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It must be remembered, however, that body under this character is something indefinite and vague, and scarcely to be made an object of scientific contemplation. It is necessary to this end, that its extension should be bounded; for as yet we have treated it without such regard. Now the bound or limit of simple body is figure; and thus it is that figure, with regard to body, becomes the next form after extension.

In body thus bounded by figure, every other of its attributes being abstracted and withdrawn, we behold that species of body called body mathematical; a name so given it, because the mathematician, as such, considers no other attributes of body, except it be these two primary, its extension and its figure."

But though the bounding of body by figure is one step towards rendering it more definite and knowable, yet is not this sufficient for the purposes of nature. It is necessary here, that not only its external should be duly bounded, but that a suitable regard should be likewise had to its internal. This internal adjustment, disposition, or arrangement, (denominate it as you please,) is called organization, and may be considered as the third form, which appertains to body. By its accession we behold the rise of body physical or natural, for every such body is some way or other organized.

And thus may we affirm that these three, that is to say, extension, figure, and organization, are the three original forms to body physical or natural; figure having respect to its external, organization to its internal, and extension being common both to one and to the other. It is more than probable, that from the variation in these universal, and, as I may say, primary forms, arise most of those secondary forms usually called qualities sensible, because they are the proper objects of our several sensations. Such are roughness and smoothness, hardness and softness, the tribes of colours, savours and odours, not to mention those powers of character more subtle, the powers electric, magnetic, medicinal, &c.

Here therefore we may answer the question, how natural bodies are distinguished. Not a single one among them consists

hear any one say, Give me all two, instead matical sciences) is more accurate and cerof Give me both.

tain than that of any other body. It is

, For the grammatical idea of both, see because of all bodies, mathematical body Hermes, p. 182.

has the fewest, the most obvious, and the The French, by a strange solecism, say most precise attributes. tous deux ; a fault which we should not ex- Hence, too, we may perceive the differpect in an elegant language, corrected and ence between a mathematician and a narefined by so many able writers.

tural philosopher. They differ as their subSee next page.

jects differ ; as the subject of the first is f In body mathematical all qualities being simple, of the last is complicated; abstracted but figure and extension, we may attributes of mathematical body are few and hence perceive the reason why the con- known, of physical body are unknown and templation of such body (which contempla- infinite. Vid. Arist. Phys. I. ii. c. 2. tion makes so large a part of the mathe

as the

of materials in chaos, but of materials wrought up after the most exquisite manner, and that conspicuous in their organization, or in their figure, or in both.

As therefore every natural body is distinguished by the differences just described; and as these differences have nothing to do with the original matter, which being everywhere similar, can afford no distinctions at all: may we not hence infer the expediency of essential forms, that every natural substance may be essentially characterized ? It is with deference to my contemporaries, that I surmise this assertion. I speak perhaps of spectres, as shocking to some philosophers, as those were to Æneas, which he met in his way to hell:

Terribiles visu formæ. Yet we hope to make our peace, by declaring it our opinion, that we by no means think these forms self-existent ; things which matter may slip off, and fairly leave to themselves, Ut veteres ponunt tunicas æstate cicadæ.

Lucr. iv. 56. They rather mean something, which, though differing from matter, can yet never subsist without it;h something, which, united with it, helps to produce every composite being; that is to say, in other words, every natural substance in the visible world.

It must be remembered however (as we have said before) that it is the form in this union, which is the source of all distinction. It is by this, that the ox is distinguished from the horse, not by that grass on which they subsist, the common matter to both. To which also may be added, that as figures and sensible qualities are the only objects of our sensations, and these all are parts of natural form ; so therefore (contrary to the

8 Nowhere, perhaps, is the force of or- and is their subject, or substratum. Arist. ganization more conspicuous, than when we de Gen. et Corr. lib. ii. p. 34, 35. edit perceive different grafts, upon the same Sylb. tree, to produce different species of fruit. By contraries, in this place, he means the

Matter and attribute are essentially dis- several attributes of matter, such as hot tinct ; yet, like convex and concave, they and cold, black and white, moist and dry, are by nature inseparable.

