It is, indeed, by the help of an innate power of distinction that we recognise the differences of things, as it is by a contrary power of composition that we recognise their identities." These powers, in some degree, are common to all minds; and as they are the basis of our whole knowledge, (which is, of necessity, either affirmative or negative,) they may be said to constitute what we call common sense. On the contrary, to possess these powers in a more eminent degree, so as to be able to perceive identity in things widely different, and diversity in things nearly the same; this it is that constitutes what we call genius, that power divine, which through every sort of discipline renders the difference so conspicuous between one learner and another. h It was from speculations of this kind, that some of the ancients were induced to consider quantity in a far higher rank than is usual in common speculations. "They considered both species under the common character of a bound or measure, and as such to be conspicuous throughout the whole universe; the nature of the continuous, called magnitude, being seen in union and connection; that of the discrete, called multitude, in accumulation and juxtaposition; that by virtue of magnitude, the world or universe was one; was extended and connected everywhere, through its most distant parts; that by virtue of multitude it was diversified with that order and fair arrangement, seen in the amazing variety of stars, of elements, of plants, of animals; of contrarieties on one side, and of similarities on the other; that if these quantities were thus distinguishable in the copy or image, (for such was this world, when compared to its archetype,) much more so were they in those pure and immaterial forms, the invariable and immediate objects of the Supreme Intellect. The whole production of quantity (as of every thing else) they referred with reason to this primary intelligent cause; whose virtual efficacy, as far as it passes through all things without dividing itself or stopping, they supposed to generate continuity and union; as far as it stops in its progress at every particular, and communicates to each a peculiar form of its own, they held to generate distinction and multitude; and as far as it perpetually exerts at once these two distinct and opposite energies, they considered as for ever rendering the universe both many and one; many, through its order and fair variety; one, through its connection and general sympathy."i * See p. 221, note d. See p. 46, note h. i The authors from whom the preceding sentiments are taken, are Plotinus and Iamblichus, in the commentary of Simplicius upon this predicament of quantity. Ἔτι δὲ ὁ Πλωτίνος—ἰδία γὰρ καὶ φύσις ἑκάστῳ, ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ παντὶ κόσμῳ θεωρεῖ. ται, τοῦ μὲν συνεχούς ἡ φύσις, ἥτις καλεῖ ται μέγεθος, κατὰ ἔνωσιν καὶ ἀλληλουχίαν τοῦ δὲ διωρισμένου, ἥτις καλεῖται πλῆθος, κατὰ σώρειαν καὶ παράθεσιν· καὶ γὰρ κατὰ μὲν τὴν τοῦ μεγέθους οὐσίαν, εἷς ὁ κόσμος ἐστί τε καὶ νοεῖται, σφαιρικὸς καὶ συμπεφυκώς ἑαυτῷ, διατεταμένος τε καὶ ἀλλη λουχούμενος· κατὰ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος, ἥτε σύνταξις καὶ ἡ διακόσμησις, ἡ ἐκ τοσῶνδε φέρε εἰπεῖν στοιχείων, καὶ ζώων ἢ φυτῶν And so much for the third universal genus, or predicament, that of quantity, its various species, and its peculiar properties.* We cannot however quit this and the preceding predicament (I mean the predicaments of quality and quantity) without observing that, as they are diffused in a conspicuous manner throughout the universe, so writers both sacred and profane, both poetic and prosaic, appear to have expressed their force, and that often at the same time, as the predicaments themselves often exist so in nature. "O Lord, how manifold are thy works! in wisdom hast thou made them all."! Here [manifold] denotes the quantity of the divine works; [made in wisdom] denotes their quality. Nam et qualis in cujusque rei natura, et quæ forma, quæritur: an immortalis anima, an humana specie deus: et de magnitudine et numero: quantus, sol; an unus, mundus." Where the critic not only delineates the two great predicaments here mentioned, but divides also quantity into its two capital species, I mean magnitude and number. Cicero goes further in his Tusculan Disputations, not only producing quality and quantity, but substance also, their support; which he places first, according to its proper order. Si quid sit hoc, non vides; at quale sit, vides: si ne id quidem; at quantum sit, profecto vides." Even comic writers have expressed the force of these two predicaments. Quantam et quam veram laudem capiet Parmeno? "How great, and how true praise will Parmeno acquire ?” Terent. Eun. v. 4. 3. Great indicates quantity: true indicates quality; for what quality in praise is more valuable than truth? The poets, who dealt in subjects more exalted than comedy, appear many of them to have employed the same language. θεωρεῖται, καὶ ἐναντιωτήτων ἢ ὁμοιοτήτων τόσων καὶ τόσως· εἰ οὖν ἐν ταῖς εἰκόσιν οὕτω ταῦτα κεχώρισται, πολὺ πρότερον ἐν τοῖς νοουμένοις γένεσι· καὶ πρὸ τούτων, ἐν τοῖς καθ ̓ αὑτὰ ξύλοις είδεσι διέστηκε, κοινὸν ἔχοντα, ὡς εἴρηται, τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ Tépas. Simplic. in Præd. p. 32. B. edit. Basil. 