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than B, without knowing that B is less than A; and if with more precision I know that A is double, I necessarily know withal that B is half: and if with still further precision I know the measure of A to be eight, I know with equal precision the measure of B to be four.2

And this naturally leads to that fundamental property of relation, on which the rest all depend, namely, the necessary and universal co-existence of relatives,“ which always commence together, subsist together, and cease together. Ulysses, in his speech to Thersites, says in anger, May I lose my son Telemachus, if I do not seize, &c. And how does he express this sentiment ! Μηδέτι Τηλεμάχοιο πατήρ κεκλημένος είην. .

Iliad. B. 260. May I no longer be called the father of Telemachus.” He well knew he could only lose that relative denomination, by losing his son, with whose birth and duration it was indissolubly connected. It was not that Ulysses might not have survived Telemachus, or Telemachus, Ulysses ; the co-existence being only attached to the relative characters, those of father and son.

And hence we may collect, that the co-existence here mentioned is not like that of substance, and its essential properties, (as rationality, for example, co-exists with man, or sensation with animal;) but a co-existence less intimate by far than that is, because it subsists between beings actually distinct one from another.

And hence it has followed, that some logicians have treated it as possessing less of the real, than any one of the other genera. They tell us, Relatio est ens minimæ entitatis.b

Yet we must be careful how we undervalue it," in consequence will know also the other relative which it tions, without change or loss within itself. refers to, with equal precision.” Arist. Let the corresponding relative but vary, or Prædic. p. 39. edit. Sylb.

cease to exist ; let the master lose his serAnd here, by the way, it is worth ob- vant, or the preceptor his disciple ; let serving, that as all relatives are recognised those who stood on my right remove themin combination, while every object of sense selves to my left; or those who stood above is perceived distinct and independent; it me, place themselves below; and it is easy follows, that all relatives are properly objects to conceive a subject, after having lost or of the intellect, and that, if it were not for varied every one of these relations, still to this faculty, we should know nothing con- `remain itself invariably the same. cerning them. Let A, for example, be sup- 4 Δοκεί δε τα πρός τι άμα τη φύσει posed the master of B, and let A be tall, elvai. Arist. Præd. p. 37. well-proportioned, ruddy, &c. These last b Fell's Logic, p. 92. characters only are visible to the eye, nor c Thus Simplicius, in his comment on this does the eye see more, while the relation categoric: Aid Tallra dè, às mapapvopiÉVTV subsists, or less, when the servant dies, and ταϊς άλλαις κατηγορίαις, την τού πρός τι the relation is at an end. Were there a επεισοδιώδη νομίζουσιν και του προηγουμέchange in the master's person, were he tο νην ουσαν, και κατά διαφοράν οικείαν become deformed from being well-shaped, or θεωρουμένην. Αύτη γάρ κοινότης έστι διά pale from being ruddy, then would the eye πάντων διήκουσα, τωντε εναντίων, και των be able to recognise what had happened. oπoσoύν διαφερόντων, και των όλων γενών, But it is a singular property of this genus, και των υπ' αυτά τεταγμένων ήτις ει μη that a relative may change, or lose its rela- παρών, διεσπάσθη αν πάντη (1. πάντα) από

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of such a notion ; since with those who well attend to its amazing efficacy, it is more likely to acquire a rank perhaps above its real merit.

What ought we to think, should it appear the basis of morality? "Moral duties (says Epictetus) are in general measured by relations. Is he a father! The relation ordains, that he must be taken care of: that thou yield to him in all things; bear with him, when he reproaches, when he strikes, &c. But he is a bad father. And wert thou then by nature connected with a good father? No; but with a father. Thus, therefore, out of neighbour, out of citizen, out of magistrate, wilt thou trace the moral duty, if thou make it a custom to contemplate the relations."

The Stoic emperor Antoninus inculcates the same doctrine: " There are (says he) three relations; one to the proximate cause, which immediately surrounds us; one to the divine cause, from which all things happen to all; and one to those, along with whom we live." So important is the knowledge of relations (according to these philosophers) in a subject which so much concerns us, I mean an upright and a virtuous conduct.