&c., which are all of them contrary one to We have already spoken as to the in- the other, from some or other of which separability of attributes : we now speak as matter is always inseparable. to that of matter.

See note the second of this chapter. It Ημείς δε φαμέν ύλην τινά των σωμάτων is a uniform position in the physics of the των αισθητών αλλά ταύτην ου χωριστής, old Peripatetics, ότι αχώριστα τα πάθη, arx'åel per' {var IbEWS : “ We say, there “ that the affections (of body) are inseparable is a certain matter belonging to all bodies, from it." See Arist. Phys. 1. i. It is one the objects of sense ; a matter, not sepa- thing to be a cube, another thing to be iron, rable, but ever existing with some contra- or silver, or wood, or ivory. The cube is riety.

most evidently and certainly no ne of Soon after: 'Apxtv mèr kal apúrnu ÚTO- these, yet is it absurd and impossible to θεμένους είναι την ύλην, την αχώριστον suppose the cube should ever exist without pěv, ÚTOKETUÉvny Tois évavtlous: “First, one of these, or something similar to support and for a principle, we lay down matter, it. See before, page 271. which is inseparable from the contraries, Pages 267, 273.


sentiment of the vulgar, who dream of nothing but of matter,) it is form which is in truth the whole, that we either hear, see, or feel; nor is mere matter any thing better, than an obscure imperfect being, knowable only to the reasoning faculty by the two methods already explained, I mean that of analogy, and that of abstraction."

Here therefore we conclude with respect to sensible forms; that is to say, forms immerged in matter, and ever inseparable from it. In these and matter we place the elements of natural substance,' and thus finish the first part of the inquiry we proposed.

We are now to engage in speculations of another kind, and from the elements of natural substance to inquire after its efficient cause;" that is to say, that cause which associates those elements, and which employs them, when associated, according to their various and peculiar characters.




Let us suppose an artificial substance, for example a musical pipe, and let us suppose to this pipe the art of the piper to be * See before, p. 271.

three. Thus, in his Metaphysics, he tells 1 Elements are τα ενυπάρχοντα αίτια, us, ότι αρχαί εισι τρείς, το είδος, και η “ the inherent,” or (if I may use the ex- otépnois kal ý ởan, “ that the form, the pression)" the in-existing causes," such as privation, and the matter, are three prinmatter and form, of which we have been ciples." He calls them elements, because treating. There are other causes, such as they have no existence, but in the substance the tribe of efficient causes, which cannot be to which they belong. To these he adds called elements, because they make no part the efficient cause, which as it exists exterof the substances which they generate or nally, that is, without the subject, he will produce. Thus the statuary is no part of not for that reason allow to be an element. his statue; the painter, of his picture. Hence he observes, cote Otolxeia Hence it appears, that all elements are τρία, αιτίαι δε και αρχαι τέσσαρες, “ that causes ; but not all causes, elements. the elements were three; the causes and

m Aristotle having reduced his three prin- principles were four." His instances are, ciples of natural productions to two, which health, the form ; disease, the privation ; two we have treated in this and the pre- the human body, the subject. In these three ceding chapter, adheres not so strictly to causes we have the elements : add to these this reduction, but that he still admits the causes the fourth, that is, the efficient, the

united, not separated as now, but vitally united, so that the pipe by its own election might play whenever it pleased. Would not this union render it a kind of living being, where the art would be an active principle, the pipe a passive, both reciprocally fitted for the purposes of each other? And what, if instead of the piper's art, we were to substitute that of the harper? Would this new union also be natural like the former? Or would not rather the inaptitude of the constituents prevent any union at all? It certainly would prevent it, and all melody consequent; so that we could now by no analogy consider the pipe as animated.

It is in these and other arts, considered as efficient habits, we gain a glimpse of those forms, which characterize not by visible qualities, but by their respective powers, their operations and their energies. As is the piper's art to the pipe, the harper's to the harp, so is the soul of the lion to the body leonine, the soul of man to the body human; because in neither case it is possible to commute or make an exchange, without subverting the very end and constitution of the animal."

And thus are we arrived at a new order of forms, the tribe of animating principles; o for there is nothing which distinguishes so eminently as these; and it is on the power of distinction that we rest the very essence of form.