1551. Ὁ δὲ θεῖος Ἰάμβλιχος—ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς δύναμις ἀφ ̓ οὗ πᾶν τὸ ποσὸν ἀπογεννᾶται, διατείνεται δι ̓ ὅλων ᾗ αὐτὴ, καὶ ὁρίζει ἕκαστον προϊοῦσα ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς, ᾗ μὲν δι' ὅλων διήκει παντάπασιν ἀδιαιρέτως, τὸ συνεχὲς ὑφίστησι, καὶ ᾗ τὴν πρόσοδον ποιεῖται μίαν, καὶ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἄνευ διωρισμοῦ· ᾗ καὶ προϊοῦσα ἵσταται καθ ̓ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν, καὶ ᾗ ὁρίζει ἕκαστον, καὶ ἕκαστον ἐν ποιεῖ, ταυτῇ τὸ διωρισμένον παράγει. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἅμα καὶ μένει καὶ πρόεισι, τὰ δύο ἀπογεννᾷ. περιέχει γὰρ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν μέτρων δύναμις ἅμα ἀμφότερα τὰ μένοντα καὶ προΐοντα ἐν ἑνὶ τῷ αὐτῷ. Simplic. in Præd. p. 34. edit. Basil. 1551. As the above sentiments are expressed in the text, a verbal translation of them is omitted. It may, however, be acceptable to the curious to see them in their originals, and for that reason they have been subjoined. * See before, note s, p. 305. m Quintil. Instit. Orat. 1. vii. c. 4. Homer, (whom it is probable the rest all copied,) speaking of Achilles : Ητοι Δαρδανίδης Πρίαμος θαύμαζ' Αχιλήα, Iliad. . 629. These attributes, given by poets to gods and heroes, have been found by Euclid in figures geometrical. He has a problem to teach us how to describe a rectilineal figure, which to one given rectilineal figure shall be similar, to another shall be equal.P Similar is a property of quality; equal, of quantity. १ But it is time to finish, and proceed to the arrangement next in order. CHAPTER X. CONCERNING RELATIVES'—their SOURCE-RELATIVES APPARENT-REAL -THEIR PROPERTIES, RECIPROCAL-INFERENCE, AND CO-EXISTENCE -FORCE OF RELATION IN ETHICS-IN MATTERS DRAMATIC-IN NATURE, AND THE ORDER OF BEING RELATIONS, AMICABLE AND HOSTILE- EVIL-WANT-FRIENDSHIP-STRIFE-RELATION OF ALL TO THE SUPREME CAUSE-EXTENT AND USE OF THIS PREDICAMENT, OR ARRANGEMENT. THROUGH the three universal genera, predicaments, or arrangements, already described, subordinate beings may be said to 66 • Pope's Homer, book xxiv. ver. 798. The translation, we see, renders the words booos and ofos by a periphrasis, and it should seem with some propriety, as "the god-like aspect" of Achilles is clearly among his qualities, and his “ majestic size" evidently respects his magnitude, that is to say, his quantity. It must be confessed, however, that much of the force of the original will necessarily be lost in the translation, where single words in one language cannot be found corresponding to single words in the other. P Euclid, vi. 25. 9 See before, pages 300, and 305. The title of this arrangement is expressed by a plural, and not a singular, (like quality and quantity,) because all relation is necessarily between two: dè oxéois τουλάχιστον ἐν δυσὶ πράγμασι θεωρεῖται. Ammon. in Cat. p. 94. B.-tolov yap Tis σχέσεως μόνης, τὸ ἐν πολλοῖς ὑφεστάναι μόνως. ὅπερ οὐδεμιᾷ πρόσεστι τῶν ἄλλων Karnyoρiv: “it is a peculiarity of relation only, to have its existence in many, which is the case with no one else of the predicaments." Simpl. in Præd. p. 41. B. edit. Basil. 1551. attain their completion; through substance they exist; through quality they are distinguished; and through quantity they acquire a magnitude, and become a certain multitude. Yet when beings are thus produced, we must not imagine them to exist, like pebbles upon the shore, dispersed and scattered, without dependence or mutual sympathy. It would be difficult out of such to compose a universe or perfect whole, because every perfect whole has a respect to its parts, as well as the parts a respect both to such whole, and to each other. Hence then the rise of that genus called relation, a genus which runs through all things, holding all of them together, inasmuch as there is no member of the universe either so great or so minute, that it can be called independent, and detached from the rest. Now in all relation there must be a subject whence it commences; for example, snow: another, where it terminates; for example, a swan: the relation itself; for example, similitude: and lastly, the source of that relation; for example, whiteness: the swan is related to snow, by being both of them white. The requisites to relation being in this manner explained, it will appear that those only are the true relatives, which express in their very structure the relative source, and whose very essence may be found in this their reciprocal habitude. But this perhaps will be better understood by a few examples. The swan (it was said before) was in whiteness like snow. Here the swan and the snow were produced as relatives. We produce others of like kind, when we assert that London is larger than York, a lemon equal to an orange, &c. But the truth is, these subjects are none of them properly relatives of themselves, but then only