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It is, indeed, by the help of an innate power of distinction that we recognise the differences of things, as it is by a contrary power of composition that we recognise their identities. These

powers, in some degree, are common to all minds; and as they are the basis of our whole knowledge, (which is, of necessity, either affirmative or negative,) they may be said to constitute what we call common sense." On the contrary, to possess these powers in a more eminent degree, so as to be able to perceive identity in things widely different, and diversity in things nearly the same; this it is that constitutes what we call genius, that power divine, which through every sort of discipline renders the difference so conspicuous between one learner and another.

It was from speculations of this kind, that some of the ancients were induced to consider quantity in a far higher rank than is usual in common speculations. “They considered both species under the common character of a bound or measure, and as such to be conspicuous throughout the whole universe; the nature of the continuous, called magnitude, being seen in union and connection; that of the discrete, called multitude, in accumulation and juxtaposition ; that by virtue of magnitude, the vorld or universe was one; was extended and connected everywhere, through its most distant parts; that by virtue of multitude it was diversified with that order and fair arrangement, seen in the amazing variety of stars, of elements, of plants, of animals; of contrarieties on one side, and of similarities on the other; that if these quantities were thus distinguishable in the copy or image, (for such was this world, when compared to its archetype,) much more so were they in those pure and immaterial forms, the invariable and immediate objects of the Supreme Intellect. The whole production of quantity (as of every thing else) they referred with reason to this primary intelligent cause ; whose virtual efficacy, as far as it passes through all things without dividing itself or stopping, they supposed to generate continuity and union; as far as it stops in its progress at every particular, and communicates to each a peculiar form of its own, they held to generate distinction and multitude ; and as far as it perpetually exerts at once these two distinct and opposite energies, they considered as for ever rendering the universe both many and one ; many, through its order and fair variety; one, through its connection and general sympathy."i

See p. 221, note d.

ται μέγεθος, κατά ένωσιν και αλληλουχίαν See p. 46, note h.

του δε διωρισμένου, ήτις καλείται πλήθος, 1 The authors from whom the preceding κατά σώρειαν και παράθεσιν" και γάρ κατά Sentiments are taken, are Plotinus and μεν τήν του μεγέθους ουσίαν, εις ο κόσμος Ιειmblichns, in the commentary of Sim- εστί τε και νοείται, σφαιρικός και συμplicius upon this predicament of quantity. πεφυκώς εαυτώ, διατεταμένος τε και άλλη"Ετι δε ο Πλωτίνος-ιδία γαρ και φύσις λουχούμενος κατά δε το πλήθος, ήτε εκάστο, ώς και εν τω παντί κόσμο θεωρεί- σύνταξις και η διακόσμησις, ή εκ τοσωνδε ται, του μεν συνεχούς ή φύσις, ήτις καλεί- φέρε ειπείν στοιχείων, και ζώων και φυτών

And so much for the third universal genus, or predicament, that of quantity, its various species, and its peculiar properties.

We cannot however quit this and the preceding predicament (I mean the predicaments of quality and quantity) without observing that, as they are diffused in a conspicuous manner throughout the universe, so writers both sacred and profane, both poetic and prosaic, appear to have expressed their force, and that often at the same time, as the predicaments themselves often exist so in nature.

"O Lord, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all." !

Here [manifold] denotes the quantity of the divine works; [made in wisdom) denotes their quality.

Nain et qualis in cujusque rei natura, et quæ forma, quæritur: an immortalis anima, an humana specie deus: et de magnitudine et numero: quantus, sol; an unus, mundus."

Where the critic not only delineates the two great predicaments here mentioned, but divides also quantity into its two capital species, I mean magnitude and number.

Cicero goes further in his Tusculan Disputations, not only producing quality and quantity, but substance also, their support; which he places first, according to its proper order. Si quid sit hoc, non vides; at quale sit, vides : si ne id quidem; at quantum sit, profecto vides."

Even comic writers have expressed the force of these two predicaments.

Quantam et quam veram laudem capiet Parmeno? “How great, and how true praise will Parmeno acquire ?" Great indicates quantity: true indicates quality; for what quality in praise is more valuable than truth?

The poets, who dealt in subjects more exalted than comedy, appear many of them to have employed the same language.

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Terent. Eun. v. 4. 3.