It is to a subordinate end, that Horace applies this knowledge, when he makes it an essential to dramatic poets, and as a philosophical critic teaches them, that it is through this knowledge only they can truly delineate characters. The verses are well known :

πάντων: “ And hence some conceive the είεν εκείναι περί τα ανυπόστατα κατατριβόpredicament of relation, by its growing on, μεναι. Πώς δε και έφετών πάσιν ο θεός as it were, to the rest, to be something λέγεται, ει μηδεμία σχέσις εστί προς το episodic and adventitious, although it be in {PETOY To doleuéve: “ For neither the fact truly principal, and an object of con- universal genera, nor the things included templation from its own distinctive cha- under them, can have any connection one racter. It is this, indeed, is that band of with another, if there exist not in things community which passes through all things; the ratio of habitude or relation. But it is through contraries, through things in any absurd to take away the connection of way different, through whole genera, and things that differ one from another: absurd through the several beings, arranged be- also to take away harmony, not that only neath them ; that principle, which, were we which exists in sounds, nor that which exto suppose away, all things in that instant ists in numbers, but that also which exists would be dissipated and torn from all in substances, and in all the variety of cathings." Simplic. in Prædic. p. 44. B. edit. pacities and energies ; that, which having Basil. 1551.

been implanted in beings, has brought them See also the same author in the same together, and effected, that they should have comment: Oote ydp mà yévn, ořte tà úm' the relation here spoken of to each other. αυτών όντα, κοινωνίαν έξει τινά προς άλ- [Further than this, by taking away relaληλα, ει μή τις σχέσεως ή λόγος εν τοις tion] there will be taken away the proporobow. "ATOTOY Thu kouvwviav åvaipeîv tionate, the equal, the knowable, and knowτων διαφερόντων προς άλληλα άτοπον δε ledge. If geometry and music are emκαι την αρμονίαν αναίρειν, ου την εν τοις ployed about relations, and these last have φθόγγοις μόνην, ουδέ τήν εν τοις αριθμούς, no existence; then will those sciences be αλλά και την εν ταις ουσίαις και δυνάμεσι ridiculous, in being employed about nonπάσαις και ενεργείαις, ήτις έγγινομένη τους entities. How also can God himself be ουσι, συνήγαγεν εις ταυτόν, και σχέσιν called an object of desire to all beings, if έχειν προς άλληλα απειργάσατο αναιρεθή- there be no relation between the thing deσεται δε και το σύμμετρον και ισον, και sired, and that which desires ? » Simplic. επιστητον, και επιστήμη. Ει δε και γεω- in Pred. p. 43. Β. μετρία και μουσική περί σχέσεις έχουσιν, d Epict. Ench. c. 30. ανυπόστατοι δε αυταί καταγέλαστοι αν e M. Ant. viii. 27.

Qui didicit, patriæ quid debeat, &c. It is thus, tvo, that Shakspeare, either by knowledge acquired, or (what is more probable) by the dictates of an innate superior genius,' makes Macbeth shudder at the thoughts of murdering Duncan, when he reflects on the many duties he owed him, arising from the many relations he stood in, all of which duties he was then basely going to violate:

He's here in double trust;
First, as I am his kinsman, and his subject,
Strong both against the deed: then, as his host,
Who should against his murderer shut the door,

Not bear the knife myself. And here I cannot help remarking upon this excellent tragedy, that it is not only admirable as a poem, but is perhaps at the same time one of the most moral pieces existing. It teaches us the danger of venturing, though but for once, upon a capital offence, by shewing us that it is impossible to be wicked by halves; that we cannot stop ; that we are in a manner compelled to proceed; and yet that, be the success as it may, we are sure in the event to become wretched and unhappy.

But to return to our subject, I mean that of relation.

If we quit mankind, and view its more general extent, we shall find, that, where continuity fails, there relation supplies its office, connecting as it were all things the most remote and heterogeneous. Were they indeed combined under an union more intimate, were it the same with that continuity, seen in a living body and its limbs, the whole universe would be no more than one immense animal. But it is not so: and those who have explained its nature have rather called it one city, or one commonwealth ;" a very different species of monad from one animal, or living being. It is here, then, (as we have said,) relation intervenes, and under a thousand different ties connects all things together.