become such (as indeed may every thing else) when a relation is raised between them through the medium of a relative attribute. London, we say, This source may be sought for among the differential characters of being, in whatever predicament or arrangement they happen to exist, be it in quality, as the character of whiter; in quantity, as that of greater, that of more numerous; in time, as that of older; in place, as that of upper, &c. This is what Simplicius means when he says, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν (scil. τὴν σχέσιν ἐν τῷ κατὰ διαφορὰν χαρακτῆρι ἐνυπάρχειν. Simpl. in Cat. Hence, too, we may see why relation stands next to quantity; for, in strictness, the predicaments which follow are but different modes of relation, marked by some peculiar character of their own, over and above the relative character, which is common to them all. Even in the two predicaments that pre cede this of relatives, I mean quality and quantity, though they have an existence void of relation, we cannot say so of their characteristic peculiarities; for like is a relative term, and so is equal. Hence Simplicius, ¿λλo yàp tò lσov Taρà TO WOODY, kal λλO TO Eμolov Tаρà Tò Tоióv: “equal is something else beside quantity; like, something else beside quality." Simpl. in Præd. By something else, he means they are relatives. · Πρός τι τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὅσα, αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἐστὶν, ἑτέρων εἶναι λέγεται· ἢ ὁπωσούν λws pòs erepov: "Such things as these are said to be relatives; namely, as many as are said to be what they are, by being things belonging to other things, or which in any other sense have reference to something else." Arist. Præd. p. 34. edit. Sylb. is larger than York. The relation subsists in larger, which being attributed to London, makes it a relative to York, which is in fact something less. The same holds in the lemon and orange, and in all possible instances. To whatever subject we associate any of the relative attributes, we immediately render the subject by such association a relative. Such a subject therefore is only a relative incidentally. But the true and real relatives are those attributes themselves, the terms larger, equal, like, &c.; for these in their very structure express the relative source, and only exist in a joint and reciprocal habitude one to another. There are also relative substances, as well as relative attributes; that is to say, terms which indicate at once both a substance and a relative. Such are master and servant, preceptor and disciple: master implies a man; and not only that, but a man having dominion: servant implies a man, and not only that, but a man rendering service; and the same may be said of the other example alleged. Now a distinguishing property of these real relatives is, that they reciprocate in their predication." Every master is the master of a servant, and every servant the servant of a master; every preceptor the preceptor of a disciple; and every disciple the disciple of a preceptor. The same holds in the relative attributes as well as in the substances, greater being always greater than less, and less being always less than greater. That this is a property which never fails, will better appear, if from any relative substance we subtract the relative attribute, and substitute in its room the substance alone. For example, from the relative substance, master, let us subtract the relative attribute, dominion, so that man only shall remain, divested of that attribute. We cannot affirm of every man, as we can of every master, that merely as a man, he is the master of a servant.* From this necessity of reciprocal predication, another property of relation follows, that we cannot understand one relative, without understanding its companion; and that in proportion as our knowledge of one relative is more precise, so is that likewise of the other. I cannot know, for example, that A is greater - Πάντα δὲ τὰ πρός τι πρὸς ἀντιστρές Porta AéYETAL. Arist. Præd. p. 35. Aristotle finds an instance in the same term, servant: Οἷον ὁ δοῦλος, ἐὰν μὴ δεσπότου ἀποδοθῇ δοῦλος, ἀλλὰ ἀνθρώπου, ἢ δίποδος, ἢ ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία ἡ ἀπόδοσίς OT: "For example, the term servant, if he be not described as the servant of a master, but of a man, or of a biped, or of any other such thing, does not reciprocate, because the description returned is not necessary and essential ; that is, we cannot say, the man of a servant, or the biped of a servant, as we say, the master of a servant.” Arist. Præd. p. 37, where much more is subjoined, worth reading. y Relata sunt simul cognitione. Cognito proinde alterutro, cognoscitur alterum ; (idque eodem plane modo, et mensura cognitionis) et ignorato ignoratur. Logic. Compend. Saunderson, p. 41. edit. Oxon. 1672. I have quoted Saunderson, as he was an accurate logician, but Aristotle's own words are as follows: 'Eáv Tis eidņi ti åpioμévws τῶν πρός τι, κἀκεῖνο, πρὸς ὁ λέγεται, ὡρισμένως εἴσεται: “ If any one know with precision any one of two relatives, he |