θεωρείται, και εναντιωτήτων και ομοιοτήτων έν ποιεί, ταυτή το διωρισμένος παράγει.-
τόσων και τόσως εί ούν εν ταις εικόσιν έπει δε άμα και μένει και πρόεισι, τα δύο
ούτω ταύτα κεχώρισται, πολύ πρότερον εν απογεννα. περιέχει γάρ ή των νοητών
τοις νοουμένοις γένεσις και προ τούτων, εν μέτρων δύναμις άμα αμφότερα τα μένοντα
τοις καθ' αυτά αύλoις είδεσι διέστηκε, κοι- και προϊοντα εν ενί τω αυτώ. Simplic. in
νον έχοντα, ώς είρηται, το μέτρον και το Pred. p. 34. edit. Basil. 1551.
Trépas. Simplic. in Præd. p. 32. B. edit. As the above sentiments are expressed
Basil. 1551.

in the text, a verbal translation

them is 'O Delos 'Idubaixos—TEISM yap ń omitted. It may, however, be acceptable του ενός δύναμις αφ' ου παν το ποσόν απο- to the curious to see them in their originals

, γεννάται, διατείνεται δι' όλων ή αυτή, και and for that reason they have been subορίζει έκαστον προϊούσα αφ' εαυτής, η μεν joined. δι' όλων διήκει παντάπασιν αδιαιρέτως, το * See before, note s, p. 305. συνεχές υφίστησι, και ή την πρόσοδον I Psalm civ. 24. ποιείται μίαν, και αδιαίρετον και άνευ διω- m Quintil. Instit. Orat. I. vii. c. 4. ρισμού ή και προϊούσα ίσταται καθ' έκαστον n Tusc. Disp. L i. 25. των ειδών, και η ορίζει έκαστον, και έκαστον

1

Thus Tibullus, speaking of Bacchus :

Qualis quantusque minetur. Tibul. 1. iii. eleg. vi. 23. Ovid, of Jupiter :

Quantusque et qualis ab alta
Junone excipitur.

Metam, iii. 204. Virgil, of Venus :

Qualisque videri
Cælicolis, et quanta solet.

Æn. ii. 589. The same, of Polypheme:

Qualis, quantusque cavo Polyphemus in antro. Æn. v. 641. Homer, (whom it is probable the rest all copied,) speaking of Achilles :

"Ήτοι Δαρδανίδης Πρίαμος θαύμας Αχιλήα,
Οσσος έην, οίος τε θεοίσι γαρ άντα εφκει.

Iliad. 2. 629.
Nor less the royal guest the hero eyes,

His godlike aspect, and majestic size." These attributes, given by poets to gods and heroes, have been found by Euclid in figures geometrical. He has a problem to teach us how to describe a rectilineal figure, which to one given rectilineal figure shall be similar, to another shall be equal.P

Similar is a property of quality ; equal, of quantity.9

But it is time to finish, and proceed to the arrangement next in order.

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CHAPTER X.

CONCERNING RELATIVES'-THEIR SOURCE-RELATIVES APPARENT-REAL

-THEIR PROPERTIES, RECIPROCAL-INFERENCE, AND CO-EXISTENCE -FORCE OF RELATION IN ETHICS-IN MATTERS DRAMATIC-IN NATURE, AND THE ORDER OF

BEING-RELATIONS, AMICABLE AND HOSTILE - EVIL-WANT-FRIENDSHIP-STRIFE-RELATION OF ALL TO THE SUPREME CAUSE-EXTENT AND USE OF THIS PREDICAMENT, OR ARRANGEMENT.

THROUGH the three universal genera, predicaments, or arrangements, already described, subordinate beings may be said to attain their completion; through substance they exist; through quality they are distinguished; and through quantity they acquire a magnitude, and become a certain multitude.

• Pope's Homer, book xxiv. ver. 798. 4 See before, pages 300, and 305. The translation, we see, renders the words † The title of this arrangement is exoooos and olos by a periphrasis, and it pressed by a plural, and not a singular, (like should seem with some propriety, as “ the quality and quantity,) because all relation god-like aspect” of Achilles is clearly among is necessarily between two: ñ oxéois ħis qualities, and his “majestic size” evi- toủadxiotov ev dvol apáyuaoi Dewpeitai. dently respects his magnitude, that is to Ammon. in Cat. p. 94. B.—YDLov yap rñs say, his quantity. It must be confessed, σχέσεως μόνης, το εν πολλοίς ύφεστάναι however, that much of the force of the μόνως. όπερ ουδεμιά πρόσεστι των άλλων original will necessarily be lost in the ratnyop@v: “it is a peculiarity of relatranslation, where single words in one tion only, to have its existence in many, language cannot be found corresponding to which is the case with no one else of the single words in the other.

predicaments." Simpl. in Præd. p. 41. B. P Euclid, vi. 25.

edit. Basil. 1551,

Yet when beings are thus produced, we must not imagine them to exist, like pebbles upon the shore, dispersed and scattered, without dependence or mutual sympathy. It would be difficult out of such to compose a universe or perfect whole, because every perfect whole has a respect to its parts, as well as the parts a respect both to such whole, and to each other. Hence then the rise of that genus called relation, a genus which runs through all things, holding all of them together, inasmuch as there is no member of the universe either so great or so minute, that it can be called independent, and detached from the rest.

Now in all relation there must be a subject whence it commences; for example, snow: another, where it terminates; for example, a swan: the relation itself; for example, similitude : and lastly, the source of that relation; for example, whiteness :' the swan is related to snow, by being both of them white.