The ties indeed are many, though the sources are few. Every subordinate being, as it is by nature subject to wants, (indigence and imperfection being essential to its constitution,) has a connection with those beings through whom such wants may supplied. Hence, then, one source of relation. Again : every being whatever, that has power to supply such wants, has a connection with those beings to whom it can thus become subservient. Hence, then, another source of relation. Now in the

* The author has in this place considered dià púowv, “ either through art, or through Shakspeare as Aristotle did Homer, and nature.” Vid. Arist. Poet. c. 8. has left it uncertain, to what cause his 8 See the remarks on this tragedy in that transcendent merit should be ascribed. Ari- elegant book, the Essay on the Writings and stotle, speaking of Homer's superiority, says, Genius of Shakspeare. in like manner, that it was rol dià téxvnv, la See p. 96, and note m.

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divine economy of the whole it is so admirably contrived, that every being in different degrees possesses this double character, and not only needs assistance, but is able in its turn to afford it. Nothing is so mighty, as to subsist without help; nothing so minute, as not at times to have its use. Thus as connections reciprocate, and are everywhere blended, the concatenation of relations grows in fact universal, and the world becomes (as above described) one city or commonwealth.

Instances of this double relation occur (as we have said) in every particular being. The ewe is related to the grass, as to the being which supplies her wants; to her lamb, as to the being whose wants she herself supplies. The grass again is related to the earth, as to the being which affords it aliment; while it is related to the ewe, by becoming itself aliment to her. The earth is related to vegetables, as she is both their parent and their nurse ; while she is related to the sun, as to the fountain of her genial warmth. The relations of the sun are finely represented by Epictetus, who makes the Sovereign of the Universe thus address that noble luminary: “Thou saith he) art sun: thou art able, by going round, to form the year and the seasons ; to enlarge and nourish the fruits; to raise and still the winds ; to warm in due degree the bodies of men: arise, go round, and beginning from the greatest, extend after this manner thy influence to the most minute.”i

Nor, when we mention the earth, ought we to forget that equitable discharge of her relations, for which Virgil well distinguishes her by the character of most just:

Fundit humo facilem victum justissima tellus. Georg. ii. 460. The Attic historian and philosopher will be found the best commentator on this elegant passage of the Roman poet: “The earth, too, (says Xenophon,) being a divinity, teacheth those that can learn it of her, justice: for such as cultivate her best, she requiteth with most goods."k

When we view the relation of the male to the female, and of the female to the male, and add to this the common relation extending from both to their offspring, we view the rise of families through the whole animal race. Among the more social, such as sheep and cattle, these families by fresh relations are combined into larger multitudes, under the name of flocks and herds. Among those of higher order still, (such as the bee,' the ant, the beaver, and, above all, the social and rational

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man :

i Arrian. Epict. l. ii. c. 24. p. 444. 'Virgil speaks of the bee, as he would of edit. Upton. Συ ήλιος ει: δύνασαι, κ.τ.λ.

ΚΑΙ 'Έτι δε η γη, θεός ούσα, τους δυναμέ- Mores et studia et populos et pralia dicam. νους καταμανθάνειν, και δικαιοσύνην διδάσ

Georg. iv. κει' τους γάρ άριστα θεραπεύοντας αυτήν, , Aristotle, distinguishing these animals πλείστα αγαθά αντιποιεί. Χenoph. Eco- from those which do no more than barely nom. p. 35. edit. Oxon.

herd together, elegantly calls them (@a trên λιτικά, “political or civil animals ;” ani- by twining round the branch of another mals formed for a life of civil association, vegetable, to bind the vine to that vegewhere the business is one, and that common table ; which vine, among the vegetable to the whole tribe ; ών έν τι, κ. τ. λ. tribe, possesses this natural character, that Histor. Anim. p. 5. edit. Sylb.

being, man,) these herds and flocks by relations more excellent are improved into civil polities, where there is a general interest or common good, a good to which either willingly or unwillingly every individual cooperates."