It is here we view form in a higher and nobler light, than in that of a passive elementary constituent, a mere inactive and sensible attribute. It is here it assumes the dignity of a living motive power,

of a power destined by its nature to use, and not be used. It is to the diversity of powers in these animating forms, that the diversity of the organizations in the corporeal world has reference. That strong and nervous leg, so well armed with tearing fangs, how perfectly is it correspondent to the fierce instincts of the lion! Had it been adorned, like the human arm, with fingers instead of fangs, the natural energies art of medicine ; and then we have the four as if a person was to say, the carpenter's causes required. Again, cail the plan of art might enter into a musician's pipe : now the house, the form; the previous want of it is necessary that every art should use its order, the privution; the bricks, the mate- proper instruments, and every soul its proper rials; add to these the fourth cause, the body. architect's art, and again we have the four © Alexander Aphrodisicnsis has an excauses required. Metaph. A. p. 198, 199. press dissertation to prove, őtı eldos ń yuxò, edit. Sylb.

“ that the soul is a form." Alex. 124, It is this efficient cause, that will make B. edit. Ald. Ven. 1534. It was so called, the subject of the following chapter. not with the least view to its having a

n Sec Arist. de An. 1. i. c. 3. p. 13. edit. figure, as if, for example, it were a spherical Sylb.

body, but because it was able not only by The Stagirite uses upon this occasion the its perceptive powers to secrete forms, but following similitude: tapanajotov gàp dé by its productive powers to impart them ; γουσιν, ώσπερ εί τις φαίη την τεκτονικήν whence, being considered as full of them, it είς αύλους ενδύεσθαι δεί γάρ τήν μέν τεχνών was elegantly described to be τόπος είδων, χρήσθαι τοις οργάνοις, την δε ψυχήν το « the region of forms." Arist. de Anim. 1. cóuatı: “They (who adopt the notion of iii. c. 4. See also l. i. c. 1. placing any soul in any body] talk the same See Hermes, p. 205, 6, 7, note e,


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of a lion had been all of them defeated. That more delicate structure of an arm, terminating in fingers so nicely diversified, how perfectly does it correspond to the pregnant invention of the human soul? Had these fingers been fangs, what had become of poor art, that by her operations procures us so many elegancies and utilities? It is here we behold the harmony between the visible world and the invisible, between the passive and the active, between the lifeless and the living. The whole variety in bodies, as well natural as artificial, is solely referable to the previous variety in these their animating forms. It is for the sake of these they exist; it is by these they are employed; and without them they would be as useless as the shoe without the foot.

It was perhaps owing to this use of the word form, in order to denote an animating principle, that the poet Ovid (who appears by his works not unacquainted with philosophy) opens his Metamorphosis with those lines, so perplexing to his commentators :

In nova fert animus mutatas dicere formas

Corpora. . “My mind (says he) carries me to tell of forms changed into new bodies," not of bodies changed into new forms, but of forms, that is to say, souls, transferred into new bodies. The bodies, it seems, were new, but the souls or forms remained the same, of which throughout his work we have perpetual testimony. Thus, when he speaks of Callisto,

Mens antiqua tamen facta quoque mansit in ursa. Metam. ii. 485. Of Arachne, Antiquas exercet Aranea telas.

Ibid. vi. 145. Of the ants that became men,

Mores, quos ante gerebant, Nunc quoque habent ; parcumque genus, patiensque laborum. Ibid. vii. 656. And so in many other places, which those who favour this conjecture may easily discover.

As nothing can become known by that which it has not, so it would be absurd to attempt describing these animating forms by any visible or other qualities, the proper objects of our sensations. The sculptor's art is not figure, but it is that through which figure is imparted to something else. The harper's art is not sound, but it is that through which sounds are called forth from something else. They are of themselves no objects either of the ear or of the eye; but their nature or character is understood in this, that were they never to exert their proper energies on their

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P Ovid appears by these quotations to be transferred from one body into another, have used the word forma, when he opens was Pythagorean, but which the Peripahis poem, in a sense truly philosophical. tetics rejected from the reasons above alHis doctrine, that this form or soul might leged, in the first note of this chapter.

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