, the knowable, and knowledge. If geometry and music are employed about relations, and these last have no existence; then will those sciences be ridiculous, in being employed about nonentities. How also can God himself be called an object of desire to all beings, if there be no relation between the thing desired, and that which desires : Simplic. in Præd. p. 43. Β.

d Epict. Ench. c. 30.
e M. Ant. viii. 27.

only they can truly delineate characters. The verses are well known:

Qui didicit, patriæ quid debeat, &c.

It is thus, too, that Shakspeare, either by knowledge acquired, or (what is more probable) by the dictates of an innate superior genius, makes Macbeth shudder at the thoughts of murdering Duncan, when he reflects on the many duties he owed him, arising from the many relations he stood in, all of which duties he was then basely going to violate:

He's here in double trust;

First, as I am his kinsman, and his subject,
Strong both against the deed: then, as his host,

Who should against his murderer shut the door,
Not bear the knife myself.

And here I cannot help remarking upon this excellent tragedy, that it is not only admirable as a poem, but is perhaps at the same time one of the most moral pieces existing. It teaches us the danger of venturing, though but for once, upon a capital offence, by shewing us that it is impossible to be wicked by halves; that we cannot stop; that we are in a manner compelled to proceed; and yet that, be the success as it may, we are sure in the event to become wretched and unhappy."

But to return to our subject, I mean that of relation.

If we quit mankind, and view its more general extent, we shall find, that, where continuity fails, there relation supplies its office, connecting as it were all things the most remote and heterogeneous. Were they indeed combined under an union more intimate, were it the same with that continuity, seen in a living body and its limbs, the whole universe would be no more than one immense animal. But it is not so: and those who have explained its nature have rather called it one city, or one commonwealth; a very different species of monad from one animal, or living being. It is here, then, (as we have said,) relation intervenes, and under a thousand different ties connects all things together.

be

The ties indeed are many, though the sources are few. Every subordinate being, as it is by nature subject to wants, (indigence and imperfection being essential to its constitution,) has a connection with those beings through whom such wants may supplied. Hence, then, one source of relation. Again: every being whatever, that has power to supply such wants, has a connection with those beings to whom it can thus become subservient. Hence, then, another source of relation. Now in the

The author has in this place considered Shakspeare as Aristotle did Homer, and has left it uncertain, to what cause his transcendent merit should be ascribed. Aristotle, speaking of Homer's superiority, says, in like manner, that it was ἤτοι διὰ τέχνην,

dià púow, “either through art, or through nature." Vid. Arist. Poet. c. 8.

* See the remarks on this tragedy in that elegant book, the Essay on the Writings and Genius of Shakspeare.

See p. 96, and note m.

divine economy of the whole it is so admirably contrived, that every being in different degrees possesses this double character, and not only needs assistance, but is able in its turn to afford it. Nothing is so mighty, as to subsist without help; nothing so minute, as not at times to have its use. Thus as connections reciprocate, and are everywhere blended, the concatenation of relations grows in fact universal, and the world becomes (as above described) one city or commonwealth.

Instances of this double relation occur (as we have said) in every particular being. The ewe is related to the grass, as to the being which supplies her wants; to her lamb, as to the being whose wants she herself supplies. The grass again is related to the earth, as to the being which affords it aliment; while it is related to the ewe, by becoming itself aliment to her. The earth is related to vegetables, as she is both their parent and their nurse; while she is related to the sun, as to the fountain of her genial warmth. The relations of the sun are finely represented by Epictetus, who makes the Sovereign of the Universe thus address that noble luminary: "Thou (saith he) art sun: thou art able, by going round, to form the year and the seasons; to enlarge and nourish the fruits; to raise and still the winds; to warm in due degree the bodies of men: arise, go round, and beginning from the greatest, extend after this manner thy influence to the most minute."i

Nor, when we mention the earth, ought we to forget that equitable discharge of her relations, for which Virgil well distinguishes her by the character of most just :

Fundit humo facilem victum justissima tellus.

Georg. ii. 460.

The Attic historian and philosopher will be found the best commentator on this elegant passage of the Roman poet: "The earth, too, (says Xenophon,) being a divinity, teacheth those that can learn it of her, justice for such as cultivate her best, she requiteth with most goods."

When we view the relation of the male to the female, and of the female to the male, and add to this the common relation extending from both to their offspring, we view the rise of families through the whole animal race. Among the more social, such as sheep and cattle, these families by fresh relations are combined into larger multitudes, under the name of flocks and herds. Among those of higher order still, (such as the bee,' the ant, the beaver, and, above all, the social and rational

i Arrian. Epict. 1. iii. c. 24. p. 444. edit. Upton. Σὺ ἥλιος εἶ· δύνασαι, κ. τ. λ. * Ετι δὲ ἡ γῆ, θεὸς οὖσα, τοὺς δυναμένους καταμανθάνειν, καὶ δικαιοσύνην διδάσκει· τοὺς γὰρ ἄριστα θεραπεύοντας αὐτὴν, ¤λeîora àyalà àνTITоieî. Xenoph. Econom. p. 35. edit. Oxon.

Virgil speaks of the bee, as he would of

man:

Mores et studia et populos et pralia dicam.
Georg. iv.

Aristotle, distinguishing these animals from those which do no more than barely herd together, elegantly calls them (wα TO

being, man,) these herds and flocks by relations more excellent are improved into civil polities, where there is a general interest or common good, a good to which either willingly or unwillingly every individual cooperates."

If we descend below animals down to vegetables, we shall discover in the yine, the ivy, the woodbine, and all the plants of slender stalk, a manifest relation to those of a trunk more solid, such as the oak, the elm, and the several trees of the forest. It

is with a power which appears almost a conscious one, that the former of these tribes, recognising their relation, apply to the latter for a support, and spontaneously twine their bodies, or at least their tendrils, around them."