If we descend below animals down to vegetables, we shall discover in the vine, the ivy, the woodbine, and all the plants of slender stalk, a manifest relation to those of a trunk more solid, such as the oak, the elm, and the several trees of the forest. It is with a power which appears almost a conscious one, that the former of these tribes, recognising their relation, apply to the latter for a support, and spontaneously twine their bodies, or at least their tendrils, around them."

it should rest upon another for its support. ήν δε μη θέλω,

Now that the tendril, by twining round the Κακός γενόμενος, ουδέν ήττον έψομαι. branch of another vegetable, should bind

Epict. Enchirid. c. 52. the vine on, neither belongs to the vine, See page 102, and note b.

when it first begins to grow, nor yet to its η Τα τέλη, εφ' & των φύσει γιγνομένων tendril; but is something which accrues έκαστα ίεται, ου και την αρχήν ευθύς φυ- subsequently: and yet, nevertheless, the ομένοις πάρεστιν αυτοίς, αλλ' ύστατα δήπου binding of it to another vegetable is the παραγίγνεται. Σκοπώμεν δ' αυτό έφ' ενός final cause why the tendril should grow at τούδε τη αμπέλου έλικι τέλος έστι, το all, and belong to the vine. But it is imετέρου φυτού πτυρθώ περιελιχθείσαν, εκείνη possible that what as yet is not, and has no την άμπελον αναδήσαι τη φυτώ, ταύτην arrangement in the order of things, (I mean εν τοις φυτοϊς τήν φύσιν ειληχυίαν, επαλ- the binding,) should be the cause of someλόκαυλον είναι. Ουκούν το ετέρου φυτού thing which now is, (I mean the tendril of πτορθώ την έλικα περιελιχθείσαν αναδήσαι the vine, when it first appears.) The cause την άμπελον, ούτε τη αμπέλα φυoμένη, of any thing produced must have an actual ούτε τη έλικι ευθύς πάρεστιν, αλλ' ύστατόν existence, and not be a nonentity. This γε παραγίγνεται: ουδέν μέντοι ήττον του binding therefore of the vine to some other φύεσθαι όλως έλικα τη αμπέλω αίτιον vegetable must have been preconceived in τελικόν η εφ' ετέρω φυτώ ανάδεσις αυτής some mind or intellect, who presiding over εστιν. Αμήχανον δε το μηδέπω όν, μηδ' it (as any man, being an artist, presides εν τοις ουσι τεταγμένον, όντος του ήδη over his works) makes the tendril grow to αίτιον γίγνεσθαι είναι γαρ δει το αίτιον it for the sake of such binding: which του γιγνομένου, ούχι μή είναι. Προειλήφ- tendril also wonderfully, if there be nothing θαι άρα δεί έν τινι να την αμπέλου εφ' adjoining of a nature for it to twine round, ετέρω φυτό ανάδεσιν, ος αυτή επιστατών, appears in some sort to shoot upwards ; but ώσπερ δημιουργός ανήρ σκευαστούς, και if any branch be near, instantly deviates την έλικα αυτή της τοιαύτης ένεκα άνα- and twines round it. It is therefore irraδέσεως φύσει και και θαυμασίως, εάν μέν tional to suppose that the tendril did not μηδέν τι αυτή τοιούτον παρακέηται οίω πε- grow to the vine, that it might hereafter ριελιχθήναι, επ' ευθύ πως φαίνεται φερο- bind it to another vegetable ; nor can there μένη εάν δε πτορθός τις παρή, ευθύς πε- be any degree of reason for asserting, that ριειλιχθη. Ούτ' ουν την έλικα τη αμπέλο Some mind or intelligence did not preside μη ου τούτου ένεκα φύεσθαι, όπως ετέρω over such operations.” αυτήν φυτώ αναδηση, νούν έχει μη αξιoύν" The force of this argument is as follows: ούτε το μη νούν τους τοιούτοις εφιστάναι things exist before their ends; that is, έχoι αν και οντινουν λόγον: “The ends, before that the ends of their existence take to which the several vegetable produc- place. The tendril exists, before it binds tions tend, are not instantly present to the vine; the minute-hand exists, before it them, as soon as they begin to grow, but indicates the minutes. And yet is this some way or other accrue to them subse binding, and this indicating so necessary, quently. We may perceive this in a single that the things themselves would never instance. The end to the vine's tendril is, have existed, but for the sake of these only.

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