The requisites to relation being in this manner explained, it will appear that those only are the true relatives, which express in their very structure the relative source, and whose very essence may be found in this their reciprocal habitude. But this perhaps will be better understood by a few examples.

The swan (it was said before) was in whiteness like snow. Here the swan and the snow were produced as relatives. We produce others of like kind, when we assert that London is larger than York, a lemon equal to an orange, &c.

But the truth is, these subjects are none of them properly relatives of themselves, but then only become such (as indeed may every thing else) when a relation is raised between them through the medium of a relative attribute. London, we say,

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• This source may be sought for among cede this of relatives, I mean quality and the differential characters of being, in what- quantity, though they have an existence ever predicamentor arrangement they void of relation, we cannot say so of their happen to exist, be it in quality, as the characteristic peculiarities ; for like is a character of whiter ; in quantity, as that of relative term, and so is equal. Hence greater, that of more numerous; in time, Simplicius, šrro gap to loov napà Td Toode, as that of older ; in place, as that of upper, kaldalo fuocov napà Td notóv: equal &c.

is something else beside quantity; like, This is what Simplicius means when he something else beside quality.Simpl

. in says, åváyka aŭtiv (scil. Thv oxéo) Præd. By something else, he means they το κατά διαφοράν χαρακτηρι ενυπάρχειν. are relatives. Simpl. in Cat.

1 Πρός τι τα τοιαύτα λέγεται, όσα, αυτά Hence, too, we may see why relation άπερ έστιν, ετέρων είναι λέγεται και οπωσούν stands next to quantity ; for, in strictness, draws tpos étepov: “Such things as these the predicaments which follow are but dif- are said to be relatives ; namely, as many, as ferent modes of relation, marked by some are said to be what they are, by being peculiar character of their own, over and things belonging to other things, above the relative character, which is com- in any other sense have reference to some mon to them all.

thing else.” Arist. Præd. p. 34. edit. Sylb. Even in the two predicaments that pre

or which

is larger than York. The relation subsists in larger, which being attributed to London, makes it a relative to York, which is in fact something less. The same holds in the lemon and orange, and in all possible instances. To whatever subject we associate any of the relative attributes, we immediately render the subject by such association a relative. Such a subject therefore is only a relative incidentally.

But the true and real relatives are those attributes themselves, the terms larger, equal, like, &c.; for these in their very structure express the relative source, and only exist in a joint and reciprocal habitude one to another.

There are also relative substances, as well as relative attributes; that is to say, terms which indicate at once both a substance and a relative. Such are master and servant, preceptor and disciple: master implies a man; and not only that, but a man having dominion : servant implies a man, and not only that, but a man rendering service; and the same may be said of the other example alleged.

Now a distinguishing property of these real relatives is, that they reciprocate in their predication.“ Every master is the master of a servant, and every servant the servant of a master; every preceptor the preceptor of a disciple; and every disciple the disciple of a preceptor. The same holds in the relative attributes as well as in the substances, greater being always greater than less, and less being always less than greater. That this is a property which never fails, will better appear, if from any relative substance we subtract the relative attribute, and substitute in its room the substance alone. For example, from the relative substance, master, let us subtract the relative attribute, dominion, so that man only shall remain, divested of that attribute. We cannot affirm of every man, as we can of every master, that merely as a man, he is the master of a servant.*

From this necessity of reciprocal predication, another property of relation follows, that we cannot understand one relative, without understanding its companion; and that in proportion as our knowledge of one relative is more precise, so is that likewise of the other. Y I cannot know, for example, that A is greater

• nárta 8è Tè após Ti apds årtiotpé servant, as we say, the master of a servant." porta Néyetat. Arist. Præd. p. 35. Arist. Præd. p. 37, where much more is sub

* Aristotle finds an instance in the same joined, worth reading. term, servant: Olov 8 dollaos, dày Mesh y Relata sunt simul cognitione. Cognito δεσπότου αποδοθή δούλος, αλλά ανθρώπου, proinde alterutro, cognoscitur alterum ; (id

dimodos, dovoûv TW TOLOÚTWv, ook que eodem plane modo, et mensura cogniårTiOTPÉDEL où gàp oikela ñ àabdools tionis) et ignorato ignoratur. Logic. ComdoTW: “ For example, the term servant, if pend. Saunderson, p. 41. edit. Oxon. 1672. he be not described as the servant of a I have quoted Saunderson, as he was an master, but of a man, or of a biped, or of accurate logician, but Aristotle's own words any other such thing, does not reciprocate, are as follows: 'Eáy tis eiðn ti åplouévws because the description returned is not ne- των πρός τι, κακείνο, προς και λέγεται, cessary and essential ; that is, we cannot ápouévws cloetai : “ If any one know say, the man of a servant, or the biped of a with precision any one of two relatives, he

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